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 Abstract 
After the global financial crisis of 2008 policy makers around the world initiated a paradigm 
shift towards macro-prudential financial regulation of banks. As a consequence the regulatory 
authorities are tasked with the objective of “maintaining financial stability”. 
This PhD analyses the potential of this paradigm shift and identifies some of the issues of its 
objective. If maintaining financial stability is not fulfilled, systemic risk can again lead to 
damages to the financial and real economy in the form of a credit crunch as seen in the early 
stages of the crisis of 2008. 
From a practical perspective, the findings of this thesis provide useful support for policy 
makers by identifying the key challenges in times of distress: Manipulating the incentives of 
banks towards the objective of promoting financial stability, and identifying the biggest 
sources for systemic risk in the banking sector and preventing its propagation. 
Within an academic context, this thesis contributes to the nascent field of qualitative and 
quantitative research on systemic risk and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) for the 
recovery and resolution of struggling banks.  
The conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) methodology is a new approach to quantifying the 
systemic risk stemming from one particular bank. The empirical results of this thesis show 
that a bank’s systemic risk is dependent on the state of the financial environment. So, this 
methodology can help the new macro-prudential regulatory agencies in their supervisory 
review of a bank. However, the results can alter substantially, depending on the sample 
period. 
CoCos automatically decrease the leverage of a bank upon a specific trigger event. The bank’s 
capital ratio is reinforced instantaneously, making it more loss-absorbent. This thesis proposes 
a design that circumvents most of the issues identified in the nascent body of research that 
could limit CoCos. Specifically, and contrary to most proposals, it reinforces the natural order 
of shareholders and other creditors. With this, the moral hazard of banks is reduced and 
financial stability promoted. 
Key words: Macro-prudential regulation, Systemic risk, ΔCoVaR, Contingent convertible 
bonds. 
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1 Introduction 
To contain the damages during the global financial crisis of 2008, policy makers followed 
pure pragmatism. Containing a disastrous crisis as it unfolds was the goal. Hence propping up 
bank capital with bail-outs by the various governments were obvious solutions alongside 
relaxed monetary policy executed by central banks such as relaxing refinancing conditions for 
banks. The International Monetary Fund concluded that: “[p]olicy responses have been rapid, 
wide-ranging, and frequently unorthodox, but were too often piecemeal” (International 
Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 6). The financial environment was laden with uncertainty as to how 
deep systemic risk pervaded the financial system and governments and regulatory agencies 
would intervene. This did not allow for finding private sector solutions to struggling banks.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 policymakers around the world pushed 
for new regulations that address the urgent problems in the financial system that have been 
revealed by the crisis, especially among banks. The paradigm shift towards a macro-
prudential approach to financial regulation is at the core of this undertaking. This is the topic 
of this PhD thesis.  
In their report “Changing banking for good” the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards in the UK proposes to address banking regulation along five main themes: First, the 
responsibility of the individual must be increased, especially on the most senior levels of a 
bank, the board room. Second, on a firm level, corporate governance must be reinforced so 
that the bank is responsible for its own safety and soundness. Third, banking markets must 
empower consumers and hence, greater discipline is exercised on the banks. Fourth, the new 
role of the regulators in exercising judgement based on their new legal powers must be 
accompanied with responsibilities. And fifth, the responsibilities of the Government have to 
be specified to address future bank-related regulation. 
These five themes can broadly be summarized along three distinctive fields: the first two 
themes address banks’ conduct directly, the third theme addresses the market environment in 
that all individual banks operate, and the final two themes focus on the role of the public 
authorities; those who regulate
1
 banks with setting the legal framework, government, and 
those who directly supervise the regulated firms.  
                                                          
1
 Note that the terms “regulation” and “supervision” of banks are used interchangeably from here on. Regulators 
set the rules the regulated subjects like banks have to abide by and supervisors monitor whether the banks 
actually abide them. Chapter 3 deals with how regulatory agencies regulate and supervise banks, yet a separation 
and discussion of who sets the rules and who supervises is not subject of this thesis. 
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This thesis is restricted to banking which is defined as deposit-taking financial services and 
the payment system. The second component of contemporary finance is the shadow banking 
sector. This is the area that is beyond the reach of regulatory agencies. In the euro area assets 
held by the banking sector accumulated to 29.5 trillion Euros in 2012 after a sharp decline of 
12 per cent compared to 2008 figures. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) reports different numbers. The total banking assets in the Euro area 
EUR 32 trillion of which the top 30 European banks hold EUR 27 billion (Schoenmaker and 
Peek, 2014). In the United States, shadow banking has traditionally played a bigger role than 
traditional banking (Shin, 2011). At the outbreak of the crisis in 2007, the shadow banking 
sector shrank from US$ 20 trillion to US$ 15 trillion in 2013. Conversely, in the USA 
traditional banking sector grew from US$ 13 trillion in 1990 to US$ 17 trillion in 2007 
(Pozsar et al., 2012). 
This PhD thesis’ contribution is organised around these three fields. The macro-prudential 
framework is the new regulatory background and defines the new regulatory objective of 
financial stability of the regulatory agencies (chapters 3 and 4). As of addressing issues of 
bank conduct, contingent capital is one of the latest tools policy makers have high 
expectations of (chapters 6 and 7). This thesis proposes how contingent capital can incentivise 
bank managers to abstain from unsustainable risk-taking, which in turn promotes financial 
stability. The market environment in which banks operate can threaten the stability of banks 
regardless of their own risk-taking strategy (chapter 2). Through this exposure, distress in the 
system can be contagious to the individual bank. At the same time the affected bank in 
distress can negatively affect the financial system. So, this systemic risk of the individual 
bank is a feedback effect (chapter 5) Again, contingent capital, as proposed in this thesis, can 
abate this threat.  
The questions that motivate this PhD thesis are: How did it come to the crisis? What is 
systemic risk and how can it be measured? The regulatory response is “macro-prudence”, but 
what exactly is it? Who identifies and judges systemic risk and puts macro-prudence into 
practice? What tools can be used to put “macro-prudence” into practice? And, finally, when 
we have the answers, does “macro-prudence” deliver? Can a financial crisis like the one of 
2008 be avoided? In order to find answers to these questions the PhD thesis is organised as 
follows: 
Chapter 2 recapitulates the global financial crisis of 2008. It analyses how it came to the crisis 
and how it spread in the global financial system, i.e. systemic risk. Consequently, the results 
15 
 
of chapter 2 are used to derive the two core research questions that are answered in each of 
the following chapters:  
- Does the topic of the particular chapter address the regulated institutions’ incentives so 
that they abstain from taking unsustainable risks that can cause systemic crisis?  
- If yet systemic risk emerges is the topic at hand able to limit its potential for further 
damages? 
Each of the following chapters aims to add to anserwing these questions. 
Chapter 3 discusses the macro-prudential regulatory framework and its different 
interpretations in the UK, USA, and EU. The macro-prudential framework is further divided 
into the regulations imposed on the banks and the architecture of the regulatory agencies in 
the respective jurisdiction. 
Chapter 4 analyses the macro-prudential tools at the regulatory agencies’ disposal. The “core” 
tools are flexible capital buffers with which the agencies can lean against the building up of 
price bubbles due to excessive lending by banks. In addition auxiliary tools like caps on bank 
managers’ remuneration are discussed. 
Chapter 5 contains an empirical analysis of systemic risk and adds a quantitative analysis to 
the qualitative analysis of chapter 2. One tool that the regulatory agencies can use to measure 
systemic risk is the conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR). The data used cover European banks’ 
stock returns from 2002 to 2014. The analysis of each bank’s systemic risk contribution is 
divided into three periods, i.e. pre-crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period.  
After the crisis contingent capital gained the attention of policy makers. Briefly, these are 
bonds that upon a trigger event de-leverage a bank in order to increase its loss-absorbency. 
The chatper further distinguishes contingent covertibles (CoCos) as a special kind of 
contingent capital, because CoCos explicitly convert into new equity. CoCos can play an 
important role in the macro-prudential toolkit. Because of its importance to this thesis’ 
contribution, two chapters are dedicated to this topic. Chapter 6 presents a critical discussion 
of the nascent literature on CoCos. The existing proposals deviate substantially in their 
features and there are concerns that they do not achieve a stabilisation but introduce 
instabilities. This can certainly not be in the interest of regulatory agencies. 
The first part of chapter 7 contains an empirical analysis of CoCos and adds a quantitative 
analysis to the qualitative analysis of chapter 6. The data used comprises CoCo bonds of five 
16 
 
of the largest European banks. The aim is to determine what factors affect the spread of 
returns of CoCos.  
The second part of chapter 7 proposes a different CoCo design. Specifically, it is shown that 
the frictions identified in the existing literature can be overcome by amending CoCos with an 
exclusive call option for the new equity in which the CoCos are converted. It is shown that, in 
contrast to the findings of chapter 3, macro-prudence can be achieved through CoCos as a 
market-based instrument. Therefore, this PhD thesis argues that the current initiative towards 
a macro-prudential regulatory framework is too heavily geared towards emphasising the 
intrusiveness of regulatory agencies. Instead of moulding banks, as the regulated subjects, to 
fit the new regulatory paradigm, the motivation of this thesis is also to harness the very 
market-forces that led to the crisis in order to discipline banks to steer clear of taking 
unsustainable risks.  
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2 The global financial crisis of 2008: Causes and consequences to regulation 
This chapter revises the global financial crisis of 2008, its sources, and consequently its 
implications for future financial regulation. Section 2.1 gives a brief overview about the key 
events of the financial crisis. Section 2.2 cites the costs of dealing with the crisis that emerged 
from these events. Section 2.3 derives the similarities with and differences to previous crises 
in order to identify the gaps in the incumbent regulatory paradigm and clear the way for 
macro-prudential regulation. Section 2.4 gives more detail on how securitisation was at the 
centre of the crisis. Consequently section 2.5 embeds the macro-prudential regulation 
paradigm into the economic theories of financial crises. This chapter further identifies 
systemic risk as a permanent risk that needs to be addressed by this paradigm. Section 2.6 
concludes and defines the research questions that build the research framework for the 
following chapters. 
 
2.1 Timeline of the crisis and policy responses 
This section summarises some of the key events of the global financial crisis of 2008. In order 
to derive suggestions how financial regulation should counter financial crises in the future, it 
is necessary to trace it back to its origins and how it spread out in the global financial markets. 
A full overview can be obtained through the websites of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
(2015a) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2015). 
The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis traces the global financial crisis back to 27 
February 2007, the date the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (alias Freddie Mac) 
stopped buying subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities.  
Only weeks later, on 2 April, New Century Financial Corporation, a leading subprime lender, 
files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and was the first casualty to the events that would 
soon unfold. 
As a consequence of defaulting mortgage payments of consumers, Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s, two of the biggest credit rating agencies, downgraded over 100 bonds related to 
subprime-mortgages on 1 June 2007. 
The first action of a public authority to curb a panic in the financial markets took place when 
the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank announced that it “will provide reserves as necessary” (Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2007) in addition to the continuously available 
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discount window as a source of funding. Furthermore, the notion that “[i]n current 
circumstances, depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs because of 
dislocations in money and credit markets” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2007), in retrospective, turns out to be the declarative statement that there is a full-
grown crisis and not mere temporary disruptions.  
In Europe, public authorities were forced to undertake actions analogous to the authorities in 
the USA. The 14
th
 of September 2007 marks the outbreak of the crisis in Europe when the 
Bank of England provided liquidity support to Northern Rock, one of the UK’s largest 
mortgage lenders. How Northern Rock experienced the crisis is provided later in section 
2.4.5. This bank’s experience during the crisis serves as a case study how the 
interconnectedness of banks with the global financial system gives importance to systemic 
risk as a permanent threat to the stability of the financial system. The weeks of late summer of 
2007 were the transition phase from what originally started as a domestic subprime lending 
crisis in the USA towards a full grown global financial crisis.  
On 17
th
 February 2008 Northern Rock was taken into public ownership by the Treasury of the 
United Kingdom (BBC News, 2008); the first of several European banks to be taken into 
public ownership. 
In March 2008 the Federal Reserve introduced two more tools to bolster stability in addition 
to a prolonged Term Auction Facility programme, i.e. holding central bank borrowing at 
historical low levels. The US$ 200 billion big Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
allowed exchanging a variety of securities for Treasury securities. The Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF) had an even broader definition of eligible securities that could, in contrast to 
TSLF, be deposited for instant cash. Different kinds of securities were accepted for collateral 
in order to hinder markets from drying up. On 24
th
 March 2008 the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York pledged to provide financial support to JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s acquisition of 
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. Instead of being recorded on JP Morgan’s books, a limited 
liability company received Bear Stearns assets worth US$ 30 billion, of which the majority 
were placed as security for a US$ 29 billion primary credit line at the Federal Reserve. JP 
Morgan Chase assumed the US$ 1 billion. 
In July the Federal Reserve Board reinforced its pledge to lend to Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mac) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
“should such lending prove necessary” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2008).  
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Several reports from across the globe push for a regulatory paradigm shift to address the 
issues stemming from the interlacement of development on the micro level to the macro level. 
For example, on an international stage the International Monetary Fund (2008) derive the 
need for a “macrofinancial stability framework to help improve supervision and regulation at 
the domestic and global levels” (p. 7). The need for co-ordinating macrofinancial stability 
soon developed into the task to create a macro-prudential financial regulation framework.  
In the European Union (EU), notable documents are the de Larosière Report (2009) that 
derives various recommendations to initiate a global agenda to address the shortcomings of 
the existing regulatory framework. Chapter 3 analyses the various initiatives in the UK, USA, 
and EU in more detail. Nevertheless, key recommendations are inter alia the orderly 
resolution of struggling banks so that the need for using taxpayers’ money is minimal, 
mandatory separation of significant trading activities in a bank, a review of banks’ loss-
absorbing capital requirements and regulatory influence in banks’ governance. Examples for 
the latter are the nurturing of a more risk-sensitive, i.e. prudent, culture at banks and 
sanctioning powers of the regulatory agencies in the form of lifetime professional ban on 
individual managers and deferring compensation. 
In the UK, the Turner Review by the Financial Services Authority (2009) (henceforth referred 
to as Turner Review (2009)) underscored the consequences to the intellectual challenge to 
comprehend system wide risk. Furthermore the review finds that regulatory agencies (then the 
UK Financial Services Authority before the UK Prudential Regulation Authority was 
founded) must be more intrusive and take a systemic view in their supervision of financial 
institutions. The challenge is to identify how certain lending practices at financial institutions, 
i.e. micro-level, have significant impacts one the financial system as a whole, i.e. macro-level. 
The same is identified in the USA in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) and 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation (2011). The securitisation of sub-prime mortages 
in section 2.4 is an example for this. 
 
2.2 Costs of mitigating the crisis 
This section reports the costs of containing the immediate damages of the crisis and the long-
term costs to the economies. Countering the adverse shocks with short-term liquidity 
injections was an appropriate tool for central banks. So, for example, the ECB injected EUR 
94.8 billion for one day to ease the tension in the financial markets; the Federal Reserve Bank 
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of New York injected US$ 24 billion; and the Bank of England provided the British banking 
system with guarantees and loans worth GBP 500 billion. (Lee, 2010). 
The International Monetary Fund (2008) estimated the losses from the initial sub-prime crisis 
to US$500 billion but follow on losses because of a contracting banking business tend to 
US$1.4 trillion, threefold the initial shock. 
The indirect losses of the aftermath of a financial crisis can be permanent (Haldane, 2010). 
So, for the years 2008 to 2018 the foregone gross domestic product in the USA is estimated to 
US$ 12.8 trillion (Feuerberg, 2008). Haldane (2010) estimates the figures for the UK to GBP 
1.8 trillion and for the global economy to US$ 60 trillion.  
In conclusion, the previous section shows how local developments in the U.S. market spread 
out to the international financial markets. The evidence suggests that the global 
interconnectedness of financial institutions is a breeding ground for a consistent threat of 
contagion. However, this new class of risk could not be contained by market forces alone. It 
required substantial efforts by national authorities in the form of co-operation and money. In 
addition, taxpayers’ money needed to be used and thus was not available for other policies to 
boost national economic programmes. These opportunity costs of foregone investments add to 
the cost of the crisis.  
 
2.3 Comparison of the global financial crisis of 2008 to other financial crises 
This section underscores the macro-prudential paradigm shift by comparing the crisis of 2008 
to previous financial crises. For a general overview of financial crises, see Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2005). How is the crisis of 2008 different to previous financial crises? What does the 
crisis of 2008 have in common with previous financial crises? If the crisis of 2008 is different 
to previous financial crises then one has to raise the question if regulation in general can 
match developments in the financial system that leads to a crisis. Yet, if financial regulation 
can do so, why has the recent crisis not been avoided or mitigated? This question is even more 
relevant especially if the crisis was not too different from previous crises. If the crisis 
followed a similar script to preceding crises, then consequences for financial regulation have 
to be drawn. Important comprehensive work on answering this question was conducted by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The authors conclude that there were early warnings similar to 
those that caused previous financial crises. For instance, a rapid increase of housing prices in 
the USA of 100 per cent within few years was bound to burst eventually. Another indicator 
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was the increase in public sector debt and household indebtedness. Yet this was not 
considered a problem by policy makers such as central bankers, see Greenspan (2007). Before 
the crisis, global financial integration prospered. This meant that countries could borrow from 
and through the global financial system with ease, especially the USA (O’Neill, 2002). 
Bernanke (2005) suggests that the then ongoing borrowing in the USA was due to a global 
savings glut.  
The financial industry and especially the banking industry in the 21
st
 century are 
fundamentally different to some one hundred years ago, especially because banking and 
financial institutions operate in international markets. In order to justify regulation it is 
important to know why banks fail. If the problems of the new world of banking are different 
from the old, the regulatory catalogue has to change, too.  
Back in the time of the Great Depression in the 1930s, to which the crisis of 2008 is often 
compared, in a study of 2,955 national bank failures in the USA from 1865 to 1936 O’Connor 
(1938) reports that the most common causes of a bankruptcy of a bank were local financial 
distress and incompetence of the bank’s management. Interestingly, he claims, a loss of the 
public’s confidence and the accompanying bank run accounted for just 5 per cent of bank 
failures. Note that in 1933 the U.S. Congress introduced the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Company (FDIC) to protect deposits as an answer to the crash of 1929 that caused the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. More recently Cottrell et al. (1995) conclude that banks fail because 
of common shocks, such as in real estate and oil prices, and not because of contagion from 
other banks without being exposed to the initial shock. However, the following sections show 
that bank interdependencies do cause contagion among banks. 
Financial crises are frequent in number. The International Monetary Fund (1998) reports 
statistics for crises for the two decades from 1975 to 1997. The report further distinguishes 
between currency crises, currency crashes, banking crises, and currency combined with 
banking crises. Currency crises occurred 158 times and banking crises only 54 times across 
industrialised and emerging economies. However, with an average of 3.1 years banking crises 
last twice as long as currency crises. Of those crises that caused an output loss, i.e. a drop in 
GDP compared to a forecasted GDP trend, banking crises came at a loss of 14.2 per cent 
compared to 7.1 per cent for currency crises. The crises are distinct, however similarities can 
be identified: Asset prices increase – inflated housing prices are amongst the key indicators 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) – and at some point turn out to be a bubble, heavy accumulation 
of household and public debt, growth patterns, and current account deficits. Kaminsky and 
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Reinhart (1999) document that financial liberalisation precedes such crises (more recently 
Brunnemeier et al., 2009). This pattern reveals the picture that the failings of individual banks 
usually cluster (Kaufman, 1999) and concurrent failings, if large enough by the numbers, can 
be called banking crisis.  
Yet, the state of the financial world has changed (see Crockett, 1997): A steep increase in 
financial transactions reflects the increased integration of global capital markets, highly 
complex financial instruments, costly crises, and high-profile scandals at individual financial 
institutions put financial stability in the spotlight. 
Criticism arose about the securitisation business banks employed to generate a steady stream 
of income. In fact it is the excessive creation and securitisation of mortgages of low credit 
quality that distinguish the crisis of 2008. How the financial instrument “securitisation” works 
and what role it played in the build-up of the financial crisis is subject of the following 
sections. Securitisation was a key element in the propagation of losses from the U.S. 
mortgage business to overseas banks for it tied banks closer together. So, European banks 
were indirectly exposed to mortgages in the USA even though they did not issue them. This 
was when the U.S. sub-prime crisis of 2007 became the global financial crisis of 2008. The 
findings stated in the previous paragraphs must be put into perspective. Common shocks lead 
to the observation that several banks fail but today’s financial and banking industry is more 
interconnected – inter alia through securitisation – and single common shocks are more likely 
to cause a chain reaction. Contemporary finance hence is accompanied by a shock-amplifying 
financial environment. The following sections give a qualitative analysis of how this 
amplification works. Each bank that is affected can drag down the rest of the system. This is 
also called the “systemic risk” stemming from the individual bank. A quantitative analysis of 
this systemic risk follows in chapter 5. 
Yet, in addition to the macro-economic factors there are further factors that fed the global 
financial crisis of 2008. For example, Avgouleas (2012) finds five sources for the global 
financial crisis:  
First, risk diversification turned out to be counterproductive. In order to diversify their risk 
exposure financial institutions and investors used Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
2
 and other 
                                                          
2
 A credit default swap (CDS) is a popular financial instrument to insure against credit risk. The holder of a CDS 
is the insurer, the issuer of a CDS wants to protect against the credit risk of a particular debt obligation. If a 
credit event occurs, the CDS holder replaces the original debtor and pays according to the CDS contract. Hence a 
CDS is an insurance against non-payment. In return, the CDS holder receives a fee for his contingent obligation 
to pay. 
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financial instruments that fall under the label “securitisation”. Theoretically, such instruments 
made available virtually every kind of risk available on the globe to create a risk portfolio 
according to one’s own preferences. However, the result was that at the outbreak of the crisis, 
financial markets were homogeneous “rather than diverse and well-balanced” (Avgouleas, 
2012, p. 69).  
Second, securitisation led to an alteration of accumulation of credit risk. So, household debt 
that is known to be a root cause for financial crises was distributed to the global financial 
system. Instead of resting with the originator of securitised risks, credit risk migrated to the 
balance sheets of capital market investors who usually lacked information about the 
underlying asset pools and had not had the quantitative skills to compute the true risk.  
Third, the increased availability of investments to investors was accompanied by an 
increasing complexity of the network itself. The result was a longer chain (Shin, 2011) of the 
network from the basic underlying asset pool, the originator of the securities based on such 
pool, to monoline insurers who syndicated financing the off-balance sheet firms that in turn 
sold the securities to the final investor. The interconnectedness within the financial markets 
made it even more difficult to estimate the true risk of such investments. 
Fourth, as a consequence of the heavy use of securitisation, the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model 
became popular among originators with disastrous implications for incentives. Making 
lending decisions, i.e. to ‘originate’ credit risk, was no longer based on the assumption of 
holding this particular risk until maturity. Instead, knowing that the securitised cash flow can 
be ‘distributed’ to the financial markets, originators held up a constant supply of credit risk 
that would not have necessarily passed their own due diligence requirements for sound 
investments. The next section analyses securitisation in more detail.  
Fifth, leverage played a major role. The global overabundance of credit resources helped 
finance those securities and led to a prolonged period of financial tranquillity. This led to 
“irrational exuberance” (Greenspan, 1996) in the financial markets. As a result, “markets 
tended to make one way bets” (Avgouleas 2012, p. 97) and financial losses due to impairment 
of the value of these securities in consideration positively correlated. Confronted with 
declining market prices on their investments, investors had to have a fire sale of assets to 
avoid bankruptcy.  
In conclusion, each of these factors can reinforce the others. Of these factors securitisation is 
special because it is a conduit for the unintended problems. On the one hand we see that 
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savings in one part of the world can be made available for investment in another country – 
assuming that domestic law provides for lifting restrictions on international capital flow. The 
effectiveness of this financial integration depends on the structure of the financial system. So, 
a bank can originate a mortgage pool just to securitise its cash flow and borrow against it with 
someone who has excess savings somewhere in the global financial system.  
The following section depicts the rationale for, and structure of, the securitisation process in 
order to fully understand how the interplay of these five factors eventually led to the crisis of 
2008. Subsequently, the rationale is confronted with real evidence from the business practice. 
 
2.4 The role of securitisation: Wrong incentives and propagation channel 
This section and sub-sections investigate excessive use of securitisation and its role in 
building up the crisis of 2008. The global financial crisis was sparked by the U.S. sub-prime 
crisis of 2006. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) comprised of securitised private mortgage 
pools, “Residential Mortgage Backed securities” (RMBS) and commercial mortgages, 
“Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities” (CMBS). From spring 2000 to summer 2001 the 
total issuance of new asset backed securities (ABS), including commercial real estates, non-
U.S. residential mortgages, sub-prime home equity, automobile finance, student loans, and 
credit cards, accumulated to just under US$100 billion. The total issuance peaked in late 2005 
and early 2007 with US$ 300 billion worth of ABS. Most notably, the securitisation of sub-
prime home equity peaked at US$ 150 billion in the summer of 2006. From September on 
figures dropped sharply to zero in March 2008. With a delay of one year issuances of the 
other asset categories fell drastically shortly before September 2007, the anniversary of the 
sub-prime crisis. At the peak of the crisis in late 2008 the losses on sub-prime mortgage-
related securities were estimated at US$ 500 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
A further analysis of the theoretical rationale for securitising assets is helpful to understand 
how exactly losses from a pure domestic market for mortgages can spread to other countries 
so rapidly. Furthermore, the results feeds into the five reasons given in the previous section 
that led to the crisis.  
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2.4.1 Introduction to the theoretical rationale of securitisation 
This sub-section gives a brief introduction to the securitisation of the cash-flows of assets. 
The term “securitisation” refers to the process by which the securities are written and placed 
in the markets. According to Schwarcz (1994) securitisation is backed by the future cash 
flows of the underlying entity’s economic future. Shenker and Colletta (1991) resolve the 
possible confusion that there is a one tier structure between the underlying cash-flow 
generating entity and the security as warrant to claim the proceeds, securitisation is:  
“the sale of debt or equity instruments, representing ownership interests in, or secured 
by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a transaction structured 
to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or lending against the 
underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily marketable and, 
thus, more liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the underlying assets” 
(p. 1374-5.). 
This citation gives a more precise image for it emphasises the potential of shifting the level 
and composition of risk according to the intentions of the creator. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
basic architecture of a securitisation. 
 
 
The underlying asset generates a cash flow available to the originator (for the following, see 
also Barmat, 1990; Schwarcz, 1994; Schwarcz et al., 2004: and International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, 2008). For example, a bank is the originator of a pool of mortgages 
that serves as the underlying asset. The mortgage payments, i.e. the cash flows, are collected 
frequently by the originator in order to be passed on to the securities. A special purpose 
Asset 
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Figure 2.1: Basic architecture of a securitisation. Source: Own illustration 
based on IOSCO (2008), Schwarcz (1994), and Schwarcz et al. (2004). 
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vehicle (SPV), or synonymously “special-purpose entity” (Schwarcz et al., 2004, p.6) is 
created by the originator who cedes the claim of the cash flows to the SPV. The SPV is a 
separate legal entity and serves as fiduciary and sells the securities and distributes the cash 
flows to the final investor who holds the securities. At the time the SPV is created, the 
investor buys the securities from the SPV. The SPV is financed with little capital to continue 
operations irrespective of the bankruptcy of the originator (Dayan et al., 1990) and therefore 
is structured “bankruptcy remote” (Schwarcz, 1994, p. 30) to the bank. This securitisation 
process allows for an isolated view on the asset and its future cash flow independent from the 
originator’s own riskiness. 
After the financial crisis of 2008 “financial innovation” has received a negative connotation. 
Innovation ought to be interpreted as improving services to the end consumer. However, the 
financial industry in the USA created off-balance sheet financing techniques, such as asset-
backed securities, that: 
“[…] are efficient means of obtaining funding for their participants while 
simultaneously achieving accounting, tax and regulatory benefits of various types. 
They are well understood by the marketplace and reflect the innovation for which the 
U.S. capital markets are known” (Batson, 2002, p. 22). 
This citation is taken from a first interim report on the bankruptcy of Enron, a large utility 
company, in 2001. There are various applications to the benefit of an originator, for example 
instantaneously increasing the liquidity of the particular firm. The role of this asset-backed 
securitisation process in the crisis of 2008 is further exemplified in the next section with the 
example of the securitisation of sub-prime mortgages in the USA. 
Securitisation is not specifically defined in detail, for it is merely a concept that describes how 
a cash-flow from a certain investment opportunity is directed to a recipient. A definition by 
U.S. legislators for the term “securities” is given by referring to “any note, stock certificate, 
bond debenture, check, draft, warrant, […], certificate of interest in property, tangible or 
intangible” (18 U.S.C. § 2311, 1994).  
The occurrence of payment disruptions can be countered with credit enhancements (Barmat, 
1990; Fabozzi, 1993). The originator, despite the aim of decoupling the originator’s credit risk 
from the risk associated with the securitised assets, can pledge to take a fraction of the losses 
of the cash flow stream (Barmat, 1990; Fabozzi, 1993). In addition, specialised insurers give 
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additional guarantees to pay a fraction upon a disruption for a predefined fee. To increase 
market acceptance, originators commission transactional lawyers and credit rating agencies to 
assist in the securitisation process (Barmat, 1990). In this light McBarnet (2010) argues that 
the driving force behind the financial crisis was also “legal engineering” that assisted the 
financial engineering of instruments. The role that legal engineering played was mainly to 
circumvent regulations by deliberately creating complexity and opacity. The next sub-sections 
analyse in more detail how banks were incentivised to issue mortgages of sub-prime quality 
due to securitisation and on top of the political agenda of the U.S. government. 
 
2.4.2 Securitisation fostered the originate-to-distribute business model 
This sub-section investigates the incentives to deliberately issue sub-prime mortgages for 
short-term profits that eventually destabilised the financial system. The rationale and possible 
advantages of securitisation are given in the previous section. However, until the 1990s 
mortgage securitisation in the USA was dominated by the government-sponsored enterprises 
Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 
known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively, who also were the largest mortgage 
issuers. Both enterprises guaranteed the debt service on the securities. From the 1990s to the 
2000s large private institutions entered the mortgage securitisation business and became 
leading in the securitisation of mortgages (Congressional Budget Office, 2010). However, in 
contrast to the government-sponsored enterprises, the debt service was not guaranteed by the 
private institutions.  
The steady increase in housing prices was largely fed by historically low interest rates. The 
Standard & Poor’s Case Shiller Home Price Index reports U.S. national housing prices 
appreciation of 8 per cent in 2003, 12 per cent in 2004, and 16 per cent in 2005 (Gerrity, 
2011). In addition, this boom was fuelled by macro-imbalances such as an international 
savings glut that, via the mortgage-issuing part of the financial industry, produced the supply 
for such mortgages. The Turner Review (2009) gives a detailed overview of these macro-
imbalances including oil prices and household debt in the USA, UK, and EU. 
However, political pressure by the U.S. government and the U.S. Fed played a major role in 
fostering the sub-prime crisis (Frame et al., 2015). The loose monetary policy of the Fed to 
keep interest rates low was part of the U.S. government’s efforts to make home ownership 
affordable to low-income households. Due to their role in putting in action the government’s 
plan to make mortgages more affordable, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac used the advantages 
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of this public-private partnership – definitions can be obtained in Burger et al. (2009) and 
references therein – and increased their financial leverage. Even if this unsustainability was 
clear to some commentators and in deed among senior staff in the two companies (Duhigg, 
2008), “serious reform efforts were portrayed as attacks on the American Dream and hence 
politically unpalatable” (Frame et al., 2015, p. 1). So, even the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), the regulatory agency in charge to supervise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
was limited in its power to challenge this mortgage business. Thus, the political agenda 
created a moral hazard problem for mortgage issuing firms. 
The securitisation process that banks employed decoupled the generation of returns from the 
default risk of the underlying assets. Ultimately securitisation opened the door for the 
excessive creation of credit risk. The originating banks only held the mortgages with the 
intention to pass them on via securitisation and not to hold them until maturity. Banks faced 
only a “pipeline risk” (Brunnermeier, 2009. p. 82) of these risk conduits. This risk-return-
decoupling was the start of an ill-aligned incentive structure for banks and their mortgage 
issuing front-office staff. Keys et al. (2010) give empirical evidence in support of declining 
credit quality of assets intended to be securitised. Through securitisation the original credit 
risk, i.e. the risk that a borrower defaults on payment on obligations, is made liquid and can 
be traded in markets. On the same token with the creation of such markets, market risk is 
created. This addresses the probability that an institution’s asset declines in value.  
The overall “[b]orrower-friendly underwriting criteria” (Krinsman, 2007, p. 1) with additional 
“teaser rates” allowed mortgage takers to pay an artificially low rate in the first years. But the 
rate would adjust to a higher level in the following years. Another common practice, 
especially among sub-prime mortgages, was issuing a long-term loan to the mortgage taker 
that was specifically designed to pay back the rates on the initial mortgage. A combination of 
teaser rates and cross-selling specialised loans are called “risk layering” (Krinsman, 2007, 
p.3). The most extreme case was the issuance of NINJA (“no income, no job or assets”) loans 
to the poorest credit quality of sub-prime mortgages without thorough documentation 
(Brunnermeier, 2009, p. 82). Under the premise of rising house prices, the bank could at least 
seize the house if the mortgage defaulted. 
Consequently, in a joint statement on subprime mortgage lending the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and National Credit Union 
Administration (2007) address the risks of the mortgage lending practice. Particular attention 
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must be paid to the customers. One particular problem was that the lending arrangement 
exceeded customers’ ability to repay and that the involved financial institutions did not 
exercise due diligence in documenting every aspect of the creditworthiness. Furthermore, a 
large portion of customers did not fully comprehend the benefits and risks associated with the 
mortgage and loan. The originate-to-distribute model was accompanied by “improper lending 
practices determined to be predatory or abusive” (Krinsman 2007, p. 8). 
 
2.4.3 Tying the underlying mortgages to the LIBOR created procyclicality 
In addition to the lax underwriting of mortgages, a further negative feature that turned out to 
be a design flaw was that the mortgage rates were tied to the interbank loan rates. These are 
the conditions at which banks borrow from each other for various short maturities, including 
overnight. The rate is a considerable factor for a bank’s ability to raise funds. The most 
common rate is the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Worldwide, an estimated US$ 
150 trillion worth of financial instruments like mortgage-backed securities are indexed to the 
LIBOR. Figure 2.2 shows the U.S. Dollar LIBOR for overnight lending for 2008: 
 
Figure 2.2: USD LIBOR in 2008. The x-axis indicates the months of the year 2008 and the 
y-axis denotes the London Interbank Offered Rate in per cent. Source: Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis. 
 
The rate remained stable at just over 2 per cent from April to August. In September 2008, 
when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the rate almost instantaneously climbed to over 6 
per cent. Consequently, mortgage borrowers who signed for a flexible rate had to pay an 
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increased monthly rate. Eventually a substantial portion of mortgages defaulted across the 
board and put banks under further constraints. Banks could not collect payments on their 
issued mortgages in full. Refunding via the interbank market was also tight. So, the result was 
a banking industry wide credit crunch. This is the first piece of evidence that the initial risk 
associated with an asset, here mortgages, can be amplified within the financial system. 
Note that from October 2008 on, the rate decreased which was not due to regaining trust 
among banks but rather the large-scale interventions by the U.S. Federal Reserve in the form 
of low charges for banks to use existing central bank facilities and newly established 
programmes. The impact of such programmes on the LIBOR rate are empirically supported 
by McAndrews et al. (2008). 
 
2.4.4 Tranquil investor perception creating a fragile financial system 
This sub-section discusses how carelessness among investors in the global financial markets 
was promoted by the very tools ought to capture riskiness.  
A further aspect of the originate-to-distribute model banks employed but did not receive due 
attention is the discrepancy of credit risk and risk-weighted regulatory capital. According to 
the Bank for International Settlements, an international forum for central bankers to discuss 
global banking standards, henceforth abbreviated to BIS, banks are allowed to employ various 
methods to calculate how much capital they need for a specific credit risk, for example an 
issued mortgage. According to accounting requirements banks keep records of these 
investments held to maturity in the banking book; the trading book on the other hand keeps a 
record of those investments that the bank holds for trading purposes only therefore not held to 
maturity. The crucial difference is that assets in the banking book are held at historical costs 
and assets in the trading book are marked-to-market with methods such as the Value-at-Risk 
method. This method is subject to the empirical research on systemic risk in chapter 5. The 
general criticism of the Value-at-Risk model is explained in more detail there.  
Before the crisis the capital requirements calculated for trading book assets were consistently 
lower and, unsurprisingly, banks exploited this gap to reduce their regulatory capital level. 
Eventually the originating banks securitised mortgages, removed them from their banking 
books, and passed them on to other banks that now would hold them in their trading books. 
The Turner Review (2009) emphasise that the overall asset growth on banks’ balance sheets 
was captured in ballooning trading books, with little risk-sensitive capital to account for 
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possible losses. It was only after the crisis that Basel II accord received an update, see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), henceforth abbreviated to BCBS.  
Regulatory arbitrage was indeed a contributing factor to the crisis (Turner Review, 2009) and 
allowed to underestimate the leverage of banks. The special purpose vehicles connect the 
originator of the underlying assets and financiers in the financial system. By this process 
asset-backed securities could be removed from the originating bank’s balance sheet. So the 
investors were not able to estimate the true leverage and therefore true risk of individual 
banks. On an aggregated level the risk of the financial system was underestimated. 
This shows that the five sources of the crisis presented in section 2.3 are closely connected to 
each other. With securitisation the credit risk of an asset was made more liquid and removed 
from the originator to a willing investor in the financial system. The increased popularity of 
this originate-to-distribute business model led to a decline in lending standards. This negative 
aspect was widely ignored but willingness to lend against securitised assets increased, the 
result was that banks increased their leverage. With more parties involved in the process of 
securitisation and trading of such, the financial network became more complex. The 
unchecked credit risk creation did not stay at specific investors but circulated in the markets. 
So it was difficult to gauge who would suffer losses upon a credit risk event. Yet the 
perception was that this had been no reason to worry.  
What from the individual bank’s point of view was prudent created an inherently fragile 
system. The arguments according to financial theory for making available a vast selection of 
different kind of risk via securitisation in order to optimise a bank portfolio falls short of 
recognising the perversion of incentives. Along the chain these were, first, the originating 
bank that neglects due diligence; second, the financial system institutions, such as credit 
rating agencies and monoline insurers, who also perfunctorily checked the securitised assets; 
and, third, the final investors at the end of the chain, who faithfully believed in the previous 
groups’ assessments. Furthermore, this chain of interconnectedness introduced instabilities 
within the structure of the financial system itself. These instabilities accumulated to what for 
regulators is the ultimate concern, systemic risk. 
Now a further look at the propagation channels within the financial system: The securitisation 
process included credit enhancers such as CDSs provided by insurance companies. Among 
them was AIG. As a direct consequence of the sub-prime mortgage business, AIG had to be 
bailed out by the U.S. Federal Reserve with US$ 85 billion. The attached insurance service 
was greatly appreciated by the markets and the securities received best credit ratings. Lewis 
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(2011) identifies a large discrepancy between the insurance pay-out for outstanding US$ 20 
billion of mortgages in the event of a default in exchange for a mere 0.12 per cent insurance 
fee per year.  
Certain investment restrictions apply to institutional investors such as banks and pension 
funds (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2011). In some countries institutional 
investors are by law limited in holding investments below a certain quality precisely to 
counter systemic risk concerns. For example, for the restrictions in the USA, see section 28 
(d) and (e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Such quality assessments can be exercised 
by the investors themselves. Because of the sheer number of available financial instruments 
that cover all kinds of investment opportunities, also sophisticated investors such as banks 
quickly reach their limit of computing power and can lose oversight. This gap of information 
asymmetry is filled by credit rating agencies’ services. In the late 1990s the BCBS proposed a 
new capital adequacy framework, which became to be known as Basel II, introducing a 
“system that would use external credit assessments for determining risk weights” (p. 5). It is 
beyond this PhD thesis to address the role of credit rating agencies and especially their 
problematic role in the recent crisis. These aspects are analysed elsewhere, see for example 
Schwarcz (2002). 
However, the rating grades attached to securitised mortgages – especially sub-prime – were 
confused with “high quality”. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011) in the 
USA identified credit rating agencies to have deliberately awarded mortgage-backed 
securities with high rating grades despite their awareness “of problems in the mortgage 
market, including an unsustainable rise in housing prices, the high risk nature of the loans 
being issued, lax lending standards, and rampant mortgage fraud” (p. 7).  
As long as investors see that the consequences of a default event of an investment are abated 
with an insurance, they are prepared to invest in it. The fundamental issue is found at the 
beginning of the chain of securitisation: the quality of assets. Even though a looming liquidity 
or credit bubble was identified it was more “profitable to ride the wave than to lean against it” 
(Brunnermeier, 2009, p. 82), see also Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) for a theoretical model 
of such an incentive. 
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2.4.5 How the U.S. sub-prime crisis led to the global financial crisis 
The previous sub-sections show how the sub-prime mortage market in the USA emerged. 
This sub-section highlights how the collapse of this domestic market evolved into a global 
financial crisis through the interconnectednedness of the global financial system. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2011) “fire sales” are: 
“[…] a forced sale of an asset at a dislocated price. A sale is forced in the sense that 
the seller cannot wait to raise cash, usually because he owes that cash to someone else. 
The price is dislocated because the highest potential bidders are typically involve in a 
similar activity as the seller, and are therefore themselves in a similar financial 
position. Rather than bidding for the asset, they might be selling similar assets 
themselves” (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011, p.30). 
Further evidence to the validity of this definition is given by some examples of the crisis. The 
International Monetary Fund (2008) finds that in the USA between April and October 2008 
the prices for Asset Backed Securities (ABS) declined by 20 per cent for a total of outstanding 
ABS worth US$ 1,100 billion with mark-to-market losses of US$ 210 billion. For the total 
outstanding US$ 400bn ABS collateralised debt obligations (ABS CDOs) mark-to-market 
losses were estimated to 60 to 70 per cent. The majority of these impairments were borne by 
banks with losses of approximately US$ 100 billion to US$ 110 billion for ABS and US$ 145 
billion to US$ 160 billion for ABS CDOs.  
The popularity of mortgage-backed securities, and derivatives thereof, maintained for a 
couple of years but quickly turned into the other extreme, a complete drying up of the markets 
for those investments. The financial markets for securities with mortgages as underlying 
assets turned into what among some economists is known as a “market for lemons”, which 
was coined by Akerlof (1970). In the “absence of a mechanism for quality certifications” 
(Hellwig, 2008, p. 9) buyers cannot estimate the quality of the good on offer, e.g. 
creditworthiness. Therefore they discount the offer price to the known average quality in the 
market. The result of this adverse selection is that high quality goods are not sold, the average 
quality in the remaining market declines, and so does the average price. At the end of this 
spiral stands a complete market break down. Despite the existing preferences for the good, 
market participants do not trade. Figure 2.3 gives a simple map of the financial system for the 
purpose of this chapter. 
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The mortgage securitisation that is subject of the preceding sections of this chapter can be 
found on the left hand side as “asset-backed securities” as financial instruments available 
within the financial system. The defaults on mortgages led to the U.S. sub-prime crisis. 
However, the global financial crisis was further fuelled by the consequential credit crunch, i.e. 
the tightening funding opportunities in rest of the financial system. On the one hand, other 
banks were reluctant to lend to their peers via the interbank lending facilities as indicated by 
soaring LIBOR rates, see Figure 2.2, above. On the other hand, funding through the money 
markets became increasingly difficult, too, and central bank facilities had to be made more 
available at regulators’ decree. Furthermore Figure 2.4 below illustrates the effects of the 
financial system, which is depicted in Figure 2.3 above, on a bank A. 
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Figure 2.3: A simple map of the financial system. Source: Own illustration. 
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The balance sheet items of bank A are listed on the left hand side and further separated by 
belonging to either assets or liabilities. The items are listed for the sake of readability and not 
by rank of liquidity. The right hand side reflects the simplified financial system.  
Suppose bank A has a substantial investment in financial instruments of a certain kind, see 
dashed arrow. If this kind of instrument collapses bank A is directly exposed to price 
corrections and suffers losses. If bank A’s capital is not enough to absorb the losses, 
bankruptcy occurs.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) distinguish between funding liquidity and market 
liquidity. First, institutions that rely on short-term funding must roll over their debt at a high 
frequency. To do so, they raise debt by borrowing against specific assets in their own 
portfolio, i.e. secured borrowing. This scenario indicated with the first solid arrow below the 
dashed arrow. Bank A is indirectly exposed to developments in the financial system. 
Mortgage-related financial instruments – e.g. sub-prime mortgage-backed securities – default 
on a large scale but bank A has no investment in such instruments. However, bank A needs to 
roll over its short-term debt and has frequently benefited from secured borrowing in money 
markets in the past. Its mortgages held on its balance sheet served as collateral for borrowing, 
see solid arrow from “Mortgages” to “Short-term funding”.  
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Figure 2.4: Interconnectedness of a bank to the financial system. Source: Own 
illustration. 
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However, in the extreme case lenders in the money markets can refuse to lend against 
mortgages in general, or at an increased risk premium – indicated with the disconnected arrow 
–, because of a panic about any mortgage-related bad news. The interbank facilities are 
alternative funding sources but are likely to be affected by adverse developments in the 
financial system, too, as indicated by the second disconnected arrow. Banks are less willing to 
lend on an unsecured basis. Secured lending is especially distressed if the collateral that is 
usually lent against is of a similar kind of the trigger event that caused the shock. Here 
mortgages in general were refused because of the large scale defaults in the sub-prime 
tranches of the mortgage market. Consequently, funding liquidity decreased steeply. 
Second, as an alternative to this secured borrowing, the very same assets can be sold to raise 
liquidity, but this depends on the market liquidity. Selling assets is only possible if the 
markets for the particular assets are functioning. Different degrees of market liquidity are 
discussed in Kyle (1985). The integrity of market liquidity is negatively affected if a 
sufficiently high number of traders sell a particular kind of asset at the same time and drive 
down the price of that asset. This can be due to fire sales as defined above when similar firms 
decide independently from each other to sell the assets, i.e. bad timing; smaller firms 
mimicking one big firm to compensate for information asymmetries; or also collusive 
behaviour. 
The last remaining funding source for banks that are directly or indirectly affected by the 
shock is the central bank, see bottom arrow. Therefore the central bank plays the role of the 
lender of last resort (Kay, 2010). The various extensions of central bank lending facilities and 
revisions of accepted collateral are listed at the beginning of this chapter and do not need to be 
repeated here. 
Northern Rock suffered from this development. Mortgages from the USA defaulted on a large 
scale and consequently the asset backed securities based these mortgages did not receive 
payments, but the following decline in demand went beyond U.S. domestic mortgage-backed 
securities. More generally, most of these securities with the word “mortgage” written on them 
were affected. To continue the analogy of the market for lemons from a few paragraphs 
before, there could still have been a preference for mortgage-related securities but high 
quality could not be fully distinguished from low or sub-prime quality. At the end of the chain 
of securitisation, markets faced the simple realisation that nobody knew or cared about which 
mortgage-related securities were affected and which were not. To show this, in his testimony 
to the HM Treasury Committee’s report on the bankruptcy of Northern Rock, Mr. Applegarth, 
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then Chief Executive of Northern Rock, clarified that the high credit quality of assets the bank 
had held was believed to assure access to liquidity in the financial markets. However, the 
bank could not borrow against their mainly UK residential mortgages. In case of tightening 
refunding conditions in the financial markets Northern Rock’s chairman, Mr. Ridley, believed 
that its “low-risk book would remain easier to fund than sub-prime mortgages” (24 January 
2008a ,HC 56-II Q 402 Ev48). This “flight to quality” (24 January 2008, HC 56-I para 24) did 
not occur. After it became clear that Northern Rock was facing liquidity problems ways of 
using the Bank of England’s facilities were discussed, even though the bank was reluctant to 
use such assistance. Instead, the central bank assistance served as a backstop, if the market 
environment continued to falter. Mr. Applegarth concluded that: “[i]ronically, it was the 
announcement and the leaking of the backstop that caused the retail run and it was the retail 
run that reduced our liquidity” (24 January 2008a, HC 56-II Q 529 Ev48). Northern Rock was 
hit by a double run: First, the financial system refused to finance a certain kind of asset. 
Second, the depositors started a run because of news of financial difficulties. 
On a global level, in order to protect themselves from defaulting investments in money market 
funds, financial institutions withdrew their money. This run on money market funds was 
stopped by the U.S. Treasury’s intervention (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). It 
offered a deposit-protection scheme guaranteed by the government, i.e. tax payers’ money. 
Generally speaking, reassuring banks that money market funds as refinancing source are 
secured would reassure the public that their deposits are safe, hence decreasing the risk of a 
bank run for withdrawing deposits. Yet, this was too late for several banks were not exposed 
in any way to mortgage-related securities, but on the other hand relied on funding by money 
markets. 
An alternative explanation to market panics can be seen in the de facto connection of the 
sponsoring banks with SPVs, compare Figure 2.1 again. The banks first did not suffer from 
adverse funding conditions directly. However, they had to move the assets held by the 
vehicles back to their books and consequently value corrections hit their loss-absorbing 
capital cushions. This was eventually recognised directly by the financial markets.  
In conclusion, the following picture of systemic risk appears: Direct links to the default risk of 
an asset class, such as credit risk of mortgages, are borne by the issuing financial institution. 
Financial innovation in the field securitisation added further elements to the chain of this 
exposure. With each link the “distance” between the source of risk and the end investor 
increased; first, literally in the case of European banks buying U.S. sub-prime mortgage-
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backed securities, and, secondly, banks kept distance to the composition and performance of 
these assets in the believe that the quality of risks were certified by credit rating agencies and 
the credit enhancements would abate possible defaults anyway.  
 
2.5 Emergence of macro-prudential regulation 
The previous sections analysed what led to the crisis of 2008. This section takes a general 
perspective on marrying the micro and macro aspects of the new framework to regulate banks 
and gives crucial definitions for “systemic risk”, “banks”, and “macro-prudence” that are 
relevant for the following chapters.  
In the aftermath of the crisis of 2008 the new regulatory paradigm and consequently 
answering what macro-prudential tools to use, depends on the fundamental question for 
policy makers and regulatory agencies whether to “lean or clean” imbalances. An indicator 
for imbalance is when the growth of the financial sector is larger than the growth of the real 
economy (BCBS, 2011; Kim, 2011).  
The term “macro-prudence” is obscure and hence subject to different interpretation, Clement 
(2010) gives an account of the origins and the evolution of this term. As of the current post-
2008 Crisis discussion of making “macro-prudence” a pillar of any financial regulation 
framework, the term dates back to a Bank of England led working group chaired by 
Alexandre Lamfalussy from 1979. Then, concerns about the international financial system, 
and its stability, were raised in the context of the pace of globalisation with rising oil prices 
and implications for international bank lending. Nevertheless the group’s original definition 
identifies the exact same issues that the crisis of 2008 has once again revealed:  
“Prudential measures are primarily concerned with sound banking practice and the 
protection of depositors at the level of the individual bank. Much work has been done 
in this area – which could be described as the ‘micro-prudential’ aspect of banking 
supervision. […] However, this micro-prudential aspect may need to be matched by 
prudential considerations with a wider perspective. This ‘macro-prudential’ approach 
considers problems that bear upon the market as a whole as distinct from an individual 
bank, and which may not be obvious at the micro-prudential level” (quoted and cited 
in Clement, 2010, p. 61). 
Especially the last sentence underscores that the stability of a system is not necessarily 
determined by the sum of all its elements. Even if all financial institutions operate profitably, 
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this does not mean that the system is in good health. Borio (2003) defines macro-prudence by 
comparing it to micro-prudence among five criterions. What is prudent on a micro-level, i.e. 
at an individual firm level, is easy to comprehend and enables one to understand how 
prudence could be applied on a macro-level. First, the proximate objective of being micro-
prudent is to limit the distress of an individual institution; macro-prudence aims at limiting 
system-wide distress. Second, the ultimate objective of micro-prudence is consumer 
protection, i.e. depositors, but macro-prudence aims at avoiding economic output costs. There 
is a critical difference: For the macro-prudential aim of limiting the costs to economic output, 
for example gross domestic product, the micro-prudential aim of depositor protection is not a 
necessity. Borio illustrates the different approaches with the example of a portfolio of 
securities: The “macroprudential [sic!] approach would then care about the tail losses on the 
portfolio as a whole, its microprudential [sic!] counterpart would care equally [sic!] about the 
tail losses on each [sic!] of the component securities” (Borio, 2003, p. 2). Put differently, a 
micro-prudential approach to financial regulation is concerned about the stability of each and 
every financial institution but the individual stability is not crucial for a macro-prudential 
approach as long as it does not threat the stability of the whole system. Third, this 
consequently implies that risk is endogenous on the macro-prudential level but individual 
institutions face risks mostly as exogenous. Hence, fourth, common exposures across 
institutions are not relevant for the individual institutions when one takes a micro-prudential 
approach but is important on the macro-prudential view. Fifth, this leads to implications for 
introducing prudential controls, i.e. regulation. Under the micro-prudential approach a peer 
group assessment can be used. This simply means comparing a financial institution to other, 
similar institutions and look how it compares to the rest of the sector. The macro-prudential 
approach reverses this bottom-up principle and analyses top-down. A peer group assessment 
is still in use but additional aspects such as concentration of exposure among these institutions 
– that per definition are not captured in the micro-prudential approach – are included. 
The next sections of this chapter narrow down the vast group of “financial institutions” to 
banks – as deposit-taking institutions that are subject to macro-prudential regulation in 
particular –, locate the interim results and further analysis in the literature, and define 
“systemic risk”, which is exactly that crucial element that is not obvious at the micro-
prudential level, but on the macro-prudential level. 
In anticipation of the next chapter where the structure of the new macro-prudential regulatory 
agencies is discussed, the regulatory agencies can be tasked with “leaning” against excessive 
credit growth that leads to asset bubbles and in the worst case to a full crisis. A collapse of 
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such is the initial external shock to the financial system, fire sales further fuel asset spirals, 
and a cascade runs through the financial system with the consequence that the whole system 
becomes unstable. Various tools aim to help lean against this developments such as sectoral 
capital requirements as will be examined in chapter 4. Kashyap and Stein (2004) contribute 
early work on making banks’ capital requirements dependent on the state of the economy to 
lean against procyclicality. Yet new macro-prudential tools are more specific. For example 
excessive growth of the sector for residential mortgages, as opposed to the general state of the 
economy, can be countered directly by increasing interest rates for originating residential 
mortgages, so that banks give out fewer mortgages. Before the crisis a monetary policy 
response could have been to increase the interest rate that applies to the whole economy rather 
than one particular sector. This risks constricting growth in other sectors of the real economy. 
Yet, the difficulty is to determine whether this persistent gap is excessive (Shin, 2011). 
Alternatively regulatory agencies can be tasked with “cleaning”. This puts regulatory action 
after the imbalances led to a shock. So after a shock regulatory agencies must use their 
mandate and tools to contain the damages from spreading. This resembles the cleaning up 
programmes that could be observed during the crisis. Yet, the critique that the new policy 
responses are again “piecemeal” (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 6) must be avoided. 
A lot of precious time can be saved when regulatory agencies have an array of specific tools 
at their disposal in order to intervene and clean specific pivotal points in the financial system. 
For example capital minimum requirements can be temporarily increased to bolster banks’ 
loss-absorbency, and additional central bank lending facilities can be temporarily made 
available to enhance liquidity for troubled assets. 
Macro-prudential financial regulation is a holistic approach to first address the build-up of 
imbalances in the first place; second, defence against downswings of disruptions; and third, 
identifying risk concentration and interdependencies in the financial system (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). Obviously the first two items suggests leaning and cleaning, rather 
than one or the other apporach.  
This chapter identifies that the build-up of imbalances start at the micro level with investment 
decisions of banks. Much is accomplished if imbalances in the form of excessive asset growth 
are countered.  
However the structure of the financial system itself is a concern to the stability of the system 
too. Even if this systemic risk is not the consequence of unsustainable risk macro-prudential 
policy must find ways to save the financial system from its inherent instabilities. Disruptions 
41 
 
in the form of external shocks are amplified within the system and downswings can be worse 
than expected.  
The identification of interconnectedness and quantification of systemic risk is a crucial part of 
macro-prudential regulation. Chapter 5 goes into more detail with an empirical analysis of 
systemic risk in the European banking sector, covering data from the year 2000 on, so 
including crisis and non-crisis times.  
Beside the new regulations that are considered the institutional arrangements of regulatory 
agencies is an important challenge too (Kim, 2011). Since the crisis was global, so must be 
the policy response. Yet, the proper supervision of banks is subject to national law. The 
current regulatory authorities tasked with supervising banks need to be revised in their scope 
and equipped with new legal mandates. Consequently this also touches challenges such as the 
accountability of the regulatory agencies and a new cultural approach within these authorities. 
This is subject of chapter 3. 
However, there are difficulties in defining the scope of macro-prudential financial regulation. 
For example according to the Section 112(a)(1)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act in the USA (henceforth Dodd-Frank Act) the newly found 
Financial Stability Oversight Council is tasked with identifying: 
“risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material 
financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank 
holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the 
financial services marketplace” (Emphasis added). 
This leaves space for interpretation and applicability of “financial stability”. On the one hand 
one problem of such a task of regulatory agencies is that too vague a definition could blur the 
regulatory agency’s view on what they are expected to deliver to the broader public. Perhaps 
the agenda within the agency is not clear enough. Regulatory staff need explicit mandates that 
clarify their responsibilities and scope for their own work (Domanski and Ng, 2011) On the 
other hand such a definition enables the agency to be flexible to address urgent issues without 
any legal constraints that need to be addressed first, otherwise losing precious time. 
Reinforcing financial stability through macro-prudence can be interpreted as “leaning against” 
the financial cycle, so that asset bubbles are avoided in the first place (Bank of England, 2009; 
Borio, 2003 and 2010) – the theory behind asset bubbles is depicted in section 2.5.2 below. A 
second interpretation is that macro-prudence should aim at specific problems that naturally 
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occur in times of system wide distress (Hanson et al., 2011). Among them are the 
mechanisms like fire sales and consequent credit crunches, i.e. disruption of lending to the 
real economy also known as dis-intermediation. So there are two interpretations for macro-
prudential regulation: broad and specific interventions. However, a regulatory agency’s sound 
judgement whether to intervene necessitates evidence that the financial stability is at stake, 
i.e. systemic risk is gathering momentum. Identifying systemic risk ex ante is the top item on 
the agenda for it is difficult to quantify.  
Furthermore the research scope of this PhD thesis is limited to banks. The previous sections 
addressed issues arising from the banking sector exclusively across national boundaries. Of 
course banks are only one kind of financial institutions of several in the global financial 
markets – pension funds, hedge funds, etc. are non-bank financial companies. The next 
section gives a further definition of what a “bank” is and gives arguments why these 
institutions in particular should be regulated.  
 
2.5.1 Banks are key financial institutions in financial crises 
This sub-section narrows down the scope of research of this thesis to “banks”, that are defined 
here. The terms “financial institution” and “bank” are used throughout this PhD thesis. In 
anticipation of the remaining chapters, a bank is defined as a deposit-taking financial 
institution. They perform what the financial literature calls “liquidity transformation” of liquid 
demand deposits to fund illiquid loans and other investments. A financial position such as a 
deposit at a bank is “liquid” when the banks’ customers, the depositors, can withdraw the 
deposit. On the other hand, a financial position such as a mortgage is a long-term commitment 
of the mortgage taker and a long-term investment of the mortgage issuer. From the issuer’s 
position it is difficult and legally not usually possible to call the full amount of the mortgage 
back immediately, hence it is illiquid. In this context by accepting deposits the banks 
“produce money-like debt” (Admati and Hellwig, 2013 p. 155) that can be granted as loans.  
In the UK the term “bank” is not explicitly defined in the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 and its amendments by the Financial Services Act 2012. Rather than an institutional 
approach to defining what a bank is, UK policy makers define a bank by the definition of the 
functions exercised by certain financial institutions. So a bank is a regulated subject under the 
Act if it performs a “regulated activity”. In the rulebook of the Prudential Regulation 
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Authority, the post-crisis UK regulatory agency, article 5 of the Regulated Activities Order 
2001 SI2001/544 identifies “accepting deposits” as a regulated activity.  
In the USA the definition of a bank is written down in 26 U.S. Code § 581. A firm has to 
fulfil three criteria to be considered a “bank”: First, it must be a firm that does business under 
the laws of the United States or of any state. Second, receiving deposits and making loans are 
substantial parts of this business. Third, the firm must be subject by law to supervision and 
examination by U.S. authorities that have supervision over banking institutions. 
It is clear to see how financial intermediation plays a fundamental role in financing the 
economy. The two key benefits are deposit-taking and the payment system. Both are 
fundamentally linked to each other. Traditionally the “checking accounts in which demand 
deposits are kept allow people to receive and make payments through checks, bank transfers, 
or the use of debit cards and credit cards” (Admati and Hellwig, 2013, p. 49). Those citizens 
and firms who have excess money deposit it at a bank and those citizens and firms who need 
it can get a loan from the bank. However, the bank must manage the maturity mismatch 
between its investments and debts in form of deposits. The liquidity of deposits is by no 
means guaranteed but highly sensitive to the bank’s investments. Pozsar et al. (2012) warn 
that credit creation with this intermediation is inherently fragile and prone to bank runs. This 
continuous threat is the justification for banking regulation (Freixas and Rochet, 2008).  
Banks must decide what loans are sound investments in order to secure long-term profitability 
and hence reassure depositors about the liquidity of their deposits. Risk management 
departments within banks assess the creditworthiness of potential loans and monitor them 
after their issuance better than individuals could. They benefit from economies of scale in 
collecting and assessing information about borrowers’ creditworthiness. Given this expertise 
banks have an informational advantage. 
Banks have access to capital markets providing funds with long maturity and access to money 
markets providing funds at shorter maturity. Also banks lend excess funds to each other 
overnight. This can occur secured, i.e. funds in exchange for collateral like government 
bonds, or unsecured, i.e. the funds are not lent against collateral. A disruption of this financial 
intermediation performed by banks can be the cause of economic crises or can exacerbate 
distress towards a crisis. Hence this pivot in the economy must be protected. 
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2.5.2 Locating the interim results and analysis in the literature 
This sub-section connects the results from the previous sections on securitisation and 
highlights the economic theory background that made the U.S. sub-prime crisis breeding 
ground for the global financial crisis of 2008. The shift towards the macro-prudential 
framework for financial regulation also challenges the policy makers in charge to reconsider 
their own beliefs. Turner (2011) emphasises the need for: 
“radical challenges to dominant economic theory. Was this crisis, as some have 
argued, a crisis not just of specific institutions and regulations, nor even just a crisis of 
markets in general, but also of an entire economic theory? And if so has that theory 
been appropriately de-throned?” (Turner, 2011, p. 2). 
The term “systemic fragility” was coined by Minsky (1977). What is known in the 
macroeconomic literature as “Minsky moments” are sudden collapses of asset values that are 
the direct consequence of business cycles within the economy. It is important to understand 
that this potential for a crisis is endogenous and not simply a short term deviation from a 
growth path. Because of the recent crisis the debate about the endogeneity of boom-bust 
cycles in the economy found attention not only among academics but also among central 
bankers such as Janet Yellen, succeeding Ben Bernanke as the Chair of the Federal Reserve in 
2014. She points to the applicability of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis to the crisis. 
So, “when optimism is high and ample funds are available for investment, investors tend to 
mitigate from the safe hedge end of the Minsky spectrum to the risky speculative and Ponzi 
end” (Yellen, 2009, p. 3). 
There are three stages of financial fragility developed in Minsky’s work (Minsky, 1986) when 
economic agents, for example private investors and households, are indebted. First, “hedge 
finance” describes that economic agents and firms can repay their debt via usual economic 
activities such as income-generating labour and company earnings, respectively. Holding cash 
reserves and the ability to liquidate assets serve as buffers in the case of an unexpected 
decline in income or increase in cash outflow.  
The second stage is “speculative finance”. Cash reserves and the liquidity of assets are not 
enough to counter expenses for liabilities. Hence, borrowing funds is necessary. Typically, 
banks as financial intermediaries are based on a business model to constantly borrow funds to 
repay claims of their depositors.  
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The third stage is “Ponzi finance”. Cash reserves and liquidating assets are insufficient to pay 
the debt. At this stage, in order to meet liability commitments, economic agents depend and 
rely on growing asset prices that can be liquidated in the future. The individual economic 
agent is now financially fragile. Alternatively, economic agents can avoid their fragility 
becoming instability if they can rollover their debt obligations. This Ponzi stage requires that 
enough funding opportunities are available in the economy in order not to collapse. To draw a 
preliminary conclusion, recall the lax mortgage business that made mortgages available to 
sub-prime borrowers. The mortgages were subsequently financed by international financial 
markets with plenty of funds. The originate-to-distribute model was bound to collapse for the 
mortgages were never to be paid back in full. 
Tymoigne (2010) hypothesizes that in capitalist economies Minsky moment like boom-bust-
cycles are a natural by-product of economic activities of economic agents. This stands in stark 
contrast to the pre-2008 crisis prevailing view that the business cycle has been tamed. For 
example in 2004 Ben Bernanke proclaimed the self-understanding of central banking as 
merely further promoting the long lasting era of low macroeconomic volatility, known as 
“Great Moderation” (Blanchard and Simon, 2001). Since the 1980s the observed low 
volatility of economic output in advanced industrial economies has declined (Blanchard and 
Simon, 2001), meaning that economic output has been growing smoothly.  
Three possible effects might explain this observation, see Bernanke (2004). First, structural 
changes such as the use of sophisticated information technology allowed firms to utilise 
communication in order to make their operations more effective. Furthermore, deregulation 
has allowed financial market integration and opened international capital flow. Second, 
“macroeconomic policies have helped moderate the variability of output as well” (Bernanke, 
2004). The third effect, according to Bernanke, that explains the economic stability is simply 
good luck, and he refers to empirical studies in support of a “good luck hypothesis” (see for 
example Ahmed et al., 2002; Stock and Watson, 2003) 
However, an increase in financial fragility has its roots in ostensibly economic good times. 
Risks accumulate during optimistic times and go unnoticed – or plainly ignored. This is also 
known as the “volatility paradox” (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). Hence, researchers face 
the challenge to choose the correct indicators to detect fragility when concerns generally find 
little attention in the markets.  
A preliminary conclusion is that it is essential for regulators to address unsustainable financial 
practices. The business practice in the financial sector needs to be in order first. For example, 
46 
 
the global financial crisis of 2008 was sparked by the crash of the U.S. housing market bubble 
that was fuelled by over-optimistic mortgage borrowers and lenders. Initial mortgage 
payments were advertised at historically low “teaser rates” combined with little to no equity 
contribution to the house purchase by the borrower. In the case of payment difficulties of the 
mortgage borrower, the mortgaged house itself served as collateral. As long as the national 
house price index in the USA constantly went up, the system worked. The building up and 
crash of the U.S. housing market turned out to suffer from its inherent fragility and was bound 
to collapse. This is a common property shared with a Ponzi scheme. However one cannot 
speak of a deliberate fraudulent intention of the mortgage issuer, which is also the definition 
of a Ponzi scheme.  
 
2.5.3 Systemic risk becomes a permanent concern 
This sub-section defines “systemic risk”. A macroeconomic perspective must be in place 
since micro-prudential principles alone cannot reinforce the stability of the financial system 
(Shirakawa, 2009). The term “systemic vulnerability” was coined by Cline (1984) in the 
context of the Latin American crisis of the 1970s. The vulnerability of the whole system is 
inherent rather than a temporarily occurring problem. Hence systemic risk emanates from the 
single bank permanently but differently strong across banks and across time.  
The term “systemic risk” was first used also in the context of the Latin American sovereign 
debt crisis of the 1980s (Cline, 1984). A universally applicable definition of systemic risk is 
given in Zigrand (2014):  
“Systemic risk is the risk of an event – labelled a systemic event – occurring in a given 
system […] that leads, at least temporarily, to an altered and damaged transitional 
‘system’ […] whose proper functioning is impeded. In the extreme, the structure of the 
system itself is damaged and the system no longer functioning.” (Zigrand, 2014, p. 32): 
In his financial markets-related definition of systemic risk, Mishkin (1995) points to the 
likelihood of a “usually unexpected […] event that disrupts information in financial markets” 
(p. 32). In the context of a global financial system, a definition by Federal Reserve Governor 
Tarullo (2009) is that: 
“[f]inancial institutions are systemically important if the failure of the firm to meet its 
obligations to creditors and customers would have significant adverse consequences 
for the financial system and the broader economy.” 
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The Group of Ten (2001) further reduces this risk’s definition to a state where: 
“[…] an event will trigger a loss of […] confidence in, and attendant increases in 
uncertainly about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough 
to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy” (p. 126) 
(Emphasis added). 
Acharya et al. (2012) reinforce the Group’s point of view by noting that Tarullo’s definition 
lacks the crucial insight that systemic risk is not exclusively indicated by a single firm’s 
failure per se. If a financial institution cannot financially intermediate anymore – whether too 
low capital or a total default – the competitors will simply take over the business 
opportunities. Hence the consolidation of the group of suppliers of credit is in itself not 
problematic and not systemic (Goodhart, 1996). Instead, if the aggregated financial 
intermediation is disrupted, then systemic risk is of an economy-wide concern.  
As a conclusion, the stability of a financial system can be undermined by either an exogenous 
shock and by the endogeneity of the financial system. The latter did not receive due attention 
in pre-crisis financial regulation. Both factors work together and exacerbate the damage to 
stability. Figure 2.5 illustrates banks’ exposure to the financial system and systemic risk that 
stems from the banks. 
 
 
 
All banks are exposed to developments in the rest of the financial system, including changes 
in macroeconomic factors as depicted in Figure 2.3 and 2.4 in section 2.4.5 above. For 
example, bank B is a bank that operates in a geographically narrow, local market. Its distress 
does not affect the stability of the financial system. Bank A is a systemically important 
financial institution (SIFI). This is either by sheer size or interconnectedness to the rest of the 
financial system, including other banks. If bank A gets into financial distress this could have 
negative consequences to other banks. Macro-prudential policy makers must consider that an 
Bank A 
(SIFI) 
Bank B 
(small) 
Financial system 
Exposure to 
developments 
Exposure to 
developments 
 
Systemic risk 
Figure 2.5: Systemic risk and financial system exposure. Source: Own 
illustration. 
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initial exogenous shock that brings bank B into distress can cause systemic risk that feeds 
back into the financial system and gathers momentum. After the exogenous shock an 
endogenous disruption follows, so that the stability of the financial system is at stake. 
For example, a sudden decline in macroeconomic factors can drive up the default rate on 
mortgages, see the sub-prime crisis. Some financial institutions are engaged in such business 
and enter financial distress. Because other financial institutions invested in those mortgage 
issuing firms directly or are exposed to the dry up of mortgage-backed securities, see above, 
the initial shock is propagated in the financial system. In case deposit-taking banks are a link 
in this chain of institutions and markets, the negative effects are more severe. Depositors run 
on a bank that is directly exposed to the exogenous shock. If another bank’s depositors lose 
confidence in their bank – even despite deposit protection being in place (Iyer and Puri, 2008) 
–, which is not directly exposed to the shock, the observed bank run might trigger a further 
panic and runs on other banks.  
Hendricks (2009) suggests that systemic crises have three distinct sources that each can cause 
sufficiently large disruptions and usually crises are combinations of these. First, the classic 
bank run attracts the public’s attention through media and introduces a momentum. If bank 
depositors lose, for whatever reasons, confidence in their bank, they withdraw their deposits. 
In order to pay out a substantial number of depositors at the same time, the bank is coerced to 
liquidate profitable investments to raise the physical funds that are paid to the depositors. 
Second, a full-grown systemic crisis can be caused by a financial market collapse. A certain 
asset class is exposed to soaring prices within a relatively short time and is soon perceived to 
be a bubble. When the bubble busts and the cumulative losses are “deep and widespread 
enough” (Hendricks, 2009, p. 3) markets will be concerned about additional losses but are 
uncertain as to where exactly. Furthermore, the perception of losses is state-dependent, too. 
During a crisis, markets might give more relevance to the losses of certain institutions that 
might have been ignored in the normal state in the past. This state-dependence is subject of 
the empirical research on systemic risk in chapter 5. The case of Northern Rock demonstrates 
that this shift of perception is also applicable to markets for certain kinds of assets like 
mortgages. 
Third, an infrastructure collapse undermines the integrity of market mechanisms themselves. 
The result is a disruption of trading and liquidity, as exemplified with Northern Rock’s 
struggle.  
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2.6 Conclusion and defining the research questions 
The global financial crisis of 2008 was sparked by the crash of the U.S. housing market 
bubble that was fuelled by over-optimistic mortgage borrowers and lenders. Initial mortgage 
payments were advertised at historically low “teaser rates” combined with little to no equity 
contribution to the house purchase by the borrower. In the case of payment difficulties of the 
mortgage borrower, the mortgaged house itself served as collateral. However, this condition 
created an inherent instability. As long as the national house price index in the USA 
constantly went up, the system worked. Even though there was no deliberate large scale fraud, 
like the Ponzi scheme is defined, the building up and eventual crash of the U.S. housing 
market demonstrated that this system was not based on a sustainable business model and, due 
to its inherent instability, value corrections fuelled a downward spiral. 
The credit risk of mortgages was converted into market risk of now mortgage-backed 
securities. While the returns remained at the issuing banks, the risks were distributed to the 
global financial system but were not encountered by enough risk-weighted regulatory capital.  
Next, the initial shock was the large scale default in the sub-prime mortgage business and was 
introduced to the global financial system through asset-backed securities. What originally was 
a “pipeline risk” (Brunnermeier, 2009, p. 82) to the originating bank turned out to create 
systemic risk. Furthermore, even those banks that were not involved in the sub-prime business 
faced repercussions as the financial system, of which they were part of, collapsed.  
As a direct consequence of the shock to mortgage-related securities banks were limited to roll 
over their short term debt and saw funding liquidity deteriorating because money markets 
were reluctant to lend against mortgages in general. Furthermore, market liquidity for 
mortgages deteriorated too, because banks were quick to fire-sale mortgages to raise funds. 
Thus, the shock in the U.S. mortgage market was introduced to global finance through 
securities serving as a conduit. This was further amplified by propagation channels such as 
money markets that are a fundamental part of the market structure itself. 
With financial institutions like banks this problem is more severe because they are all part of a 
financial system and are exposed to negative externalities that come with belonging to a 
network. Banks can also fail when they are not directly tied to one another but also, indirectly, 
just happen to be in proximity.  
Making sustainable investment decisions and the interconnectedness of the financial system, 
are the foundation for financial stability. They are now translated to the two core research 
50 
 
questions in more general terms. This PhD thesis’ main research question is whether the 
particular regulatory technique discussed in the chapters can fulfil the new regulatory 
objective to maintain financial stability. This is further separated into two more specific 
research questions:  
- Does the subject which is analysed in this chapter, address the regulated institutions’ 
incentives so that they abstain from taking unsustainable risks that can cause a 
systemic crisis?  
- If yet systemic risk emerges, does the subject, which is analysed in this chapter, able 
to limit its potential for further damages? 
The first question aims at the creation of risks on the individual bank level, i.e. micro-level. 
For example, if banks would have known that the originate-to-distribute business model 
allowed for distributing the credit risk of low quality assets to the global financial markets, 
would they have abstained from it? Would other non-originating banks have abstained from 
investing in such securities? Ideally, the financial system is made more stable if banks are 
diligent and neither excessively create nor invest in such financial instruments. Macro-
prudence should first be exercised where risks are created in the first place.  
The second question considers the fact that even if the participants in the financial system are 
diligent it is the endogeneity of the system’s structure that can cause instabilities and crises. 
The interconnectedness of the global financial system itself is a source of systemic risk. 
Hence the respective chapters also analyse whether the chapter’s subject can also put a stop to 
the momentum of systemic risk.  
The state of the global financial markets was defined by a high degree of interconnectedness 
of markets and “global player” institutions that, during the peak of the crisis when 
governments made available bail out provisions, were deemed “too big to fail”. Originally, 
the “too big to fail” doctrine described institutions that enjoy certain benefits because of their 
absolute size and presence in global markets (Turner Review, 2009). In the April 2006 report 
on global financial stability, the International Monetary Fund emphasised the benefits of 
financial innovation – including securitisation – and: 
“[…] the emergence of numerous, and often very large, institutional investors and the 
rapid growth of credit risk transfer instruments have enabled banks to manage their 
credit risk more actively and to outsource the warehousing of credit risk to a diverse 
range of investors. A wider dispersion of credit risk has ‘derisked’ [sic!] the banking 
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sector, which still occupies a strategically important role in the economy, in part 
because of its role in the payments system” (International Monetary Fund, 2006. p. 1). 
The key fallacy in the above citation is the de-risking of the banking sector which is argued in 
the analysis in this chapter. In its regulatory response, the UK Financial Services Authority 
also hints to the fundamental theoretical assumptions that led the financial system and 
regulatory agencies alike (Turner Review, 2009). Brunnermeier et al. (2009) point out that the 
markets’ and financial regulators’ perception of the stability of banks and other institutions, 
and the system are vulnerable to the fallacy of composition that “arises when one infers that 
something is true for the whole from the fact that it is true for each of the individual 
components of the whole” (p. 75). 
In conclusion, the crisis has shown that banks’ actions to increase profitability seen in 
isolation are perfectly comprehensible. However, the stability of the financial system is not 
solely determined by the aggregate of the soundness of all firm-level actions. The full 
dimension of consequences of an institution’s activities to the rest of the economy is by 
construction not properly reflected in an isolated analysis (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). This 
assessment must be extended with taking interdependencies between the institution and rest of 
the financial system into account. These interdependencies are endogenous risks to the 
stability of the financial system. Thus, the regulatory agencies must employ a macro-
prudential approach, too. How this approach can be implemented is the subject of the next 
chapters. 
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3 Towards a macro-prudential regulatory framework 
This chapter gives a brief introduction tho the regulation of markets and industries in general. 
Next follows a discussion how to organise a financial regulatory agency before the concrete 
plans for a macro-prudential regulatory framework is implemented in the UK, USA, and EU. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified that systemic risk is inherent in the financial system in the 21
st
 
century. The degree of interconnectedness of banks and different financial markets 
distinguishes the 2008 crisis from previous financial crises. Because of doubtful financial 
innovation the fundamental link of risk and return has eroded. Ill-aligned incentives, such as 
prioritising short term profitability over long-term sustainability (de Larosière Report, 2009) 
further accompanied the change. This is partly because of an economic environment that was 
perceived tranquil and partly because the innovations allowed for doubtful business practice, 
and lack of monitoring thereof. The shock in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market destabilised 
the global financial system.  
This chapter focuses on the framework of the new regulatory agencies to fulfil macro-
prudential regulation. The macro-prudential framework comprises the architecture of the 
regulatory agencies and the regulations banks have to abide by. The newly found structures 
and the revised structures in the UK, USA, and EU serve as examples. Independent from the 
structure, the macro-prudential tools that can be used to achieve the regulatory objective of 
financial stability are the subject of the next chapter, i.e. systemic risk capital buffers on top of 
the revised minimum capital requirements.  
Section 3.2 is an introduction to the rationale of regulation in general and implications for the 
choice of a regulatory architecture. Section 3.3 analyses whether macro-prudence should be 
addressed on a national or global level. The sections also trade off the advantages and 
disadvantages of having one regulatory agency in charge against having several specialised 
regulatory agencies. Next, section 3.4 analyses the particular challenges of creating a global 
regulatory framework. Section 3.5 exemplifies the different structures with the newly created 
and revised regulatory agencies in the UK, USA, and EU. Possible issues that come with the 
switch towards the macro-prudential paradigm are identified. Each of the three reformed 
frameworks are analysed according to first, the regulations they impose on the banks, and 
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second, whether the change of the architecture of the respective regulatory agencies can 
deliver their macro-prudential task. Section 3.6 concludes. 
The previous chapter analyses the nature of systemic risk and so helps further define what is 
means for a regulatory agency to be macro-prudend, i.e. addressing the building up of 
unsustainable risks and the propagation channels through which systemic risk can spread. The 
regulatory response needs to be analysed. As shown systemic risk requires a holistic approach 
that goes beyond imposing micro-level regulations. This approach is macro-prudential 
financial regulation. This chapter answers the questions whether the reforms of financial 
regulation underway, i.e. the regulations the regulated subjects have to abide by and 
restructuring of existing regulatory agencies, firstly incentivise the regulated subjects to 
conduct their business in accordance to promoting financial stability and secondly are 
appropriate to counter systemic risk as it materialises. 
 
3.2 The rationales for and approaches to financial regulation 
This section presents the rationale for regulation by giving some examples. Economic theory 
suggests three rationales for financial regulation (see representatively Davis, 1993; more 
general and application to other industries such as transportation and telecommunication, see 
Pera, 1989; Kahn, 1988): information asymmetries, negative externalities, and monopoly 
power. The latter is not as relevant for the purpose of this chapter as the other two and is 
excluded for the sake of brevity.  
If one of these elements can be observed in the real word and the market forces cannot solve 
the problem at hand by themselves, there is a market failure and a regulatory intervention can 
be justified if it improves the situation. So, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) defines regulation according to their work as a “diverse set of 
instruments by which governments set requirements on enterprises and citizens” (OECD, 
1997, p. 5). It further distinguishes three broad categories of regulations: First, economic 
regulations directly affect prices. Examples are controls in the form of caps and floors, 
competition, market entry barriers and market exit, innovation. The aim is to promote 
efficiency of markets. The government creates the law that stands at the fundamentals for the 
regulations. The enforcement can be carried out by different organisational institutions. 
Government-sponsored organisations, i.e. regulatory agencies, have the legal powers to create 
specific rules based on the law. 
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Second, social regulations help protect the public interest, including health, safety, 
environmental concerns, and social cohesion. The OECD recognises that social regulations 
can have unexpected economic effects and a sound analyses are required to derive a genuine 
need for regulations.  
Third, administrative regulations are the administrative formalities to put policy into practice. 
Changing these regulations involve cutting ‘red tape’, i.e. simplifying those administrative 
regulations that are needed and eliminating those that are no longer needed. In contrast to the 
other two categories of regulations, here the daily work of regulatory agencies and their 
organisational structure is in the centre of attention. This is independent of the existence of an 
aim that regulations seek to achieve, whether fostering economic efficiency in a particular 
market or promoting health as a public interest.   
For the purpose of this chapter economic aspects of institutions are in the focus. Particular 
interest is paid to “institutions as a special type of social structure with the potential to change 
agents, including changes to their purposes or preferences” (Hodgsons, 2006, p. 2). Here, 
“institutions’ are interpreted as regulations imposed on banks and regulatory agencies. The 
latter are organisations like central banks that are in charge of proposing regulations and 
supervising the banks. They consciously aim at changing the behaviour of a specific group of 
subjects by means of regulations.  
Market failure is put at the centre of argumentation for economic regulation and intervention 
by those who are legally enabled to do so, e.g. central banks and regulatory agencies. A 
failure is associated with a loss of social welfare. Regulation aims at incentivising private 
decision-making to reach an output that maximises welfare.  
The power of market forces to set incentives is a crucial point for this PhD thesis. The 
previous section analysed how U.S. banks’ incentives to give out sub-prime mortgages on a 
large scale were an unsustainable business. True, individuals seek to maximise their wealth 
according to what the environment provides them with. Record low interest rates fuelled the 
demand for mortgages, fostered by a housing-friendly policy in the USA, and amplified by 
securitisation of such mortgages. A constant re-evaluation of such political will must of 
course be in place, but this is not the subject of this research. Despite the political agenda to 
foster growth in certain sectors of the economy, the final decision whether to invest or not 
should rest with those who have to manage the credit risk, i.e. the issuing bank. Hence, 
despite the political agenda, the incentives to maintain sound economic reasoning must be 
maintained.  
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Addressing the issues is best made through economic regulation, especially market-based 
regulatory instruments. Market forces are more likely to be effective and efficient. A 
government involvement in banking is problematic, since the allocation of resources to 
investment opportunities with the highest possible returns – and its success is reflected in 
overall bank profitability – is not ensured. The government has a home bias (Cerutti and 
Claessens, 2014; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012) towards domestic lending, hence limiting 
financial cross-border integration. This would limit the bank to explore profitable lending 
opportunities abroad and disables the bank’s ability to diversify its portfolio, hence decreasing 
its overall risk.  
For example, the German state-owned Landesbanken suffered severely from the global 
financial crisis more than the private banks. In contrast to private banks, these Landesbanken 
by law serve a “public purpose” (Deeg, 1999). However, before the crisis these institutions 
gave themselves different business models and so there were ambitions to either become the 
world’s largest financer of container ships, become the largest financial institution in eastern 
Europe, or compete with the global investment banking firms – all backed up by their close 
ties with the local governments and implicit guarantees (Papendick, 2009; Liikanen report, 
2012). In the private sector profitability is the decision-making factor for each endeavour and 
put an early end to senior managers’ strategy if it is not convincing. However, with state-
owned banks like the Landesbanken, the simple ambition to expand regardless of long term 
profitability was at the core of decision-making and so they competed in complex global 
transactions that went well beyond their expertise (Schrooten, 2008).   
However, private incentives in banking are not purely limited by long-term profitability 
considerations. There are explicit government guarantees in place in the form of deposit 
protection schemes and implicit guarantees to protect a struggling bank if it could otherwise 
destabilise the rest of the economy. This protection to some degree relaxes the constraints on 
bank managers: If the business strategy fails, the government, i.e. tax payer, covers the losses. 
A government’s command-and-control approach to regulation can introduce a prohibition on 
certain activities (Senden et al., 2015). Such a decision can be called effective, when the 
particular problem is solved. However, the prohibition of a whole activity, rather than one 
detail that was the cause for regulatory invention in the first place, is likely to be inefficient. 
The cost of such a prohibition stands in stark contrast to the benefit. 
For example, suppose that the carbon dioxide emissions of a manufacturing industry are 
considered too high and this puts the public’s health as a policy objective. A prohibition of 
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pollution in the form of a cap on the industry’s emissions translates into a permit for each firm 
to emit the same amount of carbondioxide. It is likely that the largest producers are driven out 
of business because they cannot avoid enough emissions, or can only do so by drastically 
reducing their production. Hence, competition in the industry is distorted which make the 
industry output more expensive to the consumers because of foregone economies of scale in 
the production. Instead, an effective and efficient solution would be to introduce an industry 
cap but allow the firms to trade their allowed emissions. Smaller firms can sell their excess 
permit volume, i.e. pollution right, to the larger firms that are likely to pollute above the 
industry average. This approach is called the market-based regulation. Harnessing market 
forces actively incentivised the economic agents to pursue a regulatory objective not because 
they see the utility for the broader public – this is the regulatory agency’s view – but because 
of its own financial interest. This strategy is at the centre of argumentation in chapter 6 and 
especially in chapter 7. There CoCos are analysed and proposed as a macro-prudential tool to 
regulate banks by setting incentives. 
In conclusion, in a competitive market the price for a particular good regulates the behaviour 
of producers and consumers and so determines the allocation of resources. Yet, the allocating-
power of prices is not ensured at all times. For example a high volatility of prices drives the 
behaviour of market participants into unsteady directions. This can become a major concern 
that leads the way to a complete disruption of the market, i.e. a market failure.  
The recent crisis, as shown in the previous chapter, was a crisis of externalities. In the most 
basic case an externality means that an economic agent is affected by the actions of other 
economic agents. During the crisis, individual bank were negatively affected by the economic 
activities of other banks and financial institutions in the form of worsening refinancing 
conditions, compare section 2.4.5 and figure 2.4 for how interconnectedness of the financial 
system enables negative externalities. However, if the price for a certain asset declines 
because the markets found a new price for it, it is not a negative externality on the books of a 
particular bank that has to mark the asset to the new lower market price. The decline must be 
rather rapid and sufficiently strong to start a self-amplifying spiral that leads to a series of 
bank bankruptcies (see, for example, Adrian and Shin, 2008; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2005; and Geneva Report, 2009). Only if the financial losses of such a spiral are not met in 
full by enough banks and their shareholders directly – hence internalised –, then social costs 
can occur. These externalities are the systemic risk of one bank to the rest of the banking 
system. An empirical analysis of this is subject of chapter 5. 
58 
 
3.2.1 Self-regulation approach 
The previous section shows the rationale for regulation. Consequently after identifying the 
need for regulation, this sub-section shows how regulations can be introduced to achieve the 
desired objective. One approach is the self-regulation by the industry; the other is a 
government approach that involves an active role by the national legislator.   
Self-regulation happens on the industry level in order to introduce a behavioural pattern that 
avoids the prisoner’s dilemma every industry participant is exposed to. In short, and generally 
speaking, the dilemma describes the situation in which all market participants have the 
incentive to cheat in order to maximise their individual wealth to the detriment of the other 
participants. However, if all participants do so, the Also there is no mechanism to detect such 
behaviour or only at prohibitive costs (Tullock, 1985). Market participants still do co-operate 
if the framework of analysis is expanded to repeated co-operation where one’s credibility is 
necessary to engage in further co-operation in the future. Hence, the simple fear of a loss of 
reputation is the foundation for markets’ self-regulation (O’Driscoll and Hoskins, 2006) and 
avoiding the prisoner’s dilemma. The integrity of the market as a whole is ensured by each of 
its participants. This is not because they directly see the need for integrity as such, but 
because it is in their self-interest not to systemically exploit the opportunity to cheat. In the 
end, a consciously pursued self-regulation agenda safeguards the most precious currency: 
one’s reputation. The next section applies this rationale to the example of the emergence of 
central banking in the UK. Since that example also displays how regulation by a government 
can emerge out of the self-regulation approach, it is sensible to present it in the next section 
on government regulation.  
An example for self-regulation is a code of conduct every firm can define for their own 
governance. Firms of the same industry can also define an industry-wide code of conduct. 
Those codes can also be initiated by consumer protections groups. Note that such conduct 
does not necessitate an active role of the legislator. Nevertheless, at some point the 
government can play an active role so that the agreed shared codes or industry standards 
become obligatory. This is called co-regulation (OECD, n.d.). Also, section 3.2.2 below 
contains the discussion of central authority and government involvement. 
Take a firm-specific code of conduct for example: These are mainly values and beliefs aimed 
at own staff across the hierarchy but published publicly to address external stakeholders (see 
for example Deutsche Bank, 2014). This very much is the manifestation of the reputation 
argument made above. Failure to comply can result in the termination of employment. Such a 
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code consists of prohibitions of certain conduct and also encouragement of certain positive 
conduct. Among others the members of staff are encouraged to question the legality of 
observed business practices, bring forward ideas to add to the firm, and addressing issues that 
could lead to reputational damages to the firm in the future.  
Also an industry-wide shared and accepted code of conduct can be in place. For example, 
credit rating agencies (CRAs) experienced significant criticism for their business model. First, 
they rate the creditworthiness of bond-issuing firms with statistical methods that are not 
revealed to the public. So, critics point out that it is difficult to comprehend why such a “black 
box” should be entrusted with the assessment of creditworthiness. Second, CRAs are paid by 
the bond-issuing firms so that a conflict of interest is apparent (de Larosière Report, 2009). 
In order to address these and related issues the first attempt to introduce an industry-wide 
code of conduct was initiated by the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in 2003. Since then this “Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies” (IOSCO, 2015) received several revisions.  
This code publishes principles with the aim to protect the integrity of the rating process, treat 
investors who are interested in ratings and bond issuers who are being rated fairly, and 
safeguard confidential information about the rated issuer. These principles are: First, the 
quality and integrity of the rating process. The need to decrease the information asymmetry 
between the credit rating industry and the financial system stood in the focus. Second, the 
independence of the rating and possible conflicts of interest must be free from political or 
economic pressure. Third, overall transparency must be increased. Fourth, non-public 
information about the rated issuer must be kept confidential.  
At no time was this code of conduct legally binding or indicated to become. Nevertheless, the 
intention behind such a code can be to introduce a “comply or explain” culture in the markets. 
A firm would attract negative attention by competitors and customers for not supporting such 
a code.  
The global financial crisis of 2008 has shown that self-regulation has failed to make systemic 
risk, which is a negative externality, an actual concern for individual investors and other 
market participants. Before the crisis systemic risk was too abstract and too vague to be a 
concern because it could not be exactly quantified. Hence it was not cared about on the micro-
level. Shortly after the crisis peaked, the United Nations Expert Report (2009) on the 
reformation of international financial system encourages fostering intellectual diversity. The 
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crisis was not only financially disastrous but “exposed broader flaws in the understanding of 
the functioning of markets. There was a widespread belief that unfettered markets are, on their 
own, quickly self-correcting and efficient” (United Nations Experts Report, 2009, p. 16). 
They do not indicate the intellectual direction, but ask for alternative economic theories and 
ideas to counter the monopoly of what Avgouleas calls “neo-liberal economic doctrine and 
deregulation” (Avgouleas, 2012, p. 110).  
 
3.2.2 Regulation by public authorities 
This sub-section focuses on financial regulation by a public authority. Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (1995) do not oppose the idea of self-regulation of banks. Careful reading of 
their contribution brings to the point that banking itself has been growing to sophisticated 
levels – arguably to the point of being too complex – and new problems arise. The authors 
give a historical account of the emergence of central banking, especially its role in crisis 
prevention. Goodhart (1988) gives a comprehensive overview about the evolution of central 
banks. Starting with Walter Bagehot’s “Lombard Street” (1873) the purpose of a central bank 
was to assist only “those banks which could expect to be solvent, or to regain solvency, under 
normal non-panic conditions, the point was clearly made that a central bank should seek to act 
for the public good […]” (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995, p. 541). Hence, maintaining the 
public good was achieved by the central bank’s actions, i.e. a macro-monetary policy, but 
indeed this task was carried out with micro-level crisis management by the central bank.  
However, central banks from the early 20
th
 century differ from today’s central banks. Back 
then, the task of “central banking” was not government sponsored with the primacy of 
maintaining a public good. For example until its nationalisation in 1946, the Bank of 
England’s shareholders consisted of banks and other private sector investors. Similarly, this 
insurance-like system was not too different from the joint clearing house approach in the 
USA, see Timberlake (1984).  
From today’s perspective the most intriguing aspect was that despite the absence of a formal 
system of regulation and supervision, moral hazard had not been too big a problem since joint 
rescue efforts were not exploited. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) see two arguments for 
this: First, the public perception was that bank failures just occur and investors had been less 
prone to panic. Hence, the central bank had not been forced to take action and therefore the 
individual bank could not have been certain to receive any rescue funds. Second, peer 
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pressure was high. A rescue would have been a joint task under the lead of the central bank 
and the bank subject to rescue had to be of good reputation among the other banks. There was 
a need to be part of such a “club” (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995, p. 542) with a joint 
central bank. Mutual monitoring of the club members revealed “aberrant, and excessively 
risky, behaviour” (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995, p. 542). It was the pure self-interest of 
each club member to spot and denounce such behaviour because if not they would later be 
required to contribute to a rescue and testify to the central bank (Calomiris, 1998). 
Yet, this model ceased to exist. First of all, competition among banks increased from the 
1960s onward in the course of deregulation. Later in the 1980s this process was further 
fuelled by a series of global financial integration efforts known as the “Washington 
Consensus” (Stiglitz, 1998). States agreed to fiscal discipline such as trade liberalization, 
foreign direct investments, and further deregulation to lower market entry barriers 
(Williamson, 1993). The club members were then not willing to survey their peers since the 
restrictive practices were abolished all together. 
Businesses emerged with an ever more diversified product portfolio on offer to their 
customers, as well as exploring additional profit streams such as investment banking, trading 
activities, and life insurance; “sometimes on a single balance sheet or sometimes in separate 
non-banking entities” (George, 1997, p. 115). The financial industry has become more 
heterogeneous and less transparent because of this “blurring” (Thompson, 1996, p. 35) of 
traditional distinct businesses.  
As a consequence gaps in the task of regulating can be filled with public authorities that are 
supported by the government. However, the intervention of a government through this co-
regulation approach alters the allocation of resources. Government regulation carries the 
inherent risk of permanently eroding the system of how markets operate. For example, 
interfering in the pricing of certain goods distorts the market’s ability of price discovery. In 
the context of banking regulation “free banker” (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2002, p. 261) 
scholars put the disciplining effects of market forces – like demandable bank deposits 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), as discussed in detail in section 
6.4.2 – over the interference by a government, or other benevolent public authority, in order to 
preserve the market forces’ ability of optimal resource allocation.  
Nevertheless, the two approaches of self-regulation and co-regulation – with a public 
authority in charge – do not constitute mutually excluding approaches. On the national level 
the regulatory traditions play an important role. In the UK self-regulation gains more attention 
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than in most continental European countries. There the classic command-and-control 
approach to regulation is more popular, which does not wait for industry initiatives that soon 
are supported by the public authorities through co-regulation. It is prescriptive and simply 
prohibits certain activities (Senden et al., 2015). 
An example for co-regulation: Before it was replaced with a new regulatory environment in 
2012, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK was the industry-sponsored single 
regulatory agency (FSA, 2014). However, instead of guarding over a self-regulatory code that 
had been formulated, the FSA’s mission and legal powers were set out in the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (2000) – which also applies to the current regulatory agencies in the 
UK, which are subject of section 3.4.2. However, the regulatory model of the FSA as an 
industry-sponsored regulatory agency backed up by the legislator eventually failed. 
Unfortunately the FSA’s approach was a “light touch” (Alford, 2010, p. 1) regulation to 
attract financial services but failed to recognise the potential of a meltdown of the financial 
system (Turner, 2009).  
Then again, neither did regulatory agencies in the USA and continental Europe, regardless of 
their background. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (2013) in the UK 
concludes that regulatory failure and misjudgement of risk have led to the crisis. Those 
failures were due to the slow regulatory response process in general and a rules-based 
regulatory framework that was too much engaged with its own processes. The notion of a 
“light touch” regulation in pre-crisis times means that supervision of banks comprised of 
“mechanical data collection and box ticking” (Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards, 2013, p. 12). Regulators must exercise sound judgement, rather than ticking the 
boxes, but must constantly reflect on the risks of their own judgement. 
To recap the findings of chapter 1, systemic risk and therefore the concerns about the stability 
of the financial system has become an ongoing challenge for the financial markets and the 
regulatory agencies alike. Hence macro-prudence must address the negative externalities that 
are out of the reach – or in fact interest – of the financial institutions because they are difficult 
to identify. The self-regulation approach can address business conduct and how the regulated 
subjects engage with their customers and other market participants. But the complexity of 
maintaining financial stability requires a clear definition of who has the competence and 
accountability to engage this challenge. A centralised regulatory agency might be an obvious 
solution. However, the success depends not only on who engages this challenge, e.g. an 
industry-sponsored agency or one regulatory agency backed by the government, but also how 
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the agency regulates. This is the topic of the next two sections before the analysis of how the 
regulatory environment is reshaped in the UK, USA, and EU. 
 
3.2.3 Rules-based approach to regulation  
A strict rules-based regulation prescribes the regulated subjects what they can do and what 
they cannot do. The advantage is that the regulated subjects know exactly what rules to abide 
by all the time. Recall the above example of pollution with carbon dioxide. A rule can be that 
each firm is not allowed to emit more than a certain amount of tonnes. There is no room for 
interpretation and hence misunderstanding. Also the regulatory agency in charge can 
underscore its accountability if it is clear that it enforces the rules.  
A disadvantage is that these rules lack a degree of flexibility of the rulebook in order to match 
pressing problems at hand. Moreover, the rulebook can be quite extensive and the resulting 
compliance costs hit smaller firms the hardest for they are less likely to have vast compliance 
expertise (Financial Services Authority, 2007). Also the regulated subjects perceive the rules 
to be a box ticking exercise (Persaud, 2015). So, the rulebook in place is followed in letter 
rather than spirit.  
 
3.2.4 Principles-based approach to regulation 
The principles-based approach to regulation has the advantage that the regulated subjects are 
coerced to further look into what objectives the policy makers intend to promote. So, rather 
than just following policies by letter like the rules-based approach, they follow them in spirit, 
too. Here, the policy maker emphasises the desired outcome of regulation that can be 
achieved with principles (FSA, 2007). This helps regulators and regulated subjects to 
comprehend why the regulations are in place in the first place. The reasons for abstaining 
from certain behaviours enable a degree of flexibility that a purely prescriptive, rules-based 
approach cannot.  
For example, as a matter of principle firms can be encouraged to employ production 
technologies that are less hostile to the environment. A rules-based regulatory framework 
must identify each toxin separately and introduce caps on their emissions. A simple principle 
can capture all of these toxins that are known to be “hostile to the environment” without 
strenuously defining each and listing all of them.  
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Obviously the disadvantage of principles-based regulation is that it comes with higher 
compliance costs. Especially where there is room for interpretation. Consequently, 
supplemental guidelines may be necessary to enable the regulated subjects to comprehend 
what is expected from them and minimising the room for misunderstanding.  
Applied to financial regulation, a lack of clarity is also a cause for confusion within a 
principles-based regulation. The BCBS (2012) issued the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision. There, the 16 Principles for “prudential regulations and requirements” 
give guidance to the regulatory agencies’ tasks to supervise banks. Ten of them use the term 
“adequate” to define what the prudent agency should look for in a bank. A lack of precision is 
inherent to the definition of what is “adequate”. So, these Principles merely point to the 
direction of what prudential supervision should resemble, yet the national supervisory agency 
– together with its legislator – should formulate in more concrete terms what they expect of 
the regulated banks. For example, a stark mismatch between the performance of banks and 
excessive remuneration has been observed during the crisis. A cap on remuneration or a 
deferral of the pay-out of bonuses is currently under way in the EU. However, the there are 
exceptions to this deferrals. The guidelines on sound remuneration policies issued by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) apply within these exceptions. So, where concrete rules 
for remuneration do not apply, e.g. small institutions or where the variable remuneration is a 
small portion, the “principle of proportionality” (EBA, 2015a) applies. Nevertheless, even the 
EBA admits that these instances raise “interpretation issues for institutions, competent 
authorities, the EBA and the European Commission” (EBA, 2015a, p. 3). 
Obviously a principles-based approach makes compliance for banks an ongoing task rather 
than a once-a-year routine. Also the regulatory agencies have to constantly revise and adapt 
new principles to make sure that the regulatory framework is not outdated like a stiff rules-
based framework is likely to eventually become over time. 
Note that the two approaches of rules-based and principles-based regulation are not mutually 
exclusive, but complementary. The overall regulatory framework can consist of rules and 
principles. So, for unambiguous fundamental factors in financial regulation, like the loss-
absorbency of each bank, minimum capital requirements can be introduced; banks simply 
have to abide by these quantitative rules. Principles are more appropriate where sources of 
risks vary case-by-case and can best be addressed by banks themselves. For example a 
principle of a fair treatment of customers would require banks to know their individual 
customer’s needs and tailor solutions adequately. However, the strengths of principles can 
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only be revealed if compliance can actually be measured (Kling, 2012). For example, the 
Prudential Regulation Authority, the UK’s financial regulatory agency, requires, among 
others, that “[a] firm must at all times maintain adequate financial resources” (PRA, 2016, p. 
9) and that “[a] firm must act in a prudent matter” (PRA, 2016, p. 9). Compliance with the 
former can be measured by comparing the calculated capital cushion to the current market 
environment. A gap enables the regulatory agency to take action. In contrast, compliance with 
the latter is difficult to measure. Not complying with such a prudent manner is only identified 
ex post. So, further definitions and examples for what is and what is not “prudent manner” 
must be provided. 
 
3.3 Different ways to create a regulatory architecture 
This section focuses on how a regulatory agency can be constructed. In addition, the section 
als demonstrates the difficulties in creating a global regulator. In the UK the Turner Review 
(2009) concluded that the two to three decades prior to the 2008 crisis were dominated by 
three intellectual arguments: First, efficient and liquid financial markets make available a full 
range of contracts to fulfil lenders’ and borrowers’ preferences for risk, return, and liquidity. 
Second, “markets are sufficiently rational as to justify a strong presumption in favour of 
market deregulation” (p. 40). Third, even if irrational behaviour occurs, policymakers cannot 
be able to make a sound judgement about how heavy this irrationality weights and justify 
interventions. 
Given the experience from the 2008 crisis, in the EU the Larosière Report (2009) concludes 
that the crisis results from: 
“the complex interaction of market failures, global financial and monetary imbalances, 
inappropriate regulation, weak supervision and poor macro-prudential oversight. It 
would be simplistic to believe therefore that these problems can be ‘resolved’ just by 
more regulation. Nevertheless, it remains the case that good regulation is a necessary 
condition for the preservation of financial stability” (p.13).  
The particular challenge of creating a macro-prudential framework is to define “good” 
regulation. A simple suggestion is that good regulation first addresses the relevant problems. 
Second, on the part of the regulatory agency the regulations are enforced. Third, a good 
regulatory regime allows the regulatory agency to keep pace with the latest developments of 
the regulated industry, here addressing systemic risk in particular. So, in drafting new 
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regulations and revising existing regulations, policy makers must enable an adaptability of the 
rulebook. As the previous section shows, a more principles-based approach is best suited for 
this. 
Financial stability is a global public good (Shirakawa, 2012). Hence domestic policy makers 
and regulators must co-operate in addressing systemic risk. The path towards a shared 
regulatory catalogue is by no means a simple task. Even if regulatory reforms, for example 
minimum capital requirements, have been agreed on an international level, the 
implementation of the reforms itself becomes the subject of dispute. Blackmore and Jeapes 
(2009) identify that the “key defining feature of this financial crisis distinguishing it from 
other crises is its global nature which has led to oversee the global financial system and to 
prevent another global crisis on a similar scale happening again” (p. 113). 
Policy makers now refurbish the regulatory framework – i.e. regulations imposed on banks 
and architecture of the regulatory agencies – and allocate new responsibilities to regulatory 
agencies and the legal powers to exercise them. In the light of the above citation, a unified 
global regulatory approach seems plausible. However, as the next sections show, different 
legislations pursue different approaches to put macro-prudence into practice. The change of 
the regulatory frameworks in the UK, USA, and EU serve as examples. 
These are the four stages to form a single global regulatory agency (see Bollen, 2008): First, 
the member states that generally agree on the necessity of international standards discuss a 
road map. There is no immediate urge for commitment to adopt the standards. However, these 
discussions might be just too vague and identify the lowest common denominator, or as the 
most critical voices would call it, a “race to the bottom” (Bollen, 2008, p. 7). However, these 
international institutions have no formal mandate to give legally binding orders. This “soft” 
law (Zaring, 2012) is frequently dismissed as policy makers paying lip service to the good 
will and nothing will happen afterwards (Gersen and Posner, 2008; Macey, 2003). Much 
depends on the momentum the willingness of member states to push forward the standard 
setting. Yet, this criticism can be circumvented by introducing a “comply or explain” policy 
where member states can “black-list” those member states that do not communicate a 
commitment. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve will not allow foreign banks to open a 
branch unless the regulatory framework in its home country recognises standards similar to 
the U.S. standards (Hendell, 1994). There, the pressure of a “comply or explain” culture 
introduces peer pressure among the competitors analogous to the county-level negotiations of 
standards we currently observe. 
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Second, coordinating a serious commitment occurs through regulatory colleges provided by 
multinational forums such as the BIS with regards to global banking regulation. There 
scholars with the necessary expertise, policy makers and their national regulators, and 
business representatives can pave the path towards drafting regulatory standards (Felsenfeld 
and Bilali, 2004). The following section 3.4.1 discusses the Basel accord.  
Third, the implementation into national regulation is assisted by a body that supervises the 
national regulators. For example, the Basel Accord Implementation Group consists of senior 
regulators from across the member states (Federal Reserve, 2003) and acts as a service 
provider to clarify implementation issues. Now the international efforts are already beyond 
setting the standards for the regulated industry. The implementation process is now in the 
focus. Hence at this stage the multinational forum, or college, has spawned a “global 
coordinator” (Geiger, 1998, p. 47). 
Fourth, the ultimate stage is a “supreme global regulatory body” (Felsenfeld and Bilali, 2004, 
p. 107) that directly regulates banks. This would require the global regulator to be backed up 
with a clear mandate and the legal provision by the member states. For example, reforms in 
the EU come close to this with plans to make the ECB the single regulatory agency. 
Independent from the stage in which the international efforts are, the decision makers have to 
decide on the architecture of the resulting agency. This applies to both a global regulatory 
agency and a purely domestically operating regulatory agency. There are four approaches. 
Policy makers can base their choice starting with the regulatory agency they want to have 
(Fresh and Baily, 2009). This can be a single, “unified supervisory agency” (Llewellyn, 2006, 
p. 23), in the integrated approach, or two regulators in the twin peaks approach. Alternatively, 
they can create the regulatory agencies according to the shape of the regulated industry. If so, 
the functional approach focuses on the services industry provides regardless of its legal status, 
potentially restricting arbitrage. The institutional approach does recognise the legal status. The 
latter two approaches pose a considerable challenge to the regulatory agency (or agencies). 
The regulated industry can broaden their services faster than the regulator can catch up with. 
The institutional approach suffers from its inflexibility.  
Recall the definition of “macro-prudence” from section 2.5. At the centre of macro-prudence 
lays the deeper insight that the stability of the financial system is not the sum of the stability 
of each element of the system, especially banks. Developments on the micro-level can 
accumulate to issues on the macro-level. Two further obstacles emerge: First, who should 
address such macro-prudential issues? Is an industry-level self-regulatory body able to this? 
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Or is a regulatory authority with the legal backup better suited? Second, on what level should 
macro-prudence be addressed? A globalised financial system would require that macro-
prudential issues are addressed on an international level. This in turn would require that the 
different national jurisdictions agree to harmonise regulatory standards.  
To answer the first question, the individual financial institution must care about the problem 
in the first place. Since negative externalities are the core of the problem, the individual 
institution does not care about internalising. So, a self-regulatory framework is not likely to 
persist in the long run because the industry has no incentive to care enough about the problem, 
hence does not internalise it. 
In regards to the second question, addressing a global problem on a global level seems to be 
the appropriate solution. However, the challenge can turn out to be impracticable. This 
requires reconciling the national interests of various countries that need to hand over 
significant parts of their sovereignty of regulating financial institutions. Nevertheless, 
international co-ordination and standard setting through forums like the BIS and BCBS Basel 
accord can lead to a holistic, harmonised macro-prudential approach that is equally enforced 
on a national level. Currently, elements of the latest version of Basel III are continuously 
adopted among the 27 member jurisdictions (BCBS, 2016). 
Consequently it is argued that for the purpose of creating a macro-prudential regulatory 
environment on a national level, the integrated approach and the twin peaks approach qualify. 
Regulatory agencies that follow an integrated approach are the universal regulator for all 
types of financial institutions, ranging from deposit-taking banks to proprietary trading 
investment banks, insurers, and other financial institutions (Fresh and Baily, 2009). Llewellyn 
(2006) distinguishes between integrated and unified regulators. An agency is integrated if it 
exercises prudential supervision; an agency is unified if it exercises prudential and conduct 
supervision at the same time. This differential treatment is not followed in this thesis. 
The advantages of a single regulator are that regulatory arbitrage is abated and information 
gathering is centralised (Briault, 1998). However, the more universal a regulator is, the less 
specific the regulatory expertise can be (Llewellyn, 2006). Because of the sheer size of the 
regulatory agency, it might be the case that the senior executives prioritise a few aspects of 
the agency’s tasks and allocates the agency’s resources accordingly. The potential threat is 
that other parts of the regulated subjects are left unrecognised or under-recognised. For 
example within a unified agency, customer protection could be prioritised in times of 
financial tranquillity to the detriment of systemic risk concerns. 
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Alternatively, the task of regulation can be given to a prudential agency and a conduct agency. 
Both coexist in one jurisdiction and address the same industry but from different angles. This 
“twin peaks” (Taylor, 1995 and 1996; Goodhart, 1996) model of regulatory architecture is 
“based primarily upon the objectives of regulation, albeit fine-tuned to take account of market 
developments and of the need for accountability and efficiency” (Briault, 1999, p. 24). These 
objectives are safety and soundness (prudence) and consumer protection (conduct). Both 
regulatory agencies have advantages in catching up with trends in their respective fields and 
are more likely to develop specialised knowledge (Llewelyn, 2006). If their findings are 
merged accordingly, a comprehensive assessment of the regulated industry can be derived. A 
disadvantage one might think of is that the regulated industry has to comply with two sets of 
regulatory requirements, hence the compliance costs increase. However, the twin peaks 
approach can be more effective than a single agency. A conduct regulator usually requires 
legal expertise in consumer protection whereas a prudential regulator requires expertise in the 
field of economics (see for example Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Banking 
Supervision and Regulation, HL 101-I). The work of macro-prudential regulators can go hand 
in hand with the classic monetary policies performed by the central bank, see the UK 
architecture in section 3.4.2.2.  
 
3.4 How macro-prudential regulation is put in practice on a national and international 
level 
The previous sections highlight the difficulties in combining the difficult nature of macro-
prudence and choosing a regulatory architecture that is best suited to put macro-prudence into 
practice. This section analyses in more detail the concrete plans and what has already been 
done to reshape the regulatory frameworks in the UK, USA, and EU. The comparison of 
advantages and disadvantages of the respective frameworks help answer how macro-prudent 
the respective regulatory architecture and regulations in place are. For example, the 
architecture in the UK experienced a complete overhaul with new regulatory agencies, 
whereas in the USA existing regulatory agencies are re-shaped and new ones are added. In the 
EU the ECB is gradually building up more competences towards a unified regulatory 
structure. As for regulations, the most prominent example is the ring-fencing of deposits in 
the UK, scheduled to be implemented in 2019, that banks simply have to abide by and the 
prohibition of proprietary trading in the USA. 
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The pre-crisis paradigm was to address the financial safety and soundness of the individual 
regulated financial institutions (Turner Review, 2009). The lessons learned from 2008 are that 
the aggregate of the individual institutions does not equal the stability of the system as a 
whole. How interactions of the regulated subjects occurred in the broader financial system, 
i.e. in the borrowing and leveraging and maturity transformation was neglected. In summary, 
a holistic approach of macro-prudential regulation includes scrutinising the asset side of 
individual banks as well as the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet. For this, recall the 
case of Northern Rock from the previous chapter. Figure 3.1 illustrates the shift from the old 
to the new regulatory approach. 
Figure 3.1: Pre-crisis and post-crisis regulatory paradigms. Source: International 
Monetary Fund (2013). 
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Figure 3.1 above illustrates the gap in the regulatory approach before the crisis and the place 
of macro-prudence after the crisis. Before the crisis macro-economic policies, like monetary 
policy, are subordinated to the objective of maintaining price stability. The regulation of 
banks had a micro-prudential scope. After the crisis, macro-prudential regulation aims at 
filling the gap between the two. Financial stability is the second main objective coequal to 
price stability. Macro-prudence has to reconcile issues of price stability, the idiosyncratic risk 
of individual banks, and the externalities stemming form the interconnectedness on the micro-
level, i.e. systemic risk. 
After the gap in the regulatory paradigm has been identified and is filled with a macro-
prudential approach, in the next step policy makers must mould the new regulatory agencies 
into a specific form. The regulatory frameworks in the UK, USA, and EU are examples of 
how macro-prudence is interpreted differently. The framework consists of what new 
regulations are imposed on banks and how their respective regulatory architecture is 
overhauled. These points are subjects of sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4, respectively. 
A further reason of concern is basing the rationale for having several regulators dependent on 
the regulatory objective. For example, in the functional approach, there is one special 
regulator tasked with “systemic” concerns across all financial institutions. This necessitates 
that the boundaries of the regulator’s operating range is blurred, so that agency has access to 
banks and non-bank financial institutions alike to fulfil its objective. Because “a wide range of 
firms can now create potentially systemic problems” (Taylor, 1995, p. 4; George, 1997), the 
operating range of the regulatory agency must be increased. In addition, again, a principles-
based approach to regulation would make it easier for regulatory agencies to have this impact. 
Dudley (2014) submits three distinctive characteristics of prudential supervisionthat help tell 
the success of a new framework: fairness, conscientiousness, and effectiveness. All three of 
them translate into the corporate governance of the regulatory agencies that exercise the actual 
prudential supervision. 
Fairness is the consistent applications of rules across the regulated subjects. Regulatory 
decisions must be exercised without any influence from the business side or political wishes. 
Conscientiousness aims on how the regulatory agency perceives itself; it must be honest about 
its own work and self-critical analysis must be followed by the willingness towards self-
improvement. This is a crucial point and must not be underestimated. Hence, an internal 
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revision department or similar system is necessary to conduct annual reviews whether the 
agency captures developments in the regulated sector.  
Effectiveness of prudential supervision means that the agencies and supervisors are indeed 
tough on banks, meaning that they have the “teeth” and are not afraid of showing them. 
The Beim report (Beim, 2014) gives valuable insight into the cultural failure within the 
Federal Reserve to comply with those standards. For example, consensus-seeking among 
supervisory staff has damped the efforts to nurture a culture of debate that would eventually 
lead to better regulatory outcomes.   
 
3.4.1 International coordination of financial regulation with the Basel accord 
Before the plans for introducing a macro-prudential framework in the USA, UK, and EU are 
analysed, this sections gives a brief introduction to the Basel capital accord that is widely 
considered as the global standard for recommending a financial regulation rulebook.  
The BIS is one of the various forums where central banking issues and financial regulation are 
discussed and make it to a proposed standard. The crisis of 2008 resulted in a reviwed version 
of the Basel minimum capital accord, i.e. Basel III. The participants range from the area of 
academia, policy makers, and practitioners from both sides of the daily regulatory work, i.e. 
central bankers and bankers. The need for coordination efforts on a global level is reinforced 
with the realisation that systemic risk is a new risk category in its own right. 
One of the achievements of these high-level discussions was the Basel Accord on capital 
requirements that ought to create a level playing field for banks’ loss-absorbency. The second 
Basel Accord on capital requirements, Basel II, was drafted in the late 1990s to address the 
shortcomings of its predecessor Basel I. Currently Basel III is phased in until 2018 and 
addresses the shortcomings of Basel II. Basel II defines a three pillar regulatory framework 
that aims to be introduced into national financial regulation.  
The first pillar stipulates how banks calculate the minimum capital requirements. Pillar two 
addresses the process of the supervisory review. This enables the regulatory agencies to 
control the capital calculations of the banks. The third pillar reinforces market discipline. 
When market forces exercise such discipline, banks produce transparency about their business 
(Wall, 1989; Flannery, 1998). 
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There is plenty of criticism on this framework not only in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis but 
also during the draft stages. The rulebook is incomplete and by no means is a comprehensive 
framework. A correlation between credit risks is ignored. This means that the credit risk of 
individual borrowers is assumed to be dealt with in isolation, which is not the case since 
borrowers are exposed to the same macroeconomic factors. For example they share the 
geography and are exposed to the economic prosperity of the region. Recall the sub-prime 
crisis where the credit risk of sub-prime mortgage takers in the USA was highly sensitive to 
changes in the level of rates at which banks lend to each other, such as the LIBOR. Further 
examples are given in Admati and Hellwig (2013, p. 312f, footnote 64). 
The technical flaws of Basel II are raised in Daníelsson et al. (2001). Especially grave is the 
criticism of the treatment of risk as exogenous to banks. In fact the financial system is 
threatened by endogenous risks, for example the systemic risk stemming from the individual 
financial institution. The capital requirements actually introduce procyclicality and exacerbate 
the threat of systemic instabilities. Neither pillar sufficiently addressed this. So, banks tend to 
lend more than is sustainable from a systemic point of view. Similarly, during market 
downturns banks further tighten their lending. But the lending is needed for the economy to 
recover sooner than later. How this issue is addressed with countercyclical capital 
requirements is the subject of the next chapter where macro-prudential tools are analysed. 
Furthermore, the incentives Basel II regulations aimed to set for the regulated subjects are ill-
aligned (see Calomiris, 1998). Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, made no secret of the 
bank’s attempts to exploit the existing rules on risk-weighted assets (RWA) to the best. In his 
words the bank will “manage the hell out of RWA” (Braithwaite, 2011) to minimise the 
regulatory capital buffer. Banks put in more effort to arbitrage the existing rules rather than 
managing the business risk they face, which of course should be the intention behind such 
regulations in the first place. So, more needs to be done to emphasise that banks should abide 
the rules by spirit rather than just by letter. 
In the following sections the new and revised regulatory agencies in the UK, USA, and EU 
are compared. The changes of the regulatory environments are analysed in regards of their 
fairness, conscientiousness, and effectiveness to fulfil the macro-prudential paradigm. 
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3.4.2 Regulatory change in the UK 
This section analyses the regulatory framework in the UK. The framework is further divided 
into the new regulations banks have to abide by and the architecture of the regulatory agencies 
in the UK. Additional regulatory instruments at the UK regulator’s disposal aim on curbing 
lending with imposing different ratios in the actual lending business. For example a mortgage 
can only be granted if the mortgage is sustainable, measured by dividing the value of the 
mortgage to the borrower’s income. The regulatory agency decides on the exact level of this 
ratio. However, the following sub-sections focus on the organisational requirements imposed 
on banks to harmonise with the regulatory architecture in place; the regulatory instruments 
such as ratios are analysed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
3.4.2.1 Regulatory action in the UK: Ring-fencing deposits 
The Turner Review (2009) identified the need to formally isolate specific activities of banks 
in order to make them more manageable for the regulatory agencies. This “ring-fencing” 
(Turner Review, 2009, p. 99) of activities has been reinforced in the final report of 
Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) in 2011 and is scheduled to be introduced in 
2019. It is consequently developed further with the aim of ensuring that distressed entities, 
especially in regards to retail banking that provides credit intermediation vital to the economy, 
“can be resolved in an orderly manner” (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014, p. 5) without 
taxpayer liability and major disruptions to the core services of the banking sector. These core 
services are provided in the form of the deposit-taking entities, payment system, and credit 
supply to households and businesses in the UK (ICB, 2011). Note that this is not a complete 
decoupling of core services from other financial services. Rather, existing bank holding 
groups have to adapt their organisational structure in a way that, in principal, allows the ring-
fenced activities “to take decisions independently of other members of its group” (see 142H 
of the Act, as amended by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.). This formal 
independence of decision making must be accompanied by a resource independency. It must 
be ensured at all times that the failure of one or more members of the bank holding company 
does not affect the resources available the ring-fenced entities. One driving factor was that 
secured deposits served as funds to finance investment decisions bank could not sustain. 
Consequently, several additional prohibitions and specifications must apply to the ring-fenced 
entities. These include prohibitions on intra-group guarantees to make sure that other parts of 
the bank holding company do not have access to secured funds to equalise losses in their 
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business. Furthermore, intra-group transactions such as loans and asset sales must be priced 
under market conditions “as if they have been carried out between unrelated parties” (Baber, 
2012, p. 3) to avoid disguised cross-financing (HM Treasury, 2012a). In return, the regulatory 
agencies have easier access to the entities because of the ring-fence and so are easier to 
protect. These regulatory objectives in respect to the ring-fence are defined in section 2B of 
the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.  
 
Furthermore, this ring-fenced entity is prohibited from investing in “excluded activities” that 
would expose the entity to shocks in the financial markets (HM Treasury, 2012). The 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Excluded Activities and Prohibitions) Order 2014 
defines these excluded activities. For example, trading commodities, such as trading in the 
future contract market for sugar, is prohibited, see article 5. However, general exceptions are 
granted. The status of the activity depends of the purpose of the particular investment. 
Trading commodities for the own account, called proprietary trading, is prohibited. Yet, the 
ring-fenced entity can trade the commodity if the trade is part of the risk management, such as 
addressing liquidity risk (article 6(3)(a)) or any other purpose. However, there might be 
potential for arbitrage when the “prohibited activities” can be disguised as being part of 
addressing the own risk management as an “ancillary activit[y]” (HM Treasury, 2012b, p. 10). 
This requires the regulatory agencies to continuously review the business conduct of the bank. 
The ring-fence structure decouples the vital services to the economy from risks stemming 
from an exposure to financial markets. Consequently, this separation can reverse some of the 
synergies between the ring-fenced activities and the other groups of the bank holding 
company (Baber, 2012). 
The regulatory agencies must not operate on a zero-failure regime and protect these entities at 
any costs. As long as a failure is orderly, market discipline must not be replaced with a 
protection by the regulatory agencies. 
This way of modernisation the regulatory paradigm is insofar remarkable for it does not 
merely make the regulatory structure fit the current state of the regulated industry but also 
imposes structural requirements on the industry itself to make it fit the regulatory agencies. 
The banking industry’s ability to arbitrage the system is limited. This can turn out to be a 
significant advantage for the effectiveness of the regulatory regime, so it delivers macro-
prudence. 
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3.4.2.2 Architecture of the regulatory agencies in the UK 
A formal separation of central banking and the regulation and supervision of the banking 
sector is merely a preference of a country (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). There are no 
compelling arguments whether a model of strictly separated monetary policy and supervision 
or a single national body is the better model. Even if the two are formally separated, in 
practice they would have to – and indeed do – work closely together anyway.  
Turner (2009) notes that in retrospect the division of micro- and macro-prudence was not 
beneficial, compare upper panel of Figure 3.1. The Bank of England  
“was focused on its monetary policy mandate. The FSA focused on micro-prudential 
supervision on an institution by institution basis, and on an interpretation of that which 
was fairly legalistic and focused on systems and processes. Somewhere between the 
big picture got lost; the overall trends in credit extension across the economy and in 
assets prices were not put together with certain business developments to sound a 
warning” (Turner, 2009a). 
There is a preference in the UK towards preserving sovereignty over the domestic financial 
services industries. The UK has a market share of 39 per cent of EU stock exchanges 
measured in stock turnover (De Haan et al., 2009). The UK is also subject to efforts of 
regulatory convergence in the EU, which are subject of section 3.4.4. The EU and UK have 
different opinions about certain regulations. Hence frictions could diminish the overall 
effectiveness of macro-prudence on a global level.   
The UK follows a twin peaks structure, see Figure 3.2 below for an illustration. The 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is primarily concerned with systemic risk and 
accordingly financial stability. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) addresses the 
protection of the consumer. The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) connects the prudential 
supervison of banks exercised by the PRA and the monetary policy decisions of the Bank of 
England. The FPC and PRA are located within the Bank of England and exercise macro-
prudence. The FCA is located outside, but in contact with the FPC. 
The list of available tools at the FPC’s disposal in non-exhaustive. It is deliberately given the 
freedom to revise and develop tools as they see fit for the regulatory objective of maintaining 
financial stability. These tools include countercyclical capital buffers, leverage ratio, and 
limiting lending to housing. The tools are described in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Figure 3.2: The new regulatory structure in the UK. Source: Bank of England (2013). 
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The FCA has the ability to intervene in financial product design. The conduct regulators 
support the banks in the design process, yet the responsibility towards designing appropriate 
products lies with the banks. However, the Commission on Banking Standards (2013) point 
out that in exercising judgement, the FCA faces a tightrope walk: On the one hand too early 
an intervention could lead to market distortions to the detriment of consumer benefit. From 
the regulated subjects’ point of view this constitutes regulatory uncertainty and has to be 
factored in in the process. On the other hand, late intervention makes consumers suffer as the 
mis-selling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) by British banks has demonstrated. 
Customers with PPI bought an insurance against outstanding loans such as mortgages and 
credit card bills due to falling ill or losing their jobs. But “it will be years before […] this mis-
selling scandal is over” (Wayman, 2015). In cases where banks were involved, a customer 
only signed for a mortgage and the insurance was sold on top of it. It was not fully clear to the 
customer that PPI was a separate product that the customer could have rejected. This raises 
more general doubt about the ill-aligned cross-selling procedures in banks and the customers’ 
needs. 
The PRA has the objective of maintaining safety and soundness of its supervised institutions, 
and as second, nevertheless subordinated objective, promoting competition. In October 2014 
the PRA issued a series of Consultative Papers addressing these aspects (see PRA, 2014). Part 
of the primary objective is the deposit-protection within the ring-fenced entities as set out in 
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the Consultation Paper CP20/14 (PRA, 2014a), with regards to insurance companies to 
promote a degree of protection of the insurance policy holders (see CP21/14, PRA, 2014b), 
and fostering effective competition. In fulfilling its regulatory objectives it employs a 
judgement-based, forward looking, and focused strategy. The judgement is based on concrete 
evidence of current risks. Forward looking means that the PRA aims at anticipating future 
sources of risks and to intervene on an early stage. The focus lays on those issues and firms 
that pose the highest risk to the regulatory objectives.  
Macro-prudence is exercised with co-operation between the FPC and PRA within the Bank of 
England. The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was established under the Bank of England 
Act 1998 with amendments in the Financial Services Act 2012 and began its work in April 
2013. However, section 9C(4) of this Act reinforces that the FPC’s must not intervene at any 
costs when the consequence would be “a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the 
financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term”. 
Its mandate gives the FPC the power to first make recommendations to the regulated financial 
institutions and its subordinated regulatory agencies, the PRA and FCA, and second the 
power to direct these regulators to adjust specific macro-prudential tools. The FPC employs a 
quarterly cycle of reviewing their policies. It starts with briefings coming from the Bank of 
England’s economists, market intelligence, analysis from the PRA and FCA, and impact 
studies of existing policies that are put in place. Second, FPC “issues meetings” take place to 
discuss major threats to financial stability in the UK and what macro-prudential instruments 
might put into policy to counter the threats. Third, in the “policy meeting” appropriate steps 
are taken to draft needed policies. Fourth, the FPC communicates their finalised statements 
and recommendations to the identified threats in the Financial Stability Report.  
The FPC’s “power to recommend” (Haldane, 2013) actions to the PRA and FCA is based on a 
‘comply or explain basis’ (Bank of England, 2013a). The PRA and FCA are given the 
opportunity to explain their opinions on the recommendation. On the other hand, directions 
forwarded by the FPC must be implemented in due course. For example, the FPC gives the 
direction to change the capital buffers for banks. The FPC recognises that there can be 
procedural obstacles. Therefore it further issues a recommendation to its subordiantes 
agencies “on the timing of implementation alongside its Direction [sic!]” (Bank of England, 
2013a, p. 13). 
The FPC pledges to have an informal meeting of regulatory staff from various seniority and 
business representatives (Haldane, 2013; Kohn, 2013). This is the environment in which 
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critical thinking is not promptly dismissed. Instead the ideas are assessed to their relevance 
and further reduced to their core issues to shape the course of the discussion. For example, 
front-line supervisors who are in contact with the regulated subjects report on their interviews 
they conducted. All of this hard and soft information are gathered and then, through 
discussions, urgent problems that affect resilience are prioritised. 
 
3.4.2.3 Interim observation on the regulatory change in the UK 
In conclusion the UK approach has resemblance to the twin peaks model of regulation. The 
Financial Policy (FPC) committee is a subsidiary of Bank of England. The PRA and the FCA 
are the coequal regulatory agencies that are direct in touch with the regulated subjects. The 
macro-prudential paradigm is reflected in the work of the PRA and the Bank of England. Both 
deal with systemic risk concerns stemming from the financial system structure, deposit-taking 
banks, and other systemically relevant institutions. The FPC deals with consumer protection 
by addressing how financial institutions treat their customers.  
In terms of fairness, the FPC makes sure to hear the opinions from the regulated subjects and 
their own front-line staff. Frictions in discussions seem to be embraced rather than aiming for 
a consensus for its own sake. This goes hand in hand with conscientiousness. An informal 
environment makes it easier to reflect on the agency’s own work. The regulatory approach is 
perceived effective if the regulatory agencies enforce the rules consistently without hesitation. 
The ring-fencing of deposit-taking units allows the regulatory agencies to exercise their 
powers within their mandate without increasing the threat of regulatory arbitrage. However, 
drawing a clear line between excluded activities and ancillary business can turn out to be a 
difficult task. It is foreseeable that compliance costs increase because the bank must provide 
evidence that the trading activities are for the sole purpose of risk-managing and not 
proprietary trading. 
The discrimination between conduct regulation and prudential regulation respects the 
different cultures necessary to perform the different tasks. Conduct regulation is often 
exercised by lawyers and prudential regulation asks largely for expertise in economics (Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs, Banking Supervision and regulation, HL 101-I, p. 33), 
especially with macro-level implications that go hand in hand with monetary policy exercised 
by the central bank.   
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The framework is coherent and in itself is less likely to introduce regulatory arbitrage. The 
change in the shape of the banking sector in the UK, where deposits are planned to be ring-
fenced, allow the regulatory agencies better access to the protection-worthy services. The 
threat that financial losses, due to a shock somewhere in the financial system, find their way 
into the regulated areas is decreased. 
 
3.4.3 Regulatory change in the USA 
This section analyses the regulatory framework in the USA. The framework is further divided 
into the new regulations banks have to abide by and the architecture of the regulatory agencies 
in the USA. 
 
3.4.3.1 Regulatory action in the USA: prohibition of proprietary trading 
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act is the legal foundation for the new regulatory and supervisory 
framework in the USA. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank addresses the structural changes to the 
banking industry. This section prohibits proprietary trading and certain relationships with 
hedge funds and private equity funds. This prohibition, also known as Volcker rule, originally 
intended to ban deposit-financed proprietary trading. Former Federal Reserve chairman Paul 
Volcker, who gave this rule its name, reinforced that a complete separation of the two 
activities is paramount. Even an intended protection by ring-fencing is not optimal. In his 
consultative evidence given to the UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Volcker points 
out the impossibility to have both activities in the same organisation and expect that there will 
be no interactions between them in one way or the other (Volcker, 2012). So, only a complete 
separation dismisses the slightest semblance of arbitrage. 
Consequently, this Volcker Rule would prohibit proprietary trading of securities, derivatives, 
commodities futures and options if they do not benefit a bank’s customer. If large losses in 
these parts of the financial system occur, banks would simply not be affected directly. The 
original date of implementation was scheduled for 2010 but constant renegotiations delayed 
the implementation of a revised, less strict Volcker rule to 2014 with a one year phase-in 
period. However, this still goes well beyond the trading restrictions introduced in the UK. 
Consequently, in 2015 banks that are subject to U.S. regulations either cut their proprietary 
trading desk significantly or removed them altogether in order to avoid compliance with the 
regulation (Financial Times, 2015).  
81 
 
Under the Volcker rule in its current form banks are allowed to participate in such activities 
within narrow boundaries and conditional on comprehensive reporting requirements. Instead 
they chose to remove them from their bank-affiliated broker-dealers. This would leave a gap 
in the international trading of these financial instruments that would be filled by non-bank 
providers that are not subject to extensive regulations. This alteration could “have 
unpredictable and potentially important adverse consequences for financial stability” (Duffie, 
2012, p. 2).  
 
3.4.3.2 Architecture of the regulatory agencies in the USA 
Section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act is the basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) that has begun its work in January 2010. The FSOC is on top of a group of regulatory 
agencies that build a closely meshed web of authorities to request information and exercise 
supervision over different kinds of financial institutions in the USA. The Office of Financial 
Research (OFR) and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) are also two new 
agencies. The OFR does not examine any institutions directly but collects information for 
research purpose and communicate them to the FSOC. Furthermore it provides a forum for 
the exchange of research and develops the tools to assess financial stability not only 
nationally, but also serves as a link to the global efforts to co-ordinate the mitigation of 
systemic risk (Systemic Risk Council, 2016). One example is the gathering, discussion, and 
improvement of different measures to calculate systemic risk (Bisias et al., 2012). The 
conditional Value-at-Risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009) is one of these measures. Chapter 
5 of this thesis contains an empirical analysis applied to European bank data. 
The Act therefore stipulates an institutional approach by identifying financial institutions 
according to their legal status and does not base the regulatory structure according to the 
functions that are exercised (Acharya et al., 2010). 
In sum there are eight agencies the financial system has do deal with directly plus the FSOC 
that requests information from most of the other agencies. These agencies are: the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(see Murphy, 2015). 
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The FSOC is tasked with identifying and countering systemic risk threatening systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) and systemically important “Financial Market Utility” 
(FMUs) alike. The latter are “any person that manages or operates a multilateral system for 
the purpose of transferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other financial 
transactions among financial institutions or between financial institutions and the person.” 
(Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S. Code § 5462 (6)(A)).  
If the FSOC deems a firm’s kind of business systemically relevant, the FSOC can designate a 
FMU status to such a function if its smooth operation is essential to encounter systemic risk. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2014) interpret the FMU status 
concretely as the providers of:  
“the essential infrastructure for transferring, clearing, and settling payments, securities, 
and other financial transactions among financial institutions or between financial 
institutions and the system. In cases where a failure or a disruption to the functioning 
of an FMU could create, or increase, the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems 
spreading among financial institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of 
the U.S. financial system, the FMU may be designated as systemically important by 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council.“ (FRS, 2014 online).  
Finally, if necessary the FSOC can make a decision to break up companies if they are a threat 
to financial stability. 
As of 2015 there are eight designated systemically relevant FMUs. These are corporations 
offering clearing house services. The FSOC designates the FMU status according to first, the 
outstanding monetary value processed by the financial institution in question, second its 
aggregated exposure to counterparties, third interactions with other clearing houses that are or 
are not FMUs, and fourth, the impact a disruption or complete failure of this entity would 
have on certain markets or even the whole financial system (FSOC, 2012). Possible 
disruptions in the financial system can be countered where they are likely to be detected first. 
The FSOC hence does not wait until the observed disruptions enter the banking system to take 
action.  
Located in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the FSOC is a permanent institution that “has 
a clear statutory mandate that creates for the first time collective accountability for identifying 
risks and responding to emerging threats to financial stability” (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2014). The board of members consist of ten voting members from U.S. financial 
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regulators such as the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and an independent member with insurance 
expertise. A further five non-voting members give additional support, namely the director of 
the Office of Financial Research (OFR), the director of the Federal Insurance Office, a state 
insurance commissioner, a state banking supervisor, and a state securities commissioner.  
A declaration on tougher supervision of a single firm can be expanded to a non-bank financial 
firm if the FSOC sees their own objective of maintaining financial stability threatened. The 
FSOC can determine a systemic significance if ‘material financial distress’ emanates from 
such a non-bank firm or its “nature, scope size, scale, concentration, interconnection” and mix 
of the activities” (Dodd-Frank Act, section 113(a)(2)(G)) give reason to concerns. Such 
emerging risks are detected by assistance of the Office of Financial Research (OFR).  
Section 113(a)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act set out the risk indicators for which data is collected 
and analysed.. These indicators can be grouped into quantitative and qualitative indicators. 
Classic financial indicators like leverage, the extent and nature of off-balance sheet exposures, 
financial assets and liabilities, especially reliance on short-term funding, build the quantitative 
approach to gauge the importance of a company subject to the analysis. In addition to these 
quantitative indicators the FSOC recognizes the importance of qualitative indicators including 
relationships with other non-bank companies and bank holding companies alike, the relative 
importance of the company as source of credit for domestic households, businesses, the state, 
and local governments. The business model is now relevant to supervision as well. For 
example, it must be clear whether a company’s management owns or merely manages the 
assets that are under their control. A further point of consideration for the work of the FSOC 
is whether the company already is under the supervision of a “primary financial regulatory” 
agency. Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides a non-exhaustive list of indicators 
provided to the FSOC and further admonishes the Council to consider “any other risk-related 
factors that the Council deem appropriate” (Section 113(a)(2)(K)).  
The authorisation to collect data and the supervision of non-bank companies are two of the six 
broad aims of the FSOC. The FSOC is also responsible for:  
- the regulatory coordination in order to close gaps in the existing catalogue of 
regulations, 
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- the coordination and promotion of the co-operation of the member agencies in 
exercising their duties, 
- the recommendations of new regulatory standards, and 
- based on their daily experience of supervision and coordination, the FSOC can make 
recommendations for best practice in exercising the regulatory tasks. 
The FSOC does not have the authority to directly undertake measures against the risks it 
detects. It can give recommendations to the other regulatory agencies and inform the U.S. 
Congress about where it sees room for improvement for its own mandate to broaden its 
operating range (Kohn, 2014). Further standing functional committees assist the U.S. 
regulatory authorities to bring forth discussions to an international level. Functions that 
deserve attention are for example avoiding the duplication of gathering data from the 
supervised institutions. For all of the FSOC member agencies the OFR is the hub to request 
data from. Therefore the OFR is, at least on paper, pivotal to establishing a data sharing point 
and setting standards for the process of gathering and facilitating data and conducting research 
on the tools that help promote financial stability.  
However, the new regulatory framework faces significant criticism. Policy makers did not 
seize the opportunity to harness the momentum of political will to renew the system from the 
bottom to the top. Instead, an efficient comprehensive system has been sacrificed for a 
fragmented system with too many agencies that perform similar tasks and could have been 
merged instead. For example financial institutions in the business of investment advisory have 
to deal with two conduct regulators, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
which reports to the SEC, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. It is foreseeable 
that it comes to a duplication of compliance work (Llewelyn, 2006). Apart from the financial 
burden on the regulated institutions, it is doubtful that the regulatory system can address 
urgent concerns of financial stability fast enough. Harold Levy, former director of global 
compliance at Citigroup, warns that a lack of tough decision-making by regulators could have 
disappointing results: Regulators must be powerful and allow prosecution of wrongdoings of 
banks with hefty fines, “[o]therwise, regulation becomes simply another factor in calculating 
risk and is taken into account in pricing” (Levy, 2014, p. 16). More recently in the 2014 
annual letter to the shareholders, Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JP Morgan Chase & 
Co, criticises the new regulatory framework the bank is subject to: “I believe our stock price 
has been hurt by higher legal and regulatory costs and continues to be depressed due to future 
uncertainty [sic!] regarding both” (Dimon, 2015, p. 19). Granted the macro-prudential 
framework’s early stage of implementation, banks have to accustom to more frequent 
85 
 
compliance work. Yet, statements such as the above emphasise the monetary costs the 
regulated subjects face on a micro-level but ignore the non-monetary benefits of a more stable 
financial system on a macro-level within which the banks operate.  
There is a lack of promoting financial stability as a public good that needs preservation and 
that both the regulatory authorities and the regulated institutions must co-operate. However, 
the US authorities are more concerned about themselves. The fragmentation of regulators 
increases the possibility that information sharing is not optimal and inconsistencies maintain. 
Admittedly, the agencies are currently in the process of adapting to the new regulatory 
framework and their roles within it. At the end of this process the individual agencies must 
open up to and co-operate with their peers. The FSOC encourages to “explore best practices 
for data sharing and improving reporting efficiency” (FSOC, 2015, p.14). They may be 
reluctant to share their information on a timely basis and perhaps compete for authority over 
the regulated industry. This risk of “inter-agency rivalry and disputes” (Llewelyn, 2006, p. 
12), also called “turf wars”, should remain an objective on the agenda for improving the 
regulatory architecture and improve conscientiousness. 
However, in practice frictions among the regulatory agencies can be observed. In her speech 
Kara Stein, Commissioner at the Securities Exchange Commission, unreservedly addressed 
the regulatory agencies’ competition to the detriment of the common mission:  
“[M]embers of the FSOC are merely trying to dictate to, or control, regulators with 
primary jurisdiction over certain areas. The FSOC needs to come together as a team to 
focus and provide mutual support. And, I fear that individual members defending their 
territorial jurisdiction detracts from the FSOC’s critical mission to promote financial 
stability” (Stein, 2014). 
In an related article in The Economist Jonathan Macey of Yale Law School notes that the 
Dodd-Frank Act is not directed at people but bureaucrats and “instructs them to make still 
more regulations and to create more bureaucracies“ (Economist, 2012). In the same article 
The Economist asserts that the Dodd-Frank Act is too big not to fail. Its sheer size introduces 
a complexity due to “exceptions and nuances” that could “exacerbate systemic risks rather 
than mitigate them”.  
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3.4.3.3  Interim observation on the regulatory change in the USA 
Eventually the Dodd-Frank Act introduces a new regulatory framework to the USA. Similar 
to the UK, the USA preserves its sovereignty over its regulatory agencies. The multitude of 
regulatory agencies follows an institutional approach. However, prudential and conduct 
regulation are exercised by different agencies, too. For example the Securities and Exchange 
Commission supervises securities-related business conduct through the FINRA; the U.S. 
Commodity Future Trading Commission supervises derivatives-related business conduct. If a 
single customer wishes for a mixed investment, the financial institution must comply with 
both regulatory agencies leading to higher compliance costs. 
The regulatory architecture in the USA increases competition among regulatory agencies. In 
terms of fairness this system has to prove that it can equally enforce their regulatory 
objectives among banks. The Dodd-Frank Act is explicit and addresses financial operations 
exercised by banks and non-bank companies that could be sources of systemic risk, i.e. SIFIs 
and FMUs, respectively. However, the Act accumulates to a lengthy document with 13,789 
pages (Davis Polk, 2013). With its sheer size, critics point out that the Act is not a 
comprehensive piece that clearly defines the regulatory objectives and how to achieve them 
(Makow, 2011).   
Furthermore, conscientiousness is negatively affected by the current stage of establishing the 
new structure. The agencies could prioritise sharpening their own profile and influence within 
this regulatory community, see Stein (2014) above, over serving the public. This web of 
agencies and authorities is reason for confusion among the regulated subjects.  
The regulatory approach is effective if the regulatory agencies enforce the rules consistently 
without hesitation. The Dodd-Frank Act changes the structure of the banking system in the 
USA and the regulatory community as well. The single regulatory agencies might be effective 
within their scopes but the whole approach is lacking effectiveness in the bigger picture. The 
institutional approach does not allow the regulatory community to catch up with the latest 
developments since activities that can be of systemic relevance are exercised by financial 
institutions that do not fall on the pre-defined list of regulated institutions. For further critique 
on this approach of the Dodd-Frank Act see Acharya et al. (2010). 
Ironically the Act aims at reducing the complexity of the financial system but increases the 
complexity of the regulatory community (The Economist, 2012) and the rulebooks financial 
institutions have to abide by. The Act itself is too big and leads to excessive bureaucracy and 
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in the late stages of drafting several amendments were made that lacked serious debate and 
could be the very source of future instabilities (Barr, 2011). Concerns that the regulated 
subject would lobby the amendments to their own benefit did not turn out to be a problem. 
The opposite happens. The policy makers zest for action resulted in a rushed process of 
drafting regulations that leave doubt about the framework’s effectiveness. 
The regulatory agencies must be granted a phasing-in period to familiarise with the new 
operational framework. However frictions remain. Time and energy will be wasted on being 
too occupied with solving internal disputes about responsibilities and sharing resources 
instead of focussing on the original raison d'être: promoting financial stability. 
 
3.4.4 Regulatory change in the European Union 
This section analyses the regulatory framework in the EU. The framework is further divided 
into the new regulations banks have to abide by and the architecture of the regulatory agencies 
in the EU. 
 
3.4.4.1 Regulatory action in the European Union: Between the UK and the USA  
As of spring 2016 there are no regulatory actions that change the organisational structure of 
banks
3
 so fundamentally as in the UK and USA. Yet the 2012 report of the high-level Expert 
Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector (2012) chaired by Erkki Liikanen, 
henceforth the Liikanen report, does the groundwork for future legislation of banking industry 
in the EU. Eventually the European Council drafted a proposal “on structural measures 
improving the resilience of EU credit institutions” (European Commission, 2014).  
The proposal combines ideas for structural reforms from the USA and UK but does not match 
the actual reforms in scale. A proposed prohibition on proprietary trading as in the USA with 
the Volcker Rule applies to banks that fall under the definition of article 3 of the proposal. 
These are deemed global systemically important institutions or are sufficiently large with total 
assets amounting to at least EUR 30 billion, or display large trading activities exceeding EUR 
                                                          
3
 The European Union legislation uses the term ‘credit institution’, however for the sake of consistency this 
thesis uses the term ‘bank’. Credit institutions are defined as the business of taking deposits or other repayable 
funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account, see Article 4 1. (1) of Regulation (EU) No 
575/2013, also known as Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).  
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70 billion, or 10 per cent of its total assets. A separation of certain activities as in the UK with 
the ring-fence is proposed, yet the final decision should remain with the national authority, i.e. 
regulatory agencies in the member state. They review whether the trading activities of a 
certain bank pose a threat to its deposit-taking business (Article 9) and henceforth the EU 
financial system. If so, the national regulatory agency can instruct the bank not to carry out 
these trading activities (Article 10). 
Besides organisational reforms on banks the foundation for further regulatory actions in the 
EU is the implementation of the Basel III accord. Consequently these regulatory standards are 
transformed into a Single Rulebook. The Single Rulebook ensures a harmonisation of 
prudential rules applied to the banks and national supervisors across the EU. Since Basel III is 
not legally binding itself, the EU implements parts of it through the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR)
4
, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)
5
, and the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
6
. The CRR gives the definitions and scope of the 
regulations. The Regulation clearly defines the prescriptive rules the regulated banks have to 
abide by, most notably the definition of capital and the minimum capital a bank has to 
produce. The CRD IV is supplemental to the CRR and assists national legislators in 
implementing the regulations of the CRR into national law.  
Ultimately it is the goal to set the capital requirement to a level-playing field for the whole for 
the EU. No member state should independently increase the capital standard for its banks. 
Otherwise the threat would be that the affected bank would circumvent this requirement by 
moving to another member state. So, arbitrage must be avoided with one standard applicable 
to all banks. However, an exception can be made based on the outcome of an individual 
supervisory review. The current state of the implementation of CRR/CRD IV grants the 
member states options and national discretions concerning several key aspects. For example, 
not all member states impose systemic risk capital buffers on their banks through the 
legislator or the national supervisory authority. A comprehensive list of which member state 
uses what option can be obtained through the EBA website. For example, the PRA in the UK 
does have the permit to introduce such a buffer, but it will come into effect in 2019 at the 
earliest. In addition to the standard capital requirement capital buffers give some flexibility to 
increase the loss-absorbency of banks conditional on the state of the financial system. Chapter 
4 analyses how macro-prudent these dynamic capital surcharges are, especially to answer the 
two research questions of this thesis whether first, the incentives of banks are geared towards 
                                                          
4
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
5
 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
6
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
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macro-prudence and, second, whether the particular tool can mitigate systemic risk as it 
materialises. Furthermore, the identification of the systemic significance of a bank is a major 
challenge in the supervisory review by a national authority. Chapter 5 deals with the 
conditional Value-at-Risk measure that is specifically geared to measure the systemic risk 
contribution of a particular bank to the banking system of which it is part of. 
Cleaning up bankrupt banks was a messy task in the aftermath of the crisis of 2008. It 
required substantial use of tax money to bail out banks. The BRRD addresses this issue. The 
minimum capital requirements and dynamic capital surcharges of the CRR/CRD IV may not 
be enough to prevent single banks from failing. In fact, avoiding a failure of a bank is 
explicitly not a regulatory objective. So, if a bank must be resolved, i.e. it is a gone-concern, it 
must happen in an orderly manner, especially if these gone-concerns can drag down other 
banks. Also, a bank must not necessarily go bankrupt to cause disruptions in the financial 
system of which it is part of. This is called a going-concern bank. Currently, the BRRD only 
sketches the tools and legal grounds to recover a struggling bank that is not a gone-concern 
but remains a going-concern. Paragraph 85 of the BRRD refrains from from prescribing the 
exact tools. Nevertheless, chapters 6 and 7 contain a comprehensive analysis and a concrete 
proposal, respectively, to make CoCos a macro-prudential tool to help recover or resolve a 
bank.  
The BRRD stipultes that the regulatory authorities can request banks to provide them with 
recovery plans at least on an annual basis, if necessary more frequently (Article 5 of BRRD). 
These include information about 20 items, see annex of the BRRD, such as:  
- how the bank would manage negative market reactions,   
- what the critical functions of the bank are, 
- how the bank intends to ensure the continuous functioning of its operations (for 
example how disruptions of the IT services could threaten the core services to the 
public), and 
- how the bank intends to prepare a timely recapitalisation once the recovery plan is 
executed. 
In addition to recovery plans, resolution plans should address the possible threats that stem 
from the bankruptcy of the bank. The national resolution authorities, fpr example central 
banks, need at least information about inter alia: 
- direct holders of the bank’s equity with their respective voting rights, 
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- material assets and liabilities that are allocated to the core business and critical 
operations of the bank, 
- details about the organisational structure of the bank, including all subsidiaries, and 
- possible liquidity sources for supporting the own resolution. 
It is important that the agencies tasked with the recovery and resolution can make the banks 
provide them with hard facts abouts the organisational structure and legal interconnectedness 
to other financial institutions. Soft factors like “possible” liquidity resources are determined 
by what the financial markets allow for. This rounds up the agencies’ impression of the bank 
as a whole rather than taking such factors at face value. Suppose that a recovery or resolution 
plan comes into action at the peak of a crisis similar to 2008. Adverse external financing 
conditions are hard to anticipate, see the case of Northern Rock in chapter 2. Nevertheless, 
these repoting requirements help foster awareness among the banks’ senior management to 
show foresight and cater for the worst case scenario. Re-introducing responsibility is certainly 
paramount to disciplining banks to abstain from unsustainable business conduct.  
 
3.4.4.2 Architecture of the regulatory agencies in the European Union 
The current state of the regulatory architecture among the member states of the EU is closest 
to a global regulatory framework, compare the third and fourth stage as discussed in section 
3.3. Since late 2014 the ECB is in charge of directly supervising the 122 largest European 
banks – likely to be increased to 130 in 2016 (Nouy, 2015) – under the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) (ECB, 2014). The supervision of the other smaller banks remains with the 
national authorities. The SSM fosters the convergence of supervision across the member 
states. As of 2016 the ECB co-operates with the national central banks (NCBs) of the states 
that adopted the euro as currency, they build the Eurosystem. Slightly different is the concept 
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The ESCB comprises of all EU member 
states, including those that have not adopted the euro as currency, nevertheless co-operate 
with the ECB. 
The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) is the overarching forum for the 
supervision of banks in the EU and contains the supervisory authorities (European Parliament 
and Council Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010). Within the ESFS there are three supervisory 
authorities: the European Securities and Markets Authorities (ESMA), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Banking 
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Authority (EBA). The European Banking Authority (EBA) first carries out the objective of 
maintaining financial stability in the EU. It does so by taking the leading role in the creation 
of the “Single Rulebook” that helps foster convergence of rules in the EU. The EBA further 
supplements it with guidance on the implementation of specific rules. Second, it promotes the 
convergence of supervisory practices. 
The main objective of the central banking system is to maintain price stability. In addition to 
this classic central banking objective of monetary policy, the supervision of the stability of 
banks is codified in Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.  
The ultimate goal is to establish a banking union with the Single Rulebook as the common 
financial regulatory framework for financial services in the EU. Currently there is “a 
regulatory patchwork, leading to legal uncertainty, enabling institutions to exploit regulatory 
loopholes, distorting competition, and making it burdensome for firms to operate across the 
Single Market” (European Commission 2013, p. 7). Consequently, much needs to be done to 
improve the fairness of this framework. In order to do so, the first step is the introduction of 
the SSM. In addition to the currently supervised largest banks this would also include purely 
domestically operating banks. This development foresees one supra-national regulatory 
agency at the end of different stages towards the integration efforts in the EU.  
Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 defines the tasks conferred to the ECB, 
including the supervision of banks of the member states and conducting stress tests. The ECB 
is supposed to have the most expertise in issues relating to macro-economics and financial 
stability in particular (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, para. (13)). Since the ECB is 
more experienced it will ultimately take over the leading role and directly carry out the 
financial stability objective after the transition phase. Competition between the ECB and 
national central banks and regulatory agencies are fierce. Paragraph (79) of Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 explicitly requires NCAs to second skilled staff to the ECB. 
This temporary brain drain for NCAs is compensated by a gain in the long-run. Also, for the 
relationship between the NCAs and the ECB, staff at the NCAs better understand and accept 
the overall regulatory objectives for the trans-national supervision of banks and are not only 
focused on the domestic banking sector, thus improving conscientiousness. 
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3.4.4.3 Interim observation on the regulatory change in the European Union 
The most important regulatory reforms on the EU level on the structure of the banking 
industry resemble a “light version” of the ring-fence in the UK and a “light version” of the 
prohibition of proprietary trading in the USA, also called Volcker Rule. The regulated 
activities can still be carried out, but only within a banking group with a clearly distinct entity 
like in the UK. Yet, this applies to banking groups larger than EUR 70 billion. Upon a major 
disruption a regulatory invention is made more practical and a contagion to the rest of the 
banking group is mitigated.  
This contrasts to the structural reform of the banking industry in the USA, where certain 
activities like hedge fund investments must not be located under the same roof as deposit-
taking, the EU restricts certain trading activities in volume rather than prohibiting them 
altogether.  
However, the member states currently do not give up their sovereignty over regulating their 
banks in full. The competence for carrying out the supervision of small banks remains at the 
national level. So does the decision about putting certain regulations in place. The ECB and 
subsequent agencies, at the current stage, aim to improve the coordination among national 
supervisors. The long-term goal is to promote convergence in the regulations according to the 
Single Rulebook that would reverse the options and discretions some member states use. 
The ECB can use its data collecting powers and accumulation of qualified staff from NCBs to 
conduct centralised research. The output, in return, is available to the NCBs. The high-quality 
research with macro-prudential scope on the ECB level resembles the unifying role of the 
OFR in the USA. There, the OFR collects data from the different regulatory agencies with 
different scopes (securities, banks financial data, conduct, etc.) to derive a clear picture of the 
state of financial stability. The ECB also collects data from different agencies but since these 
are NCBs, they have the same scope; it is merely the same kind of data but from different 
jurisdictions.  
As far as the fairness of this regulatory framework is concerned, the regulations in place do 
not apply to all banks in the EU. At the current stage of integration, the SSM, under the roof 
of the ECB, supervises the 122 largest banks in the EU in terms of size. This, in general, 
would give banks the incentive to stay below the threshold conditions of the ring-fence 
regulation and proprietary trading restrictions. Also, member states make use of options and 
national discretions granted within the SSM. There are about 150 items of the CRR/CRD IV 
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that are subject to discretion (Nouy, 2015), which certainly hinders the efforts of convergence. 
However, the SSM is in its early stage of implementation and these gaps are going to be 
addressed.  
Conscientiousness, according to Dudley (2014) in section 3.4, aims on how the regulatory 
agency perceives itself; it must be honest about its own work and self-critical analysis must be 
followed by the willingness towards self-improvement. This is a crucial point and must not be 
underestimated. The staffing process after the formal introduction of the SSM alongside other 
departments of the ECB is extensive. Indeed, the competition for staff between the ECB as the 
single regulator and supervisor in the future and the NCBs can have repercussions. The ECB 
and the NCBs are expected to co-operate and work towards the common objective. 
Regardless of the SSM in particular, over the last years tensions have emerged. NCBs 
understandably have mixed feelings of a mandatory brain-drain to the ECB (Reuters, 2013a). 
Yet, if the secondments are temporary the long-term advantage is that the average quality in 
each NCB is increased, hence further strengthening the SSM. 
Apart from the regulations and architecture of the regulatory framework, a reason to concern 
the current status is the discrepancy among staff. One measure to assure the independence of 
staff is a degree of security for one’s job similar to a civil servant. In fact a significant number 
of jobs at the ECB across all departments are limited to 12 to 24 months with no guarantee of 
continuation and subsequently rolled over together with a high workload of the individual 
member of staff (Wall Street Journal, 2015). If members of staff, especially those that engage 
with the regulated subjects, are constantly worried about employment, there is an acute threat 
of capture with negative consequences on fairness and effectiveness. With the prospect of 
employment at a reviewed bank, the particular member of staff might be less intrusive and 
passes on a more positive view.  
Effectiveness of prudential supervision means that large banks are in the focus of the agencies 
and supervisors are indeed tough on them, i.e. have the “teeth” and are not afraid to show 
them. The ECB is in progress of implementing the SSM towards a unified regulatory 
approach. In the meantime, the most important contribution is, together with the EBA, to 
encourage the convergence of the Single Rulebook across the member states and assist NCBs 
in its application. So, the current state of the EU regulatory framework is effective in regards 
of harmonisation efforts but not yet effective in centralising the direct power to regulate banks 
to the same degree and on a level-playing field. 
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3.5 Conclusion and outlook 
Financial stability is the new regulatory objective and must be treated as a public good 
(Shirakawa, 2012). In the years leading to the global financial crisis of 2008, there had been a 
threat to this public good. Financial stability has been taken for granted and key players put 
stress on the stability by taking excessive risks. Regulatory agencies contributed to this too. 
There was a lack of a culture of critical thinking that might have let to challenging the 
business conduct of banks and the nature of financial risks (Turner Review, 2009). Once 
markets became unstable, the financial sector could not re-establish stability on their own. 
Hence the public sector, i.e. national governments had to intervene in this market failure. 
Ideally, the new macro-prudential regulatory paradigm realises that “markets must sometimes 
be nudged, pushed, or even forcefully shoved off their existing trajectory so as to prevent 
them from running into disasters” (Shirakawa, 2012, p.1).  
Banks have become “too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-save and too complex to manage, supervise 
and resolve” (Council of the European Union, 2015, p.1). In this chapter the different 
approaches of the UK, USA, and EU are analysed to show the different national 
interpretations of a macro-prudential framework. First, a framework addresses the regulations 
the banks have to abide by, for example in the form of organisational requirements of how a 
bank, or banking group, must be organised. Second, the framework considers how the 
regulatory agencies are organised to serve their regulatory objectives best. This can be a 
single generalist regulatory agency or several specialist agencies; The former is best suited to 
supervise certain kinds of institutions like banks, insurance firms etc. (institutional approach), 
the latter is best suited to supervise certain functions like deposit-taking, securities trading etc. 
(functional approach). 
Recall the two core research questions throughout this PhD thesis derived from the crisis of 
2008 in chapter 2. Applied to the new regulations and regulatory architecture in the UK, USA, 
and EU, the questions are: 
- Does the regulatory framework in the respective legislation address the regulated 
banks’ incentives so that they abstain from taking unsustainable risks that can cause a 
systemic crisis?  
- If yet systemic risk emerges, is the regulatory framework in the respective legislation 
able to limit its potential for further damages? 
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As for the first question, the regulatory agencies in the UK, USA, and EU are more intrusive 
than before the crisis. Banks face higher compliance costs due to the pro-activity of the 
regulatory agencies. For example, banks are required to regularly report their views on the 
own healthiness and gauge the risk to their core businesses. Unlike to the pre-crisis regulation, 
there is no “regulatory dividend” to banks. This means that regulatory agencies left banks 
alone for some time after a satisfactory compliance work (Black, 2015). Unfortnately, this 
decreased the compliance efforts after the supervisory review. Instead, from now on the 
regulatory agencies constantly conduct regulatory reviews of banks and developments in the 
financial system. This, in general terms, increases the chances to detect doubtfull business 
conduct within banks and challenges the sustainability of certain business models banks 
employ. 
As for the second question, there are mixed results, largely because the UK and EU keep 
trading and vital banking services in the same organisation, but the USA prohibits this 
practice. A complete separation bears the threat that destabilising developments in the 
financial system go unnoticed by a regulatory agency that is only concerned with banks 
exclusively. As soon as these destabilising effects enter the banking system indirectly, it 
might be already too late. Within a ring-fenced system such developments can be detected at 
an early stage.  
The UK has come up with a completely new architecture for its regulatory agencies. The FPC 
is embedded in the Bank of England, the UK’s central bank. The financial industry has to deal 
with two regulatory agencies that are subordinate to the FPC: a conduct regulator, FCA and a 
prudential regulator, the PRA. One advantage of this twin peaks model is a clear division of 
responsibilities of the agencies to hold them accountable for. The organisational structure in 
the UK provides a reliable framework to fulfil proper macro-prudential regulation. 
In the UK those activities that are vital to the economy, like deposit-taking, are planned to be 
ring-fenced. The “universal banking” model of such bank holding companies, i.e. deposit-
taking alongside proprietary trading, is not completely repealed. Instead, a clear line is drawn 
by moving proprietary trading outside the ring-fenced activities but remain intact within a 
bank holding company. Further bans on cross-financing the two groups are easier to impose 
but must be regularly supervised by the regulatory agencies. The advantage over a complete 
separation, like in the USA, is that the regulatory agenies can still monitor the developments 
in the financial markets that threaten financial stability.  
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The EU follows a less strict approach on ring-fencing, making it mandatory only for banks of 
a certain size. However, the same advanteages of the UK approach applies to the light-version 
of the ring-fence in the EU. 
As for the second question, the ring-fence regulation on banks in the UK and EU specifically 
address the problem of systemic risk that stems from a failing bank. If a bank fails, the 
resolution of a bank and the protection of core services vital to the rest of the economy are 
more practicable. This does not guarantee a perfect mitigation of a crisis. But compared to the 
pre-crisis times it mitigates the systemic risk of individual banks. 
In the EU, a coherent regulatory framework, as codified in the Single Rulebook, is the first 
step towards a banking union and member states are expected to give up some sovereignty to 
supervise domestic banks. However, at the current stage the SSM under the ECB leaves the 
supervision and intervention to the NCBs. The sovereignty of the member states of the EU is 
not yet significantly diminished. So, to some degree a member state can currently have 
deviating regulations. For example, the scope of the ring-fence regulation in the UK is much 
tougher on its banks than the EU version of the ring-fence that only applies to banks of a 
certain size.  
The ECB is a supranational single regulatory agency but the NCBs support it in the task of 
supervision in the respective member state. Only the largest banks are subject to direct 
supervision by the ECB. This approach, on paper, is a comprehensive macro-prudential 
framework. However, deviating national interests give a patchwork picture of the actual state 
of the SSM. 
In the USA the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is mounted on top of an already 
existing body of regulatory agencies. The FSOC is commissioned with the difficult task to 
manage a voluminous web of regulatory agencies. This results in overlapping responsibilities, 
duplication of work, and makes it more difficult to hold a single agency accountable.  
Competition among the regulators ideally is a process to identify “best practice” and produces 
good regulation since it avoids group think. However, at the same token overlapping 
responsibilities lead to turf wars. The agencies are more concerned about protecting their own 
reason for existence rather than serving the regulatory objective (Blackmore and Jeapes, 
2009). Especially in crisis times, the public – including the taxpayer who might have to pay – 
expects the regulators to take action. An overambitious regulator seeks to overbid other 
regulators to act immediately to sharpen its profile. Similarly, on a more senior level, 
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premature reactions of representatives of the agencies and policy makers, i.e. politicians 
serving on the committees for regulatory decisions, can be observed immediately after a crisis 
(Economist, 2008). 
In the USA the Volcker rule prohibits proprietary trading and deposit-taking in the same 
organisation. The consequence is that financial institutions simply remove those activities that 
cause systemic risk out of the regulated parts of the financial system. As of 2015 several of 
the largest banks in the USA, among them JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs, closed 
proprietary trading desks and wound down those funds that would be affected by the 
regulations. They leave the field for these particular trading and investment opportunities and 
it will be taken over by other, less regulated or not regulated parts of the financial system, i.e. 
shadow banking. The ECB (2015) identifies an increase of such migration and that the 
shadow banking system contributes to systemic risk in the whole global financial system. In 
conclusion, new regulations do not directly address the creation of systemic risk but pushes it 
to somewhere else in the system. So, in contrast to the ring-fence in the UK, and to a lesser 
extend EU, a complete separation of certain trading activities from vital services to the 
economy only takes the sources of systemic risk outside the regulatory agencies’ reach.  
The regulatory agencies can claim a success when a large disruption anywhere in the global 
financial system does not find its way into their regulated territory. With varying degrees, 
their mandate enables them to expand their interventionist powers to other sections of the 
financial system as they see appropriate. The regulators in the USA can designate the status of 
a “financial market utility” to financial institutions when they see a threat to their objective.  
Ironically, regulatory discretion introduces a dilemma: On the one hand this gives them the 
power counter banks’ and other certain financial institutions’ incentive to arbitrage as they 
can follow the sources of systemic risk. On the other hand this freedom to do so increases the 
expectations of the public that the regulatory framework avoids crises altogether. This might 
discourage the regulatory agencies to be too intrusive to the benefit of their own credibility.  
In conclusion, the current structure in the USA does not provide a credible degree of 
effectiveness. Because of its potential for inner conflicts in the form of inter-agency rivalry, 
i.e. turf wars, the organisational structure in the USA does not provide a reliable framework to 
fulfil proper macro-prudential regulation. 
The macro-prudential tools at the regulatory agencies’ disposal must follow a holistic 
approach. Ideally, a macro-prudential regulatory framework “should address the root causes 
rather than merely the symptoms of instability” (Large, 2011, p. 206). The new regulatory 
98 
 
agencies must show that they are able and more committed to catch up with developments in 
the banking sector than they were before the financial crisis of 2008. The next chapter 
discusses the macro-prudential tools to achieve this. 
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4 Macro-prudential tools 
The previous chapter shows how the new regulatory agencies are designed. This chapter 
focuses on some of the tools in the toolkit at their disposal.  
4.1 Introduction 
Regardless of how the regulatory agencies are structured – whether one regulatory agency, a 
twin peaks approach, or a plethora of agencies – this chapter analyses the tools the agencies 
are generally able to employ in order to fulfil their regulatory objectives. Not all regulatory 
agencies use these macro-prudential tools equally or at all.  
The shift towards macro-prudence does not only comprise a change in awareness of how 
systemic risk works (chapter 2), reshaping the regulatory agencies to address the challenge of 
systemic risk (chapter 3) but a set of specialised tools is necessary too. The tools at prudential 
regulator’s disposal are the subject of this chapter. 
This chapter analyses some the core tools that regulate the capital requirements, leverage, and 
lending business of banks. An overview of the macro-prudential toolkit can be obtained in 
Claessens et al. (2013). Further auxiliary tools are the use of living wills and contingent 
capital. Living wills are discussed in the context of the ECB’s recovery and resolution 
powers, the BRRD, in section 3.5.4.1 of the previous chapter and need not be repeated here. 
Contingent capital finds brief mentioning here but is subject to an in-depth qualitative 
analysis in chapter 6 and a quantitative analysis in chapter 7.  
The case for new macro-prudential tools is that they avoid the collateral damages that can 
come when traditional monetary tools are exhausted to address issues of systemic risk. The 
macro-prudential tools complement monetary policy (Hannoun, 2010). Therefore the macro-
prudential regulatory agencies must be close to the monetary decision makers to coordinate. 
So, in addition to the findings of the previous chapter, a further advantage of the twin peaks 
model employed in the UK is that the PRA under the guidance of the FPC is located within 
the Bank of England. 
For example, during and after the global financial crisis of 2008 central banks around the 
world had to pave the way out of the recession. They decreased the interest rates to historical 
low rates to encourage banks to give out more loans to the economy and stimulate growth. 
Before the crisis central banks’ objective is to maintain price stability as indicated by a 
concrete annual inflation rate of 2 per cent. For example, in the years before the crisis the 
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Bank of England has met its inflation target. However, as a consequence the balance sheets of 
domestic and international banks grew rapidly and the Bank of England conclude that 
“[m]onetary policy would not have been able to curb these emerging financial imbalances 
without diluting the commitment to its inflation objective” (Bank of England, 2009, p. 10). A 
change in monetary policy to lean against a bubble with increasing interest rates can have 
adverse consequences in other parts of the economy to the point that the economy’s output, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), decreases (for empirical evidence see Assenmacher-Wesche 
and Gerlach, 2010).  
The inherent procyclicality of the financial system can result in financial instability. In 
economic upswings financial markets underestimate risk and ignore the time dimension of 
risk (Borio et al., 2001). This means that market participants do not factor in the incentive of 
other market participants, such as banks, to load more debt on their balance sheet in order to 
produce even more lending. Banks do not raise their equity cushion in economic boom times 
when equity is cheapest. In the economic downturn they must raise equity when it is just 
needed. Now markets change their perception of banks riskiness, quite likely to overestimate 
it if they see that the banking sector as a whole is in financial distress. Consequently the banks 
compete for equity at a premium.  
Regulatory agencies now have the tools that allow them to lean against this procyclicality 
instead of cleaning up after procyclicality caused a crisis. The macro-prudential tools that are 
currently available manipulate the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet and affect banks in 
their lending decisions. The former can be separated in those tools that manipulate the capital 
requirements and the newly discussed idea of contingent capital. Interfering in the lending 
decisions is the most severe intervention through a regulatory agency but offers the most 
potential for addressing the building up of bubbles due to unsustainable credit growth.  
Section 4.2 deals with regulating capital requirements as one tool of regulating the liability 
side of the balance sheet. Higher capital cushions are important loss-absorbing resources in 
the case of financial losses. This abates the threat of a bankruptcy of a bank. Furthermore, the 
leverage ratio is the second side of the same coin and is discussed in the same section. 
Section 4.3 focuses on regulatory intervention on the asset side of a bank. At times, regulatory 
agencies can impose limits on the issuance of loans with certain ratios such as loan-to-value 
(LTV). Among others, such ratios determine the riskiness of individual lending contracts.  
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Section 4.4 presents auxiliary tools in addition to the previous “core” macro-prudential tools 
with which regulatory agencies can lean against the building up of bubbles. Ill-aligned bank 
managers’ remuneration is on the regulatory agenda to counter short-termism. Also 
contingent capital is briefly sketched as this topic is analysed in chapters 6 and 7. Section 4.5 
concludes and answers the research questions. 
 
4.2 Tools to regulate capital 
Raising capital requirements is the regulatory agencies’ tool to internalise systemic risk and 
bolster loss-absorbency against an imminent shock in the financial system. These 
requirements are further divided into countercyclical buffers to mitigate systemic risk in 
general and sectoral buffers to dampen risk coming from specific sectors, especial residential 
and commercial property. This makes the regulated banks more robust but not necessarily the 
rest of the financial system.  
The example of the UK policy makers are chosen simply for illustration purposes. The FPC 
can impose sectoral capital requirements (SCRs) and countercyclical capital buffers (CCBs) 
for specific financial institutions in the UK (Tucker, 2013; FPC, 2014). Both tools increase 
the capital standards above what a purely micro-level assessment of the particular bank would 
suggest is the appropriate level. The SCRs aim at developments in sectors that are “judged to 
pose a risk to the system as a whole” (FPC, 2014, p. 5). Concretely, these sectors are mainly 
the financing of residential and commercial property.  
The CCBs are the tool of choice to abate the systemic threat that concerns all loans given out 
to borrowers in the UK. The SCRs on the other hand address threats stemming from other 
specific sectors that are not domestic lending. The total countercyclical buffer a UK bank has 
to produce is proportional to its mix of domestic and foreign exposure. For example, if the 
CCB rate is 1 per cent and foreign is 2.5 per cent and a bank holds 50 per cent of its loans in 
the UK and 50 per cent in foreign markets, its specific buffer is 1 × 0.5 + 2.5 × 0.5 = 1.75, 
or 1.75 per cent (Bank of England, 2013). The CCB and SCR address the same threat but are 
complimentary for they either defend against systemic risk that already is in the financial 
system or abate systemic risk that comes from a specific sector, respectively (Korhonen, 
2013). 
However, capital requirements that are derived from developments in asset prices in certain 
sectors, such as commercial property, are difficult to justify. Central bankers’ are bound to 
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price stability but then again should, and after the 2008 crisis indeed have, the task to lean 
against bubbles before they burst and spread into panic. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
clearly identify a bubble ex ante. A significant increase in the price for certain assets can be 
due to a change in fundamental factors, non-fundamental factors, or a combination of both 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 2000).  
For example, assume that the prices for commercial property in a certain region increase by 
20 per cent within a three months period. It is not a bubble if this growth is the result of a 
relocation of businesses to this region, i.e. a fundamental change. It can be a bubble if 
investors, who are looking for short-term profits, observe the relocation of businesses and also 
purchase properties and so further fuel the price increase. The local businesses could 
contribute only, say, 15 per cent of the price increase and speculation the other 5 per cent. The 
difficulty is to identify the non-fundamental portion of such price increases that can become 
dangerous speculation. The economic theory behind hedgeing, speculation, and Ponzi-like 
stage of markets are explained in greater detail in chapter 2. Given the difficulties of 
identifying bubbles and the limits of the monetary policy toolkit before the crisis, it was better 
to let bubbles burst and clean up the consequences (Allen and Carletti, 2013). 
Recall from chapter 2 the excessive “originate to distribute” model that led to the U.S. sub-
prime crisis and consequently the global financial crisis of 2008. The increased capital buffer 
requirements would have produced more loss-absorbing capital against the shock. However, 
higher capital requirements do not address the lending decisions of banks directly. A 
countercyclical capital buffer is too general. Banks would see that the regulatory agencies are 
concerned with systemic risk, but a decision whether to wind down their own mortgage 
securitisation business remains unaffected. Minimum capital requirements can increase the 
stability of an individual bank simply because it is more likely to survive a distortion in the 
financial markets. So, the riskiness of the bank is decreased hence investors would require a 
lower rate of return on their stake in the bank (Admati and Hellwig, 2013) However, recall 
from section 3.4.1 the reluctance of bank managers to embrace regulations that aim at 
reducing social costs that stand in contrast to the return on equity, the main measure of bank 
performance (Moussu and Petit-Romec, 2013). Bank managers will treat mandatory higher 
equity holding as what it is in their opinion: a cost factor. More regulatory capital will help 
fulfil the regulatory objectives but is unlikely to introduce a cultural change of taking risks. 
Addressing the incentives must be a crucial part of the paradigm shift toward macro-
prudence. 
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A thorough application of the CCB and SCR among the financial sector is crucial to avoid the 
possibility for regulatory arbitrage. The FPC caters for this issue by recommending HM 
Treasury to grant an extension of the FPC’s reach (HM Treasury, 2012). The list of 
institutions to which the macro-prudential tools currently apply (see Bank of England, 2013) 
can be extended beyond banks, building societies, and large investment firms incorporated in 
the UK to small and medium-sized investment firms if concerns of risking financial stability 
are evident. Hence, the concern of regulatory arbitrage can be abated. Regulatory agencies in 
other jurisdictions must have the same degree of freedom to request an extension of their 
operating range. 
Another macro-prudential tool is the manipulation of the leverage of banks. The 
recommendations for leverage ratios are, in analogy to capital requirements, set out in Basel 
III in an effort for global harmonisation. The leverage ratio is complementary to capital 
requirements with a crucial difference: The capital requirements are risk-weighted, leverage is 
not. The weighting of risk is difficult especially in regards to the volatile nature of systemic 
risk. A proposal for measuring systemic risk is subject of chapter 5. The previous chapters 
show that banks have incentives to interpret the applicable formulae for risks according to 
their individual preferences, i.e. decreasing regulatory capital based on risk-weighted assets. 
However, additional risk-independent leverage requirements serve as an additional 
“backstop” (BCBS, 2014). 
Manipulating the leverage ratio of financial institutions will be phased in from 2016 (FPC, 
2015a). Three different ratios are planned: The minimum leverage will be applied to all PRA-
regulated institutions. This sets the absolute minimum to prevent the risk that internal rating 
methodologies fail to produce appropriate risk-weighted capital. Second, additional leverage 
ratio buffers aim at the distribution of risk within the financial system and indicate systemic 
risk to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The third leverage tool is the 
countercyclical leverage ratio buffer. This tool introduces an additional flexibility in assigning 
a systemic risk buffer. For example credit growth is subject to cycles. In times of a soaring 
credit growth, especially when it is unsustainable, the buffer increases and relaxed when 
growth is moderate. 
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4.3 Tools to regulate lending  
This section focuses on the tools that influence the lending side of a bank and therefore 
interfers in the business decisions of a bank. Borio (2011) defines the success of a macro-
prudential tool by its ability to dampen the upswing movement of a financial cycle during 
which systemic risk accumulates. So, the particular tool serves as a “speed limit” (Borio 2007, 
p. 5). This aims at introducing a countercyclicality that aims at leaning against excessive 
credit expansion, which most likely comes with unsustainable risk-taking on part of the 
banks. Obviously, avoiding the building up of a boom must start with the lending decision to 
the individual mortgage borrower. For this the following ratios should be determined with 
prudence: the loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI), and debt-to-income (DTI). All of 
them are complimentary. 
The LTV ratio compares the value of a mortgage to the value of the house. For example if the 
house is valued at US$ 100,000 and the mortgage is US$ 80,000, the loan-to-value ratio is 80 
per cent. The mortgage taker can be required to pay the other 20 per cent with own equity. It 
is important to ensure that the mortgage taker does not game the rules by raising debt 
elsewhere and declare it as equity. Otherwise the mortgage would be 100 per cent debt-
financed, which increases the chances that the mortgage taker defaults if the annual rates 
increase. Hence, at the same token the mortgage lender must conduct due diligence 
background checks on its customers to avoid this scenario. Gerlach and Peng (2005) 
investigate the housing market in Hong Kong. They find that a LTV of 70 per cent is a 
prudent level, so that a sharp decline in the housing sector has less an effect on the stability of 
the banking sector.  
A further prudent measure within a bank’s due diligence is the LTI ratio. The LTI compares 
the particular mortgage to the overall income of the borrower and indicates the constraints the 
mortgage would impose on the borrower. So, household indebtedness in the form of NINJA 
loans, that fuelled the U.S. sub-prime crisis, would have been curbed. In 2014 the FPC 
recommended to the PRA and FCA to ensure that lenders are constrained to give out no more 
than 15 per cent of their total number of new residential mortgages at a LTI of 4.5 or higher 
(FPC, 2014a). However, this constraint only applies to lenders with mortgage lending worth 
more than GBP 100 million per year. The excess demand for high LTI ratio mortgages is 
served by smaller lenders. This recommendation helps avoid a clustering of such high risk 
mortgages around a few lenders that dominate the mortgage business and would otherwise 
scoop the vast majority of demand. 
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An accompanying measure is the DTI ratio which measures, independent from the price of the 
property and the mortgage on offer, the overall indebtedness of the borrower. The difference 
between the DTI and LTI is that the former is a ratio of all of the household indebtedness and 
the LTI ratio reflects just how much of a financial commitment the mortgage loan is to the 
mortgage taker. 
Similarly, the DTI limits the proportion of mortgages a lender could give to households with a 
relatively high indebtedness, as indicated by the ratio of debt to income. Such limits would 
not have avoided a sub-prime market for mortgages in the USA, which is not the point, but 
would have avoided an unrestricted growth of such a market. Further restrictions on the 
amount of high LTI ratio mortgages each bank is allowed to issue avoid that the growth of 
such markets are in the hands of few institutions that can eventually become systemically 
relevant. If identified early, the growth of such a market can be restricted before its collapse is 
sufficiently big to spark systemic risk. 
For example, in 2014 the FPC identified instabilities in the UK housing markets (Bank of 
England, 2015). In accordance with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the FPC recommended 
that the HM Treasury uses its statutory powers to enable the FPC to task its subordinated 
regulatory agencies, the PRA and FCA, to limit the regulated lenders in their mortgage 
business. The macro-prudential tools with which the limit was imposed were the LTV and 
DTI. Igan and Kang (2011) find empirical evidence that limits on LTV and DTI do curb 
property speculation in the first place.  
The higher the various ratios are, the riskier is the mortgage to the issuing bank. So, those 
households that take mortgages but have a small income are offered mortgages with high 
LTV ratios. If in addition, as seen in the U.S. sub-prime business, additional mortgage 
insurance is bundled, the customer can not reasonably be expected to pay back in full. 
Nevertheless, the “originate-to-distribute” model intended to securitise the mortgage. If a 
strict regime of LTV, LTI, and DTI ratios was in place, this business practice could have been 
avoided. Hence, low quality mortgage-backed securities, that eventually became toxic, would 
not have been distributed to the financial system in high volumes. This is exactly how to lean 
against a bubble, instead of cleaning it up afterwards. 
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4.4 Further possible regulatory tools and powers of the regulators 
In addition to the core macro-prudential tools this section illustrates two more promising 
auxillary macro-prudential tools, i.e. contingent capital and bank manager remuneration. 
 
4.4.1 Contingent capital 
A promising avenue for regulating the liability side of banks is the use of contingent capital. 
This topic receives more attention in chapters 6 and 7. There are several issues depending on 
the design features of contingent capital. Chapter 6 identifies these by reviewing the existing 
body of literature and identifying problems. However, chapter 7 proposes a design that 
circumvents the most pressing problems. 
In short, contingent capital aims to boost a bank’s capital cushion when needed. Of course due 
care must be exercised in determining the terms and conditions of such capital. What is 
basically done is that debt is either written down in the bank’s books or is converted into 
equity upon a trigger event to increase the loss-absorbency of the bank.  
Also the design of the trigger event plays an important role. For example, conversion can be 
exercised automatically if the capital ratio falls to a dangerously low level of, say, 5 per cent. 
Alternatively the regulatory agency in charge can be equipped with the discretion to pull the 
trigger. This, of course, would require the agency to have a comprehensive opinion on the 
systemic risk threat stemming from the particular bank.  
Because of the alternative design features it is sensible to be clear on the terminology. If the 
decision to trigger rests with a regulatory agency, such contingent capital is also called bail-in 
capital. Effectively, creditors are bailed-in by a public authority and face a total loss or a hair-
cut on their pecuniary claim in a bank. In the case of a haircut, there are two scenarios. The 
write-down can be permanent or, if the bank recovers, can be written-up again to the initial 
face value of the debt claim.  
If on the other hand the conversion is not triggered by regulatory discretion but a previously 
defined and contractually agreed event, the name contingent convertible (CoCo) applies. The 
most interesting scenario is the conversion of the debt claim into newly issued equity. The 
idea is that if a bank’s capital ratio falls below some ratio that is deemed too low, then the 
CoCo investors are repaid in new shares of this bank. The loss-absorbency is boosted 
instantaneously and therefore saves precious time to resolve the financial distress of the bank. 
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Then again, why would a creditor agree to have his debt claim wiped out and be compensated 
with equity of a bank that is in distress? The answer depends on the terms of conversion that 
are discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
4.4.2 Bank management remuneration and retaining earning 
This sub-section discusses the limits of capping bank managers’ remuneration that ought to 
set incentives to abstain from short-termism. The UK Commission on Banking Standards 
(2013) propose to get the balance of costs and benefits of risks right. Banks set the 
remuneration of their staff, but the regulators must critically inquire firstly whether the 
financial success justifies remuneration figures and secondly from what part of the banks’ 
business areas the success comes from. For example, the regulators – now looking through a 
macro-prudential lense – must be wary of banks making non-sustainable short-term profits, 
threatening financial stability on a macroeconomic level. Furthermore, dealing only with 
financial figures of the entire bank could be misleading. Imbalance among the different 
business areas could lead to cross-financing loss-generating areas. Nevertheless, the ring-
fence of certain activities proposed in the UK and EU assist the agencies to detect such 
imbalances. 
The actual plans are found in a joint Consultation Paper of the PRA and FCA (PRA, 2014c). 
There, the aim is to curb excessive risk-taking and short-termism in order to incentivise bank 
managers to employ more serious and effective risk management systems. Those members of 
bank staff face the consequences for wrong doing in the form of either a clawback on already 
paid bonuses or a deferral of bonuses.  
A clawback means that already paid remuneration in the form of bonuses is paid back to the 
bank if the PRA sees a violation of conduct. A deferral is a current halt on variable 
remuneration. For example, if a bank requires public aid in the form of tax money, bonuses 
are withheld. These rules apply not only to the senior management but also to relevant 
managers that are junior in the hierarchy. If the PRA sees it appropriate, senior managers’ 
bonuses can be deferred up to seven years and up to five years for other material risk takers 
like risk managers. The period for ex post clawbacks is up to ten years for senior management 
and seven years for other material risk takers.   
The powers to manipulate the incentives of senior management and staff are a crucial part of 
the regulatory agencies’ tasks. Focussing on the incentives of individuals instead of taking a 
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firm-level view allows for severe repercussions for wrongdoing. The aim is to promote 
prudence by reinforcing personal accountability. 
In general terms, aligning the returns with the risks taken should be a fundamental guide for 
taking sustainable risks. Chapter 2 shows how the incentives were distorted prior to the crisis 
by decoupling the long-term risks of issuing mortgages from the returns, which were made 
liquid and paid to the banks almost instantaneously. This must be corrected. However, doing 
so through regulatory agencies that can punish managers ex post is not optimal. Critics of 
capping bonuses hint to the threat that banks simply decrease variable pay and increase fixed 
remuneration (EBA, 2015). Also, if drawing the consequences, i.e. a financial impairment, 
comes years after the initial misconduct, it is arguable whether the particular individual 
actually experiences a learning effect. Chapter 7 proposes CoCos as an alternative to retained 
remuneration in order to reinforce personal accountability of bank managers.  
 
4.5 Conclusion and outlook 
The capital requirements in the form of SCRs and CCBs are risk-weighted measured in 
absolute values. A necessary accompanying regulation is the imposition of leverage 
requirements. Both requirements are liability side regulations tools. The leverage is the ratio 
of capital, especially high quality equity, to other debt. An increased CCB for example does 
not completely insulate a bank from distress. 
Those macro-prudential tools have a potentially higher impact than traditional monetary 
policy tools that affect the economy by large. This is largely due to their focus on adjusters on 
the micro-level. Therefore the macro-prudential regulation exercised by regulatory agencies 
can be renamed “systemic policy”, which is complementary to classic “monetary policy” 
exercised by central banks (Large, 2011). Monetary policy can focus on the traditional central 
banking objective of maintaining price stability. The systemic policy promotes the second 
objective of maintaining financial stability by means of various macro-prudential tools. 
Systemic policy can avoid the build-up of unsustainable businesses in the first place, which 
can be the potential source of systemic risk, by imposing restrictions on the lenders. For 
example, mortgage loaning banks can only hold a specific portion of their total newly issued 
mortgages which have a specific risk structure. This structure is expressed in the Loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio and Loan-to-income (LTI) ratio. High LTVs mean that the majority of a 
property’s value is financed with a mortgage, i.e. the mortgage taker is highly leveraged. 
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Lower LTVs require the mortgage taker to bring own equity. The LTI accompanies the LTV. 
Low ratios aim at preventing household indebtedness. 
The regulatory agencies can interfere in the lending decisions by rationing high risk mortgage 
lending. This avoids incentives for arbitrage, because it is not a complete prohibition on high 
risk lending, as indicated by high LTI and LTV. With these tools the creation of systemic risk 
stemming from lending to the real economy is dampened in the first place rather than 
somehow managed after it was already within the financial system. 
However, large sized firms that are bank customers are not exclusively dependent on funding 
through credit intermediation performed by banks (Park, 2011). Given their size, they can 
raise funds by issuing bonds and other obligations directly in the global capital markets. They 
would do even more so the tighter the regulatory agencies adjust the macro-prudential tools. 
Higher capital charges on loans with the aim of dampening exuberance in asset growth would 
discriminate against smaller firms that do not have direct access to capital markets as an 
alternative source of funding. Also, turning to other sources of funding in less regulated parts 
of the financial system can again lead to systemic risk concerns. 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction each chapter is set to address the two research 
questions identified in chapter 2. Therefore, the following discussion aims to answer: 
- Do these macro-prudential tools encourage sustainable risk-taking? 
- Do these macro-prudential tools curb systemic risk when it materialises? 
As for the first question, the regulatory agencies can manipulate the capital requirements of 
banks through sectoral capital requirements (SCRs) and countercyclical capital buffers 
(CCBs). This, in general, should affect the risk appetite of banks in the lending decision of the 
respective sector. For example, the unsustainable lending practices in the U.S. sub-prime 
mortgage sector are likely to have not occurred with such a SCR. If the central bank had 
identified a bubble in this sector and had leant against it by raising the capital requirements 
for residential mortgages, issuing such mortgages would have been less profitable – if 
profitable at all. However, taking such a macro-prudential view poses a challenge to the 
regulatory agency in charge of the deployment of the tool. The difficulty is to determine the 
existence of the specific sectoral bubble. Countercyclical buffers are raised in financially 
tranquil times in order to avoid exuberance in excessive credit growth; the buffer is relaxed in 
the downward movement during a recession to stimulate lending. So, compared to the pre-
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crisis cyclicality of booms and busts, the peaks are damped in order to make the downswing 
less severe.  
A cap on the remuneration of managers at pivotal points in the bank and the more senior level 
hit the management personally. If individual misconduct can be proven, forfeiture or at least 
deferring bonuses is an appropriate tool to incentivise managers. A retrospective punishment 
through a clawback of already paid bonuses would, in general, push managers from short-
termism towards foresighted risk-taking. However, if wrong-doing is revealed and punished 
years after the incident, then the incentives towards sustainability might not be as high as 
hoped for. 
As for the second question, SCRs and CCBs apply to banks as the regulated subjects. The rest 
of the financial system, i.e. shadow banking system, is less regulated. There is the threat of 
arbitrage. Certain businesses that would be subject to SCRs when performed by banks can 
simply be taken over by other, less regulated financial institutions. For example, the ECB 
(2015) warns that disintermediation in the banking sector is happening and that other players 
in the financial system are taking over the credit intermediation that was previously performed 
by banks.  
In conclusion, banks are incentivised to abstain from certain businesses that the regulatory 
agencies consider a source of systemic risk. So, the individual banks are less of a systemic 
risk concern. However, banks are still exposed to possible adverse refinancing conditions in 
the financial system, as the case of Northern Rock shows.  
In contrast to the specific sectoral requirements, the leverage ratio is not a risk-weighted 
capital requirement but an absolute threshold. The maximum leverage is determined by the 
regulatory agency similar to the countercyclical capital buffer. A prudent level of leverage 
increases the loss-absorbency of a bank in general. Consequently, regardless of where 
systemic risk emerges banks with more prudent leverage ratios are better equipped in dealing 
with financial distress. 
In conclusion, the various macro-prudential tools individually address problems of incentives 
and systemic risk. No single tool can address every problem equally. So the tools are 
complementary and should be part of a holistic toolkit at the regulatory agency’s disposal. 
Curbing systemic risk necessitates that the regulatory agency can identify systemic risk, 
ideally in its early stages. The different measures of how to spot systemic risk well before it 
accumulates to concerning levels is the subject of the next chapter.  
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5 Conditional Value-at-Risk as a systemic risk measure 
This chapter contains an empirical analysis of the systemic risk of the 41 largest banks in 
Europe. Hence, this quantitative analysis is complementary to the qualitative discussion about 
systemic risk in chapter 2. Also, this chapter discusses how the proposed methodology and 
results could support the daily work of the regulatory agencies that are subject of chatper 3. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an introduction to the conditional Value-at-Risk 
(CoVaR) as a tool to measure a single bank’s contribution to systemic risk. Chapter 2 
analyses systemic risk from a qualitative perspective. This chapter expands the qualitative 
findings of chapter 2 with a quantitative analysis. 
This chapter contains an empirical analysis of the systemic risk contribution of individual 
banks to the banking system which they are part of. The original data set comprises 41 
European banks’ share prices from 2002 to 2014. Systemic risk is defined as the possibility 
that an event on a bank-level could cause a severe instability or even collapse of its 
surrounding environment. This environment can be a clearly defined banking sector, a wider 
defined financial system including non-bank financial institutions, and the real economy. The 
latter can be purely domestic or comprise a selection of countries.  
This chapter shows how to apply the ΔCoVaR methodology most prominently suggested by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). This measure compares the impact of two different stages 
of one particular bank on the environment, here the European banking system over a given 
period. The first step is to look at how the system looks like conditional on the one bank being 
healthy; the second step is to look how the system looks given that the bank is in distress. The 
two steps alone deliver the individual CoVaR of the system contingent on the individual bank. 
This is a simple statistical measure. More interesting is the comparison of the two scenarios in 
order to derive a difference. This delivers the ΔCoVaR. The Δ now in turn allows for an 
inference on the marginal systemic risk contribution of the bank. A significant change in the 
system suggests that the systme follows the bank, i.e. is highly correlated. Put differently 
there is a co-movement of the bank VaR and the system VaR. Hence, the prefix “Co” stands 
for co-movement, or also conditional, contagion (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011), or 
contributing VaR (Fullenkamp, 2013).  
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Obviously, regulatory agencies can incorporate the ΔCoVaR methodology as a macro-
prudential tool to identify those financial institutions that pose a threat to the financial 
stability objective, i.e. are large contributors of systemic risk. This is most likely true for 
institutions that are systemically important by their sheer size in terms of assets and/or 
interconnectedness in the financial world.  
In addition to the macro-prudential purpose, which is the subject of this chapter, this 
methodology can also be introduced to banks’ own risk management system to counter 
systematic risk. In order to do so, the conditioning event is reversed, i.e. the own bank’s 
performance is now conditional on the system. The result reveals how exposed the bank is to 
developments in the banking system. Ideally, a bank’s management would employ measures 
to counter the co-movement and insulate the bank from the industry-specific systematic risk. 
Banks are required to employ risk management systems in order to calculate the risk of their 
investments and produce shock-absorbing capital. The Basel II framework for minimum 
capital requirements gives guidance. From a macro-prudential point of view on criticism is 
that Basel II only addresses micro-level risks to calculate regulatory capital. In fact systemic 
risk concerns are inherent to the financial system in general and banking system in particular. 
Hence, at the end of this area of research, a macro-prudential tool must be precise enough so 
that this “calibration can help ensure that each institution pays for the externality it imposes 
on the system” (Bisias et al., 2012, p. 55). 
This chapter compares the CoVaR for the financial system, which incorporates a conditioning 
event, to the unconditional VaR of each individual institution that is an element of the 
financial system. This chapter accentuates that the sum of all individual banks expressed in 
VaR does not reflect the riskiness of the system. The latter has an intrinsic macro-level 
systemic risk component that is not reflected in the existing micro-level risk measures such as 
the VaR. Thus, the riskiness of the financial system is more than the sum of individual banks’ 
idiosyncratic risk, i.e. their specific risks such as management risk. 
This chapter helps understand the nature of systemic risk, using European bank data. Within 
this PhD thesis this chapter contributes to the previous chapter. Chapter 3 exemplifies the new 
legal powers to intervene in a bank’s business model and certain markets with a range of new 
tools that are discussed in chapter 4. The new regulatory paradigm of macro-prudence 
introduces “maintaining financial stability” as a regulatory objective. In order to do so the 
ΔCoVaR methodology is a simple tool at the regulatory agencies’ disposal to detect banks 
that can become a systemic risk concern in the near future. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 of this chapter reviews the 
literature about different systemic risk measures. Section 5.3 gives a general introduction to 
the most common (non-systemic) tool employed in banks’ risk management departments, the 
Value-at-Risk (VaR). Section 5.4 presents the ΔCoVaR methodology in more detail and 
section 5.5 discusses the data used in the computation. Section 5.6 discusses the results. 
Section 5.7 and 5.8 give recommendations for regulators and conclude, respectively.  
 
5.2 Literature Review on systemic risk measures 
This section presents an overview of the different approaches to measure the systemic risk of 
individual banks. The related literature on systemic risk measures in general, and ΔCoVaR in 
particular, is nascent. However, a number of papers applied the ΔCoVaR to various data sets. 
There is a growing literature on CoVaR, respectively ΔCoVaR, proposed by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011). They analyse U.S. data of deposit-taking banks, investment banks, 
insurance companies, and government-sponsored enterprises, such as “Fannie Mae” and 
“Freddie Mac” – the two largest mortgage-issuing lenders that played a key role in the U.S. 
sub-prime crisis 2006. They find a weak link between the institutions VaR and ΔCoVaR. So, 
the authors conclude that the ΔCoVaR is better suited than the VaR to estimate the systemic 
risk contribution of the single financial institution. Two banks can have identical VaRs but 
different ΔCoVaRs. This means that the riskiness of the asset portfolio of one bank has a 
higher impact on the financial system than the other bank’s portfolio risk. Similarly, Adams et 
al. (2015) find that the design of the VaR measure underestimates spillover effects among 
financial institutions. Consequently the authors introduce a state-dependent sensitivity VaR 
that, just like the CoVaR, uses quantile regression and considers the state of the economy 
(tranquil, normal, and volatile). However, they conduct regressions on the single institution’s 
VaRs and not the returns of assets as Adrian and Brunnermeier, or returns of the single 
institution’s equity as it is done in this chapter. They use data for commercial banks, 
investment banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds. One finding is that during times of 
financial distress in the markets, hedge funds become more interconnected. While an increase 
of one per centage point of such a fund’s VaR causes an increase of of 0.05 percentage points 
in an investment bank’s VaR, the same shock to a hedge fund’s VaR during a distressed 
period cause an increase of 0.3 per cent point of the VaR of the insurance industry. This 
change of correlation of VaRs is revealed considering the state of the economy, by 
introducing a conditioning variable just like the CoVaR measure does. 
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Girardi and Ergün (2013) use equity retunrns data of 72 U.S. deposit-taking financial 
institutions, non depositories, insurance companies, and broker dealers from 2000 to 2008. 
The authors find that at least for this sample period deposit-taking banks are the systemically 
most relevant financial institutions. They also find that the ΔCoVaR time-series could have 
more information to determine the systemic risk contribution of a single institution than the 
time-series of its VaR, hence “monitoring a firm’s tail risk in isolation is not sufficient to 
determine its systemic risk contribution” (Girardi and Ergün, 2013, p. 22). Gauthier et al. 
(2012) apply the CoVaR measure to the Canadian banking sectior, but use aggregated 
interbank exposure data, e.g. bilateral shareholding, interbank deposits, and unsecured loans. 
Again, considering interbank exposure give a different picture about individual bank risk than 
analysing bank-specific data. 
Wong and Fong (2011) apply the CoVaR methodology to country data rather than micro-level 
bank data. The authors apply this measure to CDSs of 11 Asian-Pacific countries and find that 
a country’s sovereign risk increased when another economy is in distress; this impact tends to 
be stronger in crisis times than in economic boom times. Similar to Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
the authors find that the VaR underestimates the systemic risk, thus the CoVaR methodology 
is worth further research. 
Karimalis and Nomikos (2014) calculate the ΔCoVaR for European banks from 2002 to 2012, 
which is a slightly narrower data set being used in this chapter. The authors use a copula 
approach to estimating the average weekly systemic risk contributions of individual banks. 
This approach respects a change in the correlation of asset returns, depending on the state of 
the economy. This chapter’s findings are in support of Karimalis and Nomikos (2014) in that 
the French and Spanish banks, on average, generate the highest average systemic risk 
contributions, but BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, BBVA, and Credit Suisse are the most 
systemically relevant individual banks. 
This chapter uses easy-to-compute equity retuns to calculate VaRs and ΔCoVaRs and uses 
different state variables for these calculations; it derives similar conclusions with less 
complex data. Also, splitting the whole sample into different periods, i.e. pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis period, allows for a ranking of systemic significance among the banks, which is not 
done in the existing literature. This might help regulatory agencies to allocate supervisory 
resources to address the most threatening banks to abate the risk of a systemic crisis in its 
early stage. The literature agrees that leverage and size of the individual banks tend to be good 
predictors of systemic risk contribution in the form of ΔCoVaR. This chapter, however, 
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focuses on the impact of the state variables such as the short term refinancing conditions 
rather than bank specific factors. Recall the definitions and differences of the macro-
prudential and micro-prudential approach according to Borio (2003). Under a micro-
prudential approach a peer group assessment suggest comparing the bank specific factors such 
as size and leverage. However, the macro-prudential approach also suggests investigating the 
interconnectedness between banks. Suppose that size and leverage have been addressed by 
regulatory reform and are not a distinguishing factor among banks in the peer group 
assessment. The economic conditions in which banks operate are external risk factors to 
banks under the micro-prudential approach. So, the economic environment, represented by 
various state variables that are explained in the data section below, gains importance in 
understanding how systemic relevance of each bank changes over time. In anticipation of the 
results section, one finding is that refinancing conditions have a different impact on banks and 
can switch signs through time. Karimalis and Nomikos (2014) point to this but did not further 
develop the implications for regulation. This finding could suggest that in addition to factors 
like leverage and size, regulatory agencies should analyse the business model of each bank in 
more detail, especially when the bank is flagged up as currently being among the most 
systemically threatening banks. 
Benoit et al. (2013) compare several systemic risk measures applied by financial regulators. 
These are marginal expected shortfall (MES), (SRISK), and ΔCoVaR; the definitions follow 
in the sub-sections below. Using U.S. bank data the authors conclude that different systemic 
risk measures identify different institutions as systemically important and that the systemic 
risk ranking of all institutions corresponds with their respective market risk or liabilities.  
Bisias et al. (2012) present a survey of 28 approaches to measure systemic risk. These 
different approaches, among the ΔCoVaR, fall into one of five categories with different 
starting points, which are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.  
 
5.2.1 Granular foundations and network measures 
First, “granular foundations and network measures” start on a rather abstract view on the 
financial industry. Borrowing from network analysis, it proposes to create an interbank 
exposure risk map of the financial world. So this network is visualised with nodes, 
representing singe financial institutions, and straight lines that connect the nodes to each 
other. Each node is a legal entity such as an individual bank (see also Gray and Metzing, 
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2013). This entity itself is a portfolio of contracts which in turn are individual exposures to 
other nodes. These connections, or exposures, are the financial commitments to other nodes in 
the form of contractually agreed payment obligations. Put differently, this view aims on the 
legal interconnectedness of financial institutions to others.  
A contract is a legal obligation to another node. However, this network approach defines 
“obligation” not only as legally binding payment promise but extend the term with contingent 
claims. These contingent claims also include options. An option gives the holder a right for a 
specific payment. This means that the holder has a choice to either exercise or decline the 
option. As long as the option exists it is not a legally binding obligation to the counterparty. 
Only when the option is exercised it becomes a legally binding obligation of the counterparty. 
When looking at this over a period of time, this shows that the holders of options undoubtedly 
have a claim at every point of time. But unless it is not actually exercised, it is not reflected as 
a certain debt but a contingent debt to the obligator.  
Whether options are exercised or not depends on the contingency that leads to that decision. It 
is obvious that deriving the exact probability for such a contingency, hence payment 
obligations, is as crucial as it is difficult. Consequently, prudential supervision comprise of 
modelling and studying the dynamic behaviour of the entirety of institutions and contracts. It 
is done so by creating a risk map that visualises these legal entities and their connections. In 
order to give it relevancy and enable a regulatory agency to intervene based on the results the 
map must be complete. The extensive collecting of data and computing results can come at 
high costs. For example, regulatory agencies are able to collect more data from banks as the 
regulated subjects.  
 
5.2.2 Forward-looking risk measurements 
The second group of systemic risk measures are “forward-looking risk measurements”. These 
include tools that are widely known in the financial risk management of banks such as CDS 
and the VaR. The latter concept is addressed in more detail in the next sub-section. 
Essentially, historical data of an asset or portfolio of assets is used to derive an estimate for 
the future risk of that portfolio. The particular challenge is to identify the non-linearity and 
other higher-order attributes such as the magnitude and changes of correlations within the 
portfolio. For example, the riskiness of a portfolio expressed in the VaR of the portfolio is not 
necessarily the weighted sum of the individual VaRs of the assets in that portfolio.  
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Intuition suggests that the experience with the movement of the portfolio VaR in the past can 
be used to predict future portfolio VaRs. However, this assumes that the distribution function 
of the VaR holds indefinitely, these statistical properties are also referred to as being 
homoscedastic. This is not always the case.  
A promising extension is making the prediction of future performance a function of one or 
more external factors. For example, the portfolio VaR is dependent on factors such as interest 
rates and movements of other indices and markets. However, assumptions have to be made 
about the continuation of these relationships – a causality identified today can disappear in the 
future – and the future values of the external factors as well. Comparing several outcomes of 
different scenarios rather than relying on one forecast can increase precision. This leads to 
stress tests that are discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2.3 Stress tests 
The third approach to measure systemic risk is to “stress test” financial institutions. In 
hypothetical forward-looking scenarios the theoretical risk of an institution is analysed. For 
example, a sudden change in macroeconomic factors like gross domestic product is a simple 
predictor for the future conditions of banks (Alfaro and Drehmann, 2009). Hirtle et al. (2009) 
give an overview of the 2009 Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), the U.S. Federal 
Reserve’s stress test on U.S. bank holding companies.  
Duffie (2011) proposes a more comprehensive scenario analysis that consists of a set of 
several distinct stress scenarios rather than relying on one big change in one factor. Rather 
than focussing on the precision of the prediction of a future outcome, using a set of different 
scenarios allows for gauging the future outcome within a band of possible outcomes. 
However, stress testing before the financial crisis of 2008 was not based on clear guidelines 
with comprehensive principles for conducting a stress test. Stress testing was a trial-and-error 
process and often lacked expertise by those who designed them and limited by the available 
data (International Monetary Fund, 2012).  
The International Monetary Fund (2012) proposes a list of principles for stress testing on a 
macro-level. One of the most important principles is identifying those financial institutions 
that are of systemic importance. Similar to the creation of a risk map proposed in the 
“granular foundations and network measures” approach, a stress test can only be reliable if the 
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data input reflects the true entirety of the financial system. Otherwise the stress test misses out 
important data. The ΔCoVaR methodology proposed in this chapter can assist in identifying 
those institutions that contribute to systemic risk before the actual macro-level stress test is 
conducted.  
 
5.2.4 Cross-sectional measures 
Fourth, “cross-sectional measures” improve the forward-looking measures with the 
introduction of firm interdependency. The health of the individual institution is conditional on 
the health of another.  
The systemic expected shortfall (SES) (Acharya et al., 2010; Brownlees and Engle, 2015) 
measures the expected contribution of a financial institution to a systemic crisis. This 
contribution is derived from the likelihood that a particular institution is undercapitalised 
conditional on the financial system being undercapitalised. The starting point for the 
assessment of this tool’s potential to predict undercapitalisation of a bank is already existing 
results: First, the authors use the actuall recommended capital banks had to raise as a 
consequence of the global financial crisis. The figures for this capital shortfall are derived 
from the stress test conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve in 2009. Second, the realised 
systemic risk is measured in the decline in the value of financial institutions’ equity. Third, an 
increase in credit risk is measured in the spreads of the institutions’ CDSs. 
After the SES is calculated, the authors take a step back and derive two factors that are the 
main drives for an institution’s SES: the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and leverage. 
The MES are the extreme losses in the tail of the sector’s loss distribution. The tail contains 
the most extreme values that occur with a low probability. The Systemic RISK measure 
(SRISK), proposed in Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2015), is defined as 
the capital a firm would need in a financial crisis. This SRISK is in fact a stress test tool that 
depends on a scenario analysis and builds up on marginal expected shortfall (MES). In 
Acharya et al. (2012) the financial system is simulated for a time horizon of six month into 
the future. Volatilities and correlations are allowed to change over time; no assumptions of 
homoscedasticity are made. The worst-case scenario is a simulated loss of 40 per cent of a 
market return index over the six months. The SRISK of an individual bank is a portion of the 
equity. This portion is the capital shortfall conditional on a crisis. 
The Capita shortfall (CS) as taken from Brownlees and Engle (2015) is defined as 
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     𝐶𝑆𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑘𝐴𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑊𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑘(𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑊𝑡
𝑖) − 𝑊𝑡
𝑖     (5.1) 
The factor 𝑘 is a fixed “prudential capital fraction” (p. 6), for example 8 per cent minimum 
capital requirement; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the value of assets of the firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡; 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the market value 
of equity; and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of debt.  
Assume that a bank has total assets that are valued at $100.
7
 Accordingly the sum of all 
liabilities, i.e. equity and debt, is $100. Therefore, with 𝑘 = 8 per cent the minimum capital 
requirement of the bank is $8. If the bank produces more than this fraction, say 10 per cent 
equity, i.e. $10, the capital shortfall equals -2. For negative values of CS, the bank has a 
capital surplus and is perceived to be healthy.  
Now assume that a bank has a capital cushion at a level below 𝑘. In the numerical example 
say 5 per cent that translates into $5 when assets are held at $100. The absolute value for the 
capital requirements of 8 per cent, or $8 in the example, stands against $5 market valued 
equity. The bank falls short of capital worth $3 which is associated with a state of distress.  
So far, the CS is a simple balance sheet ratio. A regulatory agency could identify those 
financial institutions that have a positive CS and therefore are currently undercapitalised. 
However, this would be a micro-level regulatory tool. One must not run the risk of relying 
that the system is stable as long as the vast majority of financial institution report healthy 
results for the CS. Consequently, the CS now is expanded with a macro-level scope.  
To do so, the second step is to anticipate such a shortfall by conditioning the CS on a systemic 
event C. The result is the systemic risk contribution SRISK. The following is a more precise 
equation than originally in Acharya et al. (2012) but more simple than in Brownlees and 
Engle (2015): 
     𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡+ℎ
𝑖 |𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡+ℎ)  (5.2) 
The SRISK of institution i at time t is the expected value at t of the CS within the time 
horizon t+h. For example, the time horizon h captures the next six months and given that a 
crisis event occurs within t+h. 
As previously mentioned a single bank in distress – here expressed as a failure due to capital 
shortfall – does not necessarily lead to a systemic crisis. Instead, if on an aggregated level the 
financial sector suffers from a capital shortfall, a systemic crisis is indeed a concern.  
                                                          
7
 In the example calcultions the $ sign is used to indicate a currency, rather than US$ for the sake of readability.  
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The suffix “+” is introduced and denotes the maximum of (𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡
𝑖, 0), so that 
   𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝑆𝑈𝑀(𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡
𝑖) +     (5.3) 
and only those institutions with a positive capital shortfall are considered, i.e. those that 
actually suffer from distress. Consequently the left hand side of the equation is the key 
number to determine whether the current state of the financial institutions at time 𝑡 is likely to 
absorb imminent distress or whether the losses can lead to a systemic crisis. 
Institutions with a negative shortfall have a capital surplus and can be ignored in calculating 
distress of the financial system. Suppose that a significant number of banks report positive 
SRISKs. If the sum of their SRISKs is a significant portion of the whole banking sector a 
distress is less likely to be absorbed by the system, potentially leading to a systemic crisis. If a 
large amount of institutions is affected, it is not likely that the remaining healthy institutions 
will take over the struggling banks via mergers and acquisitions or provide emergency loans 
with their surpluses (Brownlees and Engle, 2015). On an aggregated level excess capital 
cannot be expected in full to counter SRISK. 
However, Idier et al. (2013) compare the MES approach to simple measures such as balance 
sheet ratios already employed by regulators to gauge ex ante riskiness of banks. Applied to 
U.S. bank data from 2007 to 2009, the authors conclude that the commonly used ratios are 
superior to MES. 
Research on systemic risk introduces a conditioning event to the systemic risk formula. The 
capital shortfall measure essentially suggests a levy on equity to make the institution more 
robust, hence boosting the stability of the financial system from the micro-level.  
The CoVaR is another cross-sectional measure with a conditioning and is developed in more 
detail below. Suppose that there are only two institutions. The CoVaR is simply the VaR of 
the one institution conditional on the other institution being on its VaR too. A high value for 
CoVaR means that if the one institution is in financial distress, the other one accompanies the 
other. Not necessarily is this a symmetric relationship. Especially banks that are considered 
systemically relevant due to their sheer size different values of institution-specific CoVaR and 
ΔCoVaRs occur in comparison to smaller, relatively less significant institutions. A large 
institution is a source to the stability of the system, hence creates systemic risk; also it is 
exposed to the risk of the system, i.e. systematic risk. Small institutions are not primary 
sources of systemic risk individually. However, they individually suffer from developments 
of the system, i.e. import systematic risk.  
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5.2.5 Measures of illiquidity and insolvency 
Fifth and finally, “measures of illiquidity and insolvency” are crucial because these factors are 
the essence of crises. Banks convert long-term investments into liquidity via maturity 
transformation. Therefore a sudden drop in the liquidity is an inherent risk of this 
intermediation However, balance sheet based measures of the liquidity and solvency are a 
point-in-time estimate. The risk of liquidity and solvency must be captures over a period of 
time. Furthermore, the previous approaches stress that some sort of “contingency” must be 
introduced for the assessments of an individual financial institution’s systemic risk 
contribution. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2010) propose a “risk topography”. In contrast to the risk map proposed 
in the granular data approach above, the authors firstly aim to model how market participants 
respond to negative shocks rather than relying too much on the current state of their assets and 
how they would perform under various stress scenarios. Second they investigate whether and 
how these responses can have feedback effects on an aggregated, system-wide level. Each 
class of assets (mortgages, loans, etc.) and liabilities (deposits, etc.) are given a liquidity 
index. These indices are depended on the state of the world. Asset liquidity indices have 
positive values bigger than 0 and a maximum of 1, liability indexes have negative values 
smaller than 0 and a minimum of -1. Exceptions are government-backed Treasury bills and 
overnight lending facilities. Both are state-independent. Treasuries are highly liquid and set to 
1; overnight facilities are highly liquid and set to -1. The sum of asset liquidity is compared to 
the sum of liability liquidity to derive the potential liquidity risk to the single institution. 
A simple example of a shock is the scenario of declining asset prices, for example housing 
prices. The liquidity-related consequence of this scenario is that the institution would have to 
write off some of their margins on that asset. There is a finite number of values of the shock, 
say there are 𝑁 possible values for the housing prices, and a finite number 𝑀 of levels of 
write-offs. In summary a 𝑁 × 𝑀 matrix covers the entirety of possible choices an institution 
can make for that particular risk factor, here the housing price. Each bank reports the four 
states in which it would face the highest losses. Institutions can face the same shock in the 
form of declining housing prices but respond with different haircuts on their outstanding 
mortgages, depending on their internal risk calculations.  
Next, for a variety of scenarios all institutions report their estimated losses. Brunnermeier et 
al. (2010) conclude that if banks respond in different ways with their individual choices of 
each 𝑛 × 𝑚, systemic risk is contained. If, however, responses cluster among a certain 
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combination of shock 𝑛 and response 𝑚, systemic risk materialises. To rephrase, systemic 
risk is a concern if the financial institutions are homogeneous in their responses to a shock. 
Instead of deriving a risk map that contains all financial institutions and their obligations, the 
risk topography summarises how financial institution will respond to a shock. The key insight 
of illiquidity approaches is that institutions are not only interconnected with the rest of the 
financial system through contractual and contingent claims. The dependence on refinancing 
conditions, such as interbank lending facilities and money markets, are also key factors in 
systemic risk. Again, the case of Northern Rock and the adverse refinancing conditions it 
faced despite a sound asset portfolio serves as an example, as captured in chapter 2.  
 
5.2.6 Interim conclusion 
Systemic risk builds up in the background of times of financial tranquillity. During such times 
market participants are prone to under-price risks. Historically low interest rates encouraged 
financial institutions and households to load on leverage. Yet, opposite to intuition that high 
leverage can quickly turn to a disaster, risk spreads and volatility experienced historical low 
values as well (Goodhart, 2008). The financial stability of a bank depends not only on micro-
level data such as leverage. The case of Northern Rock demonstrates that the individual 
bank’s health also depends on macro factors, especially changes in the financial system itself. 
This particular case exemplifies the most severe case that Northern Rock was not led into the 
crisis by micro-factors, but predominantly by its interconnectedness to the financial system it 
was part of. 
Thus, regulatory agencies must choose a risk measure that takes interdependence into 
account. Stress-tests look at the bank in various “what if” scenarios and point to the direction 
of “forward-looking risk measures”. The crucial extension of simple risk measures is to 
introduce a conditioning event. In most of the related academic research papers this event is a 
sudden drop in the macro-economic environment. Assessing the individual financial 
institution with the various measures presented above is important to reveal their stability 
given distress on the macro level. 
The crucial difference of the CoVaR and ΔCoVaR in the remainder of this chapter is that the 
CoVaR measure reverses the research question: Rather than asking “how will the bank be 
affected if the financial system experiences a shock?” CoVaR asks “how will be the financial 
system be affected if the bank experiences a shock?”  
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A drawback of the network measures approach is the costly and perhaps incomplete collection 
of granular data. The forward-looking measures make contestable assumptions about the 
relationships of external factors and asset portfolios that undermine predictive power of the 
simple statistical relationships. The stress test approach analyses financial institutions’ health 
by employing a variety of scenarios. In contrast to the simple statistical forward-looking 
measures stress tests allow for gauging the health within pre-defined boundaries rather than 
making a precise prediction. However, stress tests can be criticised for being unrealistic 
scenarios. A lack of acceptance of these by the regulated industry is exacerbated if the results 
are the foundation for regulatory intervention in the form of higher minimum capital 
requirements. Furthermore, regulatory agencies deliberately hold back how they create these 
stress tests for a good reason. It is important to prevent the industry from adapting to the stress 
criteria. Unfortunately this counteracts the effort to reduce barriers between the regulatory 
agencies and the regulated industry. Mutual exchange and understanding how the other party 
perceives developments in the financial system must be an integral part of macro-prudence.  
The ΔCoVaR methodology and its application to European data are explained in section 7.5. 
Before that the next section gives an introduction to the VaR as the standard tool in financial 
institutions’ risk management. The VaR itself is a forward-looking measure. The introduction 
of the conditioning event as proposed in the ΔCoVaR is a transition to a cross-sectional 
approach.  
 
5.3 Introduction to the Value-at-Risk  
This section discusses the various methods of the VaR and its limits to capture systemic risk. 
There are regulations in place, which are based on the Basel capital accord, that require banks 
to calculate how much regulatory minimum capital to produce in order to counter the threat of 
losses. The financial institutions that are subject to the Basel minimum capital accord 
calculate their minimum capital according to the following formula (see BCBS, 2004):  
 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 ≥ 0.08 × ["𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠" + 
  12.5 × (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)]     (5.4) 
To counter the exposure to credit risk as a risk-weighted asset regulated institutions have the 
choice between creating their own risk models and using external ratings conducted by credit 
rating agencies. The former requires approval by the institution’s supervisor. For the latter, 
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the Basel Committee provides tables to translate the credit agencies’ rating notches into 
weights. For example, claims on central banks with the highest credit rating come with zero 
risk weight because they are considered safe. Central banks are usually backed by their 
government; the government can raise taxes to repay claims on its central bank. However, 
claims on private corporations such as insurance companies with the highest credit ratings 
come with a 20 per cent weight. Even though they enjoy a top rating, this is not a guaranteed 
no-default claim.  
In case the bank choses the internal ratings-based approach, the VaR is the most popular risk 
measure in the financial industry. There are several merits to the VaR concepts, however 
criticism persists. Choudhry (2006) gives an introduction.  
The VaR is the maximum loss that can occur on a 𝑞-percentile confidence level over a 
predefined holding period. For example, the bank’s risk management estimate a VaR of $100 
on the confidence level of 𝑞 = 5 per cent for the next day. This means that the loss of the 
portfolio will exceed $100 with the probability of 5 per cent. In other words, the risk 
management reports that in 95 per cent of the time losses within the next 24 hours will not 
exceed $100.  
There are three distinctive approaches to derive the VaR. The first, and most common method 
due to its simplicity, is the historical simulation. The correlation method is more advanced 
and calculates the variances of and co-variances between assets. It is also called parametric 
method. The third method is the Monte Carlo simulation of the VaR. 
The ΔCoVaR methodology in this chapter uses historical stock market data and the parallels 
to the historical simulation method are obvious. Both methods use historical returns of assets. 
Before the VaR methodologies are explained in more detail, the next sub-section gives a 
definition how to derive returns using algebra. 
 
5.3.1 The algebraic concept of returns 
This sub-section defines how returns are calculated in this empirical analysis, since different 
ways to do so have diferent statistical properties. The “return” is a gain or a loss of an 
investment in a predefined period, see the following equation.  
 𝑟𝑡 =
𝑝𝑡−𝑝𝑡−1
𝑝𝑡−1
      (5.5) 
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The gain or loss of an investment in t equals the difference of its price 𝑝 in period 𝑡 and the 
previous period 𝑡 − 1. This absolute value carries little information how significant this 
change in value is. Therefore it can be expressed in a percentage. In the simplest form this 
value is divided by the investments’ previous price, hence called “simple return”.  
However in finance another definition of returns is commonly used: the logarithmic return, or 
log return. It is the logarithm of ratio of the increase in the price to the previous price. 
 𝑟𝐿𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡−1
)      (5.6) 
Equation (5.6) can be rearranged to  
 𝑟𝐿𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑡−1)     (5.7) 
so that the log return of an investment in period 𝑡 is the difference of the logs of the two 
prices in 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. Using the logarithmic return rather than the simple return can is justified 
by the practical advantages of the logarithmic return. Hudson and Gregoriou (2010), and 
references therein, compare the two methods and find that the logarithmic mean of a data 
series is less than the mean of that series computed with the simple returns method. Yet, this 
difference does not follow a pattern. Hence the results of one method cannot be compared to 
the other. The advantage of logarithmic returns increases as data frequency increases. For 
high-frequency data test results for statistical significance become slim. A slight change in the 
mean of the data set can be critical whether the null hypothesis is rejected or not. 
Consequently, a method that regularly computes lower means is more prudent, hence making 
the results of research statistically more robust. 
 
5.3.2 Historical simulation method 
This sub-section focuses on the historical simulation approach to the VaR. Note that a critical 
assumption is made here that also applies to the CoVaR in later sections: The VaR of a bank 
is calculated using its stock price returns, representing the value of the bank’s equity and not 
the returns of the portfolio of assets on the balance sheet of the bank, which is usually done. 
Collecting this kind of data in full was not feasible in course of this PhD. So alternatively it is 
assumed that the market price of the bank’s equity reflects the riskiness of its asset portfolio. 
Choi and Richardson (2015), and the literature therein, give an overview how equity volatility 
is affected by asset returns volatility. For the historical simulation, in order to construct the 
single cash value for the VaR stock returns of a certain time window have to be ordered. For 
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example, a weekly VaR for a given portfolio of investments – financial institutions are in fact 
a portfolio of investments – is an approximation of the riskiness of that portfolio. In 
preparation for the ΔCoVaR calculations in this chapter, the stock prices of a bank serve as an 
illustrative example. A year consists of 252 trading days. The daily closing prices of a bank’s 
shares are the starting point to derive the input data for the VaR of the month, see Figure 5.1, 
below.  
Figure 5.1: Deutsche Bank daily returns in 2014. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the daily returns of Deutsche Bank over the 252 trading days in the year 
2014. The stock returns are the difference of two closing prices of two successive trading 
days. Hence, in a second step, all of the now 252 observations are plotted in a histogram in 
ascending order, from the most negative stock returns to the highest returns, as Figure 5.2 
reports.  
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Figure 5.2: Daily Value-at-Risk of Deutsche Bank in 2014. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 reports the daily VaR result of Deutsche Bank for the year 2014. The daily VaR is 
calculated based on the log-returns of the previous 261 trading days For the sake of simplicity 
all returns are merged into bins. Also note that losses, i.e. negative returns, are plotted in 
absolute values to answer the simple question VaR aims to answer: “With a confidence of 95 
per cent, what amount of losses is not exceeded?” 
The above histogram of VaR in Figure 5.2 already hints to extreme losses that can occur in 
the left tail. Losses are given in absolute values. The red bins indicate the VaR on a 
confidence level of 0.95, i.e. with a probability of 95 per cent losses will not exceed 2.6348 
per cent. For the sake of simplicity and applicability, these are ignored in the daily risk 
management. However systemic risk measures look exactly into these extreme loss quantiles.  
One advantage of the historical simulation of VaR is that it does not make any assumptions 
about the distribution of the data. In addition, the concept follows a simple intuition that 
actually realised returns help gauge the current risk of a portfolio. McKinsey (2012) estimates, 
that 72 per cent of banks use the historical simulation technique. 
One disadvantage of using historical data is the distorted effect of one-off events on the 
volatility of the VaR. A large one-off movement of the markets can distort the volatility 
calculations of the VaR. If for example the VaR is calculated over a 30-day horizon a single 
market shock is captured until the time window moves another 30 days and the event drops 
out of the data. To circumvent this problem, single observations in the data set can be 
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weighted. A higher weight to the most recent observations would abate the distortive effect of 
single shocks as the time horizon moves on. The generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model does exactly this. However, GARCH models generally 
“rely on the assumption that future volatilities can be predicted from historic movements” 
(Choudhry, 2006, p. 34). However, the majority of banks that employ historical simulation for 
VaR apply equal weights to the time span and only 15 per cent weight (McKinsey, 2012).  
 
5.3.3 Correlation method 
This sub-section focuses on the correlation method, or variance-covariance method, to 
calculate the VaR. It assumes a normal distribution of returns. Furthermore the correlations 
between the risk factors are assumed to be constant, and so are the deltas of each portfolio 
constituent. The delta assumption means that the price sensitivity of the portfolio to changes 
in one risk factor is constant and does not dependent on the current absolute value of the risk 
factor.  
This method was promoted by JP Morgan, a bank. They developed the JP Morgan 
RiskMetrics, a guide for professionals in the field of finance. This method decomposes the 
portfolio at hand into its single assets. Assuming that the underlying factors are normal 
distributed, there is no need to collect and analyse historical data. Conveniently, specialised 
firms such as JP Morgan provide these statistics for the vast majority of securities in the 
financial markets.  
For illustrative purpose, suppose there is a portfolio with only two securities. The following 
equation is the way how the variance 𝜎 of portfolio 𝜌 is calculated: 
 𝜎𝜌 = √𝛼𝑗
2𝜎𝑗
2 + 𝛼𝑘
2𝜎𝑘
2 + 2𝛼𝑗𝛼𝑘𝜌𝑗𝑘𝜎𝑗𝜎𝑘    (5.8) 
The portfolio variance is the square root of the sum of the various products. The 𝛼 is the 
weight within the portfolio of security 𝑗 and 𝑘, respectively. The various 𝜎 on the right hand 
side are the variances of the securities 𝑗 and 𝑘, respectively. The 𝜌 is the correlation 
coefficient between 𝑗 and 𝑘. 
For example (see Choudhry, 2006), a portfolio consists of 60 per cent of security 𝑗 and 40 per 
cent of security 𝑘, α𝑗  = 0.6 and α𝑘 = 0.4, respectively. The standard deviations for 𝑗 and 𝑘 are 
calculated and are σ𝑗  = 11.83 per cent and σ𝑘  = 17.65 per cent, respectively. The two 
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securities correlate to 64.7 per cent, which means that on average, an increase of 1 in the price 
of security 𝑗 is followed by an increase of 0.647 of security 𝑘. The portfolio variance 
according to equation 5.8 is 0.0165. The square root of the variance gives standard deviation 
of 0.12848. 
The choice of the confidence level now determines the portfolio VaR. A 95 per cent 
confidence level translates into 1.645 standard deviations. Multiplying the confidence level 
with the portfolio standard deviation gives a portfolio VaR of 0.211. Now multiply this VaR 
with the current price of the portfolio investment and the portfolio VaR is expressed in 
monetary terms. If $10 million is invested in this portfolio, the investor will not lose more 
than $2.11 million in 95 per cent of times. 
 
5.3.4 Monte Carlo simulation method 
This sub-section focuses on the Monte Carlo simulation VaR, which is more flexible than the 
historical simulation and the parametric method. This method uses historical data just like the 
historical simulation and does not assume a normal distribution of parameters. The historical 
volatility and correlations of the market factors generate an actual distribution of these factors 
rather than just assuming a, for example, normal distribution. Based on this historical 
distribution multiple simulations are conducted “to obtain simulated changes in the market 
factors over the time horizon to be used in the VaR calculation” (Choudhry, 2006, p. 37). 
Running the simulations require large computational powers and time.  
 
5.3.5 Final remarks on Value-at-Risk as a risk measure 
The VaR has frequently been praised in the past for its intuitive plausibility but criticism was 
reinforced with the global financial crisis of 2008, both for theoretical reasons and the 
comprehension of those who employed the VaR. First, in the UK, the Turner Review (2009) 
reports thats one key concern is the “fundamental question about the validity of VaR as a 
measure of risk” (p.22). A well-known but underappreciated fact is the endogeneity of the 
VaR. Current estimates do affect the value of future estimates and destabilise predictions of 
such. Furthermore, the VaR is not sub-additive which means that the VaR of a portfolio of 
assets does not equal the sum of the VaRs of each asset. The correlations of asset can quickly 
130 
 
change unexpectedly, especially in times of distress (Daníelsson et al., 2001; Daníelsson, 
2002; Daníelsson and Zigrand, 2006).  
Second, the criticism aired by sceptical industry representatives such as Taleb (2008), find 
that, ironically, it is the very notion of the VaR’s conceptual simplicity that leads to 
overconfidence. In his more general critique on the trend toward automation of routines, 
Taleb (2012) argues that too much comfort poses less a challenge to the individual and leads 
to a dangerous comfort. He quotes the example of the Federal Aviation Administration 
regulations to force “the aviation industry to increase its reliance on automated flying” (p. 43) 
only to realise that this regulation encourages pilots to often “abdicate too much responsibility 
to automated systems” (p. 43); parallels to the regulation of what risk measures may be 
employed and the interpretation of such by the financial industry can be drawn. Even though 
the CoVaR is worth further research, the general criticism about using historical data should 
not be forgotten. 
The discrepancy between what academics identify as key issues and the financial industry’s 
conduct is obvious. However, this difference existed long enough because of flawed 
regulations set in the Basel II accord for minimum capital requirements. Besides the criticism 
of the technical aspects of VaR academics criticise the regulatory framework of Basel II for 
not appreciating the fact that financial regulation itself is inherently procyclical and the VaR 
will only exacerbate the problem of endogeneity and undermine the very purpose of financial 
regulation to “reduce the likelihood of [a] systemic crisis” (Daníelsson et al. 2001, p. 3) 
Financial institutions have the incentive to manipulate their own VaR if this measure is used 
to determine the regulatory capital they have to produce (Sollis, 2009).  
 
5.4 ΔCoVaR Methodology 
This section contains the empirical analysis o the CoVaR. The code used is based on the 
original open source MATLAB code of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), available for 
download from the Office of Financial Research at: http://www.treasury.gov/ofr. 
 
5.4.1 Definition of CoVaR 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) developed a simple statistical tool called ΔCoVaR. It is 
defined as a measure of “the marginal contribution of institution i to overall systemic risk and 
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reflects the difference between the VaR of the financial universe conditional on the stressed 
and the median state of institution i” (p. 17).  
In the first step the VaR of institution 𝑖 must be defined. The VaR of 𝑖 now serves as the 
micro-level distress event. Here the VaR is defined as the log-returns on the institution’s 
stocks. Recall from the previous section that the exact monetary VaR is a statement about the 
maximum potential loss under a given probability. This does not mean that a given VaR 
marks the exact point where to tell an institution is in financial distress and faces bankruptcy. 
The CoVaR investigates whether extreme losses of the individual institution and the rest of 
the financial system correlate. The extreme losses here are the 5 per cent worst return figures. 
This is exactly what the VaR describes.  
However, this section reverses the purpose of the VaR. The risk manager seeks to gauge the 
worst monetary loss that covers 95 per cent of all the times excluding the few extreme events 
that only occur in the other 5 per cent of times. For the CoVaR on the other hand these 5 per 
cent of excessive losses in the tail of the returns distribution are of significance. Hence 
“financial distress” is somewhat arbitrarily defined as the worst 5 per cent, or the 5 per cent 
quantile 𝑞 so that:   
𝑞 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑋𝑖  ≤  𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 ),     (5.9) 
where 𝑋𝑖 serves as the variable of institution 𝑖 for which 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖  is defined. It is common 
practice in risk management departments of banks to define the VaR as the worst 5 per cent of 
all observations or 1 per cent of all observations, which translates into setting 𝑞 = 0.05 and 𝑞 
= 0.01, respectively. Howevere, here the 5 per cent level is used to indicate financial distress. 
In the second step the conditional event is modelled. The CoVaR is denoted as the VaR of the 
system 𝑗 given that a particular institution 𝑖 is at its VaR previously determined as quantile 𝑞, 
or simply: 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
. Intuitively replacing the conditional event 𝑖 with equation (5.9) results 
in: 
    𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑋𝑖= 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖
.     (5.10) 
Note that 𝑗 does not necessarily need to be a system or a portfolio of assets, but can also be 
replaced with another single financial institution, e.g. a bank, hedge fund, monoline insurer 
etc. This is an interesting alteration in order to supplement a systemically important financial 
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institution’s risk management with further information about their exposure to another 
specific institution.  
The third step is to derive the marginal systemic risk contribution of institution 𝑖 to the VaR of 
the system 𝑗 by: 
 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
=  𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑋𝑖= 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖
−  𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑋𝑖= 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖
. (5.11) 
The 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
 is the difference between the VaR of the system conditional on institutions 𝑖 
being in distress, for example at the 5 per cent quantile 𝑋𝑖 =  𝑉𝑎𝑅0.05
𝑖   and being in 
economical normal times, expressed as the 50 per cent quantile 𝑋𝑖 =  𝑉𝑎𝑅0.5
𝑖 . For the sake of 
readability the latter is replaced with 𝑋𝑖 =  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 in the equation above.  
Adams et al. (2012) further modify the simple ΔCoVaR towards a state-dependent sensitivity 
Value-at-Risk (SDSVaR). The original ΔCoVaR model does not recognise the state of the 
economy when deriving spill-over estimates. The SDSVaR introduces three regimes: The 
most robust state of the economy is a state of tranquillity, in the model expressed with the 
75%-quantile. Systemic risk grows especially in this state where market participants are prone 
to taking risks in the absence of a crisis. This corresponds to the irrational exuberance 
(Greenspan, 1996) and an immediate undervaluation of actual risk. Secondly, the normal state 
of the economy is expressed with a 50%-quantile. Finally, a distressed economy is expressed 
with the 12.5%-quantile.  
Regardless of how financial distress is propagated, systemic risk in their definition 
materialises as a significant and sustained decrease of the impairment of the intermediation 
capacity of the financial system to supply credit to the real economy. Such a disruption of the 
financial system can occur directly via contractual links of financial institutions and indirectly 
via price effects and liquidity spirals, when financial institutions are faced with distressed 
market conditions. A more detailed qualitative discussion about systemic risk is presented in 
chapter 2. The next section sums up the key points that are necessary for this chapter on 
ΔCoVaR. 
In the field of finance, the application of quantile regression is a novel technique. Now that 
systemic risk is a new risk category in its own right, regulatory agencies and banks have to 
deal with, quantile regression is less a mere nieche in financial research, but grows to be an 
accompanying tool to (ordinary) least-squares regression. 
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Choosing a quantile of a data set – previously ranked from lowest to highest – is synonymous 
to looking into a pre-defined percentile of all observations by splitting the data. Suppose one 
is interested in the “average” salary of a population to derive a gauge for the living standard in 
a country. The arithmetic mean is less an informative definition of “average” because salaries 
are usually skewed and not normal distributed. With few people on the high end of the salary 
distribution the arithmetic mean suggests too high an average income. The median is a better 
alternative for determining the average. The median splits the observations in the data set into 
two portions of equal size, i.e. the 50% quantile. The salary in the middle of all observed 
salaries is likely to be lower than the mean. Yu et al. (2003) give a general introduction and 
application to different research areas. 
For the ΔCoVaR the quantile regression technique is used, which is popular among non-
financial economic research, inter alia health economics.  Koenke and Hallock (2001) give an 
introduction to quantile regression. They use Abrevaya’s (2001) research on the health of new 
born babies contingent on a set of indicators as a case study how to apply quantile regression. 
The authors demonstrate that simple linear regression suggests that the older the mother, the 
lighter the new-born, which is associated with a relatively low level of health. However, 
quantile regression, which incorporates minimal more effort on the part of the researcher, has 
its advantages. For example, one result is that when simply using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, on average women in their thirties – the upper age boundary of the sample 
– are more likely to give birth to underweight children. However, using quantile regression 
instead, this “trend” reverses for extreme values, i.e. the top quantile of the age range. Women 
who are in their late thirties give birth to children with a significant above average weight. 
With a sample size of 198,377 babies this conclusion is robust at the 1 per cent level.  
The CoVaR of the system is the VaR of the system conditional on institution 𝑖 being on its 
VaR, more formally: 
  ?̂?𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 .    (5.12) 
Recall the abbreviation from equation (5.9) so that 
  ?̂?𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑖.     (5.13) 
With the help of quantile regression the CoVaR of a system can also be expressed as 
   ?̂?𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑖 =  ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 + ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 𝑋𝑖     (5.14) 
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with ?̂?𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑖
 as the predicted value of the system conditional on institution 𝑖 for quantile 𝑞. 
Recall that 𝑋𝑖 in equation (5.9) is the variable for the actual VaR of a particular institution 𝑖 at 
the 𝑞th-quantile. The quantile regression delivers the estimated beta factor ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 . This is a 
measure of how much i’s VaR contributes to the system VaR. The ?̂?𝑞
𝑖  is the intercept.  
In conclusion, the full CoVaR definition with increasing detail from left to right is given by 
 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑋𝑖=𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖
∶= 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 =  ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 + ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 .  (5.15) 
The ultimate aim is to calculate the marginal contribution expressed in ΔCoVaR. The 
marginal is the difference between the normal state of the conditioning event and distress. For 
the calculations in this chapter these two scenarios are determined by the 50 per cent quantile 
and the 5 per cent quantile, respectively; or 𝑞 = 0.5 and 𝑞 = 0.05, respectively. 
The ΔCoVaR for every institution 𝑖 is calculated on a weekly basis. In addition to comparing 
bank returns and system returns a vector of lagged state variables, 𝑉𝑡−1 serve to indicate the 
state of the economy. The subscript 𝑡– 1 indicates a one period lag. 
The true value of the VaR of the system at time 𝑡 is  
 𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 =  𝛼𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
, (5.16) 
with the intercept 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 as the coefficients for the VaR of the single institution and the 
lagged factors, respectively, and the error term є. 
The financial system is defined as the sum of the 41 banks in the sample, see the data section 
5.5, below. Consequently the error term can be dropped, so that for the estimation of the VaR 
of the system it follows that:  
  𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) =  ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) + 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑉𝑡−1.   (5.17) 
Furthermore, note that 𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
 and 𝑋𝑡
𝑖 from equation (5.16) are expanded with a variable for 
the quantile in order to derive the final formula for the ΔCoVaR: 
   ΔCoVaR𝑡
𝑖 (𝑞) = CoVaR𝑡
𝑖 (𝑞) − CoVaR𝑡
𝑖 (0.5)     (5.18) 
                        =  ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) − 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(0.5)).    (5.19) 
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5.4.2 Properties of ΔCoVaR, its limits, and target audience 
This sub-section highlights the statistical properties of ΔCoVaR. The target audience for the 
ΔCoVaR is foremost a regulatory agency. The aim is to add the ΔCoVaR to the regulatory 
agencies’ toolkit in order to detect systemical banks. Yet, this promising idea could be 
dampened by the limitations of the ΔCoVaR methodology and available data. The ΔCoVaR 
measure has the Single Supervisory Mechanism employed by the ECB in mind. However, the 
data set includes financial institutions from the UK and Switzerland, both not full part of the 
European “Banking Union”. Because of strong linkages of the UK and Swiss financial sector 
and the rest of Europe, it is plausible to include this data. Furthermore, under the new macro-
prudential financial regulation approach and a mutual recognition of foreign financial 
supervisors and their European peers, so-called “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU), 
cross-border co-operation in exchange of data and findings is paramount to capture systemic 
risk. If she detects that a single financial institution has a high contribution to the CoVaR of 
the system, regulatory action can lead to a mandatory increase in the countercyclical capital 
buffer. The regulatory agency can decide to introduce policies with immediate effect on the 
interconnectedness of the regulated institutions. This might be increasing capital to decrease 
the threat if counterparty risk materialises, or disentangle the counterparty risk all together by 
introducing investment restrictions. 
This chapter compares individual banks’ VaR to their systemic risk contribution measured in 
ΔCoVaR. Note that despite the general criticism about VaR as a concept for risk management 
purposes within banks, the VaR here serves a different objective. In this chapter it is not the 
aim to back-test the VaR concept’s qualities for loss prediction. Instead, this piece of research 
demonstrates the discrepancy between realised losses of one bank and the threat it poses to the 
whole system; put differently, micro-level losses are screened for their macro-level 
consequences.  
The CoVaR measure suffices six statistical properties, see Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011): 
(i) The cloning property allows dividing one particular big institution into n smaller 
clones. The CoVaR of clone n is exactly the same as the CoVaR of the original 
institution. 
 
(ii) The marginal systemic risk contribution, ΔCoVaR, is not a measure of causality. 
On the contrary, this is an advantage for it captures causality and common factor 
exposure at the same time. The focus lays on the quantifiable impact on the co-
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movement. For example, a common exposure effect can quickly be identified by 
comparing all institutions’ ΔCoVaR at one particular time. If all institutions are 
affected, there might be a common factor. In isolation one ΔCoVaR observation 
has limited informational value and should always be interpreted alongside a set of 
other institutions. 
 
(iii) Because of the quantile regression, CoVaR operates in the tail distribution, where 
the worst losses occur. The crucial advantage over other statistical measures, such 
as covariance, is that CoVaR reflects the downward shift of the mean, the increase 
in variance, and moments such as skewness and kurtosis in the distribution by 
conditioning on the negative shocks.   
 
(iv) The choice of conditioning the CoVaR allows minimising ambiguity. The 
conditioning on the q per cent quantile of the losses of an institution i, i.e. the VaR 
with a q = 0.05, or 5 per cent probability, is a fixed event and therefor independent 
of i’s risk taking. If on the other hand the CoVaR is conditioned on the level of 
returns, low-risk institutions can have a higher CoVaR. This is because the 
conditioning event appears to be more extreme to the less risky, i.e. less volatile, 
institutions. 
 
(v) The CoVaR of an institution i is endogenous and depends on the other institutions’ 
risk-taking. So, generally, CoVaR therefore qualifies to be considered for financial 
regulation since it allows for internalisation of the negative externalities. 
 
(vi) The CoVaR is also directional. This means that the CoVaR of the system 
conditional on one institution i does not equal the reversal, i.e. the CoVaR of the 
institution i conditional on the financial system being in distress.    
This insight helps reinforce the macro-prudential regulatory framework. Regulators are 
provided with empirical results about the notion that the financial system is not the simple 
aggregate of all individual banks’ risk that materialises in their profit-and-loss calculations. 
The degree of their interconnectedness with the financial network does play an important role, 
too. This has frequently been labelled the “too big to fail” problem. More precisely, this 
should be understood as the “too interconnected” problem. Nevertheless, it is true that 
interconnectedness tends to increase with the absolute size of a financial institution. The 
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bigger the institution is, the more likely it is that it operates in different markets and offers a 
variety of products and services that are syndetic. Yet, institutions can demonstrate a high 
degree of interconnectedness and pose a systemic risk if they are relatively small in terms of 
balance sheet volume, but are key players in niche markets. This is true even more so when 
big institutions happen to operate in those markets as well. Hence, this constitutes a 
propagation channel for systemic risk. 
 
5.5 Data 
This section contains a discussion about the data used to calculate the ΔCoVaR of banks in 
section 5.6. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) use market-valued total financial assets to derive 
a ΔCoVaR measure. Alternatively, for systemic risk supervision a broader definition comprise 
of additional data including off-balance-sheet businesses, derivative exposures and further 
data that regularly is not captured by accounting techniques. Analyses can also take the 
opposite direction and have a reduced source of data as a starting point. For example, the 
ΔCoVaR can be computed for liabilities only. The aim is to identify systemic risk with a 
ΔCoVaR looking into institutions’ reliance on debt funding. Using only equity data on the 
other hand derives a systemic risk measure based on an asset-liability mismatch. Exploiting 
the maturity mismatch with an overreliance on short-term funding, over-leveraging, was 
essential to the 2008 crisis. 
This chapter intentionally focuses on a simple ΔCoVaR as an institution’s systemic risk 
gauge. Regulatory agencies are equipped with a tool that screens for those institutions that 
potentially could pose a threat in the sense of being systemically significant in their 
contribution to financial instability. Only then regulators can proceed and inquire more 
detailed into the relevant institutions. Hence for the empirical analysis in this chapter the 
observed share prices serve as simple institution-specific data, alongside only a few macro-
economic key indicators to determine the state of the economy.
8
 
 
                                                          
8
 The results are computed with Matlab version R2015b. The code is based on various functions. A 
comprehensive overvies of the ΔCoVaR methodology, coding, and alternative methodologies can be found in 
Office for Financial Research (2014). Regarding the functions used for this chapter: delta_co_var_v5.m 
originally by Dimitrios Bisias, Andrew Lo, and Stavros Valavanis, modified by Robert Sollis; rq_fnm.m coded 
by Koenker, originally proposed by Portnoy and Koenker (1997); bootstats.m written by Robert Sollis.  
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5.5.1 Financial institution-specific data and the economic system data 
This sub-section discusses the choice of bank data used to calculate ΔCoVaR. The bank data 
used in the empirical analysis is derived from list of constituents of the Euro Stoxx 600 Bank 
index available in Datastream. It comprises all European exchange listed banks and therefore 
reflects the regulated financial institutions and the European banking sector. Only regularly 
traded banks are used. There are banks that are officially exchange listed but the vast majority 
of shares are in the hands of a few investors. The public is not able to trade the shares. 
The data set comprises of financial institutions domestic to Europe, including the UK and 
Switzerland. However, few exceptions are made in the groups of financial institutions that 
include deposit-taking commercial banks and investment banks. Especially the latter are 
global in their business activity. Yet, dropping them from the data set would ignore the close 
ties between their activities and those of commercial banks and the potential of contagion. 
This relationship played a major role in the proliferation of the “originate-to-distribute” 
business model, which was a key contributor to the recent global financial crisis. 
The aim of this ΔCoVaR analysis is to support supervisors in gauging systemic risk in the 
European financial sector. Investment banks with their headquarters outside of the EU, 
especially U.S. institutions, are out of the regulatory agencies’ reach. However, in order to 
develop a better understanding of actual systemic risk on a global scale these additional data 
are necessary, hence they are “too big to be ignored”. Firstly, for the sake of simplicity only 
European data is used for the ΔCoVaR. Of course, one might argue that this is the first data-
related limitation of this contribution at hand. Secondly, the aim of this contribution is not to 
claim absolute soundness of the results, but to investigate and broaden the understanding how 
systemic risk behaves. 
This contribution echoes Adrain and Brunnermeier (2011) who introduce their ΔCoVaR 
measure as a purely statistical “without explicit reference to structural economic models” (p. 
8). This lack of assumptions does not put the results and therefore the whole analysis at threat. 
Because of its merely statistical nature it the crucial contribution is that ΔCoVaR identifies 
the advent and disappearance of possible propagation channels from one financial institution 
to another. Therefore, ΔCoVaR provides the target audience, i.e. primarily regulatory 
agencies, with an indicator where to start with further in-depth investigations, for example in 
the form of regulatory reviews conducted by NCBs in the EU, see chapter 3.  
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5.5.2 State variables 
This sub-section discusses the state variables that determine the state of the economy. It is 
important to point out that all state variables do not serve as systemic risk factors per se 
according to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Instead they are conditioning variables to 
assess the current state of the economy in which the financial industry operates. 
For the empirical work in this chapter the choice of the kind of state variables that condition 
the quantile regression closely follows Adrian and Brunnermeier for U.S. banks data and 
Karimalis and Nomikos (2014) for the European banking sector.  
(i) The VSTOXX 50 Volatility Index measures the implied volatility in the European 
stock market. This is the equivalent to the VIX reported by the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange as a “fear gauge”. It helps infer market uncertainty. The studies 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph use the VIX exclusively. 
 
(ii) The change in the Euribor gives away further information about the state of the 
financial markets. This overnight borrowing condition indicates how easy it is for 
banks to improve their liquidity situation. The change in Euribor rather than the 
value shows how that situation can suddenly change for better or worse.  
 
(iii) Change in credit spread, or corporate bond spread of moderately risky private 
sector investment opportunities and a (quasi) risk-free investment in government 
bond of equal maturity, here expressed in ten-years Moody’s seasoned BAA-rated 
corporate bond and the German ten-year government benchmark bond, 
respectively.  
 
(iv) The S&P 500 Composite Index is a proxy for equity market returns as they deliver 
returns of the real economy. Because of a close economic integration of the 
European markets to the globally leading U.S. economy, this index is an 
appropriate equity benchmark. 
Weekly data of these variables were obtained from Datastream. The time horizon for the data 
collection spans from the beginning of the global financial crisis in Q1 2002 to Q4 2014. The 
summary statistics for the state variables through the sampled time are shown in the following 
sections.  
140 
 
5.6 Empirical Results 
The ΔCoVaR calculations presented in this section follow the historical simulation method 
for the VaR. The weekly ΔCoVaRs are calculated using moving window estimations. So, first 
the daily stock returns of the past 12 months are calculated. Next, the state variables in this 
particular week serve as conditioning event to estimate the state of the economy to put the co-
movement of the stock returns into perspective. Consequently, in order to allow for an 
analysis of the banks’ stock returns with the above weekly state variables, the stock returns 
are converted into weekly stock returns. For the next week’s ΔCoVaR the 12 month 
observation period for the stock returns moves by one week, i.e. five trading days. The 
absence of any assumptions of the distribution of returns and especially the tail distribution is 
a feature rather than a disadvantage (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). The advantage of the 
ΔCoVaR is that it uses the worst 5 per cent quantile of the return distribution to investigate 
the co-movement of the financial system contingent on the individual financial institution.  
If one considers harnessing ΔCoVaR for estimating future systemic risk contribution 
restrictions have to be mentioned. Take for example the rolling window of the ΔCoVaR 
calculation. The more observations are collected, the more precise is the distribution. 
However, as the introduction section on VaR above explains, the longer this time window is, 
the longer do shocks prevail in the distributions. The same applies to series of observations 
that suggest tranquillity, hence potentially underestimating predicted values (Sollis, 2009).  
For short periods the implicit assumption that the future will be similar to the recent past is 
plausible. However, for longer horizons this assumption is not robust. 
The following sections report the sample result figures for the respective time period. For the 
sake of readability the tables are in the results appendix and are referred to in the text. The 
next sections lead the discussion from the full sample period (2002-2014), to the pre-crisis 
period (2002-2006), the crisis period (2007-2009), and post-crisis period (2010-2014). 
 
5.6.1 Full sample results (2002-2014) 
The following figures report the state variables change in Euribor, corporate bond spread, the 
VSTOXX, and the S&P 500 equity returns. Table 5.2 in the results appendix summarises the 
statistics for the four state variables over the full period from 2002 to 2014. This section also 
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presents the results of the linear regression and tests of statistical significance of the state 
variables on banks’ VaR and ΔCoVaR for the full sample period of 2002 to 2014. 
 
Figure 5.3: Change of Euribor, 2002-2014 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the full sample change in Euribor as the indicator for the short-term liquidity 
state variable. In the original recorded values since June 2003 the Euribor maintained constant 
values slightly above 200 basis points until November 2005. From that point on the rate 
continuously climbed to approximately 400 basis points in May 2005. The Euribor continued 
to increase to its peak of 538 basis points, or 5.38 per cent. From there on the rate plummet to 
around 65 basis points. From late 2012 on the Euribor maintained a value ranging from 20 to 
34 basis points.  
Figure 5.3 above translates this movement into the change of the Euribor expressed in per 
cent. It remains constant within the band of 0.2 per cent and -0.2 per cent until the first week 
of August 2007. One week later the weekly change jumped to 0.37 per cent. From there on 
the change follows a volatile path. In December of the same year the change experienced a 
drop of 0.32 per cent. Only four weeks later in the middle of January 2008 the spread 
decreases to 39 basis points that is reflected in a change of 0.32 per cent. The sharpest reversal 
was in the weeks of late September to middle of October 2008. A positive change in the 
Euribor rate of 0.38 per cent was followed by a drop of -0.65 per cent. 
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Figure 5.4: Corporate bond spread, 2002-2014 
 
The original Moody’s corporate bond reaches a high in late October 2008 with 949 basis 
points or 9.49 per cent. From 2009 on the interest on the corporate benchmark bond steadily 
decreases to 475 basis points or 4.75 per cent. The government benchmark bond has a high of 
468 basis points in July 2007 and reaches a similar level of 464 basis points in June 2008. But 
from there on the interest rate steadily decreases to below 100 basis points or 1 per cent in late 
September 2014. 
The corporate bond spread is shown in Figure 5.4. The spread between the two benchmark 
bonds show a sudden jump to a high of 82 basis points in the middle of October 2008, only 
days before the peak of corporate bond interest rates. This suggests that the central bank’s 
monetary policy, i.e. making available further lending facilities and revising existing ones, 
increased funds available to invest. However, relatively safe investments such as government 
bonds attracted the funds rather than corporations from the real economy. This is crucial 
information in regards to the financial sector, too. In general terms one would assume that 
financial institutions have easy access to funds and hence, ceteris paribus, have a decreased 
risk of becoming illiquid. Now this turns out to be not always the case but it depends on the 
state of the rest of the economy. This is exactly why the CoVaR measure introduces a 
conditioning event. 
To support this suggestion the mood in the financial markets must be measured. So, the state 
variable VSTOXX is the European financial market counterpart of the Volatility Index (VIX) 
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in the USA. Figure 5.5 below shows how this “fear gauge” developed from 2003 to early 
2015. 
 
Figure 5.5: VSTOXX volatility index, 2002-2014 
 
In the years before the financial crisis of 2008 and the U.S. sub-prime crisis of 2006 the 
financial markets were relatively calm with an implied volatility of below 20 from 2004 to 
June 2006. A sudden increase occurred in the middle of October 2008 to a peak of 87. The 
volatility recovered to a level close to 20 in January 2010 and suddenly increased to 50 in 
May 2010. The peak of the VSTOXX as a measure for financial markets’ unease occurred 
around the same time as the peak observation of the corporate bond spread.  
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Figure 5.6: S&P 500 returns, 2002-2014 
 
The returns on the S&P 500 index represent the equity return state variable see Figure 5.6. 
Unsurprisingly during the crisis period 2007-2009 the returns follow a volatile pattern. The 
period of tranquillity in 2006 was followed by a gradually increasing volatility. In late 2007 
weekly returns touched the bank of 5 per cent and -5 per cent. A minus of 18 per cent in 2008 
was followed by a gain of 10 per cent, just to turn negative again and so on. 
 
Figure 5.7: Bank system returns, 2002-2014 
 
A more detailed insight into the bank system returns rather than the whole economy, 
represented by the S&P 500 index, is presented in Figure 5.7. In late 2008 the European 
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banking sector suffered its largest loss with -32 per cent. Yet two months later a positive 
return of 16 per cent could be observed. Since the crisis the returns of the banking sector are 
more volatile than before the crisis. Table 5.3 in the results appendix gives the summary 
statistics for the bank system returns.  
 
Figure 5.8: Weekly ΔCoVaRt for the five largest banks, 2002-2014 
 
Figure 5.8 above reports the ΔCoVaR results for the five largest banks in the sample. With 
HSBC and Barclays two British banks are among the largest banks, Crédit Agricole and BNP 
Paribas represent the two largest French banks, and with Deutsche Bank the largest German 
bank is represented. The ΔCoVaRt gives the change in the financial system’ VaR, here the 5 
per cent quantile, when the particular bank realises its VaR. The results in the following sub-
sections are reported in their decimals. 
The weekly systemic risk contributions are similar in their pattern across the full period from 
2002 to 2014. Yet, in episodes of spiking systemic risk contributions BNP Paribas has the 
most severe ΔCoVaR. For example in late 2002 the ΔCoVaR of BNP Paribas was -0.16 (or -
16 per cent), followed by Deutsche Bank with -0.13. The lowest ΔCoVaR can be observed in 
late 2008 with -0.2376 for BNP Paribas, followed by Crédit Agricole (-0.2014), Deutsche 
Bank (-0.1450), HSBC (-0.1366), and Barclays (-0.1243). So, this means that on average, if 
these banks are at their respective VaRs – for example BNP Paribas viewed in isolation –, the 
VaR of the banking system increases by 16 to 23.76 per cent. The results in this chapter are 
broadly in line with the results reported in the existing literature.  
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Most contributions derive the average weekly ΔCoVaRs based on a large sample period. 
However, the results are more informative when the sample is disentangled and separated into 
the pre-crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period in the next sub-sections. Naturally 
because of tighter data samples the results may vary. For example, the worst estimated weekly 
ΔCoVaR according to the full sample is BNP Paribas with close to -0.25, or a systemic risk 
contribution of 25 per cent. However, its crisis-period value is -0.3586.  
Note that by design, all banks are systemically important since they are part of the financial 
system but they differ in the magnitude of their respective importance. So, in the full sample 
period of 2002 to 2014 the average ΔCoVaR of, for example, BNP Paribas is -0.0578 but for 
the bottom five banks the estimates are -0.03 or lower. Still, these 5.8 per cent and 3 per cent, 
respectively, are the average weekly systemic risk contributions – not extreme observations – 
and do not suggest that there is a threshold that distinguishes between “relevant” and “not 
relevant” institions. Therefore, it is suggested here that each average and single estimate of 
weekly ΔCoVaRs should be interpreted considering the estimates of the other 40 banks in the 
sample.  
In addition to the values of each bank’s ΔCoVaR, there is a change in ranking of the five 
largest banks. In late 2008, during the crisis period 2007 to 2009 HSBC, leads the field with 
an estimated ΔCoVaR of -0.5206, as reported in section 5.6.3, below. This is more than 
twofold the worst valueover the full sample. Varying the sample period should serve as a 
word of warning if one considers the application of the ΔCoVaR measure for regulatory 
purposes. For example, this measure suggests itself to quantify a systemic risk capital buffer 
according to a polluter-pays principle. Yet, altering the sample period can lead to contrasting 
results that may not support the capital policy choice by a regulatory agency. So, this is an 
important limitation of the ΔCoVaR at the current stage of research. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwile to further investigate how systemic risk contributions of the European banks 
behave in the different periods in order to derive a systemic risk map, which is reported in 
section 5.6.4. 
In addition the ΔCoVaR is plotted against the VaR to investigate wheter the the measure 
justifies the effort of introducing a conditioning event into a systemic risk analysis. The 
simple linear regression, the estimate for the slope, and its respective t-statistic are reported in 
the results appendix.  
Let the linear regression in the scatterplot be: 
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𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥 + є        (5.20) 
The dependant variable 𝑦 is explained by a constant 𝛼, the explanatory, or independent, 
variable 𝑥 with a slope of 𝛽 and an error term є, which is normally distributed random 
variable with a mean of zero and unknown variance. 
The slope of the regression of the VaR vs. CoVaR differs dependant on the length of the time 
series, i.e. full period sample, pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis sample period. The t-statistic 
attached to the slope indicates statistical significance. The H(0) is that the slope of the 
regression is zero, meaning that the VaR and CoVaR are independent. The value of the t-
statistic is calculated with the following equation: 
𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
(?̂?−𝛽0)√𝑛−2
√𝑆𝑆𝑅 𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
2⁄
     (5.21) 
The ?̂? is the least squares estimator of the slope of the regression. The 𝛽0 denotes a specific 
value for the estimator that is tested; here this is set to zero since the H(0) is that VaR and 
CoVaR are independent. The 𝑛 denotes the degrees of freedom. The 𝑆𝑆𝑅 stands for sum of 
squares of residuals, that cannot be explained with the linear regression. Finally, the lower 
denominator is the sum of squares of the differences between all observed values for the 
independent variable 𝑥 and the mean ?̅? of this variable. 
 
Figure 5.9: Average ΔCoVaRt vs. VaRt, scatterplot and regression line, 2002-2014 
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Figure 5.9 plots the linear regression results of the banks average ΔCoVaR over the full 
sample period and their respective average VaR. Recall that the VaR is a popular measure for 
estimating the maximum loss over a given period. Here the VaR is based on the stock returns 
of the banks and serves as a benchmark for the riskiness of the particular bank. In contrast to 
the ΔCoVaR the VaR has no conditioning event, i.e. the state of the economy is ignored. This 
figure reports that the two measures are distributed in a cloud that does not give valuable 
information about the connection of the two measures. Table 5.8 in the results appendix 
suggest a slope of 0.1017. The t-statistic is 1.3 at the 5 per cent level, which is less than 1.96. 
So the H(0) that the VaR and CoVaR are independent, is not rejected. Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) also find a connection between VaR and CoVaR. However, their sample 
covers data from 1986 to 2010. A strong connection would decrease the advantage of the 
ΔCoVaR measure – that comes with more computational work – over the simple VaR. 
Nevertheless, the next sections separate the full sample of this empirical analysisi into the 
three distinct periods. Doing so gives more information about the relationship between these 
two variables. For the sake of readability the result tables are kept in the appendix and 
referred to in the text like below. 
 
[Insert Table 5.5 about here] 
 
Table 5.5 summarises banks’ average ΔCoVaR s and state-dependent VaRs on a county level. 
The median VaR results from the conditioning event that the state of the economy is relatively 
calm. The distressed VaR results from the conditioning event that the state of the economy is 
in distress, defined as the 5 per cent quantile.  
According to the median VaR the Swedish banking sector is the least concerning with 0.0028. 
On the other end, Portugal and Greece have a value of -0.0028.  
Looking at the VaR in financial distress reveals a different picture. Sweden is the least 
concerning with -0.0691. Yet, Ireland is the most concerning with an average distressed VaR 
of -0.151 for the full period of 2002 to 2014.  
Interestingly, a ranking according to the average ΔCoVaR leads to different conclusions. The 
French banking sector bears the most systemic risk of -0.0488 over the full sample period 
2002 to 2014 followed by Sweden, who was the safest according to the previous two VaR 
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measures. So, this leads to the conclusion that an isolated analysis of the regular VaR 
methodology can be misleading. For this reason the following sections address only the 
average ΔCoVaR for the counties and do not explicitly mention the VaR and distressed VaR. 
Of course, the countries are not equally represented in the European banking sector. Spain 
contributes five banks and Germany only two. Yet, this is not an issue. This only supports the 
view that few banks are systemically more relevant than other banks. 
 
[Insert Table 5.6 about here] 
 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, below, report the distressed VaR and ΔCoVaR, respectively. For the 
distressed VaR the intercept is ?̂?. The following four parameters are the lagged state variables 
change in Euribor (?̂?1), corporate bond spread (?̂?2), VSTOXX volatility index (?̂?3), and the 
S&P 500 index as equity return benchmark (?̂?4).  
The respective t-statistics of the estimated parameters can be found on the right-hand side of 
the tables. Note that these t-statistics are produced with the likelihood ratio version of the 
bootstrapping method.
9
 For example, if the calculated t-statistic value is more negative than -
1.96, or more positive than +1.96, we conclude that the estimated parameter is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent significance level. This means that it is statistically important. 
The respective bank’s distressed VaR (Table 5.6) is mainly driven by the VSTOXX. For 35 
banks the VSTOXX shows a negative t-statistic. Interestingly four of the Italian banks 
(Popolare Emilia, Di Milano, Monte Dei Paschi, and Di Sondrio) and one Portugese (Espirito 
Santo) are not affected by the VSTOXX. This suggests that markets, at least over the full 
sample period, discriminate among banks. However, the mean of the estimates is -0.0028. On 
the other hand, the mean of the Euribor is the highest with 5.78, but the Euribor is just 
significant for 13 banks.  
                                                          
9
 Bootstrapping is a resampling method that assigns a measure of accuracy to the sample estimates. After a 
parameter has been estimated, bootstrapping allows for measuring the properties of this estimate, for example the 
estimates mean. The intention is to infer from the estimated mean of the original data set, i.e. sample with the 
size N, to the whole population. Because a complete set of observations for the population can be obtained or 
computed, the true mean – and other estimates like the variance – are unknown. However, bootstrapping 
circumvents this issue and helps gauge the true mean. The original sample is repeatedly resampled so that for 
each time the mean is computed, the sample looks different. The result is a histogram of bootstrapped means. 
The researcher now has information about the distribution of the mean of the whole sample. So, if the estimated 
mean has a low variance, then it is reasonable to assume that the true mean of the population is not unlike the 
bootstrapped estimate for the mean. 
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However, the results for the 𝑅2 reveal that with the OLS regression the state variables have a 
weak explanatory power for the distressed VaR. Note that Table 5.5 ranks the banks 
according to their average ΔCoVaR but reports the regression results for the distressed VaR. 
The further down in the ranking the lower are the 𝑅2 tends to be. The most precise regression 
is the one for the distressed VaR of BNP Paribas with 24.2 per cent. The least precise is for 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio with a 𝑅2 of 0.0031. 
 
[Insert Table 5.7 about here] 
 
Table 5.7 reports the quantile regression result for the ΔCoVaR over the full sample period 
2002 to 2014. Note that the returns on the banking system returns serves as a further state 
variable. This is the conditioning event discussed in the methodology section. So ?̂? is the 
intercept, or constant, and the bank system returns are captured by the parameter estimate ?̂?1. 
The following four parameters are again the lagged state variables change in Euribor (?̂?2), 
corporate bond spread (?̂?3), VSTOXX volatility index (?̂?4), and the S&P 500 index as equity 
returns benchmark (?̂?5). 
In general, the lagged bank system returns are significant for almost every bank in every 
single sample period, i.e. full, pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis period. Moreover, the sign is 
positive, meaning that an increase in the returns of the system benefits the ΔCoVaR of the 
single bank, i.e. systemic risk contribution tends to decrease. For example, ceteris paribus, an 
increase of system returns of 1 comes with an increase of the value of ΔCoVaR of 0.69 for 
BNP Paribas. Note that the sign of the estimate is positive. This means that the ΔCoVaR goes 
in the same direction as the bank system returns. Since the ΔCoVaR is expressed as a negative 
number, systemic risk decreases.  
For the quantile regression results for the ΔCoVaR in Table 5.7 the change in Euribor has a 
considerably higher impact on banks’ ΔCoVaR compared to the distressed VaR. In the VaR 
regression the Euribor is statistically significant for only 13 banks. Yet, for the systemic risk 
calculations it is significant for 30 banks. The t-statistics with a mean of 2.37 are positive and 
the significance reaches avalue of 5.95 for Mediobanca. The corresponding parameter 
estimate suggests that an increase in the Euribor of 1 per cent decreases the ΔCoVaR – which 
is expressed in decimals – of Mediobanca by 12.31. This appears like an extreme value. 
However, also note that the results are based on weekly changes in the explanatory variables. 
151 
 
Of course an increase of the Euribor of 1 per cent in one week is unrealistic. Recall from 
section 5.5.2 that the variables serve as a conditioning event. So, the purpose of this analysis 
is to derive the direction and likely magnitude of the effects depending on the state of the 
financial environment and not to exactly quantify them.  
The highest Euribor parameter estimate can be observed for Cantonal Vaudoise with 15.55. 
However, one exception is HSBC with a negative t-statistic of -2.29 and estimate of -7.25. 
This difference in direction of the effect could be explained with a bank’s reliance on short 
term funding through the markets. More expensive refinancing conditions put more stress on 
banks that need the overnight borrowing, while those banks that have excess funds can lend 
them profitably overnight. Both effects are reflected in the change of the systemic risk 
contribution. 
The second significant parameter is the VSTOXX that gauges the fear in the markets. It is 
significant for 35 banks for the VaR but all 42 banks for the ΔCoVaR. Now, in contrast to the 
VaR in Table 5.6, the Italian banks are also affected by the fear gauge when one looks at their 
systemic risk contribution. For all affected banks, accroding to the t-statistics, the effect is 
negative for the VaR and ΔCoVaR. The mean indicates the likely magnitude of the variable 
and is higher in magnitude for the VaR (mean -6.20) than for the ΔCoVaR (mean -5.56).  
The results for the 𝑅2 reveal that the OLS regressions are substantially higher than for the 
distressed VaR regressions. The regression for Bilbao BBVA has a 𝑅2 of 0.574, however 
Valiant has only 0.1623. On average, the larger the ΔCoVaR is, the larger is the 𝑅2. This is an 
interesting difference to the previous distressed VaR results, where no such pattern emerges. 
This suggests that the conditioning event, or “state of the economy” effect, does determine the 
systemic risk of banks; the ΔCoVaR regression captures this, while the VaR does not. 
 
5.6.2 Pre-crisis results (2002-2006)  
This section presents the results of the linear regression and tests of statistical significance of 
the state variables on banks’ VaR and ΔCoVaR for the pre-crisis period of 2002 to 2006. 
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Figure 5.10: Weekly ΔCoVaRt for the five largest banks, 2002-2006 
 
Figure 5.10 above closer investigates the ΔCoVaR results for the five largest banks in the pre-
crisis sample 2002 to 2006. With HSBC and Barclays two British banks are among the largest 
banks, Crédit Agricole and BNP Paribas represent the two largest French banks, and with 
Deutsche Bank the largest German bank is represented.  
BNP Paribas contributes more systemic risk than the others. For example, in late 2002 the 
bank has the worst weekly ΔCoVaR of -0.0698, followed by Deutsche Bank (-0.0534), 
Barclays (-0.0324), HSBC (-0.03247), and Crédit Agricole (-0.0240). From that time on the 
systemic risk contributions come closer to move within the band of roughly -0.01 to -0.02. 
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Figure 5.11: Average CoVaRt vs. VaRt, scatterplot and regression line, 2002-2006 
 
Figure 5.11 shows the scatterplot of the ΔCoVaR against the VaR. This OLS regression is 
steeper than the full period scatterplot in the previous section. Table 5.13 in the results 
appendix determines a slope of 0.242 compared to a slope of 0.1017 for the full period 
regression. However, the value for the t-statistics (3.8968) for the slope expressed in 
parameter ?̂?1 leads to the rejection of the H(0) that the VaR and ΔCoVaR are independent. So, 
the resustls suggest that the VaR is significant in explaining the ΔCoVaR at least in this pre-
crisis period.  
 
[Insert Table 5.9 about here] 
 
Table 5.9 gives the median VaR, distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for the banks in the pre-crisis 
period 2002 to 2006, ordered from highest to lowest ΔCoVaR. Santander and BNP Paribas 
jointly lead the field with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0245; Banco Di Sondrino is the last with 
an average systemic risk contribution of -0.0007. 
 
[Insert Table 5.10 about here] 
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Table 5.10 in the results appendix gives the median VaR, distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for 
the countries in the period 2002 to 2006, ordered from highest to lowest ΔCoVaR. Sweden 
leads the field with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0207; Finland is the last with an average 
systemic risk contribution of -0.0058.  
 
[Insert Table 5.11 about here] 
 
Table 5.11 in the results appendix gives the quantile regression for the distressed VaR in the 
period 2002 to 2006. Again, the VSTOXX is is the most significant variable mean of -4.49 
and applies to 34 banks. Again, Italina banks can be found in these exceptions (Mediobanca, 
Popolare Emilia, and Di Sondrio) together with the Portugese Espirito Santo and two Danish 
banks, Jyske and Sydbank. 
The Euribor, corporate bond spread, and S&P index only apply to four, five, and 11 banks, 
respectively. The signs are positive for the corporate bond spread and S&P index. As 
expected, if the equity returns increase, the systemic risk of banks decreases. However, mixed 
signs can be observed for the Euribor. Karimalis and Nomikos (2014) suggest that the 
direction of the impact of a variable on the riskiness of a bank can change depending on the 
state of the economy. The accuracy of the regression ranges from 𝑅2 = 0.24 for Santander to 
0.0454 for Banca Popolare di Sondrio.  
 
[Insert Table 5.12 about here] 
 
Table 5.12 in the results appendix gives the quantile regression for the ΔCoVaR in the period 
2002 to 2006. The VSTOXX is significant and negative for all 42 banks in the sample with 
large t-statistics, the mean is -6.20. However, the estimate it low with a mean of -0.0009.  
The corporate bond spread increased its importance and is significant for 18 banks’ 
ΔCoVaRs; the spread is significant for only five banks’ VaRs. The estimate for most of these 
banks moves in the band of 2.18 for Deutsche Bank to 4.85 for Valiant. Santander is the only 
bank with a negative estimate of -2.55. The accuracy of the regression ranges from 𝑅2 = 0.57 
for Bilbao BBVA to 0.26 for Banca Populare Di Sondrio and Banque Cantonale Vaudoise.  
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5.6.3 Crisis results (2007-2009) 
This section presents the results of the linear regression and tests of statistical significance of 
the state variables on banks’ ΔCoVaR for the crisis period of 2007 to 2009. 
 
Figure 5.12: Weekly ΔCoVaRt for the five largest banks, 2007-2009 
 
Figure 5.12 reports the weekly ΔCoVaR results for the five largest banks in the sample in the 
crisis period from 2007 to 2009. Until mid-2007 the ΔCoVaRs followed a relatively calm 
pattern until they became more volatile. In the autumn of 2008 the ΔCoVaRs became more 
severe almost instantaneously. The worst recorded ΔCoVaR was for HSBC with a value of -
0.5206, followed by Crédit Agricole (-0.4303), Deutsche Bank (-0.4248), BNP Paribas (-
0.3586), and Barclays (-2945). It took one year until the systemic risk contributions decreased 
in volatility and moved back to a band within zero and -0.1 in late 2009. 
Also note that the ΔCoVaRs are re-calculated based on the specific time period rather than 
taking the results from the introductory section 5.6.1. So, the worst value of HSBC’s ΔCoVaR 
is -0.5206 in this sample, but only -0.1366 in the full period sample 2002 to 2014.  
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Figure 5.13: Average ΔCoVaRt vs. VaRt, scatterplot and regression line, 2007-2009 
 
Figure 5.13 plots the ΔCoVaR against the VaR. With a slope of 0.1128 the OLS regression is 
slightly steeper than the 2002 to 2014 regression of the previous section, see Table 5.18 in the 
results appendix. With a t-statistic of 1.704 the H(0) that the VaR and ΔCoVaR are 
independent cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent level, but would be rejected if the analysis 
would be made less strict at the 10 per cent level. So, there would be no advantage of one 
measure over the other for the crisis period sample. However, arguably, the crisis period 
replaced the pre-crisis state of tranquility that led to an underestimation of systemic risk by 
the VaR measure; put differently the VaR now better indicates systemic risk contributions 
that the ΔCoVaR already identifies by design. This suggests that the ΔCoVaR plays out its 
advantage with the featuring of a conditioning event. If so, this measure is more powerful than 
the VaR to identify the currently most systemically relevant banks and gives regulatory 
agencies reason to prioritise interventions in these banks.  
 
[Insert Table 5.14 about here] 
 
Table 5.14 reports the median VaR, distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for the banks in the crisis 
period 2007 to 2009, ordered from highest to lowest ΔCoVaR. Intesa Sanpaolo leads the field 
with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.1043; Valiant is the last with an average systemic risk 
contribution of 0.0045. 
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[Insert Table 5.15 about here] 
 
Table 5.15 in the results appendix gives the median VaR, distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for 
the countries in the crisis period 2007 to 2009, ordered from highest to lowest ΔCoVaR. 
Belgium leads the field with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0834. Note that Belgium is 
represented by one bank, KBC, so this bank’s ΔCoVaR also represents the country ΔCoVaR. 
Switzerland is the last with an average systemic risk contribution of -0.0464.  
Interestingly, comparing the two tables reveals that there is no clustering of banks according 
to nationality. For example the five British and eight Italian banks are evenly spread in the 
ranking. So, again, this bank and country comparison emphasises that regulatory agencies 
should focus more on banks in particular and put less emphasis on countries. Taking a mere 
county-level perspective on systemic risk can obfuscate the real sources of systemic risk.  
 
[Insert Table 5.16 about here] 
 
Table 5.16 in the results appendix gives the quantile regression for the distressed VaR in the 
crisis period 2007 to 2009. The VSTOXX is statistically significant for 39 banks with a mean 
of -4.80 and negative t-statistics across the board. The three exeptions are again the Italian 
banks Mediobanca, Di Milano, and the Portugese Commerciale Portugues with no significant 
values for the t-statistics. The estimates are again small in size with a mean of -0.005.  
In contrast to the quantile regressions on the VaR for the full period and pre-crisis period, now 
the S&P equity returns index is significant with for approximately half of the banks. As 
expected the S&P returns have positive effects on the VaRs of the banks, the largest being 
1.27 for the Belgian KBC. However, negative t-statistics can be observed for the Italian 
Banco Populare (parameter estimate -0.78) and German Commerzbank (parameter estimate -
0.93), suggesting that higer S&P equity returns are counterproductive fot these banks’ 
systemic risk. The accuracy of the regression ranges from 𝑅2 = 0.4 for Jyske and Santander to 
0.07 for Mediobanca.  
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[Insert Table 5.17 about here] 
 
Table 5.17 in the results appendix reports the quantile regression results for the ΔCoVaR in 
the crisis period 2007 to 2009. The VSTOXX is significant for all banks in the sample with a 
mean of -5.57. Yet, the estimates for this parameter have a mean of -0.0026.  
The S&P equity returns are significant for 20 banks. The t-statistitcs are positive, as expected, 
but again two execptions can be observed. These are not the same banks as in the previous 
VaR results. KBC has a t-statistic of -3.30 and Sydbank -2.35. The corresponding estimates 
are -0.32 and -0.39, respectively. This means that an in crease in the S&P equit returns is 
counterproductive for the systemic risk contribution of these two banks. The corporate bond 
spread is significant only for 10 banks, but the sign of significance varies. Swedbank can 
decrease its systemic risk contribution by 3.51, Populare Emilia’s systemic risk becomes more 
severe by 6.30. The accuracy of the regression ranges from 𝑅2 = 0.69 for Bilbao BBVA to 
0.33 for Valiant. 
 
5.6.4 Post-crisis results (2010-2014) 
This section presents the results of the linear regression and tests of statistical significance of 
the state variables on banks’ VaR and ΔCoVaR for the post-crisis period of 2010 to 2014. 
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Figure 5.14: Weekly ΔCoVaRt for the five largest banks, 2010-2014 
 
Figure 5.14 reports the weekly ΔCoVaR results for the five largest banks in the sample in the 
post-crisis period from 2010 to 2014. There are two spikes of a magnitude of approximately -
0.14 in mid-2011 and late 2011. However, these are nowhere near the crisis values. Barclays 
has the most negative ΔCoVaR of -0.1462 and -0.1370. BNP Paribas has values of -0.1302 
and -0.0944, respectively. HSBC was the biggest concern during the crisis period. However, 
at the two peaks after the crisis the bank has the lowest of the five banks’ values of -0.0696 
and -0.0515, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.15: Average ΔCoVaRt vs. VaRt, scatterplot and regression line, 2010-2014 
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The above Figure 5.15 plots the ΔCoVaR against the VaR in the post-crisis period 2010 to 
2014. Table 5.23 in the results appendix indicate a slope of 0.0203. With a t-statistic of 
0.3829 the H(0) cannot be rejected, meaning that the two measures are independent. This 
continues the suggestion made for the crisis-period: The ΔCoVaR is different from the VaR 
and an application for macro-prudential regulation should be considered. 
However, note that the six matches on the upper left could be statistical outliers. The banks 
with this discrepancy between ΔCoVaR and distress VaR are National Bank of Greece (-
0.0254 vs. -0.1976), Banco Comercial Portugues (-0.0267 vs. -0.129), Monte Dei Paschi (-
0.0359 vs. -0.127), Bank of Ireland (-0.0392 vs. -0.1409), Espirito Santo (-0.0417 vs. -
0.1219), and Banco Di Milano (-0.0458 vs. -0.1293). 
Omitting these banks would result in a regression line that suggests that there is a strong 
relationship between ΔCoVaR and VaR. As a consequence, this would mean that the 
ΔCoVaR might not be considerably more informative than the easy to compute distress VaR.  
 
[Insert Table 5.19 about here] 
 
Table 5.19 reports the median VaR, distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for the banks in the post-
crisis period 2010 to 2014, ordered from highest to lowest ΔCoVaR. RBS leads the field with 
an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0631; Valiant is the last with an average systemic risk contribution 
of -0.02. 
 
[Insert Table 5.20 about here] 
 
Table 5.20 in the results appendix reports the median VaR, distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for 
the countries in the post-crisis period 2010 to 2014, ordered from highest to lowest ΔCoVaR. 
Austria leads the field with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0576. Greece is at the bottom with an 
average systemic risk contribution of -0.0254.  
Even though the worst crisis period systemic risk concerns are a matter of the past, the 
average post-crisis ΔCoVaRs do not move back to pre-crisis levels. The banks on the bottom 
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of the table have higher values than the banks on top of the pre-crisis table. For example, 
Greece’s post-crisis ΔCoVaR is higher than Sweden’s. 
The ranking of the individual banks show the same picture. According to Table 5.19, post-
crisis Valiant and National Bank of Greece have the lowest ΔCoVaRs of -0.02 and -0.0254, 
respectively. The top pre-crisis systemic risk concern was Santander with an average 
ΔCoVaR of -0.0245, too. For this, compare Table 5.9 again.  
 
[Insert Table 5.21 about here] 
 
Table 5.21 in the results appendix reports the quantile regression for the distress VaR in the 
post-crisis period 2010 to 2014. With 28 banks the VSTOXX is significant for the least 
amount of banks compared to the full sample, pre-cisis, and crisis period. The mean for the t-
statistics is also lower with -2.90. Like in the other samples, the mean of the estimated values 
are low with -0.0025. 
The S&P equity returns lose explanatory power compared to the crisis period. Only 12 banks’ 
distress VaRs are determined by the equity index. The positive estimates range from 0.41 for 
Danske Bank to 1.31 for RBS. The single exception is an estimate of approximately -0.81 for 
Crédit Agricole, so an increase in equity returns increases this bank’s systemic risk. The 
accuracy of the regression ranges from 𝑅2 = 0.18 for Jyske to 0.018 for Espirito Santo. Recall 
from the section 5.6.2 that Karimalis and Nomikos (2014) suggest a reversal of the signs of 
the variables’ effect on the systemic risk of banks. In addition, within the state of the 
economy, the results in this analysis here suggest that the direction can differ among banks, 
too. Anecdotal evidence can be observed for the effect of the corporate bond spread on 
Deutsche Bank’s ΔCoVaRs: In the pre-crisis period the t-statistic is 2.62 but -2.26 in the post-
crisis period.  
 
[Insert Table 5.22 about here] 
 
Table 5.22 in the results appendix reports the quantile regression results for the ΔCoVaR in 
the post-crisis period 2010 to 2014. The t-statistics for the VSTOXX are significant for 22 
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banks with a negative sign. The mean of the estimate is -0.001. Surprisingly, the S&P eqiuty 
returns index is significant for almost half of the banks’ ΔCoVaR in the crisis period. It is 
relevant only for four banks here in the post-crisis period. Of these, three have negative 
estimates, suggesting a further increase in systemic risk. The accuracy of the regression 
ranges from 𝑅2 = 0.57 for BNP Paribas to 0.10 for Vailant. There is a tendency that high 
ΔCoVaRs have high values for 𝑅2. 
In conclusion, the statistical significance of the variables and the values of the parameters do 
not tend to correlate with the ΔCoVaR ranking. This is interesting because one would 
hypothesise that the systemically most relevant banks are exposed to higher scrutiny by 
markets than the least relevant banks: A change in one of the variables would have a higher 
impact – i.e. statistical significance and larger estimate – on the most relevant banks. 
However, this is not so. For example, in the crisis period 2007 to 2009, the lagged corporate 
bond spread is only significant for 10 banks. But those are evenly spread among the ranking 
and vary considerable in size. For example, Swedbank ranks 8
th
 most relevant bank and the 
change in spread has an estimate of 3.51. Natixis is the least systemically relevant bank with a 
statistical significance of the corporate bond spread in the crisis period. This effect’s estimate 
is -6.97.   
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Table 5.1: Ranking of banks according to their period-specific average ΔCoVaR 
    
Rank 
  
       
  
pre-crisis 
 
crisis 
 
post-crisis 
  
2002-2006 
 
2007-2009 
 
2010-2014 
Banco Santander 
 
1 
 
11 
 
12 
BNP Paribas  
 
2 
 
10 
 
3 
Bilbao BBVA 
 
3 
 
4 
 
16 
Deutsche Bank 
 
4 
 
7 
 
25 
Svenska 
 
5 
 
28 
 
18 
Nordea 
 
6 
 
24 
 
26 
Société Générale 
 
7 
 
6 
 
4 
Credit Suisse 
 
8 
 
29 
 
11 
Danske Bank 
 
9 
 
20 
 
27 
Unicredit 
 
10 
 
5 
 
2 
UBS 
 
11 
 
15 
 
21 
HSBC 
 
12 
 
3 
 
29 
DNB 
 
13 
 
35 
 
30 
Swedbank 
 
14 
 
8 
 
36 
Commerzbank 
 
15 
 
33 
 
7 
Lloyds 
 
16 
 
37 
 
14 
Barclays 
 
17 
 
26 
 
9 
Mediobanca 
 
18 
 
12 
 
5 
KBC 
 
19 
 
9 
 
13 
Standard Chartered 
 
20 
 
21 
 
33 
RBS 
 
21 
 
33 
 
1 
Banco Populare Espanol 
 
22 
 
18 
 
19 
Intesa Sanpaolo 
 
23 
 
1 
 
10 
Banco Populare 
 
24 
 
13 
 
8 
Crédit Agricole 
 
25 
 
2 
 
17 
Banco Di Milano 
 
26 
 
30 
 
22 
Bank of Ireland 
 
27 
 
25 
 
32 
Banco Comercial Portugues 
 
28 
 
38 
 
39 
Monte Dei Paschi 
 
29 
 
17 
 
35 
Banco Espirito Santo 
 
30 
 
31 
 
28 
National Bank of Greece 
 
31 
 
22 
 
40 
Erste Group Bank 
 
32 
 
23 
 
6 
Natixis 
 
33 
 
40 
 
20 
Sydbank 
 
34 
 
16 
 
37 
Sabadell 
 
35 
 
36 
 
34 
Jyske 
 
36 
 
14 
 
24 
Pohjola 
 
37 
 
34 
 
31 
Valiant 
 
38 
 
41 
 
41 
Banco Popolare Emilia 
 
39 
 
19 
 
15 
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise 
 
40 
 
39 
 
38 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio 
 
41 
 
27 
 
23 
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Table 5.1 ranks the banks in the sample according to their average ΔCoVaR in each sub-
sample, before, during, and after the crisis of 2008. The ranking is derived from Table 5.9, 
Table 5.14, and Table 5.19 in the results appendix. The biggest systemic risk contributor in 
the pre-crisis period was Santander with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0245; in the crisis period 
Intesa Sanpaolo with an average ΔCoVaR of -0.1043; and in the post-crisis period RBS with 
an average ΔCoVaR of -0.0631. 
There are some interesting results. For example, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, and 
Unicredit are always in the top 10 of the most relevant banks. In terms of the value of the 
average ΔCoVaR, Unicredit’s systemic risk contribution was -0.0189, -0.0918, and -0.061, in 
the respective periods.  
The Swedish banks Svenska and Nordea experience another extreme systemic risk migration. 
Before the crisis ranked 5
th
 and 6
th
, respectively, the banks rank in the bottom half of the table 
during and after the crisis.  
The bottom 16 banks, or roughly 40 per cent of the sample, experience no extreme systemic 
risk migration according to the ranking. The exceptions are the Austrian Erste Bank Group 
with a jump to a 6
th
 rank in the post-crisis ranking and Banco Popolare Emilia that was the 
third last in pre-crisis times, but moved to the midfield. Banco Di Milano ranks 26
th
, 30
th
, and 
22
nd. In terms of the value of the average ΔCoVaR Banco Di Milano’s systemic risk 
contribution is -0.0143, -0.0633, and -0.0458, respectively.  
The five largest banks give a mixed picture. Before the crisis, BNP Paribas was in second 
place and remains in the top 10 with a crisis rank 10 and a post-crisis rank of 3. Deutsche 
Bank was placed 4
th
 and 7
th
, but 25
th
 in the post-crisis ranking. Its average ΔCoVaR of -
0.0876 during the crisis nearly halved to -0.0442 after the crisis. HSBC experienced an even 
more severe migration. Starting as 12
th
 before the crisis, the bank became 3
rd
 only to plummet 
to rank 29
th. The average ΔCoVaR decreased by more than 50 per cent from -0.097 to -
0.0409. In contrast, Barclays started as 17
th
, improved to rank 26, but made it to the top 10 
after the crisis, ranking 9
th
. Crédit Agricole has a similar pattern to HSBC. Starting ranked 
25
th
, the bank jumps to 2
nd
 place during the crisis, but drops to rank 17 after the crisis. This is 
a jump from a comparatively moderate average ΔCoVaR of -0.0144 before the crisis, an 
increase by a factor of almost 7 to a value of -0.0991, and eventual post-crisis ΔCoVaR of -
0.0491, which is still more than threefold the pre-crisis systemic risk contribution. Only 
Deutsche Bank and HSBC could improve their ranking substantially.  
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5.7 Recommendations for regulators 
Looking further into the extreme losses in the 5 per cent quantile, this measure would suggest 
itself to quantify a systemic risk capital buffer according to a polluter-pays principle. 
However, if one considers the application of the ΔCoVaR measure for regulatory purposes, 
varying the sample period should serve as a word of warning. Altering the sample period can 
lead to contrasting results that may not support a capital policy choice by a regulatory agency 
to charge a systemic risk premium on the systemically most relevant banks. So, over the full 
sample period from 2002 to 2014 there is a considerable change in ranking of the five largest 
banks in the list of all 41 banks in the sample.  
However, this section concludes that the research results should not yet serve to quantify a 
bank’s systemic risk contribution in order to calculate and charge a systemic risk capital 
buffer. Instead, this should first and foremost serve as an indicator for regulatory agencies to 
identify those banks that are currently the most systemically concerning. The results can be 
introduced to the supervisory review NCBs conduct and exchange with the ECB, which is 
tasked with macro-prudential regulation, as sections 3.4.4.2 and 3.5 demonstrate. Again, the 
actual estimate for a bank’s weekly ΔCoVaR should not be interpreted as a number to 
calculate capital in addition to a systemic risk capital buffer. Instead, it is argued here that the 
estimate should be compared to the estimates of all other banks to derive a current systemic 
risk ranking like table 5.1. So, the regulatory agencies can prioritise the most concerning 
according to the ranking and allocate their resources accordingly to further investigate the 
particular banks. 
Furthermore, a sudden reversal of the state variables’ beta factors suggests that the state 
variables, such as the change in Euribor, are interpreted differently according to the state of 
the economy (Karimalis and Nomikos, 2014). So, a change in the sign of the state variables, 
captured by the beta factors, reflects the change in market perceptions. For example, a 
generally applicable view on whether a low Euribor reflects calmness cannot be made. The 
Euribor is the rate at which banks borrow funds from other banks overnight without 
depositing collateral that could be seized if the funds are not paid back. What on the one hand 
side makes it easier for banks to meet their short-term financial obligations can be interpreted 
as stigma during a systemic crisis. The dependence of the bank on external refinancing 
sources makes it more vulnerable to a drying up of the outside source, hence increasing the 
markets’ perception of the bank’s risk. This decline in information is exacerbated by central 
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bank intervention in the form of monetary policy. The post-crisis beta factors for the Euribor 
differ considerably to the crisis period.  
 
Also the reversal of signs shows an inherent countercyclicality known as “volatility paradox” 
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009, p.4). Systemic risk is built up long before it materialises, 
especially during low volatility environments. This reversal has been subject to theoretical 
and empirical research in, among others, Brunnermeier, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; and Hameed et al., 2010. The empirical findings of this 
chapter are in further support of these arguments.  
 
5.8 Conclusion and implications for promoting financial stability 
In contrast to most alternative measures for systemic risk proposed and re-discovered in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the ΔCoVaR measure is a purely statistical measure that does not 
require certain assumptions to validate itself. It therefore follows that, in analogy to any 
historic VaR calculation, one must handle the results carefully.  
The ΔCoVaR shows how systemic risk moves but has no explanatory power as to what 
factors explain the movement. Thus it is an observation tool complementary to the rest of the 
regulatory toolkit at the regulator’s disposal to screen for financial institutions that can 
potentially pose a threat. Only then should regulators take the next step. The lagged values of 
the VSTOXX and corporate bond spread are significant for the banks’ ΔCoVaR in the pre-
crisis and crisis period, but the corporate spreade decreased in importance over the time. So, 
the spread was significant for 18 (almost all t-statistics are positive), ten (most of the t-
statistics are negative), and five (all t-statistics are negative) banks in the respective period. 
This suggests that markets perceive banks different to other companies, once a crisis occurs. 
In the light of a recovery of national economies after the crisis of 2008 but ongoing 
consolidation in the global banking sector, this could be expected.  
The results are that systemic risk contribution in the form of ΔCoVaR does not correspond 
with the micro-level risk measure VaR. Relying on a bank-specific VaR measure neither 
indicates the magnitude of systemic risk contribution, nor the timing when it materialises. A 
specific bank’s worst VaR can be higher over the whole observation period than its maximum 
systemic risk contribution. There are also banks with a reverse relationship.  
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The results must not be taken as a definite answer to the riskiness of an individual bank. 
Instead it is the aim of this chapter to develop a measure that serves as a starting point for 
supervisors for further investigation. Having the new paradigm of macro-prudential regulation 
in mind and especially if one is contemplating to harness the ΔCoVaR in the process of 
implementing macro-prudential regulation, limitations have to be discussed. In a more general 
critique Boucher et al. (2013) subject the main systemic risk approaches, including ΔCoVaR, 
to a model error analysis. They conclude that the results of all of these models are highly 
sensitive to model errors. Thinking a step further, if financial regulatory agencies ground their 
opinions about the regulated subjects, such as banks, on these models, arbitrary decisions will 
be a regularity that would ultimately undermine the credibility of the regulatory agencies. 
At the current level of available data serving as input, ΔCoVaR is still is a crude measure. 
Nevertheless, it is the aim of this chapter to help understand systemic risk and point to 
possible opportunities to harness the ΔCoVaR method for an application in regulatory 
agencies. The ΔCoVaR can flag up single institutions that become a systemic concern. With 
regards to the data input, the data collecting allowances of regulatory agencies must be used 
to further improve ΔCoVaR, making it more powerful, hence more robust to criticism. 
Different kinds of data generally allow for the creation of customised variables that capture 
the interconnectedness directly. Data of higher quality, frequency, and scope become 
available due to initiatives on international scales, such as the BIS, see Cerutti et al. (2012). 
So, detailed and full data on proprietary trading (Greenwood et al., 2012) are promising, 
especially now that regulatory agencies are equipped with the statutory powers to do so. 
With the lessons learned from the global financial crisis of 2008 a word of warning has to be 
added that applies to all of the various measures of systemic risk, especially when harnessed 
by regulatory agencies for their judgements: The results can serve as indication for systemic 
risk at best and must not be confused with actual proof. Ironically, in the Turner Review 
(2009), the UK Financial Services Authority – the regulatory agency in charge at that time – 
find fault with a “misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths” (p.22), while those who are 
experienced with the matter point out that it should read as “misplaced reliance on 
sophisticated statistics [sic!]” (Sollis, 2009, p. 412). 
As mentioned in the introduction, each chapter is set to address the two research questions 
identified in chapter 2. Therefore, the following discussion aims to answer: 
- Does the ΔCoVaR incentivise banks towards sustainable risk-taking? 
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- Does the ΔCoVaR curb systemic risk when it materialises? 
As for the first question, the proposed ΔCoVaR measure supports the regulatory agencies 
with the detection of those institutions that can be a threat to the financial stability objective. 
A pro-active agency can put an institution under closer immediate scrutiny. Therefore the 
ΔCoVaR does not incentivise the regulated institutions directly but is a crucial aid to the 
regulatory agencies to exercise pressure.  
A bank’s management still has the freedom to do business as they see fit. Particular 
investment decisions remain untouched by the presence of the ΔCoVaR own measure and the 
results. An application of the ΔCoVaR in the bank’s risk management system, which is 
briefly proposed in section 5.4.1, reveals the interconnectedness to the rest of the financial 
system. Consequently, the bank would use the results to decide whether to undertake 
precautionary measures to defend against this exposure. For example it can produce more 
capital to absorb losses linked to this interconnectedness or it can decrease this 
interconnectedness altogether.  
As for the second question, the ΔCoVaR is a detection method and cannot directly contain 
damages as they occur. Yet, a quantitative judgement about the systemic risk contribution of 
an institution based exclusively on ΔCoVaR supports the financial stability objective as a 
crisis prevention tool. Once an institution is identified as a systemic risk concern the 
regulatory agency can take further action. For example, a further capital premium can be 
imposed, partly based on the ΔCoVaR results.  
For example, suppose that a number of regulated institutions have comparatively highly 
negative ΔCoVaR values at the same time. Regardless of whether one of these institutions is 
labelled too-big-to-fail, these institutions can be systemically relevant as a group. Hence this 
means that a significant portion of the financial system, rather than one institution, turns out 
to be a systemic threat. The regulatory agency can decide to impose further capital 
requirements on this group of institutions to dispel concerns in the rest of the financial system.  
Of course, reliance in the methodology and the data input must be beyond reasonable doubt 
and deserves more attention of researchers. Otherwise the regulatory agencies find themselves 
in a precarious situation. On the one hand, intrusiveness urges regulators and front line 
supervisors to not omit intervention. On the other hand, overeager agencies could intervene 
too much too soon, ultimately putting the future credibility of the regulatory framework at 
risk.   
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for state variables, full period 2002–2014 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Std Skewness Kurtosis 
Euribor -0.0065 0.0038 -0.0001 0 0.0009 -2.3566 17.2408 
Corporate 
spread 
-0.0089 0.0153 0 0.0001 0.0018 0.8558 12.8953 
Volatility 
index 
11.6 81.03 24.6384 21.955 10.6606 1.7069 6.6446 
S&P 500 
returns 
-0.1788 0.1041 0.0004 0.0016 0.026 -0.5148 7.4068 
 
Table 5.3: Summary statistics for bank system returns, full period 2002–2014 
Min Max Mean Median Std Skewness Kurtosis 
-0.3158 0.1643 -0.0009 0.0013 0.0398 -1.0884 11.6937 
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Table 5.4: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, full period 2002–2014 (average over time) 
Country/Bank MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
FR BNP Paribas 0.002 -0.0813 -0.0578 
IT Unicredit 0.0016 -0.0924 -0.0546 
FR  Crédit Agricole 0.0014 -0.0997 -0.0538 
FR Société Générale 0.0018 -0.0926 -0.0533 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0019 -0.0729 -0.0523 
ES Banco Santander 0.0028 -0.0727 -0.0521 
IT BancoPopulare -0.0011 -0.1085 -0.0506 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0004 -0.0845 -0.0486 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.0018 -0.0851 -0.0486 
DE Commerzbank -0.0031 -0.1006 -0.0485 
CH UBS 0.0005 -0.0763 -0.0481 
IT Popolare Emilia 0.0008 -0.0816 -0.0473 
SWE Nordea 0.0018 -0.0676 -0.047 
SWE Swedbank 0.0024 -0.0798 -0.0467 
BE KBC 0.0027 -0.1056 -0.0462 
DK Sydbank 0.0032 -0.066 -0.0462 
SWE Svenska 0.0042 -0.0599 -0.0461 
AT Erste Group Bank 0.0013 -0.0902 -0.0453 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.001 -0.0898 -0.0453 
DK Danske Bank 0.0021 -0.0674 -0.0443 
DK Jyske 0.0021 -0.0653 -0.0441 
IT Mediobanca 0.0005 -0.0741 -0.044 
GB HSBC 0.0003 -0.0486 -0.0435 
GB Standard Chartered 0.0016 -0.0717 -0.0432 
IT Di Milano 0.0003 -0.0893 -0.0424 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0012 -0.0746 -0.042 
NOR DNB -0.0009 -0.075 -0.0397 
FIN Pohjola 0.0009  -0.0657 -0.0392 
GB RBS -0.0007 -0.0976 -0.0392 
IE Bank of Ireland -0.0014 -0.151 -0.0389 
PT Espirito Santo -0.0007 -0.0934 -0.0386 
GB Barclays -0.002 -0.0982 -0.0366 
GB Lloyds -0.0001 -0.0883 -0.0361 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0024 -0.0963 -0.0349 
IT Di Sondrio 0.0001 -0.0579 -0.0335 
ES Sabadell 0.0013 -0.0719 -0.0316 
FR Natixis -0.0009 -0.0888 -0.0304 
GR National Greece -0.0028 -0.1321 -0.0278 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.005 -0.0943 -0.0249 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0008 -0.0632 -0.0186 
CH Valiant 0.0011 -0.029 -0.0017 
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Table 5.5: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all countries ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, full period 2002–2014 (average over time) 
Country MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
France 0.0011 -0.0906 -0.0488 
Sweden 0.0028 -0.0691 -0.0466 
Belgium 0.0027 -0.1056 -0.0462 
Austria 0.0013 -0.0902 -0.0453 
Spain 0.0013 -0.0768 -0.0453 
Germany -0.0021 -0.0876 -0.0452 
Denmark 0.0025 -0.0662 -0.0449 
Italy 0.0002 -0.0857 -0.0445 
United Kingdom -0.0002 -0.0809 -0.0397 
Norway -0.0009 -0.075 -0.0397 
Finland 0.0009 -0.0657 -0.0392 
Ireland -0.0014 -0.151 -0.0389 
Portugal -0.0028 -0.0939 -0.0317 
Switzerland 0.0007 -0.0633 -0.0292 
Greece -0.0028 -0.1321 -0.0278 
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Table 5.6: Quantile regression results for the distress VaR model for all banks, full period 2002–2014 (with banks ordered from largest 
to smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 
Intercept Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 𝑅
2 
FR BNP Paribas 0.0135 8.4555 -1.6154 -0.0038 0.0674 1.5603 2.0559 -0.9052 -10.8151 0.5669 0.242 
IT Unicredit -0.005 12.9804 -3.3127 -0.0035 -0.1449 -0.3948 2.3488 -1.3313 -6.8843 -0.8259 0.1722 
FR Crédit Agricole -0.0023 -0.2493 -9.0037 -0.0039 0.0588 -0.1568 -0.0398 -3.1958 -6.7838 0.3035 0.1107 
FR Société Générale 0.0105 7.9137 -6.4041 -0.0041 0.0425 0.857 1.5209 -2.7343 -8.9023 0.257 0.1935 
ES Bilbao BBVA -0.0198 3.6459 -4.4492 -0.0021 0.0506 -2.2261 0.783 -2.4578 -5.8137 0.374 0.1577 
ES Banco Santander -0.014 6.8036 -4.8418 -0.0024 0.3767 -1.6335 1.6706 -2.7293 -7.0266 2.9723 0.1985 
IT Banco Populare 0.0044 1.0395 -6.989 -0.0046 0.0622 0.2918 0.1503 -2.4878 -7.8153 0.3016 0.09 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0169 6.4454 -4.3851 -0.0041 0.0076 2.116 1.5582 -2.7027 -12.3275 0.0605 0.2037 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo -0.0045 4.4463 -5.749 -0.0032 0.1485 -0.4678 0.9023 -2.8606 -8.1604 0.9993 0.1659 
DE Commerzbank -0.0226 0.0796 -2.5376 -0.0032 0.1988 -1.3136 0.0107 -0.7588 -4.7932 0.8217 0.1289 
CH UBS -0.01 8.855 -0.7165 -0.0027 0.6965 -1.004 2.0428 -0.3806 -6.8343 4.854 0.2173 
IT Popolare Emilia -0.0574 4.5955 -5.0931 -0.001 0.0323 -3.5443 0.686 -1.7533 -1.5231 0.1418 0.0316 
SWE Nordea -0.011 16.7751 -3.4738 -0.0022 0.3641 -1.1259 4.0324 -1.8751 -6.204 2.7725 0.1893 
SWE Swedbank 0.0181 4.5836 -3.9131 -0.004 0.3439 1.382 0.8581 -1.6506 -8.0094 1.9446 0.1703 
BE KBC 0.0531 1.6014 -1.201 -0.0064 0.1218 4.362 0.2685 -0.4929 -12.6069 0.7096 0.2014 
DK Sydbank 0.0178 4.9336 -4.1318 -0.0034 0.3029 1.9156 1.2441 -2.2712 -9.0813 2.3358 0.1491 
SWE Svenska -0.0088 10.663 -2.4185 -0.002 0.3872 -1.122 2.7265 -1.5006 -6.181 3.3143 0.144 
AT Erste Group Bank 0 15.2863 -1.088 -0.0036 0.1673 0.0021 2.9794 -0.5022 -8.2782 1.0304 0.1458 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.05 5.0496 -7.0839 -0.0016 -0.0544 -4.061 0.8477 -2.5147 -3.3418 -0.2775 0.067 
DK DanskeBank 0.0099 -0.9219 -4.6967 -0.0031 0.4975 1.1739 -0.2346 -2.6806 -9.2958 4.3346 0.2189 
DK Jyske 0.0072 -0.7222 -4.2175 -0.0029 0.4556 0.9042 -0.1862 -2.5416 -9.0967 3.886 0.2273 
IT Mediobanca -0.0432 -0.9807 -0.5149 -0.0013 0.3076 -3.1065 -0.1589 -0.191 -2.2917 1.6207 0.0316 
GB HSBC -0.0151 9.6333 0.1469 -0.0013 0.0769 -2.6091 3.5692 0.121 -5.6704 0.8744 0.1721 
GB Standard Chartered -0.026 14.8984 -7.982 -0.0018 -0.1211 -2.1387 2.8357 -3.5835 -3.6307 -0.7597 0.1372 
IT Di Milano -0.0635 1.2894 -3.9852 -0.001 0.3483 -4.0935 0.1819 -1.3059 -1.6414 1.5481 0.0354 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0079 16.764 -1.8393 -0.0026 0.0472 -1.0349 4.5738 -1.2164 -8.6623 0.441 0.2101 
NORDNB -0.0032 5.9681 -4.918 -0.0029 0.4189 -0.3888 1.5231 -2.9288 -8.9826 3.4055 0.186 
FIN Pohjola 0.0015 -5.6068 -2.9368 -0.0027 0.2674 0.175 -1.3241 -1.7345 -7.8814 2.1219 0.0962 
GB RBS 0.0017 9.0931 1.1891 -0.004 0.6214 0.1086 1.3388 0.3801 -7.0422 2.8241 0.1298 
IE BankIreland 0.0605 12.0551 -1.9642 -0.0085 0.3537 3.3406 1.4126 -0.5222 -11.1724 1.3246 0.2148 
PT Espirito Santo -0.1043 22.9691 -11.9068 0.0005 0.1609 -7.2622 3.1703 -3.843 0.9051 0.7361 0.0529 
GB Barclays -0.0134 20.1686 -4.21 -0.0034 0.045 -1.2166 3.7029 -1.8247 -7.2486 0.2599 0.1184 
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GB Lloyds 0.0092 5.4536 -2.369 -0.0039 0.1795 0.6629 0.9797 -0.9369 -7.2769 0.9132 0.1911 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0776 4.5201 -1.2798 -0.0008 0.6532 -4.7586 0.6335 -0.392 -1.1806 2.6911 0.0473 
IT Di Sondrio -0.046 0.5373 -0.3127 -0.0005 -0.0258 -3.4152 0.1019 -0.1295 -0.9535 -0.1442 0.0031 
ES Sabadell -0.0563 10.1184 -6.109 -0.0006 0.0667 -5.5146 2.3309 -3.0437 -1.5022 0.4622 0.0561 
FR Natixis -0.0124 -1.616 0.4692 -0.0031 0.486 -0.9841 -0.265 0.1984 -6.0736 2.7177 0.1419 
GR National Greece -0.0745 0.5092 -8.6664 -0.0023 -0.3126 -2.7606 0.0429 -1.6964 -2.2174 -0.8423 0.0883 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0441 3.8241 -9.0666 -0.002 0.0756 -2.5511 0.5138 -2.8951 -3.0057 0.3205 0.0837 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0068 -14.6317 -2.2303 -0.0029 0.2898 0.8445 -3.7638 -1.2848 -8.7907 2.4053 0.1689 
CH Valiant -0.0278 -0.0277 -3.9506 -0 -0.0867 -4.4668 -0.0095 -3.0731 -0.1652 -0.9272 0.0368 
mean values -0.0144 5.7853 -3.8965 -0.0028 0.196 -1.0647 1.1613 -1.7129 -6.2014 1.2895 0.1372 
 
Table 5.7: Quantile regression results for the CoVaR model for all banks, full period 2002–2014 (with banks ordered from largest to 
smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 Intercept 
Bank 
system 
returns 
Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 ?̂?5 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 𝑅
2 
FR BNP Paribas -0.0059 0.6939 2.351 -2.5653 -0.0011 0.1298 -1.4387 25.3516 1.2289 -3.0748 -6.2489 2.2664 0.546 
IT Unicredit -0.0048 0.5802 6.9429 1.4857 -0.0012 0.1314 -1.0339 20.8381 3.7272 1.5738 -6.5076 2.0737 0.5298 
FR Crédit Agricole 0.0014 0.5325 0.7922 -2.8083 -0.0016 0.0089 0.2865 17.5563 0.3381 -2.8499 -8.1418 0.1216 0.5019 
FR Société Générale 0.0044 0.5647 1.3824 -0.9401 -0.0016 -0.0031 0.9006 20.8159 0.6586 -1.0135 -8.1591 -0.043 0.5555 
ES Bilbao BBVA -0.0152 0.6997 5.1079 -0.009 -0.0007 0.0917 -3.4699 21.1754 2.3913 -0.0104 -3.6826 1.4016 0.574 
ES Banco Santander -0.0047 0.6901 5.876 -1.3347 -0.0011 0.0398 -0.8762 17.3905 2.6532 -1.3299 -5.1674 0.5284 0.5394 
IT Banco Populare -0.0101 0.4708 1.6557 -1.3635 -0.0011 0.0228 -1.5889 14.3673 0.606 -1.0872 -4.4124 0.2629 0.4673 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0061 0.5717 5.4891 -0.4242 -0.0019 0.0655 1.1877 17.2724 2.3155 -0.3863 -9.5519 0.928 0.4657 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo -0.0041 0.5598 8.8376 -0.411 -0.0013 0.1828 -0.7004 14.4613 3.4725 -0.3826 -5.8961 2.1808 0.4802 
DE Commerzbank -0.012 0.4968 6.8097 -2.8939 -0.0011 0.0943 -2.0682 16.6589 2.5567 -2.4815 -4.7376 1.1293 0.4088 
CH UBS -0.0034 0.626 -2.7809 -2.1579 -0.0015 0.0035 -0.5727 14.5029 -0.9707 -1.813 -6.2462 0.0397 0.4488 
IT Popolare Emilia -0.0036 0.5738 7.818 0.4767 -0.0017 0.1141 -0.5388 11.1771 2.6 0.3502 -6.5921 1.2935 0.3594 
SWE Nordea -0.0269 0.6771 8.1967 -1.6081 -0.0005 -0.129 -4.9909 14.9554 3.1788 -1.5044 -2.3478 -1.7751 0.4772 
SWE Swedbank -0.0258 0.5679 4.3287 1.1499 -0.0009 -0.3469 -3.9228 12.9599 1.3308 0.8644 -3.2308 -3.7838 0.4085 
BE KBC -0.0106 0.4272 1.1001 -0.636 -0.001 -0.0269 -2.1409 19.0489 0.4686 -0.6627 -4.9254 -0.3657 0.5218 
DK Sydbank -0.0154 0.6676 8.7263 -2.5276 -0.0013 -0.3738 -2.4856 12.1119 3.0019 -1.9754 -5.398 -4.2834 0.4152 
SWE Svenska -0.0271 0.7196 9.4389 -0.629 -0.0007 -0.2628 -3.9839 11.1185 3.0706 -0.4652 -2.4553 -2.6379 0.4068 
AT Erste Group Bank -0.014 0.4952 5.748 -0.1691 -0.001 0.0559 -2.5301 15.3345 2.2668 -0.1474 -4.7184 0.661 0.4563 
ES Banco Populare 
Espanol 
-0.002 0.5095 1.9682 -0.1882 -0.0015 0.2201 -0.3566 12.2326 0.7635 -0.1715 -6.5155 2.7257 0.451 
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DK Danske Bank -0.0117 0.6381 7.883 -1.8404 -0.0014 -0.1294 -1.8893 14.1785 2.8354 -1.5367 -5.8026 -1.4835 0.435 
DK Jyske -0.0212 0.6539 9.0342 -0.4202 -0.001 -0.1912 -3.5011 12.2158 3.5217 -0.3414 -4.3768 -2.1481 0.398 
IT Mediobanca -0.0014 0.5897 12.3115 -1.4301 -0.0016 0.078 -0.3096 17.2436 5.9508 -1.5455 -8.8081 1.2308 0.4521 
GB HSBC -0.0074 0.8888 -7.2487 -2.1399 -0.0016 0.1749 -1.1039 13.1722 -2.2882 -1.5425 -5.73 1.7532 0.3847 
GB Standard Chartered -0.001 0.5897 3.1079 -1.9852 -0.002 0.234 -0.1356 10.8345 0.8745 -1.2404 -6.5208 2.153 0.3268 
IT Di Milano -0.0034 0.4736 9.0442 -2.9822 -0.0017 0.2375 -0.534 13.5683 3.1649 -2.5228 -7.18 2.6571 0.4196 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0086 0.5722 7.5544 0.9338 -0.0011 0.0648 -1.594 16.1161 3.1391 0.8174 -5.1585 0.8348 0.5171 
NOR DNB -0.0147 0.5358 6.2702 -1.5517 -0.0014 -0.0182 -2.4291 12.2027 2.1059 -1.1962 -5.8886 -0.1977 0.4118 
FIN Pohjola -0.0229 0.5888 8.8948 -2.9275 -0.001 0.1624 -3.7445 11.7551 3.2006 -2.5336 -3.8491 1.8981 0.3921 
GB RBS -0.0131 0.4049 13.1387 0.1973 -0.0011 0.0293 -2.3496 15.2498 4.4818 0.154 -5.1358 0.3239 0.422 
IE Bank of Ireland -0.0127 0.26 6.5376 -1.9579 -0.0013 0.1234 -1.7088 9.8247 2.0219 -1.3806 -4.4021 1.1345 0.3389 
PT Espirito Santo -0.0053 0.416 6.902 0.3254 -0.0016 0.0195 -0.848 12.2531 2.3199 0.2472 -6.6562 0.2212 0.3368 
GB Barclays -0.0113 0.3803 10.3162 -2.6108 -0.0012 0.1878 -1.6022 13.6682 3.5643 -1.8131 -4.206 1.9326 0.4205 
GB Lloyds -0.0234 0.4095 3.8658 -2.1856 -0.0008 0.0917 -3.7081 13.2988 1.2489 -1.8452 -3.2176 1.066 0.4224 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0214 0.3715 11.8085 -1.9039 -0.0009 -0.0102 -3.3991 9.4024 3.7249 -1.4808 -3.4868 -0.113 0.3346 
IT Di Sondrio 0.0014 0.5775 5.9486 -0.6827 -0.002 0.1912 0.2108 7.8436 1.8716 -0.5164 -7.5533 1.9467 0.3405 
ES Sabadell -0.0082 0.4309 8.9949 -0.8114 -0.0014 0.0211 -1.3491 8.155 3.1119 -0.6224 -5.9974 0.2308 0.3648 
FR Natixis -0.0219 0.3458 5.332 -2.2627 -0.0007 0.0998 -3.5901 9.1849 1.8223 -1.7387 -2.9136 1.0711 0.3761 
GR National Greece 0.0068 0.2148 11.2761 -1.215 -0.0024 0.0154 1.0393 7.6 3.7152 -0.9929 -9.3613 0.1702 0.2648 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0064 0.2787 13.6801 -0.5726 -0.0018 0.1564 -0.9172 6.4425 4.2928 -0.4217 -6.281 1.6345 0.2951 
CH CantonaleVaudoise -0.013 0.2897 15.5514 -0.5426 -0.0019 0.0282 -1.6085 4.0688 3.9052 -0.337 -5.67 0.2357 0.1983 
CH Valiant -0.0137 0.0573 13.0691 -1.2927 -0.0019 0.2326 -1.4385 0.3583 3.0451 -0.6752 -5.0152 1.5857 0.1623 
mean values -0.01 0.5144 6.66 -1.1564 -0.0013 0.0443 -1.6301 13.365 2.3729 -0.9666 -5.5645 0.5088 0.4153 
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Table 5.8: OLS regression results for regression of the average ΔCoVaR on the VaR for 
all banks, full period 2002–2014 
Parameter Estimate value Standard error t-statistic 
?̂? -0.0334 0.0067 -4.9897 
?̂?1 0.1017 0.0782 1.3008 
 
Table 5.9: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, pre-crisis period 2002–2006 (average over time) 
Counrty/Bank MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
ES Banco Santander 0.0043 -0.0535 -0.0245 
FR BNP Paribas 0.004 -0.0556 -0.0245 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0009 -0.0524 -0.0238 
DE Deutsche Bank 0.0028 -0.0571 -0.023 
SWE Svenska 0.0013 -0.0456 -0.0222 
SWE Nordea 0.0026 -0.0554 -0.0218 
FR Société Générale 0.0024 -0.056 -0.0215 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0048 -0.0712 -0.0214 
DK Danske Bank 0.003 -0.0373 -0.0194 
IT Unicredit 0.0027 -0.0478 -0.0189 
CH UBS 0.0041 -0.0436 -0.0187 
GB HSBC -0.0002 -0.0384 -0.0182 
NOR DNB 0.0014 -0.0523 -0.018 
SWE Swedbank 0.0043 -0.0417 -0.018 
DE Commerzbank -0.0006 -0.0705 -0.0174 
GB Lloyds 0.0006 -0.057 -0.0165 
GB Barclays 0.0011 -0.0539 -0.0163 
IT Mediobanca -0.0006 -0.0424 -0.0162 
BE KBC 0.0033 -0.053 -0.0161 
GB Standard Chartered 0.0011 -0.0488 -0.0159 
GB RBS 0.0011 -0.0508 -0.0154 
ES Banco Populare Espanol 0.0024 -0.0335 -0.0147 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.0036 -0.0625 -0.0147 
IT Banco Populare 0.0015 -0.0387 -0.0145 
FR Crédit Agricole 0.0026 -0.053 -0.0144 
IT Di Milano 0.0042 -0.0486 -0.0143 
IE Bank of Ireland 0.0025 -0.0451 -0.014 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0024 -0.0519 -0.0125 
IT MonteDeiPaschi 0.0035 -0.058 -0.0123 
PT Espirito Santo 0.0008 -0.0216 -0.011 
GR National Greece -0.0002 -0.0593 -0.0096 
AT Erste Group Bank 0.0049 -0.0487 -0.0082 
FR Natixis -0.0007 -0.0377 -0.0078 
DK Sydbank 0.0039 -0.0193 -0.0067 
ES Sabadell 0.0028 -0.0291 -0.0066 
DK Jyske 0.0029 -0.0311 -0.0058 
FIN Pohjola 0.0028 -0.0449 -0.0058 
CH Valiant 0.0013 -0.0097 -0.0052 
IT Popolare Emilia 0.0018 -0.0246 -0.0045 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0007 -0.0654 -0.0017 
IT Di Sondrio 0.0015 -0.017 0.0007 
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Table 5.10: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all countries ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, pre-crisis period 2002–2006 (average over time) 
Country MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
Sweden 0.0027 -0.0476 -0.0207 
Germany 0.0011 -0.0638 -0.0202 
Norway 0.0014 -0.0523 -0.018 
Spain 0.0026 -0.0421 -0.0174 
France 0.0021 -0.0506 -0.017 
United Kingdom 0.0007 -0.0498 -0.0164 
Belgium 0.0033 -0.053 -0.0161 
Ireland 0.0025 -0.0451 -0.014 
Switzerland 0.0027 -0.0475 -0.0118 
Italy 0.0023 -0.0425 -0.0118 
Portugal -0.0008 -0.0367 -0.0118 
Denmark 0.0033 -0.0292 -0.0106 
Greece -0.0002 -0.0593 -0.0096 
Austria 0.0049 -0.0487 -0.0082 
Finland 0.0028 -0.0449 -0.0058 
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Table 5.11: Quantile regression results for the distress VaR model for all banks, pre-crisis period 2002–2006 (with banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 Intercept Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 𝑅
2 
ES Banco Santander 0.0011 8.2294 3.6384 -0.0023 0.2199 0.1391 1.2893 1.3499 -7.7993 1.5817 0.2456 
FR BNP Paribas 0.0146 -3.5771 0.7898 -0.003 -0.2443 2.1991 -0.624 0.3244 -10.9012 -1.8679 0.2746 
ES Bilbao BBVA -0.0007 -7.0109 5.955 -0.0022 0.0686 -0.0986 -1.0955 2.2837 -7.4606 0.5533 0.2251 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0013 -5.5439 -3.4696 -0.0024 0.0888 -0.1621 -0.9028 -1.2526 -7.3277 0.6001 0.246 
SWE Svenska -0.0206 -1.1345 0.7459 -0.0011 0.3549 -2.29 -0.149 0.2297 -2.7385 2.0769 0.0944 
SWE Nordea -0.0078 9.9527 5.2941 -0.002 0.6125 -0.9088 1.4566 1.8415 -6.0002 4.0361 0.2213 
FR Société Générale 0.0081 -7.2345 -2.8002 -0.0027 0.0091 1.1477 -1.2105 -1.1788 -9.6035 0.0735 0.2721 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0051 -7.9752 -2.0078 -0.0033 -0.1501 0.3804 -0.7671 -0.4869 -6.0684 -0.632 0.1737 
DK Danske Bank -0.0039 -5.089 0.0438 -0.0014 0.16 -0.5161 -0.8298 0.0173 -4.5733 1.2484 0.1152 
IT Unicredit 0.0127 12.2702 -3.1987 -0.0026 -0.2179 1.7058 1.9811 -1.2586 -8.4473 -1.5941 0.2159 
CH UBS -0.0032 -13.1216 2.8889 -0.0017 0.1793 -0.4214 -2.1329 1.1156 -5.5273 1.4398 0.203 
GB HSBC -0.0153 -2.7768 -3.4616 -0.001 -0.0667 -2.1819 -0.5011 -1.6003 -3.6232 -0.6003 0.1119 
NOR DNB -0.0184 7.968 -4.3008 -0.0015 0.3426 -2.3169 1.1339 -1.5346 -4.7225 2.4079 0.1393 
SWE Swedbank -0.0177 -4.6478 1.9662 -0.001 0.2826 -2.8133 -0.9556 0.9431 -3.7963 2.5377 0.1605 
DE Commerzbank -0.0015 -22.6226 1.9553 -0.0029 0.4493 -0.114 -2.1571 0.4256 -5.6242 1.9344 0.2497 
GB Lloyds -0.0145 14.7049 2.704 -0.0018 -0.0998 -1.6025 2.0335 0.8697 -5.1547 -0.6442 0.2551 
GB Barclays -0.0183 13.1676 3.4693 -0.0015 -0.0178 -2.2291 1.8195 1.1716 -4.4317 -0.1164 0.1609 
IT Mediobanca -0.0275 9.0563 3.6273 -0.0006 0.1452 -3.2481 1.3752 1.391 -1.8888 1.0954 0.0861 
BE KBC -0.0118 -2.0195 6.7445 -0.0017 0.1969 -1.24 -0.2583 2.0666 -4.7639 1.0979 0.1067 
GB Standard Chartered -0.02 -3.1704 2.6485 -0.0012 -0.0674 -2.7575 -0.5409 1.0947 -3.9861 -0.5428 0.1039 
GB RBS -0.0085 3.8007 0.3134 -0.0018 -0.1502 -0.9432 0.5173 0.1068 -4.9972 -0.9879 0.1602 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.022 1.0326 1.9198 -0.0005 0.0667 -4.4508 0.2617 1.1851 -2.4733 0.8074 0.0465 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.0155 -9.2215 -3.4438 -0.0033 0.397 1.857 -1.3857 -1.2353 -9.9965 2.6037 0.2824 
IT Banco Populare 0.0024 -4.6389 -3.3636 -0.0018 -0.0206 0.3208 -0.815 -1.3953 -5.946 -0.1529 0.1373 
FR Crédit Agricole -0.0203 -4.2105 -8.9486 -0.0014 -0.0048 -2.217 -0.5409 -2.9094 -3.6885 -0.0278 0.1629 
IT Di Milano -0.0344 6.6722 -3.9606 -0.0006 -0.1117 -5.0991 1.2803 -1.7691 -2.2711 -0.8926 0.0729 
IE Bank of Ireland -0.0176 4.6793 -0.023 -0.0012 0.1841 -2.7078 0.8808 -0.0099 -4.5023 1.5465 0.1969 
PT Comercial Portugues 0.003 7.6942 0.2823 -0.0023 0.0631 0.4137 1.2943 0.109 -8.1638 0.4905 0.2325 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0136 2.9211 0.581 -0.0019 0.2113 -1.3418 0.3474 0.1848 -4.4949 1.1506 0.1969 
PT Espirito Santo -0.0163 1.5391 -2.2304 -0.0002 0.1709 -3.5404 0.4133 -1.4014 -1.2605 2.1974 0.0779 
GR National Greece -0.0318 -14.3098 3.6031 -0.0011 0.2028 -2.9167 -1.6772 0.9869 -2.6115 1.0725 0.0797 
AT Erste Group Bank -0.0262 -6.9591 4.1406 -0.0009 0.4799 -2.9257 -0.9935 1.4412 -2.5611 2.9239 0.0862 
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FR Natixis -0.0229 -10.5747 -3.0032 -0.0006 -0.0048 -2.1118 -1.2001 -0.9232 -1.4847 -0.0257 0.0727 
DK Sydbank -0.0107 -9.6189 4.1991 -0.0003 0.0374 -1.9917 -2.4198 2.4847 -1.4953 0.4005 0.0472 
ES Sabadell -0.0106 1.7258 2.9276 -0.0008 0.5024 -2.1435 0.4266 1.8861 -3.8355 5.4678 0.1686 
DK Jyske -0.0216 -9.7319 6.4266 -0.0004 0.3167 -3.1863 -1.5828 2.6253 -1.2808 2.6058 0.1038 
FIN Pohjola -0.0209 -8.8328 -2.1547 -0.001 -0.1308 -1.7725 -1.0287 -0.6049 -2.215 -0.6631 0.0603 
CH Valiant -0.0095 2.3046 1.0707 -0 0.0946 -6.3634 1.7944 2.048 -0.0735 3.318 0.0945 
IT Popolare Emilia -0.0196 -3.2469 1.0506 -0.0002 0.2723 -2.6973 -0.5909 0.4463 -0.6945 2.2463 0.0783 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0105 -1.9069 -10.174 -0.0033 0.2217 0.6155 -0.1502 -1.903 -4.8884 0.7752 0.1912 
IT Di Sondrio -0.0132 -4.0745 1.2977 -0.0002 0.0896 -3.0879 -1.2064 0.9218 -0.8905 1.225 0.0454 
mean values -0.0105 -1.5983 0.3352 -0.0015 0.1252 -1.5517 -0.1807 0.246 -4.4942 0.9943 0.1526 
 
Table 5.12: Quantile regression results for the CoVaR model for all banks, pre-crisis period 2002–2006 (with banks ordered from largest 
to smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 
Intercept 
Bank 
system 
returns 
Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 ?̂?5 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 𝑅
2 
ES Banco Santander 0.0021 0.4242 0.6537 -2.5509 -0.0009 0.081 0.7355 12.5918 0.2778 -2.8082 -7.7488 1.6691 0.5008 
FR BNP Paribas -0.0053 0.4108 -1.6318 0.1964 -0.0005 0.2007 -1.8304 12.9362 -0.7068 0.195 -3.9396 3.9969 0.5402 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0024 0.4457 -0.8597 -1.5188 -0.0007 0.1073 0.9965 15.14 -0.4432 -1.8414 -7.3389 2.4151 0.574 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0035 0.3835 2.9018 2.1767 -0.0005 0.1568 -1.446 14.7749 1.421 2.6194 -5.2801 3.3976 0.5329 
SWE Svenska -0.0091 0.4731 2.4123 -0.9842 -0.0004 0.0483 -3.3097 11.8428 0.9725 -1.1069 -3.8728 0.9557 0.4792 
SWE Nordea -0.0061 0.3761 -1.9691 0.173 -0.0006 -0.0154 -1.4782 8.1912 -0.6224 0.1297 -3.7953 -0.2171 0.4446 
FR Société Générale -0.0028 0.3675 -1.209 0.6252 -0.0005 0.1865 -0.8992 11.1515 -0.4614 0.6322 -4.2233 3.5722 0.5329 
CH Credit Suisse -0.0053 0.2819 0.1074 0.0446 -0.0005 -0.029 -1.6134 9.6027 0.0402 0.0401 -3.9416 -0.4859 0.4743 
DK Danske Bank 0.003 0.4825 -3.1495 -0.3067 -0.0012 -0.0357 1.0497 10.8378 -1.3154 -0.3092 -10.225 -0.7165 0.3918 
IT Unicredit -0.004 0.3742 -4.1858 2.2901 -0.0008 0.1802 -0.9062 6.5652 -1.1927 1.6584 -4.4688 2.4075 0.3856 
CH UBS -0.0012 0.3919 -3.1823 0.9168 -0.0007 0.1132 -0.4901 11.9591 -1.4891 1.1429 -6.3971 2.4007 0.523 
GB HSBC -0.0001 0.4761 -2.9851 3.8369 -0.001 0.075 -0.011 5.4433 -0.7815 2.4479 -5.2485 0.9042 0.3493 
NOR DNB -0.0021 0.3362 -1.361 0.3596 -0.0009 0.1649 -0.6676 8.8825 -0.5145 0.3628 -7.476 2.9871 0.3937 
SWE Swedbank -0.0031 0.3916 0.0796 0.3591 -0.0008 0.1565 -0.7934 7.0403 0.0237 0.2611 -4.8701 2.1538 0.4174 
DE Commerzbank -0.0104 0.2496 2.7448 1.7882 -0.0003 0.0365 -3.278 9.1337 0.9841 1.6277 -2.337 0.6382 0.487 
GB Lloyds -0.0035 0.286 -5.61 -0.1887 -0.0007 0.1728 -0.7906 5.5911 -1.5707 -0.1356 -3.9134 2.1834 0.3704 
GB Barclays 0.0001 0.2967 -2.7001 -0.2865 -0.0007 0.1186 0.0279 5.8281 -0.8392 -0.2065 -3.9798 1.6914 0.3982 
IT Mediobanca -0.0038 0.3889 -0.7464 -1.4525 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.9824 7.5765 -0.249 -1.1839 -5.094 -0.0191 0.4301 
BE KBC -0.006 0.2863 -0.7746 0.1773 -0.0006 0.1174 -1.9916 6.8415 -0.2947 0.1722 -4.487 2.0939 0.4323 
GB StandardChartered -0.0047 0.318 -1.6528 2.7269 -0.0006 0.0708 -0.8941 5.4703 -0.4391 1.6696 -3.0545 0.8357 0.3813 
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GB RBS -0.0029 0.2973 -2.0597 2.6332 -0.0007 0.1549 -0.8903 6.7378 -0.7414 2.3625 -5.0168 2.564 0.4222 
ES Banco Populare 
Espanol 
0.0069 0.4095 -3.1253 2.5559 -0.0012 0.2304 2.0077 6.0665 -1.1322 2.1128 -9.2296 3.788 0.4049 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo -0.0074 0.2218 0.8752 2.6556 -0.0005 0.1015 -2.0168 6.6445 0.3027 2.1838 -3.2922 1.5237 0.4279 
IT BancoPopulare -0.0036 0.3622 -1.3288 2.3701 -0.0009 0.0657 -0.8898 6.2441 -0.4662 1.8694 -5.653 0.9595 0.3837 
FR Crédit Agricole -0.0003 0.2587 -2.4485 2.2679 -0.001 -0.0043 -0.1051 7.2784 -0.9642 2.2641 -8.5022 -0.0809 0.3779 
ITDi Milano -0.0001 0.2714 -5.6461 -0.2254 -0.001 0.0719 -0.0357 5.1496 -1.7338 -0.156 -6.0536 0.9832 0.3438 
IE Bank of Ireland 0.007 0.2946 -6.4086 2.5753 -0.0013 0.0658 2.1443 6.4307 -2.2394 2.2954 -9.2769 1.1011 0.3569 
PT Comercial Portugues 0.0036 0.2533 -4.9947 3.2048 -0.0013 0.0609 0.9181 5.077 -1.6112 2.3335 -8.3764 0.8978 0.299 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0047 0.1997 -3.6439 2.8941 -0.0007 0.1291 -1.3715 5.3552 -1.2436 2.5657 -5.3237 2.1135 0.391 
PT EspiritoSanto 0.0053 0.4908 -5.7123 4.2401 -0.0013 0.0739 1.5774 4.7746 -2.1323 3.7056 -9.3881 1.207 0.3499 
GR National Greece -0.0017 0.1619 -4.3546 -0.1742 -0.001 0.1269 -0.426 4.2559 -1.3246 -0.127 -6.5494 1.8975 0.3336 
AT Erste Group Bank 0.0012 0.1537 -6.1936 4.3123 -0.0011 0.0886 0.3243 3.9529 -1.9467 3.5876 -7.5491 1.48 0.319 
FR Natixis -0.0006 0.21 -2.7609 1.6117 -0.001 0.1542 -0.1832 4.1607 -1.0002 1.4719 -7.0995 2.6565 0.3431 
DK Sydbank 0.0003 0.29 -4.2508 1.2019 -0.0012 0.1205 0.0863 4.0298 -1.4865 1.0349 -8.3109 1.9252 0.3452 
ES Sabadell 0.0047 0.2071 -7.4138 3.6602 -0.0013 0.0178 1.1269 2.5852 -2.386 2.8579 -8.0001 0.2619 0.3075 
DK Jyske 0.0048 0.1704 -6.6776 2.9685 -0.0014 0.0812 1.3966 2.9847 -2.4307 2.7286 -10.209 1.3064 0.3305 
FIN Pohjola -0.0014 0.1225 -5.1244 2.2095 -0.0011 0.0892 -0.2697 1.6986 -1.2565 1.2851 -5.3969 1.0311 0.2818 
CH Valiant -0.002 0.4676 -9.2745 4.8529 -0.0012 0.0572 -0.5158 2.3432 -3.0097 3.916 -7.5656 0.7822 0.2681 
IT Popolare Emilia 0.0018 0.1705 -6.3791 3.5763 -0.0012 0.1175 0.4303 1.5009 -1.7477 2.6255 -7.2714 1.5584 0.2798 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0037 0.0264 -7.5572 3.7726 -0.0013 0.1075 0.8186 0.6412 -2.0816 2.5955 -7.2093 1.4448 0.2615 
IT Di Sondrio 0.0018 -0.04 -6.6082 3.5706 -0.0012 0.163 0.4162 -0.322 -1.8579 2.4508 -7.1634 2.0555 0.2584 
mean values -0.0011 0.3034 -3.0294 1.5882 -0.0009 0.097 -0.3422 6.7071 -0.968 1.252 -6.1983 1.5688 0.3933 
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Table 5.13: OLS regression results for regression of the average ΔCoVaR on the VaR 
for all banks, pre-crisis period 2002–2006 
Parameter Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
?̂? -0.0033 0.003 -1.104 
?̂?1 0.242 0.0623 3.8868 
 
Table 5.14: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, crisis period 2007–2009 (average over time) 
Country/Bank MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.0006 -0.1224 -0.1043 
FR Crédit Agricole -0.0029 -0.1377 -0.0991 
GB HSBC -0.0027 -0.0946 -0.097 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0037 -0.1096 -0.0927 
IT Unicredit 0.0058 -0.1399 -0.0918 
FR Société Générale -0.0055 -0.1421 -0.0902 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.007 -0.1429 -0.0876 
SWE Swedbank -0.0076 -0.1665 -0.0855 
BE KBC -0.0026 -0.1975 -0.0834 
FR BNP Paribas -0.0036 -0.1333 -0.083 
ES Banco Santander 0.0019 -0.0995 -0.0825 
IT Mediobanca -0.0012 -0.0816 -0.0817 
IT Banco Populare -0.0055 -0.1429 -0.0791 
DK Jyske -0.0058 -0.087 -0.0776 
CH UBS -0.0068 -0.124 -0.077 
DK Sydbank -0.0012 -0.0961 -0.0758 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0036 -0.0981 -0.0755 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.0048 -0.117 -0.0745 
IT Popolare Emilia -0.0058 -0.0734 -0.0721 
DK Danske Bank -0.0077 -0.1109 -0.0719 
GB Standard Chartered -0 -0.1185 -0.0716 
GR National Greece -0.0028 -0.1048 -0.0695 
AT Erste Group Bank -0.0145 -0.1525 -0.0689 
SWE Nordea -0.0036 -0.0891 -0.0663 
IE Bank of Ireland -0.0191 -0.2498 -0.0662 
GB Barclays -0.0113 -0.204 -0.0656 
IT Di Sondrio -0.003 -0.0623 -0.0656 
SWE Svenska 0.0051 -0.0955 -0.0644 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0032 -0.1152 -0.064 
IT Di Milano -0.0025 -0.0905 -0.0633 
PT Espirito Santo -0.0066 -0.0796 -0.0623 
DE_Commerzbank -0.0099 -0.1622 -0.0612 
GB_RBS -0.0144 -0.1892 -0.0609 
FIN_PohjolaDEAD -0.003 -0.1062 -0.0597 
NOR DNB -0.0053 -0.1276 -0.0586 
ES Sabadell -0.0042 -0.0784 -0.0577 
GB Lloyds -0.0071 -0.1689 -0.0555 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0111 -0.0947 -0.054 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0033 -0.0834 -0.0493 
FR Natixis -0.02 -0.1568 -0.0387 
CH Valiant 0.0016 -0.0164 0.0045 
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Table 5.15: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all countries ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, crisis period 2007–2009 (average over time) 
Country MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
Belgium -0.0026 -0.1975 -0.0834 
Italy -0.0019 -0.1014 -0.0792 
France -0.008 -0.1425 -0.0778 
Spain -0.0009 -0.1011 -0.0769 
Denmark -0.0049 -0.098 -0.0751 
Germany -0.0084 -0.1525 -0.0744 
Sweden -0.002 -0.117 -0.0721 
United Kingdom -0.0071 -0.1551 -0.0701 
Greece -0.0028 -0.1048 -0.0695 
Austria -0.0145 -0.1525 -0.0689 
Ireland -0.0191 -0.2498 -0.0662 
Finland -0.003 -0.1062 -0.0597 
Norway -0.0053 -0.1276 -0.0586 
Portugal -0.0089 -0.0872 -0.0582 
Switzerland 0.0003 -0.0848 -0.0464 
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Table 5.16: Quantile regression results for the distress VaR model for all banks, crisis period 2007–2009 (with banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 Intercept Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 𝑅
2 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo -0.0187 -8.6653 -6.6882 -0.0036 0.8889 -0.527 -0.8974 -1.3636 -2.8567 2.4926 0.2505 
FR Crédit Agricole 0.0233 -9.0477 -3.5859 -0.0056 0.521 1.169 -1.5447 -1.1665 -7.7362 2.5522 0.2676 
GB HSBC 0.0155 1.5162 -1.4796 -0.0037 0.8168 0.9541 0.3268 -0.5593 -5.9092 4.357 0.3333 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0113 -14.5632 -2.1088 -0.0043 0.815 0.6284 -2.772 -0.7368 -6.4887 4.1959 0.3583 
IT Unicredit 0.0152 -9.3397 -1.504 -0.0054 0.6337 0.5168 -0.9912 -0.3004 -4.83 1.8571 0.3142 
FR Société Générale 0.0077 -5.959 -7.675 -0.0052 0.4921 0.3099 -0.9012 -2.2405 -5.9498 2.0476 0.3067 
DE Deutsche Bank 0.0432 -13.6532 -11.9477 -0.0066 -0.0242 1.3379 -1.6507 -2.5956 -5.6077 -0.0772 0.3009 
SWE Swedbank 0.0662 -16.9003 -4.6174 -0.0083 -0.27 2.5113 -2.2593 -1.2322 -8.9299 -1.0267 0.3234 
BE KBC 0.1132 -16.7922 -0.4362 -0.0109 1.2665 2.4749 -1.2712 -0.0689 -5.9749 2.4787 0.2937 
FR BNP Paribas 0.0114 15.2817 -1.9334 -0.0048 0.7577 0.4645 2.2531 -0.5622 -5.4403 3.0545 0.3517 
ES Banco Santander 0.0212 -12.3033 -3.5428 -0.0043 0.4892 1.0876 -2.1654 -1.2477 -6.1334 2.4811 0.4 
IT Mediobanca -0.0469 -3.5414 0.5375 -0.0012 0.2355 -1.7255 -0.489 0.147 -1.2723 0.9115 0.0659 
IT Banco Populare 0.0646 -1.3878 -10.614 -0.0072 -0.7786 2.7227 -0.1939 -2.984 -7.8026 -3.1064 0.2949 
DK Jyske 0.0216 -2.3021 -6.0613 -0.0037 0.3427 1.313 -0.4916 -2.7259 -6.1819 2.1177 0.4042 
CH UBS 0.0149 -13.0728 -1.2161 -0.0049 0.4885 0.4886 -1.5481 -0.2976 -4.6172 1.5271 0.2477 
DK Sydbank 0.0068 -13.9995 -10.399 -0.0037 0.4489 0.2459 -1.711 -2.7851 -3.529 1.5655 0.354 
IT Monte Dei Paschi 0.0001 -4.5953 -0.8119 -0.0034 0.4693 0.005 -0.5949 -0.2073 -3.423 1.7221 0.1625 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.0206 -7.5447 -4.7286 -0.0034 0.1786 -0.8825 -1.0928 -1.3467 -3.9989 0.7167 0.1817 
IT Popolare Emilia 0.0071 -8.1928 3.9087 -0.0029 0.397 0.5165 -2.2316 1.9619 -5.7553 2.8764 0.1796 
DK Danske Bank 0.0015 -12.8425 -5.3789 -0.004 0.6441 0.0541 -1.6152 -1.3281 -3.8444 2.188 0.3359 
GB Standard Chartered 0.0067 -5.8401 -9.1309 -0.0044 -0.1809 0.1939 -0.6444 -1.924 -3.6203 -0.5174 0.3042 
GR National Greece 0.0188 -4.4287 -6.756 -0.0043 -0.2896 0.6169 -0.539 -1.7003 -3.838 -0.9492 0.3613 
AT Erste Group Bank 0.0826 -16.9173 -0.7344 -0.0083 0.6203 2.8057 -2.0453 -0.1676 -7.6206 2.0427 0.2964 
SWE Nordea 0.029 4.844 -4.5015 -0.004 0.1264 1.0421 0.6702 -1.2093 -4.0248 0.4531 0.2729 
IE Bank of Ireland 0.1407 -27.3192 -7.7848 -0.0138 1.0423 2.9054 -1.9129 -1.1294 -7.4495 2.044 0.3321 
GB Barclays 0.0919 29.3173 -15.6264 -0.0098 0.0844 1.5883 1.9064 -2.0062 -4.6697 0.1403 0.2247 
IT DiSondrio 0.0114 -6.7004 0.2788 -0.0026 0.3888 0.9586 -1.92 0.1534 -5.9982 3.2014 0.2017 
SWE Svenska 0.001 -5.3466 -2.8932 -0.0034 0.4541 0.041 -0.7914 -0.8528 -3.9424 2.0139 0.2918 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0166 -8.9672 -12.4169 -0.0046 -0.1166 0.5592 -1.0388 -2.7955 -4.1566 -0.4046 0.3083 
IT Di Milano -0.0301 -4.3777 0.5298 -0.0021 0.2793 -1.0131 -0.525 0.127 -1.8658 0.9091 0.0891 
PT Espirito Santo 0.0027 1.6968 -0.3863 -0.0028 0.152 0.1321 0.2946 -0.1298 -3.7586 0.7126 0.2732 
DE Commerzbank 0.0736 -4.3401 -13.1715 -0.0082 -0.9305 1.4775 -0.3727 -2.0667 -4.8611 -1.9841 0.1901 
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GB RBS 0.1064 -2.9991 -8.9012 -0.0102 0.3962 1.6021 -0.1687 -0.9557 -3.5681 0.5291 0.176 
FIN Pohjola 0.0067 -14.974 -0.4837 -0.0041 -0.0986 0.2985 -2.3111 -0.154 -5.0118 -0.4238 0.2357 
NOR DNB 0.0475 -11.9697 -5.8112 -0.0061 0.9101 1.9347 -1.6689 -1.6173 -6.8189 3.4899 0.2903 
ES Sabadell -0.0332 5.941 -3.5137 -0.0015 -0.0977 -1.9697 1.2093 -1.4359 -2.3321 -0.5524 0.152 
GB Lloyds 0.1302 -2.8498 -2.0399 -0.0104 0.3254 2.8127 -0.2224 -0.336 -5.9625 0.6059 0.3079 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0652 0.7171 -7.9635 -0.0009 0.5646 -4.1741 0.16 -3.4738 -1.6271 3.4092 0.2482 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise -0.032 -17.1724 -0.0785 -0.002 0.4926 -1.4632 -3.0539 -0.0275 -2.5866 2.3228 0.198 
FR Natixis -0.0073 -8.6942 6.4783 -0.0052 0.9367 -0.2397 -1.0118 1.4535 -4.8314 2.9484 0.1964 
CH Valiant -0.0072 0.0985 -2.4931 -0.0003 -0.0261 -1.7507 0.0905 -4.3613 -2.1193 -0.6497 0.098 
mean values 0.0231 -6.2972 -4.3337 -0.005 0.3377 0.5372 -0.8716 -1.128 -4.8035 1.3237 0.2628 
 
Table 5.17: Quantile regression results for the CoVaR model for all banks, crisis period 2007–2009 (with banks ordered from largest to 
smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 
Intercept 
Bank 
system 
returns 
Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/Bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 ?̂?5 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 𝑅
2 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.003 0.8482 4.1536 2.3786 -0.0021 0.4394 0.2428 13.8142 1.2587 1.4537 -4.7577 3.5994 0.6226 
FR Crédit Agricole 0.0241 0.7353 1.0981 -0.821 -0.0026 0.2946 2.7322 17.2974 0.4281 -0.6373 -8.1916 3.2621 0.6604 
GB HSBC 0.0161 1.0549 -10.494 2.6903 -0.0027 0.451 1.7266 17.9529 -3.8094 1.9657 -7.9944 4.6479 0.6446 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0038 0.8182 -3.6898 0.2569 -0.0018 0.2707 0.3754 14.3337 -1.277 0.1725 -4.9444 2.4447 0.694 
IT Unicredit 0.0024 0.6302 2.4624 1.941 -0.0018 0.1223 0.2165 13.3563 0.8292 1.2497 -4.3256 1.1171 0.6347 
FR Société Générale 0.0183 0.6606 -4.3144 -0.9866 -0.0024 0.0791 1.8062 16.1214 -1.4111 -0.6806 -6.2066 0.7235 0.6428 
DE Deutsche Bank 0.0263 0.6443 4.174 -0.8581 -0.0026 -0.0503 3.1357 19.6027 1.9911 -0.797 -8.7943 -0.6359 0.6828 
SWE Swedbank 0.0124 0.5387 -10.998 3.511 -0.0027 0.1634 1.012 12.5814 -3.2168 1.9737 -6.1391 1.3316 0.6038 
BE KBC -0.0237 0.4279 2.4395 -1.8006 -0.0008 -0.3193 -2.6654 15.7079 0.9067 -1.3755 -2.4706 -3.3065 0.6869 
FR BNP Paribas 0.0184 0.6395 -3.9681 0.0699 -0.0023 -0.0006 1.5556 11.2742 -1.2705 0.041 -4.9417 -0.0046 0.6208 
ES Banco Santander -0.0077 0.8136 0.6845 -0.4745 -0.0013 0.2792 -0.4083 8.9578 0.1581 -0.2099 -2.1142 1.8066 0.6288 
IT Mediobanca -0.0167 1.0162 4.0194 -2.9776 -0.0014 0.38 -1.0464 9.2189 0.9588 -1.342 -2.2481 2.4172 0.5548 
IT Banco Populare 0.0112 0.5758 -5.3519 -4.6163 -0.0024 -0.0287 0.7697 11.5622 -1.4039 -2.2775 -4.6402 -0.2048 0.595 
DK Jyske -0.0013 0.956 2.5808 -4.42 -0.0023 -0.0714 -0.1062 13.0442 0.7247 -2.4766 -5.0243 -0.542 0.5571 
CH UBS 0.0006 0.6569 -0.5036 -3.2609 -0.002 -0.0471 0.0398 9.477 -0.1202 -1.6345 -3.4789 -0.3019 0.5514 
DK Sydbank -0.0203 0.7992 10.5622 -1.8127 -0.0016 -0.3855 -1.2758 9.4842 2.368 -0.755 -2.6581 -2.3526 0.5494 
IT Monte Dei Paschi 0.037 0.7993 -5.1623 -2.1703 -0.0038 0.1447 2.8599 10.3393 -1.4964 -1.1812 -8.3462 1.2091 0.5629 
ES Banco Populare 
Espanol 
0.0042 0.6648 -6.7597 -1.2091 -0.0021 0.4446 0.2731 8.662 -1.6271 -0.5861 -3.6548 2.6867 0.5944 
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IT Popolare Emilia 0.0057 1.0671 -5.713 -6.3072 -0.0028 -0.0723 0.5367 15.2928 -1.8617 -4.1712 -6.9897 -0.6656 0.5552 
DK Danske Bank 0.0149 0.6968 3.1942 4.9809 -0.0025 -0.1442 1.9638 18.5852 1.4676 4.268 -8.8209 -1.7633 0.653 
GB Standard Chartered 0.0109 0.6046 -6.5231 7.0173 -0.0028 0.8156 0.8549 10.2681 -1.8771 3.8476 -5.607 5.9052 0.531 
GR National Greece 0.0124 0.6821 -11.970 2.103 -0.0031 0.5465 1.1583 13.9632 -3.7711 1.2474 -7.9097 4.5832 0.549 
AT Erste Group Bank -0.0082 0.4991 5.9122 2.0923 -0.0013 0.4124 -0.5308 9.3684 1.3198 0.9354 -2.0891 2.6226 0.6004 
SWE Nordea 0.0007 0.7755 0.6246 -3.1067 -0.0018 -0.0409 0.0709 14.1455 0.2234 -2.0718 -4.6645 -0.3872 0.664 
IE Bank of Ireland 0.0145 0.2869 4.4056 -0.6928 -0.003 0.4767 1.193 11.2088 1.3112 -0.3945 -7.0033 3.7177 0.54 
GB Barclays 0.0338 0.3405 -0.6766 1.953 -0.0034 0.363 2.65 10.3747 -0.2046 1.052 -7.5511 2.9757 0.5739 
IT Di Sondrio -0.0045 1.1063 -2.9074 -4.3647 -0.0024 0.4529 -0.3613 9.2066 -0.7745 -2.2376 -5.1522 3.4066 0.5075 
SWE Svenska 0.0263 0.6397 -8.6873 1.5964 -0.0034 -0.0646 1.9044 8.381 -2.2263 0.8391 -6.4714 -0.4313 0.563 
CH Credit Suisse 0.015 0.5405 4.0873 3.995 -0.0025 0.3448 1.2223 10.4445 1.1798 2.2228 -5.4013 2.8194 0.6243 
IT Di Milano -0.0199 0.7186 8.4994 -2.9862 -0.0011 0.3371 -1.7763 11.916 2.8074 -1.8434 -2.714 2.883 0.6433 
PT Espirito Santo 0.0297 0.8546 -9.9394 -3.8297 -0.004 0.3986 2.623 9.9709 -2.9074 -2.0839 -9.546 3.1551 0.4928 
DE Commerzbank 0.0385 0.4021 -7.0901 3.0961 -0.0038 0.4158 3.6547 9.2888 -2.1356 1.8595 -9.3161 3.3392 0.544 
GB RBS 0.0022 0.3483 11.9287 0.1089 -0.0017 -0.0242 0.1112 8.91 2.8034 0.0428 -2.4658 -0.143 0.5405 
FIN Pohjola 0.0118 0.5786 0.7603 0.6697 -0.0032 0.457 0.7462 6.5349 0.1618 0.2995 -5.4866 2.6913 0.4964 
NOR DNB 0.0007 0.4793 0.1389 0.3232 -0.0022 0.0492 0.0588 8.6682 0.0408 0.1841 -4.7822 0.3766 0.5976 
ES Sabadell 0.0095 0.7773 -6.3676 0.6629 -0.0024 0.0904 0.6856 6.3672 -1.4422 0.3188 -4.3444 0.5639 0.5333 
GB Lloyds 0.0177 0.3431 -6.8235 -2.1474 -0.0031 0.0744 1.0037 7.8592 -1.5539 -0.8681 -5.0715 0.4542 0.5365 
PT Comercial Portugues 0.0085 0.6459 0.0618 -3.8791 -0.0032 -0.2123 0.4921 7.3642 0.0132 -1.5354 -5.1801 -1.1914 0.4459 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0582 0.568 -4.8007 -3.3068 -0.0056 -0.281 3.9921 5.9595 -1.0958 -1.5814 -10.216 -1.7832 0.4011 
FR Natixis 0.0336 0.2828 -1.6472 -6.9652 -0.0036 -0.0283 2.0122 4.8408 -0.3658 -3.2157 -5.6024 -0.1762 0.4737 
CH Valiant 0.0182 -0.2524 0.7359 1.4394 -0.0037 0.5374 0.9443 -0.4686 0.1435 0.4995 -4.957 2.4434 0.3335 
mean values 0.0107 0.6406 -1.265 -0.5392 -0.0026 0.1724 0.8891 11.0058 -0.3598 -0.2313 -5.5676 1.2998 0.5729 
 
185 
 
Table 5.18: OLS regression results for regression of the average ΔCoVaR on the VaR 
for all banks, crisis period 2007–2009 
Parameter Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
?̂? -0.0571 0.0085 -6.7184 
?̂?1 0.1128 0.0662 1.704 
 
Table 5.19: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, post-crisis period 2010–2014 (average over time) 
Country/Bank MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
GB RBS 0.0045 -0.1106 -0.0631 
IT Unicredit 0.0001 -0.1089 -0.061 
FR BNP Paribas 0.0042 -0.0828 -0.0602 
FR Société Générale 0.0007 -0.1062 -0.0581 
IT Mediobanca 0.0032 -0.0971 -0.058 
AT Erste Group Bank 0.0011 -0.0953 -0.0576 
DE Commerzbank -0.0027 -0.1005 -0.0563 
IT Banco Populare -0.0009 -0.122 -0.0562 
GB Barclays 0.0016 -0.0993 -0.0559 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.0025 -0.0903 -0.0544 
CH Credit Suisse -0.0024 -0.0766 -0.0539 
ES Banco Santander 0.0047 -0.0748 -0.053 
BE KBC 0.0049 -0.1101 -0.0529 
GB Lloyds 0.0077 -0.0947 -0.0528 
IT Popolare Emilia -0.0017 -0.1055 -0.0524 
ES Bilbao BBVA 0.0001 -0.0798 -0.0506 
FR Crédit Agricole 0.0004 -0.1029 -0.0491 
SWE Svenska 0.0057 -0.0491 -0.0487 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.0039 -0.1017 -0.0478 
FR Natixis 0.0063 -0.0787 -0.0464 
CH UBS -0.0006 -0.0677 -0.0463 
IT Di Milano -0.0064 -0.1293 -0.0458 
IT Di Sondrio -0.0069 -0.0754 -0.0456 
DK Jyske 0.0031 -0.0652 -0.0452 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0034 -0.0746 -0.0442 
SWE Nordea 0.0031 -0.0626 -0.0421 
DK Danske Bank 0.0036 -0.0679 -0.0419 
PT Espirito Santo -0.0019 -0.1219 -0.0417 
GB HSBC 0.0025 -0.0473 -0.0409 
NOR DNB 0.0032 -0.0694 -0.0408 
FIN Pohjola 0.0039 -0.0553 -0.0392 
IE Bank of Ireland 0.0028 -0.1409 -0.0392 
GB Standard Chartered 0.0022 -0.0627 -0.0377 
ES Sabadell -0.0026 -0.0861 -0.037 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0105 -0.127 -0.0359 
SWE Swedbank 0.0046 -0.064 -0.0356 
DK Sydbank 0.0005 -0.0599 -0.0347 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0031 -0.0444 -0.0338 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.003 -0.129 -0.0267 
GR National Greece -0.015 -0.1976 -0.0254 
CH Valiant 0.0009 -0.0516 -0.02 
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Table 5.20: Median VaR, Distressed VaR, and ΔCoVaR for all countries ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR, post-crisis period 2010–2014 (average over time) 
Country MedianVaR DistressedVaR ΔCoVaR 
Austria 0.0011 -0.0953 -0.0576 
France 0.0029 -0.0926 -0.0534 
Belgium 0.0049 -0.1101 -0.0529 
Italy -0.0026 -0.1069 -0.0512 
Germany -0.0031 -0.0876 -0.0502 
United Kingdom 0.0037 -0.0829 -0.0501 
Spain -0.0004 -0.0856 -0.0471 
Sweden 0.0045 -0.0586 -0.0421 
Norway 0.0032 -0.0694 -0.0408 
Denmark 0.0024 -0.0643 -0.0406 
Finland 0.0039 -0.0553 -0.0392 
Ireland 0.0028 -0.1409 -0.0392 
Switzerland 0.0002 -0.0601 -0.0385 
Portugal -0.0024 -0.1254 -0.0342 
Greece -0.015 -0.1976 -0.0254 
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Table 5.21: Quantile regression results for the distress VaR model for all banks, post-crisis period 2010–2014 (with banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 
Intercept Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/Bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 𝑅
2 
GB RBS -0.0181 -6.7617 -5.8421 -0.0041 1.3127 -0.7978 -0.4261 -1.5334 -4.4559 4.2413 0.1192 
IT Unicredit 0.0155 13.632 -9.8551 -0.0052 -0.3677 0.5903 0.7306 -2.1822 -4.6878 -1.0251 0.1267 
FR BNP Paribas 0.0089 -23.6725 -5.1484 -0.0039 -0.2631 0.5418 -1.8829 -1.7132 -5.566 -1.0549 0.1637 
FR Société Générale 0.0144 -20.6313 -9.367 -0.0052 -0.0097 0.612 -1.1591 -2.3073 -5.1746 -0.0314 0.1627 
IT Mediobanca -0.0661 -8.0261 2.6665 -0.0015 0.8125 -2.9567 -0.4626 0.6772 -1.5601 2.3725 0.0232 
AT Erste Group Bank 0.0198 -1.4367 -0.5694 -0.0049 -0.1071 0.9024 -0.0826 -0.1403 -5.3228 -0.3117 0.1726 
DE Commerzbank -0.0535 -28.778 -1.3916 -0.0021 0.3239 -2.0205 -1.4824 -0.2819 -1.9162 0.8044 0.0716 
IT Banco Populare -0.0777 -10.21 2.6295 -0.002 0.9205 -3.6321 -0.639 0.6559 -2.3113 2.7718 0.0621 
GB Barclays -0.0218 -4.559 -0.8188 -0.0035 1.1758 -1.0058 -0.2886 -0.2102 -3.8047 3.8241 0.0883 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo 0.0023 -0.6562 -2.962 -0.004 0.1314 0.1314 -0.0477 -1.0606 -5.0123 0.4936 0.1055 
CH Credit Suisse 0.0058 1.0374 1.3812 -0.0035 -0.1368 0.3975 0.0873 0.5088 -5.4675 -0.5787 0.1326 
ES Banco Santander -0.0236 -13.0072 -2.7025 -0.0022 -0.1311 -1.1056 -0.863 -0.7902 -2.5254 -0.4164 0.0355 
BE KBC 0.0749 -0.066 -0.235 -0.0079 -0.2227 2.8098 -0.0033 -0.0503 -6.9331 -0.592 0.1716 
GB Lloyds 0.0123 -28.4057 -7.199 -0.0047 0.6073 0.4901 -1.442 -1.686 -4.2698 1.7212 0.1157 
IT Popolare Emilia -0.0969 50.308 0.4085 -0.0003 0.3164 -4.5876 3.1452 0.1099 -0.334 1.035 0.0209 
ES Bilbao BBVA -0.0373 -4.8057 0.6468 -0.0019 0.149 -1.6874 -0.3169 0.1703 -2.0232 0.49 0.0413 
FR Crédit Agricole 0.0117 -8.688 -6.2425 -0.0048 -0.8051 0.5357 -0.6008 -1.7217 -5.0941 -2.7408 0.1155 
SWE Svenska 0.0021 -8.9162 -1.241 -0.0023 0.5869 0.1637 -0.9655 -0.5597 -4.0508 3.3304 0.113 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.1106 19.7007 -9.268 0.0004 -0.0013 -4.7869 1.1068 -2.2918 0.4539 -0.0042 0.0313 
FR Natixis 0.0036 -7.0078 0.339 -0.0035 -0.1924 0.2012 -0.5054 0.1011 -4.6896 -0.7232 0.1361 
CH UBS -0.0207 -2.0781 0.2598 -0.0021 0.511 -1.4188 -0.199 0.1059 -3.4713 2.3747 0.0755 
IT DiMilano -0.0184 -29.0356 -8.6224 -0.0048 0.2575 -0.6275 -1.2583 -1.545 -3.8523 0.5621 0.0649 
IT DiSondrio -0.0812 -12.1635 -3.6829 0.0003 -0.1201 -4.9742 -1.0088 -1.2937 0.3615 -0.54 0.0196 
DK Jyske -0.0022 -29.7903 -5.8427 -0.0028 0.4983 -0.1642 -2.9587 -2.5694 -4.7965 2.5264 0.1843 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0223 -7.8301 -1.7334 -0.0023 0.4712 -1.8079 -0.8686 -0.8078 -4.3133 2.6679 0.1389 
SWE Nordea -0.0147 -19.0995 -1.514 -0.0021 0.4388 -0.7978 -1.441 -0.4646 -2.7668 1.7017 0.1158 
DK Danske Bank 0.0277 -11.7118 -5.4724 -0.0042 0.4127 1.8344 -1.0699 -2.0985 -6.2978 2.1246 0.1739 
PT Espirito Santo -0.1579 24.2522 -10.2181 0.0017 -0.3327 -3.2427 0.7917 -1.3388 0.7178 -0.4821 0.0176 
GB HSBC -0.0274 0.4722 -1.469 -0.0008 -0.078 -1.9056 0.0497 -0.6522 -1.4367 -0.4111 0.0521 
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NOR DNB -0.0199 -27.0446 -6.2431 -0.0022 0.3993 -1.1834 -2.1643 -2.2273 -3.174 1.658 0.1268 
FIN Pohjola -0.0287 -6.8678 -2.0527 -0.0012 0.3444 -1.6158 -0.5379 -0.6367 -1.6046 1.3641 0.047 
IE Bank of Ireland -0.0387 -18.9476 0.895 -0.0044 -0.1342 -0.8007 -0.5677 0.1111 -2.1781 -0.2109 0.0628 
GB Standard Chartered -0.0424 -12.206 -3.6692 -0.0009 -0.0271 -2.1234 -0.8328 -1.0542 -1.0304 -0.098 0.0228 
ES Sabadell -0.1063 -2.0319 -4.7226 0.0009 0.0242 -6.2287 -0.166 -1.564 1.2385 0.1047 0.0289 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.1169 -2.503 5.0838 -0.0005 0.5983 -3.3786 -0.1031 0.8282 -0.365 1.2876 0.0226 
SWE Swedbank -0.0065 -5.1278 -5.1127 -0.0025 0.6356 -0.3145 -0.3432 -1.3872 -2.8388 2.0746 0.1171 
DK Sydbank -0.0087 -17.6777 1.3223 -0.0023 0.6194 -0.5827 -1.6158 0.495 -3.8109 2.9543 0.1196 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise 0.0028 -9.6742 -4.9463 -0.0021 0.297 0.1976 -0.9947 -2.158 -3.488 1.5643 0.1385 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0902 -6.7691 -5.5633 -0.0016 -0.2113 -2.7282 -0.3031 -1.0621 -1.1823 -0.4599 0.048 
GR National Greece -0.1686 -63.2109 -18.8414 -0.0013 -0.1935 -2.7988 -1.4624 -1.9363 -0.5121 -0.2243 0.0243 
CH Valiant -0.0574 -4.4582 -9.807 0.0003 -0.0285 -4.3068 -0.4486 -4.2342 0.4838 -0.1566 0.08 
mean values -0.0325 -8.6452 -3.5786 -0.0025 0.2069 -1.3213 -0.5756 -0.9706 -2.904 0.829 0.09 
 
Table 5.22: Quantile regression results for the CoVaR model for all banks, post-crisis period 2010–2014 (with banks ordered from 
largest to smallest ΔCoVaR) 
 Intercept 
Bank 
system 
returns 
Euribor 
Corporate 
bond 
spread 
VSTOXX 
S&P 
returns 
t-statistic  
Country/Bank ?̂? ?̂?1 ?̂?2 ?̂?3 ?̂?4 ?̂?5 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 𝑅
2 
GB RBS -0.0337 0.5478 4.9108 0.9217 -0.0005 -0.0521 -3.1441 9.9575 0.6076 0.4678 -1.0306 -0.3394 0.3785 
IT Unicredit -0.0027 0.56 -9.0154 0.4737 -0.0014 0.0391 -0.3353 16.9229 -1.4342 0.3295 -4.0038 0.3383 0.5052 
FR BNP Paribas -0.0277 0.6928 -3.318 -2.5122 -0.0003 0.1501 -4.0168 16.6174 -0.6744 -2.0187 -0.949 1.5773 0.5677 
FR Société Générale -0.0011 0.5433 -2.6254 -1.7197 -0.0014 -0.025 -0.1183 14.8336 -0.4361 -1.2075 -3.9108 -0.2186 0.5501 
IT Mediobanca -0.0099 0.578 5.0859 -2.0988 -0.0013 0.0188 -1.2705 13.1686 0.8457 -1.5871 -4.0362 0.1652 0.4612 
AT Erste Group Bank -0.0371 0.5971 -2.169 1.5973 -0.0001 0.075 -3.9183 12.3197 -0.3243 0.9456 -0.1321 0.5666 0.4143 
DE Commerzbank -0.0493 0.5757 -1.7929 -1.343 0.0004 0.1465 -5.4067 13.2717 -0.2539 -0.8938 1.0324 1.0948 0.3843 
IT Banco Populare -0.0087 0.4644 -15.5974 -0.0393 -0.0016 0.0579 -0.7595 9.0522 -1.8408 -0.0189 -3.3811 0.3543 0.3798 
GB Barclays -0.0009 0.5544 -5.2008 0.6172 -0.0019 -0.1016 -0.1162 12.0036 -0.7296 0.4052 -5.3804 -0.8125 0.398 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo -0.0318 0.5868 17.3151 1.3377 -0.0003 -0.1313 -2.8281 10.3698 2.1333 0.7271 -0.6154 -0.8549 0.4804 
CH Credit Suisse -0.0184 0.7265 1.7412 1.8193 -0.0009 -0.0447 -2.0687 12.4819 0.2713 1.2027 -2.5941 -0.353 0.4513 
ES Banco Santander -0.0245 0.6667 16.8533 -2.0948 -0.0005 -0.0895 -2.9147 11.8272 2.6869 -1.355 -1.4333 -0.7387 0.5135 
BE KBC -0.0392 0.4601 -0.8258 -3.692 -0.0001 0.2227 -4.54 12.4966 -0.1241 -2.5292 -0.2396 1.8232 0.4642 
GB Lloyds -0.0271 0.5156 2.0332 -3.2612 -0.0008 0.101 -3.3666 11.127 0.3162 -1.9707 -2.4083 0.8236 0.4324 
IT Popolare Emilia 0.0085 0.5048 -13.2304 -0.3386 -0.0025 -0.2473 0.5909 7.5268 -1.2754 -0.1343 -4.2386 -1.2603 0.2858 
ES Bilbao BBVA -0.0149 0.6332 8.2842 -1.686 -0.0008 0.1837 -1.8263 13.5087 1.4027 -1.1919 -2.3194 1.5573 0.54 
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FR Crédit Agricole -0.0173 0.4757 -8.8643 -0.1379 -0.0008 0.1385 -2.1924 11.4418 -1.3706 -0.089 -2.3791 1.1631 0.5122 
SWE Svenska -0.0448 0.8877 6.5058 -1.3275 -0.0004 -0.3213 -3.8954 8.4661 0.812 -0.6726 -0.8336 -2.0786 0.3496 
ES Banco Populare Espanol -0.0135 0.4884 9.1399 0.3275 -0.0012 0.2613 -1.2864 9.3263 1.0939 0.1673 -2.8884 1.6704 0.3726 
FR Natixis -0.0302 0.5451 10.2614 -0.4438 -0.0005 0.0856 -2.4046 8.7148 1.2242 -0.2168 -0.854 0.5346 0.3929 
CH UBS -0.0174 0.69 -7.5292 -1.8441 -0.0011 -0.171 -1.7571 10.0867 -1.0476 -1.0797 -2.5428 -1.2707 0.384 
IT Di Milano -0.0082 0.3726 7.2065 -3.0065 -0.0017 0.0613 -0.5183 6.0299 0.6565 -1.1513 -2.6777 0.2767 0.2951 
IT Di Sondrio 0.0068 0.6648 -12.8586 -0.1941 -0.0026 0.8284 0.6847 10.5686 -1.791 -0.1233 -6.1917 6.0095 0.3371 
DK Jyske -0.0315 0.6623 10.0939 2.3344 -0.001 -0.0531 -2.9499 8.3951 1.1386 1.1561 -2.1524 -0.3395 0.3397 
DE Deutsche Bank -0.0302 0.6201 -8.9587 -3.7257 -0.0003 0.095 -3.1458 10.4098 -1.2548 -2.2597 -0.8317 0.7234 0.4566 
SWE Nordea -0.0373 0.6401 8.6156 -0.0262 -0.0004 -0.1588 -3.6694 7.9987 1.1898 -0.0145 -1.0133 -1.0876 0.4112 
DK Danske Bank -0.0314 0.5861 14.0435 -1.6898 -0.0009 -0.2153 -3.9652 10.1294 2.262 -1.0945 -2.536 -1.8886 0.353 
PT Espirito Santo 0.0028 0.3478 0.6959 1.0429 -0.002 -0.2099 0.2512 11.5067 0.0942 0.5859 -4.0968 -1.397 0.3111 
GB HSBC -0.0288 0.821 -23.3085 -3.0282 -0.0011 0.3788 -1.6642 4.6549 -1.8165 -0.9508 -1.5321 1.462 0.188 
NOR DNB -0.0302 0.5626 -7.6134 -3.0376 -0.0009 -0.3762 -2.4959 6.5505 -0.8186 -1.4776 -1.701 -2.1753 0.3191 
FIN Pohjola -0.0385 0.6629 1.4146 -2.9739 -0.0002 -0.0605 -3.5793 8.1075 0.1682 -1.5585 -0.5205 -0.3872 0.3808 
IE Bank of Ireland -0.039 0.2732 -19.0328 -0.6046 -0.0009 0.2007 -3.0321 6.8563 -1.9084 -0.2484 -1.708 1.0572 0.2383 
GB Standard Chartered -0.0221 0.5813 -10.2902 0.49 -0.0015 -0.1907 -1.4313 5.1169 -0.9043 0.1912 -2.3154 -0.8516 0.2141 
ES Sabadell 0.0006 0.4429 6.4213 -4.5171 -0.0022 -0.0622 0.0503 6.9572 0.6313 -2.1001 -4.1736 -0.3468 0.2903 
IT Monte Dei Paschi -0.0477 0.308 18.0878 -3.6615 -0.0003 -0.1095 -3.1449 5.7459 1.7772 -1.43 -0.4275 -0.5312 0.2293 
SWE Swedbank -0.0429 0.5193 3.025 2.9036 -0.0006 -0.369 -4.0414 7.4545 0.3842 1.4903 -1.3784 -2.4122 0.3214 
DK Sydbank -0.0206 0.5744 0.5622 -1.3936 -0.0015 -0.1824 -1.9792 6.7111 0.0672 -0.7361 -3.2914 -1.1819 0.3346 
CH Cantonale Vaudoise -0.0401 0.7112 -13.7078 -1.1075 -0.0011 -0.2566 -2.6698 3.899 -1.2166 -0.4207 -1.7031 -1.1363 0.1641 
PT Comercial Portugues -0.0098 0.2122 24.4417 -3.7844 -0.0021 0.3293 -0.7928 3.9328 2.6349 -1.7057 -4.1772 1.7947 0.2069 
GR National Greece -0.012 0.1389 -10.8921 -5.4866 -0.002 0.0982 -0.9955 4.2069 -1.1295 -2.2453 -3.8949 0.4921 0.1704 
CH Valiant -0.0482 0.3812 -17.0232 -2.2887 -0.0006 0.3403 -2.9591 2.4582 -1.4005 -0.8111 -0.8303 1.4956 0.0988 
mean values -0.0232 0.5458 -0.4174 -1.2 -0.001 0.0094 -2.1859 9.3466 0.0158 -0.625 -2.251 0.0809 0.3629 
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Table 5.23: OLS regression results for regression of the average ΔCoVaR on the VaR 
for all banks, post-crisis period 2010–2014 
Parameter Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
?̂? -0.0442 0.005 -8.7945 
?̂?1 0.0203 0.053 0.3829 
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6 Contingent capital part I: A critical literature review 
This chapter extends the list of possible macro-prudential tools from chapter 4 with an 
analysis of contingent capital. Chapter 6 gives a critical literature review before chapter 7 
gives an empirical analysis of a sample of already issued CoCos and a new CoCo proposal 
that fits into the recovery and resolution of a struggling bank. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Contingent capital is unsecured debt in the form of a bond that is among the most junior 
among creditors’ claims to a bank. Upon a predefined trigger event this bond increases the 
equity ratio of the bank. The affected bank would not need to finance itself with issuing equity 
directly in the primary financial markets and a bail-out by the government to avoid contagion 
is less likely. This can be done by a conversion into newly issued equity or a principal write-
down of the bond that de-levers the bank. To avoid confusion about the notation, this chapter 
uses “contingent capital” as the general term to refer to either approach and “CoCos10” are 
defined as contractually agreed (Zhou et al., 2012) debt-to-equity
11
 convertibles. So, in this 
and the next chapter the differences of CoCos to other contingent capital proposals are that 
first, CoCos do not have the aforementioned principal write-down feature, but an irreversible 
conversion of debt into equity. Second, there are different trigger events. For example 
contingent capital can be triggered by a regulatory agency’s decision. CoCos, as suggested in 
chapter 7, can have a market-based trigger. The first part of chapter 7 contains an empirical 
analysis of contingent capital notes that have a write-down feature, but are called “contingent 
convertibles” or “CoCos” by the issuing banks. So, strictly speaking there is no “conversion” 
of debt because it is simply a write-down, or complete write off, on these notes. So, it would 
more appropriate to call these notes “contingent write-down” or “contingent de-leverage” 
bonds.  
Furthermore, the term “bail-in” circulates in the discussion about CoCos. For example, Perotti 
and Flannery (2011) stress that CoCos “represent a form of private bail-in cushion for 
individual bank distress” (p. 1). However the term “bail-in” is exclusively reserved for any 
regulatory measure that is exercised by a regulatory agency (Zhou et al., 2012). 
Commentators of the banking crisis frequently emphasised the need to make shareholders and 
                                                          
10
 Alternative notations evolve in the nascent literature and are presented in the literature review below. For the 
sake of readability this chapter uses the most prominent one, contingent convertibles or just CoCos. 
11
 Note that “equity” and “capital” are used interchangeably. 
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creditors of a bank pay for financial losses before a bail-out by the government with 
taxpayers’ money is even considered. So, policy makers have high expecations of contignent 
capital (BCBS, 2011a; Haldane, 2010; Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, 2010). 
From a regulatory agency’s point of view depositors are the most important group of creditors 
of the bank. They are of fundamental importance to the financial intermediation exercised by 
banks. A stable operation of the payment system constitutes a public good
12
. CoCos convert 
into a predetermined amount of equity upon an also predefined trigger event. Ideally, 
conversion immediately boosts the capital ratio of a bank to a healthy level to absorb financial 
losses and hence abates concerns about disintermediation, i.e. less lending due to mass 
withdrawals of deposits. 
The analysis of CoCos from a macro-prudential perspective is divided into two main chapters. 
This chapter gives a literature review with a critical analysis of the proposed CoCo designs in 
the nascent literature. Consequently, CoCos are compared to the increased minimum capital 
requirements, which are the most important regulatory tools. This comparison reveals that 
CoCos can incentivise banks towards moderation in taking risks that equity alone cannot. The 
findings are crucial for the design of CoCos that is subject of chapter 7. There, the CoCo 
proposal helps fill the gaps in the literature. From a practitioner’s point of view including 
regulators, bank managers, and CoCo investors, the proposed CoCo design enhances financial 
stability and offers a low-risk investment opportunity. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an introduction to the basics of CoCo before designing a 
CoCo proposal that qualifies it for being a macro-prudential tool. The latter is subject of 
chapter 7. The existing literature on CoCos deals with issues such as finding an appropriate 
pricing model. These papers raise valid research questions and certainly give crucial insight 
into the topic. However, their results are more interesting for theoretical argumentation within 
the quantitative string of the theory than for a practical application. One of the obvious 
concrete applications is to introduce CoCos in the recovery and resolution of struggling 
banks. For example, CoCos can be a tool of the BRRD of the SSM in the European macro-
prudential regulatory framework, mentioned in sub-section 3.4.4.1 of chapter 3.   
The methodology in this chapter differs for it analyses CoCos within a macro-prudential 
framework. Particular attention is paid to the incentive structure of different stakeholders of a 
                                                          
12
 One of the criteria of a public good is the non-exclusivity. This means that individuals cannot be excluded 
from benefitting from the public good. A text book example is traffic light that increases street safety also for 
those individuals that do not pay for the provision of such a public good. In order to curb this free rider problem 
the public authorities may collect taxes from each individual to finance public goods.  
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bank, such as the management, shareholders, depositors, and other creditors. The discussion 
about CoCos is compared to the established banking theory. Among them are for example the 
notions how leverage in general and deposits in particular should, according to the theory, 
increase market discipline. The bankruptcy of a bank can be costly but due to government 
guarantees to protect deposits and the payment system, banks suffer from moral hazard. Thus 
in the presence of such guarantees, which cannot credibly be revoked, the market discipline 
does not exercise full power.  
This chapter’s original contribution is that it analyses CoCos from a different theoretical angle 
than the majority of the literature. It emphasises that CoCos can disentangle the incentives of 
different stakeholders in a bank in order to address issues of moral hazard that come with a 
debt overhang problem and implicit and explicit government guarantees alike. In short, the 
debt overhang problem is a persistent problem when a bank is close to bankruptcy but its 
shareholders are reluctant to inject further equity that can rescue the bank. The debt overhang 
is addressed in more detail in sub-section 7.3.4 of the next chapter, where an alternative CoCo 
design proposes how to circumvent the debt overhang problem. 
Section 6.2 recapitulates the current regulatory treatment of contingent capital in general 
according to Basel III. Section 6.3 gives a literature review of CoCos. The chronological order 
of key papers furthermore sketch how the discussion evolved from early ideas to more 
comprehensive formal models. Section 6.4 compares CoCos to higher capital requirements, 
i.e. a higher equity ratio, that are the most prominent and important tool at the regulatory 
agencies’ disposal. So far this thesis deliberately saved a theoretical discussion of bank runs, 
the disciplining powers of deposits and government protection schemes, and leverage for the 
discussion of CoCos. Section 6.5 concludes and answers the research questions.   
 
6.2 Regulatory treatment of contingent capital under Basel III 
This section shows the regulatory treatment of contingent capital in the Basel II framework. In 
general terms, the Basel II minimum capital requirements from 2004 distinguish between 
three tiers of capital. First Tier 1 is “hard” or core capital that is ready to immediately absorb 
financial losses and retained earnings in the form of not-distributed dividends to shareholders. 
Tier 1 capital consists of common equity that absorbs losses on a going-concern basis, 
meaning that the bank is not faced by a bankruptcy but is expected to survive current financial 
distress.  
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Second, Tier 2 capital, or supplementary capital, include hybrid debt instruments. In addition 
to common equity the revised capital accord Basel III leave space for non-common equity 
instruments that fulfil certain criteria. Third, Tier 3 capital is short term debt with a nominal 
maturity up to two years and neither any interest on such a debt nor the principal value is 
payable if the bank is below its minimum capital requirement, or payment of these would 
drive the capital below this requirement. The sum of all tiers accumulates to a minimum of 8 
per cent. Furthermore certain ratios between the tiers are in place. Tier 2 must not exceed Tier 
1 capital.  
In a revised version from 2011 the new capital accord, Basel III, forwards a more stringent 
definition of capital. Table 6.1 below gives a simplified illustration according to Avdjiev et al. 
(2013). The minimum capital ratio is still set to 8 per cent. Tier 1 consists of “core” equity 
including common shares, retained earnings, and reserves from the re-evaluation of assets. 
Additional equity comes from preferred shares and high-trigger CoCos. Tier 2 capital consists 
of subordinated debt and low-trigger CoCos. Tier 3 is discarded. A complete list of the 
definitions can be obtained from the BIS (2011). 
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Table 6.1: CoCos in Basel III capital requirements. Source: Avdjiev et al. (2013). 
Tier 2 (T2)         
 
      
    Non-CoCo subordinated debt   
    Low-trigger CoCos   
         
         
    Additional Tier 1 (AT1)     
 
       
    Preferred shares   
    High-trigger CoCos   
         
         
  
CET1+AT1+T2 
 Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1)   
 
 
≥ 8% RWA 
      
         
 
CET1+AT1 
       
 
≥ 6% RWA 
  Common shares   
    Retained earnings   CET1 
        ≥ 4.5% RWA 
        
         
         
         
         
    
High-trigger and low-trigger CoCos refer to different purposes of the respective CoCos and 
hence are differently recognised by capital regulations. As the name suggests a high-trigger 
CoCo is converted before a low-trigger CoCo, i.e. on a going-concern basis and gone-concern 
basis, respectively. Items that classify as Tier 1 capital are loss-absorbing and allow for a 
continuation of the bank’s business, the bank stays a going-concern.  
Basel III in general allows for CoCos few policy makers explore this regulatory tool. For 
example policy makers in the USA do not foster CoCos. On the other hand, the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) (2011) already introduced high and low-
trigger CoCos for their banks. One explanation can be fundamental differences in the 
treatment of hybrid securities, as indicated in domestic tax laws. In the USA the debt 
component is emphasised while in other countries, such as Germany, hybrid securities can 
enjoy a preferred tax treatment.  
At the point of the bank’s non-viability, i.e. a foreseeable bankruptcy, Basel III stipulates that 
all non-common equity instruments of Tier 1 and Tier 2 must be fully loss-absorbing. Only 
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after all capital resources are exhausted, capital injections by the public can be considered. In 
addition to reinforcing that all available private capital is used before public aid is considered, 
a new option for a gone-concern bank is to bail-in other creditors. One of the highest-ranking 
items on the agenda of regulatory reform is making banks’ creditors pay before authorities 
bail out banks with taxpayers’ money. This is also the predominant feature of CoCos.  
In addition, further restrictions on those creditors who have regular debt claims could be 
imposed. One of them is to write down their claim temporarily or permanently given that the 
bank is in severe distress that could cause systemic risk. Alternatively, their debt claim can be 
converted into equity. Both alternatives are due to the discretion of a regulatory agency. The 
crucial difference between these measures and CoCos, as discussed in this chapter, is that that 
the former are bail-in instruments and the latter are pre-defined contractual agreements. Put 
differently, while both ideas look identical at first glance, bail-in measures are decided and 
executed by a regulatory agency, CoCos feature an automated mechanism that does not leave 
space for discretion.  
This is not a small difference. One of the driving factors behind systemic crises is uncertainty. 
Especially when it comes to making decisions about bailing-in banks’ creditors, the discretion 
of the agency can quickly put creditors into uncertainty. If they see that creditors of another 
bank are bailed-in by the regulatory agency why should that not happen to them too? Hence, it 
would be rational to fire-sell these bonds, which again is perceived as a negative sign by the 
financial markets. 
To conclude, at worst, contingent capital can have destabilising effects during a crisis if the 
point of non-viability of a bank is determined by a regulatory agency. At best, contingent 
capital can contribute to financial stability if the “contingency” is clearly defined. Basel III 
only allows for CoCos as AT1 and not Tier 1 core capital. Tier 1 capital is per definition 
available at all times. Obviously, only upon the contingency event, CoCos make available 
new equity or de-leverage by means of a write-off of the CoCos’ nominal value.  
This chapter defines CoCos as contractual agreements for a conversion of debt into equity 
upon a trigger event. The remainder of this chapter looks into the technical aspects of a CoCo 
design. The key conclusions are that for the proper functioning of contingent capital in 
general, much depends on who decides on conversion – contractually agreed CoCos or bail-in 
capital decided by a regulatory agency – and what the terms of conversion are.  
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The next chapter outlines a CoCo proposal that serves as a script to go through a financially 
distressed bank. At all times it must be clear to bank managers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders what is going to happen if the bank is dangerously undercapitalised. Only with 
this certainty these groups are able to make decisions. In contrast to the CoCo-related 
literature the macro-prudential research framework of this PhD thesis provides additional 
benefits to the CoCo design process. This means that by analysing the literature this chapter 
derives “essential features” a CoCo proposal must fulfil. One of the essential features is first 
and foremost to incentivise bank managers to exercise moderation in their business. And even 
if a systemic crisis arises CoCos can curb some of the losses compared to a state without 
CoCos.  
 
6.3 Literature review on contingent capital 
Regulators have high expectations for contingent capital in the regulation of banks, especially 
systemically significant institutions. The nomenclature in the still nascent body of literature 
varies. With “contingent capital” as the most basic name (McDonald, 2011) Flannery (2009) 
suggests “contingent capital certificates”. Albul et al. (2010) call them simply “contingent 
convertible bonds”. Other authors, such as Duffie (2009), are more specific in their proposals 
and call them “distress-contingent convertible debt”. For the sake of readability the term 
CoCo is used.  
However, the main purpose of such a hybrid instrument is to boost the capital ratio of a bank 
if a specific trigger event is hit. For example, as soon as a bank’s capital ratio falls below a 
previously defined ratio, a transformation of the debt-like CoCo into equity is triggered 
(BCBS, 2010a). The debt claim of the CoCo disappears and CoCo investors are repaid in 
newly issued equity of the bank. Table 6.2 below illustrates CoCos on a bank’s balance sheet. 
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Table 6.2: A bank's balance sheet with CoCos. Source: Own illustration. 
Bank A 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash 
Equity 
CoCos 
Securities 
Other debt 
Loans Deposits 
 
The asset side is constructed following a liquidity hierarchy, from the most liquid asset cash 
over securities to the least liquid assets, i.e. loans. The liability side is constructed according 
to loss absorbing capacity. Equity, or also called capital, is the first tranche to mitigate 
financial losses stemming from the asset side. Asset write-downs are a consequence of the 
impairment of the current value of the asset side. CoCos follow and are converted into equity 
before other debt would be considered to be subject of regulatory mandated write-downs. 
Deposits are the last tranche. Note that the relative sizes of the boxes do not indicate specific 
ratios but are solely for an illustrative purpose. As soon as the trigger event occurs, the CoCos 
are change from being a debt claim into a residual claim on the profits of the bank, i.e. equity. 
One view of the crisis is that there was a lack of discipline among banks to abstain from 
unsustainable leverage, loading on unsustainable risks, and a lack of monitoring efforts by 
their stakeholders. Stakeholders are the sum of economic agents that have an interest in the 
soundness of a bank. These include shareholders and debtholders, including depositors.  
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Figure 6.1 shows the different design features for contingent capital. The trigger event can be 
mechanical or conversion can be exercised by a regulator’s decision. In the case of a 
mechanical trigger– which is assumed in the next chapter – the convertible is referred to as 
CoCo; in the case of a regulatory announcement of a conversion the contingent capital is 
classified as bail-in capital. Since CoCos are triggered to counter a weak capital cushion of a 
bank a drop of capital ratio is the trigger event. This mechanical trigger must further be 
specified as either a book value of capital or market-based evaluation of the equity.  
The loss-absorption helps boost the capital ratio, i.e. de-lever a bank. Investors of contingent 
capital can be compensated for a loss of their debt claim either with cash, obtain newly issued 
equity, or see their debt claim mandatorily written-down. The next sections look closer at the 
differences between the choices of the trigger event and the terms of conversion. 
 
6.3.1 Bail-in capital vs. contractually agreed contingent capital 
This sub-section demonstrates the advantages of a contractually agreed CoCo conversion over 
a difficult to anticipate regulatory decision to trigger the “contingency”.  
Calello and Ervin (2010) give an example of a debt-to-equity swap by a regulatory agency’s 
decision – so it is a bail-in according to the definitions given in the introdution. This could 
Contingent capital 
design features 
Trigger 
Loss– 
absorption 
mechanism 
Mechanical 
Regulator’s 
decision 
Conversion 
to cash 
Conversion 
to equity 
Principal 
write-down 
Book 
value 
Market 
value 
Figure 6.1: Design features of contingent capital. Source: Own illustration based 
on Avdjiev et al. (2013). 
200 
 
have been an alternative solution to the collapse of Lehman Brothers:  
 The first step would have been to write down the assets of Lehman Brothers by US$ 
25 billion which would have wiped out shareholders completely.  
 Second, subordinated-debt holders and senior unsecured debt holders would 
recapitalize the bank. The first investor group would have converted US$ 25 billion in 
exchange for 50 per cent of the new equity of the bank. The second group would 
receive the other 50 per cent of the equity by converting 15 per cent of their US$ 120 
billion total claims.  
 On the balance sheet, the new equity would be worth US$ 43 billion, approximately 
double the size of Lehman’s previous capital base. The management would have been 
replaced by the new owners. The whole process could have been accompanied by a 
consortium of other big banks to make available a further funding facility for Lehman 
Brothers to eliminate the last remaining doubts of the markets about the survival of the 
firm.  
Calello and Ervin (2010) underline the advantage of regulatory authorities’ bail-in provisions 
for “[i]t would give officials the authority to force banks to recapitalise from within” 
(emphasis added). The authors do admit, however, that this whole process must be executed 
in a short time period to soothe markets before they panic. They compare the case of the “fast-
track” reorganization of CIT, a small-business lender, to the case of Lehman Brothers. The 
former was considered fast within 38 days, but the latter just allowed for 48 hours before a 
panic would eventually spread. 
Bail-in capital includes a decision-making process that requires time. But saving time is a 
crucial factor in curbing a panic that could cause and exacerbate a systemic crisis in the worst 
case. CoCos are contractual agreements that map out the course of action once the 
contingency occurs. Therefore CoCos, compared to bail-in capital, are a time-saving measure 
to recapitalise the bank from within. 
The authors further conclude that a remaining problem is that “[s]ceptical customers and 
counterparties would still need to be convinced to deal with the new company” (Calello and 
Ervin, 2010). Another example that illustrates the concerns raised so far is the expropriation 
of its shareholders when Northern Rock was brought into public ownership. Due to the 
nationalisation of the bank, Northern Rock’s shareholders faced severe losses. The primary 
duty of the authorities was not the protection of private property but “comparing the financial 
benefits to the taxpayer of nationalisation with the alternatives available” (SRM Global 
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Master Fund LP, 2009, para. 166). Similarly, in order to protect taxpayers against losses, 
some jurisdictions rule that “funding provided to an entity that is being restructured or 
resolved in other ways enjoys a priority over other creditors” (BCBS, 2011b, p. 22). In more 
general terms, a bank’s existing shareholders’ position could still be diluted in the future even 
after the institution has been saved. Consequently, shareholders and other investors would be 
at odds with each other, costing the bank precious time to quickly recapitalize. However, a 
private solution is always preferable to a publicly funded government intervention. With a 
government institution, which acts on behalf of taxpayers, it is not clear whether existing 
shareholders would be compensated at all in the case that a bank is a going-concern, i.e. 
surviving financial distress. 
Of course, shareholders of gone-concern banks lose wealth. So do bail-in capital investors in 
either case whether the trigger event stipulates conversion to equity or a principal write-down. 
If the bank is under severe financial distress but still with the prospect of remaining a going-
concern, a prediction about the net loss of wealth cannot be done with precision. A bail-in 
exclusively serves the regulatory objective of maintaining financial stability by giving the 
regulatory agency room for manoeuvre. This discretion comes to the detriment of bail-in 
capital investors who cannot predict their future wealth.  
To draw an interim conclusion, CoCos give two advantages over bail-in capital. First, due to a 
contractual agreement on the contingency event, i.e. the trigger, conversion occurs 
immediately with no delay that could otherwise cause uncertainty to the involved parties. 
Second, due to a contractual agreement on the terms of conversion into equity CoCo investors 
are better able to estimate their wealth compared to a situation in which their wealth depends 
on the decisions of the regulatory agency. 
These two examples provide the string of argumentation for the remainder of this chapter and 
the CoCo proposal in chapter 7. The incentives of, bank managers, shareholders, CoCo 
holders, other creditors, and supervisors, have to be aligned towards the new objective of a 
macro-prudential regulatory framework: promoting financial stability.  
 
6.3.2 The origins of contingent capital 
Contingent capital as a tool of increasing financial stability found attention during the 2008 
Crisis when a group of fifteen leading economic scholars, known as the Squam Lake Group 
(2009), gathered and reasoned about the basic features contingent convertible bonds must 
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provide in order to fulfil this aim. The idea of this kind of hybrid debt is not completely new 
and can be traced back to the contributions by Doherty and Harrington (1997) and Flannery 
(2002). Hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Squam Lake Group consisted of 
fifteen academics first convened in fall 2008. Of the original fifteen members Duffy (2010) 
and Kashyap together with Rajan and Stein (Kashyap et al., 2008) are now among the most 
important authors.  
The Group suggested that the trigger event for the conversion of “regulatory hybrid 
securities” – a generic term before the name contingent convertible bonds, or CoCos, was 
introduced – should depend on two criteria: First, the conversion is only possible when the 
regulators announce that there is a systemically relevant crisis that may affect the whole 
banking sector. Second, after a declaration is made, a bank must fulfil a specific requirement, 
the trigger, that finally leads to the conversion. The first criterion would help to maintain the 
disciplining power of debt financing on the bank’s management.  
The second criterion helps avoid an undiscriminating obligation to convert among the banking 
sector. Otherwise banks that suffer from financial stress and should be allowed to fail would 
be strengthened by a conversion. Healthy banks would be punished by unnecessarily 
increasing their equity ratio.  
This two-component trigger would avoid an indiscriminate conversion of debt into equity 
across the banking industry which would penalize those banks that have taken due care in 
reinforcing their capital ratio and putting adequate risk management measures in place. In the 
long run, banks would have little incentive to independently reinforce financial resilience. The 
BCBS adopted this proposal and further suggest that the trigger “could be based on any 
combination of regulatory ratios, market based ratios, accounting ratios, bank discretion, 
supervisory discretion, and more.” (BCBS, 2011a, p. 26). Obviously, this suggestion is 
reminiscent of the new intrusive approach to macro-prudential regulation since it involves the 
regulator’s decision. 
However, the idea to have banks use hybrid securities to counter financial distress dates back 
to pre-2008 crisis times, see Flannery (2002).
13
 The aims of CoCos are the protection of 
depositors and taxpayers, and the internalization of costs of bankruptcy risk by shareholders. 
Automatic re-capitalization is an essential design feature. The trigger event is a pre-defined 
ratio of the market value of equity and the notes convert into common equity. After 
                                                          
13
 In his contribution Flannery analyses the potential for “reverse convertible debentures” (RCDs). For the sake 
of readability the term CoCo is used. 
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conversion of outstanding CoCos, the bank is required to promptly replace the converted 
bonds with a new issuance of such bonds.  
The simple model over two periods t = 0 and t = 1 works as follows, see Table 6.3 below: A 
bank is equipped with assets worth $100, liabilities are composed of $8 equity distributed 
among N = 10 shares, $5 CoCos, and $87 deposits. 
 
 
In t = 0 the bank has a capital ratio of 8 per cent. The bank has N = 10 shares. Hence the share 
price PS of the equity is $0.80. Any value below this is set as the conversion trigger. Of the 
total outstanding $5 CoCos only a portion is converted in order to increase the capital cushion 
back to a 8 per cent ratio. Now, assume that a shock leads to a value decline in assets of $3 
that is reflected in a write-down of equity from $8 to $5. Before the final balance sheet is 
achieved in t= 1, the decrease in the capital cushion and ratio is shown in t = 1/2, the 
transition from period 1 to 2. The ratio is now (5/97) = 0.05154,(5.15 per cent). Equity is now 
re-evaluated and priced at ($5/10) = $0.50. However, in order to maintain the regulatory 
minimum of 8 per cent, equity must be $7.76 since (x/97) = 0.08 <=> x=7.76. The difference 
of $2.76 is compensated by converting $2.76 worth CoCos. Priced at a fair per share price of 
PS = $0.50, this results in issuing ($2.76/$0.50) = 5.52 new shares for CoCo holders, who face 
no financial loss because of this conversion at par. Flannery points out that the outstanding 
CoCos should be issued in different tranches to make it easier to anticipate the order of 
conversion. 
Following up his 2002 paper, Flannery (2009) furthermore specifies the advantages of 
t = 0  t = ½  t = 1 
Assets Liabilities  Assets Liabilities  Assets Liabilities 
100 8 Equity  97 5 Equity  97 7.76 Equity 
 5 CoCo   5 CoCo   2.24 CoCo 
 87 Deposits   87 Deposits   87 Deposits 
 
N = 10, 
 
PS = 
$8
10
 = $0.80 
  
N = 10, 
 
PS = 
$5
10
 = $0.50 
  
N = 15.52, 
 
PS = 
$7.76
15.52
 = $0.50 
 
Table 6.3: Numerical example for CoCo conversion into equity. Source: Flannery 
(2002). 
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CoCos.
14
 When conversion occurs, the debt-for-equity swap reshuffles the capital structure of 
the bank but the asset side and assets value of the bank stays identical just in time of 
conversion. Hence, the default probability and loss given default decline, making the bank 
more robust. Wiping out previous shareholders is one key feature to reinforce market 
discipline.  
Further holding restrictions must be imposed on other systemically important institutions. 
They must not own CoCos especially of other systemically important firms to avoid a 
situation where financial losses due to conversion could lead to contagion. The yield on 
observable CoCo prices can provide additional market information about a bank’s capital 
adequacy. In contrast to his initial conversion rule to recapitalize equity to the chosen 
regulatory capital minimum of exactly 8 per cent, Flannery (2009) suggests converting 
outstanding CoCos to 1 per cent point above the required minimum. Consequently conversion 
would happen on a less frequent basis. 
 
6.3.3 Design problems of CoCos: Endogeniety and prohibitive pricing difficulties 
This sub-section discusses the most pressing problems with CoCos that could defeat their 
purpose. Kashyap et al. (2008) discuss the issue of endogeneity of the trigger. For example 
there could be “problems with indeterminacy or multiple equilibria” (p.33) if the trigger is 
based on the bank’s stock prices and a stock price index of other banks as a benchmark. The 
conversion of CoCos indeed serves as insurance for a bank’s capital and should be reflected in 
its stock price. Consequently, the trigger event should be an exogenous measure. They 
advocate allowing a conversion only when the financial system is severely in distress, 
indicated by a high volume of aggregated losses among the banking industry. In contrast to 
CoCo proposals such as Flannery’s (2002) they put a high weight on the disadvantage that 
come with conversion. The bank would be provided with “debt forgiveness if it performs 
poorly enough [and] it could exacerbate problems of governance and moral hazard” (Kashyap 
et al., 2008, p. 35f).  
Sundaresan and Wang (2010) present an in-depth analysis of the most worrying technical 
aspect of a CoCo design: The threat of multiple price equilibria. The reason for an absence of 
an equilibrium lays in the very purpose of CoCos. Additional capital is triggered when 
economic agents “are not allowed to choose a conversion policy in their best interest” (p. 4). 
                                                          
14
 Flannery introduces the term Contingent Capital Certificates (CCCs). For the sake of readability the term 
CoCo is used.  
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One key result is that CoCo bond holders tend to prefer an equilibrium that is near early 
conversion and incumbent shareholders tend to choose an equilibrium that suggests a delay 
conversion or avoid it all together. Markets with multiple or no equilibria increase 
uncertainty. 
Pennacchi et al. (2011) demonstrate the multiple equilibria concern of Sundaresan and Wang 
(2010) of CoCos with a simple numerical example. Suppose the following balance sheet of 
bank A in Table 6.4:  
 
Table 6.4: Numerical example for a bank's balance sheet with CoCos. Source: Pennacchi 
et al. (2011). 
Bank A 
Assets Liabilities 
Assets $1100 
 
Equity $70 
(with N = 7 
outstanding shares) 
 
 
 
CoCos $30 
 
 
 
 
Senior debt $1000 
 
 
 
Assume that the value of assets stays constant. The CoCos have a trigger set at a share price 
of $8. With seven shares in circulation, the current share price is $10. Conversion of all 
CoCos is executed when the stock price is lower than the trigger, since conversion exactly at 
the trigger is unlikely to happen in reality, see McDonald (2011) above. The observable share 
price relevant at the time of conversion is for example $5 well below the trigger. Accordingly, 
markets assume that $30 worth CoCos at this conversion price delivers (
$30
$5
) = 6 new shares 
to CoCo holders. The new equity added to pre-conversion equity is now $100, hence fair 
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value of equity over outstanding shares is (
$100
13
) = $7.69. This represents the new unique 
equilibrium price, which is much lower than the pre-conversion equilibrium of $10. CoCo 
holders have a net wealth increase of $7.69 × 6 − $30 = $16.14. This is a transfer of wealth at 
the expense of previous shareholders since their net wealth decreased by 23.1 per cent per 
share from $10 to $7.69. When share prices and CoCo prices are determined simultaneously, 
so Sundaresan and Wang (2010), incumbent shareholders prefer the first equilibrium and 
CoCo bond holders prefer the second, lower equilibrium price. 
The threat of multiple equilibria is highest when the bank’s value drops to a level close to the 
equity trigger. The possibility for this wealth transfer is the reason for the existence of the two 
possible equilibria prices $10 or $7.69. If investors believe conversion will not happen, equity 
will stay above the trigger. If investors believe that conversion will happen, equity value will 
hit the trigger in a self-fulfilling manner. In the long run, Sundaresan and Wang (2010) 
suggest that there can be a range of different equity values above the trigger.  
There can be a special case of an absence of an equilibrium all together if conversion pushed 
the share price above the trigger. For example, suppose that in the numerical example the 
conversion price is not $5 but approximates the trigger level from below, say $7.50. Four new 
shares (
$30
$7.50
) are issued to compensate CoCo holders. However, if share price recovers to its 
new fair value that with a total outstanding eleven shares now is (
$100
11
) = $9.09, which is 
higher than the trigger of $8. This results in a wealth transfer to shareholders. This leads to a 
paradox situation: If investors believe that conversion will happen, equity must fall below the 
trigger; with the expectation that equity will be worth more after conversion, equity will not 
decline in value in the first place, hence avoiding conversion. If on the other hand conversion 
is assumed not to happen, equity’s expected value is less than after a theoretical conversion. 
Therefore equity is more likely to fall below the trigger, hence causing conversion.  
Sundaresan and Wang (2010) determine that in order to avoid multiple equilibria or absence 
of an equilibrium price a “zero value transfer condition” (p. 7) is essential in any CoCo 
design. This translates into a conversion at par value to CoCo bond holders, so they are 
indifferent between the face value of unconverted CoCos or receiving shares with a market 
value that exactly equals this face value. This key feature is introduced to the CoCo proposal 
in the next chapter. 
The competition between CoCo holders and incumbent shareholders ought to exercise 
discipline on the bank. However, the post-conversion wealth transfers between these groups 
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introduce further problems. In particular, multiple equilibria pricing problems raise doubt 
whether CoCos are an actual improvement. Nevertheless a zero value transfer condition 
abates the problem. Rather than putting various groups into potentially harmful competition, 
designing CoCos so that at least one group is indifferent eliminates the pricing problem. So a 
conversion of CoCos still enhances the equity position of the bank without disruptive side 
effects. More realistically, observable equity prices in the markets will change over time. In 
fact, in the exact moment of conversion, the wealth of a CoCo investor is identical since price 
of the CoCo bond equals shares received at current market price. However, the equity is 
subject to re-evaluations in the financial markets anyways and so the wealth of the former 
CoCo investor is likely to increase or decrease and does not stay constant over time. This is a 
key argument for the CoCo design proposed in the next chapter.  
 
6.3.4 The dual trigger: Determination of conversion subject to micro- and macro-level  
This sub-section identifies the trade-offs between the terms of conversion of CoCos into 
equity and uses numerical examples based on McDonald (2011) in order to show how 
conversion affects investors’ wealth. McDonald (2011) suggests a dual price trigger that 
comprises of a micro-level and macro-level trigger. The conversion of CoCos is triggered 
when both the bank’s stock price and a stock index fall below a certain average value during a 
particular time window. This dual price trigger is the synthesis of the proposal to expose the 
contingent capital conversion to a systemic crisis originally envisioned by the Squam Lake 
Group
15
 and a trigger that is entirely based on microeconomic indicators such as a bank’s 
stock price.  
In a simple numeric example, he compares different design features of a CoCo. Conversion is 
triggered if, and only if, the bank’s share price falls below a set “stock trigger”, say $50, and 
if the “index trigger”, that serves as a benchmark for a system-wide fall in value preceding a 
financial crisis, falls to below $90. Furthermore, CoCo contracts can be written with different 
conversion mechanisms (see, McDonald, 2011) as listed in Table 6.5 below. 
 
                                                          
15 The Squam Lake Group suggests leaving the declaration of a systemic crisis to a regulatory agency based on 
macro-economic indicators. Consequently in regards to the terminology used in this chapter the Group’s 
proposal is a “bail-in” capital proposal.  
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Table 6.5: List of different CoCo terms of conversions. Source: McDonald (2011). 
 Fixed share conversion 
 
CoCo holders receive a certain number of 
shares for every CoCo bond they hold  
 Fixed dollar 
conversion: 
 
CoCo holders receive shares each worth a 
predefined dollar value 
 Par conversion: 
 
The received shares are worth the par 
value of the CoCo bond, $1000 CoCo 
bond converts into $1000 shares 
 Premium conversion:  
(from CoCo holders 
perspective) 
 
The received shares are worth less than 
the par value of the bond, $1000 CoCo 
bond converts into $900 shares 
 Discount conversion:  
(from CoCo holders 
perspective) 
 
The received shares are worth more than 
the par value of the bond, $1000 CoCo 
bond convert into $1100 shares 
 
However, McDonald notes that especially for the stock trigger, it is unlikely that the stock 
price will exactly touch the trigger lever before conversion. If the conversion allows for a 
little delay, perhaps the conversion will be executed at the end of the trading day, the stock 
price can still fall to $48.  
Under a fixed share conversion regime CoCo bond holders would convert their bonds into a 
fixed number of shares valued at the current stock price, which for 20 shares equals a 
conversion into equity worth 20 × $48 = $960. If the CoCo bond’s value was $1000, 
conversion comes with a loss of $40. Anticipating this loss, CoCo bonds would have to pay a 
higher interest rate, i.e. coupon, given that the conversion price is unlikely to exactly equal the 
trigger price. In the example here, conversion at the exact stock trigger of $50 rarely happens. 
In addition, when conversion is executed at a market price below the trigger, CoCo bond 
holders buy the new equity at a premium. If the CoCo bond contract stipulates a conversion 
into less shares, say 18, CoCo bond holders would buy equity with an implicit share price of 
(
$1000
18
) = $55.556, which is higher than the stock price trigger. 
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Under ideal circumstances a fixed dollar conversion at par would not come at a loss for CoCo 
bond holders. Again, the actual stock price is $48 and below the intended trigger of $50. A 
CoCo bond worth $1000 now is divided by the current share price of $48 and compensates 
CoCo bond holders with 20.833 shares to preserve wealth of $1000. Manipulation of the stock 
index pays off more if the bank’s stock price can be decreased from $51 down to well below 
the trigger. If the current price per share is pushed down to $47 every CoCo bond would 
receive (
$1000
$47
) = 21.277 shares. If the bank’s share prices recovers to its initial level this 
strategy pays off 21.277 × $51 = $1085.127. 
Alternatively, if conversion is not at par but is merely on a fixed share basis, manipulation 
becomes a concern. Suppose that the stock trades at $52 just above the stock trigger and the 
index trigger is hit. If a trader owns a $1000 CoCo bond and has the opportunity to short the 
bank’s stock price to $49, she would receive 20 shares at $49 worth $980 in sum. However, 
the short-selling strategy is not finished yet. If the infinitesimal decrease of the stock price just 
under the trigger is not a genuine signal that the bank’s situation according to its fundamentals 
is deteriorating, the trader can anticipate that the stock price will go back to its initial level of 
$51. Now her stocks are worth 20 × $51 = $1020 making a profit of 2 per cent. To counter 
this simple approach to manipulation is the introduction of “a wedge between the par value of 
the bond and the conversion value of the shares” (McDonald, 2011, p. 11). Conversion at par 
value suggests issuing 20 shares. The payoff for manipulation can be drastically decreased if 
the number of shares that can be received is decreased. If only 19 shares are issued but at a 
fixed price of $50, the trader who holds the CoCo bond receives 19 × $50 = $950. This 
translates into a per share loss of (
$50
19
) = $2.63. In order to make manipulation profitable, the 
bank’s stock would have to recover to a value of at least $52.36.  
This leads to the conclusion that paradoxically, the more a conversion occurs at a premium, 
i.e. an immediate loss of wealth of the CoCo bond holder, the more incentive the CoCo bond 
holder would have to drive stock prices up after conversion. Under the proposed dual-trigger 
framework, manipulating a bank’s stock price up when the market environment is already in 
distress – not yet in a crisis – seems unlikely. Manipulation of the market index is not a 
concern if the trigger is object to a 20-day average of the index. Hence, short-selling strategies 
do not pay off and the criticism that CoCos are prone to manipulations is dismissed.  
McDonald’s suggestion carries the advantage that the regulators are not involved in the 
conversion and the resulting credibility of market-based trigger allows an easier pricing of 
CoCos. The second advantage is that in the absence of a systemic crisis, an individual bank is 
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still allowed to fail without having its CoCos triggered and a second chance of avoiding a 
bankruptcy.  
However, he points out that his suggestion bears some contradictions when too-big-to-fail 
banks are involved. In expectation that there is no systemic crisis, the markets expect CoCos 
not to convert and would price them accordingly. Per definition, systemically important 
financial institution are big enough so that a decline in their individual trigger correlates with 
a decline in the relevant market trigger (index trigger), effectively defeating the purpose of a 
dual-trigger mechanism. However, “[i]f the contingent capital were expected to convert and 
prevent failure, the index would never fall below the trigger value and thus the contingent 
capital would not convert. If the contingent capital were expected not to convert, the index 
would fall below the trigger value and the [contingent] capital would convert” (McDonald, 
2011, p. 6, footnote 9), hence another equilibrium price is the correct one. McDonald 
emphasizes that CoCos can serve as a backstop for regulatory failures and does not substitute 
good supervision. 
 
6.4 The alternative to contingent capital: Why not simply higher capital 
requirements? 
Despite the attention contingent capital and debt-to-equity CoCos have received in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, a more basic question has to be answered. Why should 
CoCos be introduced and not just capital minimum for banks increasing in order to make 
banks more stable? A lesson learned from the global financial crisis of 2008 is that time was a 
scarce resource. Decision makers had been compelled to undertake incomprehensive actions 
or in the other extreme, delayed much needed action. For example, requiring banks to increase 
their capital cushion came much too late. It was only after the crisis when the U.S. American 
legislature took the necessary steps to mandate their banks to hold substantially higher capital 
ratios. Their European peers lack behind in implementing equal requirements. Of course, one 
might rightly suspect whether the administrative infrastructure behind deriving concrete 
decisions plays a role. The chain of consultation, discussion, and legal powers are explained 
in chapter 3 and do not need to be repeated here.  
One important result for this chapter on CoCos is that timing is a crucial factor in mitigating a 
systemic crisis. The paradigm shift towards macro-prudential regulation should be 
accompanied with a higher sensitivity for countercyclicality. If all banks would be required by 
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the regulating authorities to increase their capital in times of financial stress across the 
industry, then the single bank would see itself in competition with its peers for capital when 
capital is already expensive to collect because markets price-in the distress.  
 
6.4.1 Optimal capital structure 
This sub-section reviews the differnet theories on the choice of an optimal capital structure of 
a firm in general. The literature on the optimal ratio of equity capital to other liabilities has 
gained interest after the 2008 crisis. The Modigliani-Miller theorem of the irrelevance of a 
firm’s capital structure is the foundation for corporate finance research. Modigliani and Miller 
(1958 and 1963) derive that in the absence of distortions such as different tax treatment of 
debt and equity, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, and imperfect capital markets where 
individuals and firms cannot borrow at the same rate, total financing costs will not change. 
The riskiness of a corporation solely depends on its projected cash flow and not on the 
distribution of the proceeds to shareholders in the form of dividends and other creditors in the 
form of interest payments. Further studies, for example by Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) 
relax these assumptions and examine the impact of taxes on financial structure. They 
conclude a significant incentive to increase a higher debt to asset ratio. As for bankruptcy 
costs, Altman (1984) estimated the costs to investors to about 20 per cent based on evidence 
from 19 industrial firms from 1970 to 1978. More precisely, this cost split up into a pecuniary 
loss of asset value, costs for the liquidation of the firm, and legal expenses. 
Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) offer three additional theories about an optimal capital 
structure decision of a firm. The trade-off theory assumes a deviation from Modigliani and 
Miller’s zero bankruptcy costs. A high leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy since 
less equity is available to be written down if assets lose value. The firm can internalize some 
of the bankruptcy costs – decreasing the probability of bankruptcy – by trading off loss-
absorbing equity at a loss of tax deductibility of debt, a loss of the so called “tax shield”. 
Jensen (1986) derives the advantage of debt to decrease agency costs in general terms; an 
application for banking can be found in Kashyap et al. (2008). 
Second, the free-cash-flow hypothesis suggests that a high debt-to-equity ratio, i.e. leverage, 
disciplines a firm’s management. If relatively more debt has to be paid in the form of interest, 
then the management has fewer opportunities to pursue their own interest if it is not in the 
interest of the firm’s owners. For example, in the absence of sufficient monitoring by the 
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firm’s shareholders, the management can extract cash or invest it according to their personal 
interest.  
The third theory is the pecking-order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984). A firm is assumed 
to act in the interest of its shareholders despite information asymmetries to the advantage of 
the management. If the market valuation of the firm is higher than the private information of 
the management suggests, issuing new equity increases shareholder value. However, markets 
are aware of the information asymmetry and interpret the issuance of new shares as a negative 
signal; the firm is deemed overvalued. As a result, share prices decrease and shareholder 
value, too. Therefore, the management is reluctant to expose shareholders to the severe 
valuation problem of equity under asymmetric information. Equity is the lowest in the 
pecking order of financing the firm. Internal financing opportunities, such as retaining 
earnings, are the first choice. Only if external debt-financing is exhausted, raising equity 
would be considered. Dierkens (1991), D’Mello and Ferris (2000), Eckbo (1996), and Shyam-
Sunder (1991) find empirical evidence in support of this theory. 
 
6.4.2 The costs of equity in banking 
In preparation for the specific CoCo proposal in the next chapter, this sub-section analyses a 
bank’s stakeholders’ incentives. These incentives are reflected in the costs of the choice of an 
equity level. Bank managers, shareholders, CoCo investors, and regulators pursue different 
goals. The latter are concerned with the financial stability of the system that may be 
threatened by an individual bank, the bank management is not directly concerned with this. 
However, it is also the aim of this and the following section to demonstrate how setting 
incentives can be imbedded into the new approach to macro-prudential regulation. A frequent 
comment in banking is that equity is costlier than debt finance. Also, banks provide a public 
good by taking in deposits and therefore must be recognized differently in comparison to 
other industries. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) developed a basic model for deposit-taking 
banks (see also Diamond and Rajan, 1999). Banks function as financial intermediaries with 
special endowments. They are better skilled than other economic agents to collect interest 
payments from their borrowers. A bank can give a long-term maturity credit to an 
entrepreneur by financing it with a flow of deposits of shorter maturities. It is not necessary 
that one or several particular depositors lend against the particular credit to the entrepreneur to 
make the loan liquid. Instead the only important requirement to make and keep the credit 
liquid is that at all times enough deposits are placed with the bank.   
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If a bank has a high level of equity, meaning fewer deposits relative to equity, the bank could 
survive longer if a run on uninsured deposits occurs. Hence, the bank could negotiate down 
the payments of interests on deposits and retain more revenues to their own interest. With 
more deposits on the balance sheet, i.e. lower capital ratio, this incentive to threaten 
depositors is lowered. One of the key conclusions is that banks are exposed to a collective 
action problem among depositors. Because there is a latent threat of depositors starting a run 
on the bank whenever they think their deposits are in danger, bankers would commit to make 
decisions towards the survival of the bank.  Thus, importantly, Diamond and Rajan (1999) 
stress that a degree of “financial fragility is essential for banks to create liquidity” (p. 7).  
The creation of liquidity refers to the flow of credit in the economy. In contrast to the 
pecking-order hypothesis according to Myers and Majluf (1984) because of asymmetric 
information, Diamond and Rajan (1999) see the costs of high equity in a social loss of 
liquidity creation.  
However, Admati et al. (2013) challenge the dogmatic view on the high costs of equity to 
banks. According to critics of higher capital minima, too high an equity capital ratio could in 
fact harm the efficiency of the banking industry as presented in Diamond and Rajan (1999), 
and would decrease lending to the real economy, thus stripping economic growth. Admati et 
al. (2013) argue that answering the question whether equity is costly for banks falls short of 
considering different costs and benefits that have to be traded off. This argument finds favour 
with regulatory authorities like the ECB (Nouy, 2015). In more detail, the discussion has to 
differentiate between social benefits, social costs, private benefits, and private costs of higher 
equity ratios. The opacity of certain assets like loan portfolios gives reason to doubt this 
argument. Managers can exploit their information advantage together with the high liquidity 
to reshuffle their asset positions quickly without notice of the creditors. This information 
asymmetry and agency problem is a further distortion excluded in the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem, but is nevertheless highly relevant in reality. 
Miles et al. (2011) calculate the social optimal level of capital. UK banks should hold capital 
of 16 per cent to 20 per cent. This significantly exceeds current demands by the regulators. 
The intended result is to offset the additional private costs of banks that come with holding 
more equity with the social benefit of having a banking sector that is better prepared for 
extreme shocks. Kashyap et al. (2010) come to a similar result for U.S. banks but warn that 
changing regulations just towards increasing the minimum capital ratios would lead to 
regulatory arbitrage. More specifically, they are concerned that a new “capital regime, even if 
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it does not materially impact the cost of credit, raises very significant concerns relating to the 
reshaping how credit will be provided, and the associated implications for financial stability” 
(p. 32). 
From the policy makers’ side, the UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
issued the “Changing banking for good” report and conclude that: 
“If higher capital requirements make banks less vulnerable to disasters in the future, 
those banks are a more attractive investment. Further reforms will carry a cost in the 
short term, but an effectively-reformed banking sector subject to less uncertainty will 
be a better long-term recipient of investment” (Commission on Banking Standards, 
2013, para. 39, p. 21).  
By the same token, the Commission on Banking Standards acknowledge that the initial 
position in respect to tax law for banks’ choice of financing was tilted towards (over-) 
leverage. The following is an extract from written and oral evidence to Parliamentary hearing, 
summarized in the annex to the Commission on Banking Standards report: 
“Ernst and Young highlighted [in written evidence] that the tax system was not 
‘aligned to incentivise similar behaviour to regulation’, meaning that complying with 
regulations could ‘penalise banks from a tax perspective’. Andy Haldane argued [in 
oral evidence] that the tax system was pulling in the opposite direction to regulatory 
capital requirements, meaning that regulators were ‘trying to induce banks to do 
something that the tax system at present provides a disincentive to do, which is to raise 
extra equity’” (Commission on Banking Standards, 2013b, para. 187, p. 159). 
Admati et al. (2013) doubt the benefits of CoCos. Despite the possible advantages of having 
an automatic conversion mechanism in place, contingent capital holders might want to sell 
their securities well before conversion conditions are reached. The intended smoothing of 
distress would just be moved forward in time. However, this chapter argues that moving the 
frictions stemming from asymmetric information to an earlier stage well before systemic risk 
concerns arise should be the purpose of CoCos.  
 
6.4.3 Equity ratios vs. CoCos: Different incentives for banks 
This sub-section demonstrates that CoCos can manipulate bank managers’ incentive towards 
prudence in a way that equity alone cannot. In their criticism of CoCos Admati et al. (2013) 
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focus exclusively on the loss absorbing properties of equity and CoCos illustrated in the 
following table.  
 
Table 6.6: Bank equity cushion before and after CoCo conversion. Source: Admati et al. 
(2013). 
  Bank A      
  Assets Liabilities   Bank A  
   
Equity 
  Assets Liabilities  
CoCo-financed 
bank 
  
CoCos 
   
Equity 
 
 Assets       
   Straight 
debt 
  Assets Straight 
debt 
 
         
         
         
         
  Bank A      
  Assets Liabilities   Bank A  
      Assets Liabilities  
Equity-financed 
bank 
  Equity    
Equity 
 
 Assets       
   Straight 
debt 
  Assets Straight 
debt 
 
         
         
         
         
 
The starting situation for a bank, according to Admati et al. (2013), with CoCos along equity 
and debt finance and a bank that is financed with equity and debt is pictured on the left-hand 
side of the above Table 6.6. Deposits fall into the category of “straight debt”. Before the 
shock on the bank’s balance sheet has to be written down, i.e. a loss in the value of assets like 
defaulting mortgages, the assets are assumed to be identical regardless of the bank’s financing 
on the liabilities side.  
The shock is reflected in the decline of asset value translates into a decline in equity to absorb 
the loss. In the upper left balance sheet the initial write down on equity is sufficiently large to 
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fall below the contractual trigger of outstanding CoCos, the balance sheet results to a form 
pictured in the upper right-hand side. In a simple case, upon the trigger event all CoCos 
convert into a new equity issuance with the same face value. For example, if the CoCos have 
a value of $100 they will be replaced with new equity worth $100. Now the equity cushion is 
increased and available for absorbing further losses. The balance sheet on the upper right-
hand side shows the financial situation of the bank after the asset price correction has been 
matched with writing down equity, both from existing equity and newly issued equity after 
CoCo conversion. Note that the surviving equity is not exclusively composed of former CoCo 
investors. It is a mix of incumbent, pre-conversion shareholders’ investment and CoCo 
investors who just saw their CoCos transformed into a shareholding. However, theoretically, 
the surviving equity cushion can be composed of former CoCo investors entirely only if the 
trigger for conversion is a zero per cent equity cushion. In this extreme case the equity 
cushion would be entirely wiped out and the bank would be bankrupt. Nonetheless, this case 
renders CoCos obsolete since their intended purpose is to avoid an abrupt default of a bank. 
The lower-left hand balance sheet shows the alternative to a CoCo-financed bank. In contrast 
to the previous case, the equity requirements are drastically increased. For example, during 
the 2008 crisis the ratio of “hard” equity ready to absorb losses was just 3 per cent for 
Lehman Brothers, despite the fact that they had fulfilled regulatory capital requirements end 
even exceeded them with a ratio of 11.6 per cent (Johnson and Kwak, 2010). If now this 
equity ratio amounts to 15 per cent – see suggestions by Miles et al. (2011) and Kashyap et al. 
(2010) above – immediate loss-absorbency would be available. The same shock demands for 
writing down asset valuation and therefore writing down the value of equity. The balance 
sheets of a bank ex post conversion of CoCos and a bank with substantial equity in the first 
place are identical after financial losses. Therefore, so the argument, CoCos would not deliver 
any advantages over straight equity capital. However, Admati et al.’s analysis of CoCos is 
only driven by the following question: “If we want to enhance the bank’s capital cushion, why 
not just require the cushion to come in the form of simple equity?” (Admati et al., 2013, 
p.53). This is a purely technical approach that focuses on the balance sheet structure and its 
mechanisms and does not aim at designing an incentive structure for banks and their 
investors. This should be the approach in order to make CoCos a macro-prudential tool that is 
not limited to absorb losses as they occur, but more importantly counter unsustainable risk 
taking in the first place. 
Higher equity ratios are certainly important to increase the loss-absorbency of banks. 
Paradoxically, the opportunity costs of such a higher buffer may encourage more risk-taking 
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(see Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011). Persaud (2009) expressed a similar point of view: The 
resilience of the whole financial system cannot be increased by just raising capital ratios 
unless it is completed by a “better match [of] risk-taking to risk-capacity” (Persaud, 2009) of 
banks. In terms of incentives to banks to take risks, Date (2010) argues that higher returns 
must be created in order to satisfy the increased number of shareholders asking for a 
minimum return of their investment. This could push the bank’s management to engage in 
high-risk investments not in disregard of higher capital requirement but because of them. 
Admati et al. (2013) argue from another point of view. Increasing the equity ratio decreases 
the bank’s bankruptcy risk. Consequently, the shareholders’ exposure to risk would be 
reduced and so would the demanded return on equity. For the same reason the interest rates on 
debt would decline, too. The bank would consequently be less tempted to invest in high-risk 
positions in order to satisfy investors’ demands.  
The question why there should be a reason for contingent capital
16
 instead of just increasing 
equity capital raised by Admati et al. is certainly an important question any contingent capital 
proposal has to defend itself against. However, reducing the analytical framework to the 
observable capital cushion on the balance sheet is not sufficient. The research question has to 
be amended by an analysis of how the incentive structure of bank managers, shareholders, and 
contingent capital investors can be improved. The question how unsustainable risk-taking can 
be avoided is equally important. 
Unlike raising fresh equity exactly when it is needed, CoCos are not exposed to the problem 
of procyclicality. CoCo contracts “will be set up in good times, they will be cheap (compared 
with raising capital in a recession) and easier to enforce” (Rajan, 2009). In the case of 
systemic distress upon the contingency event, the bank would not have to collect additional 
loss-absorbing capital at unfavourable conditions because for reasons of adverse selection 
(Herring, 2011; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Also, Kashyap et al. (2008) stress that additional to 
a higher ex ante equity cushion, recapitalisation must always be an option to mitigate a 
financial distress. New capital regulations must “pre-wire” (Kashyap et al., 2008, p. 26) the 
private sector towards providing more equity instead of relying on government aids. 
The post-conversion ownership of the bank encourages a more prudent risk strategy of the 
bank that simple higher capital requirements cannot. Coffee (2010) represents the legal body 
of literature with a different approach to exploring the potential of CoCos. In this proposal he 
                                                          
16
 Recall that contingent capital is further divided into CoCos and bail-in capital that are private financial 
contracts (Zhou et al. 2012) and subject to regulatory agency’s discretion, respectively.  
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draws the attention to the post-conversion composition of a bank’s shareholders. He pays 
particular attention to the agency relationship between bank managers and shareholders. 
Shareholder pressure is the main driver for banks to take excessive risks and leverage their 
capital ratio beyond sustainable levels. Debt holders are protected by a dilution of incumbent 
equity holders at a high conversion ratio of CoCos. This is a conversion at a discount when 
the shares after conversion are worth more than the face value of CoCos described by 
McDonald (2011) in section 6.3.4. After conversion, former CoCo investors are given 
preferred stock with significant voting rights. It is further assumed that shareholders are prone 
to risk and CoCo investors are naturally risk-averse. Now, after conversion, the latter are part 
of the shareholder group. The resulting “countervailing voting constituency” (Coffee, 2010, p. 
10) would take off pressure from bank managers to accommodate the risk-tolerant 
shareholders’ demand for a high return on investment (similarly Rajan, 2009). This idea of 
interfering in the ownership structure of a bank motivates the proposal for CoCos that follows 
in the next chapter. However, that proposal differs. It is designed to be a tool for the recovery 
or resolution – i.e. going concern basis and gone concern basis – of a bank and concentrates 
ownership to a few shareholders that are willing and able to reform the bank instead of 
making the shareholder group larger, like Coffee suggests. 
An important preliminary result so far is that the different suggestions of the equity and 
incentive-related literature are not opposing each other. Higher capital ratios make banks 
more loss-absorbent indeed, therefore decreasing the probability of a bail-out with taxpayers’ 
money. With the introduction of CoCos a further line of loss-absorbency can be imbedded 
into a bank for times of distress. Consequently CoCos are not a substitute for good 
supervision by authorities and not a substitute for higher equity; it is a complementary tool 
(McDonald, 2011; Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011).  
CoCos can decrease the costs on a bank’s creditors in a way that capital alone cannot 
Flannery (2009). If creditors are concerned about the bankruptcy process in which they could 
face severe losses, they would “curtail their involvement with troubled financial firms even 
before bankruptcy has become probable” (Flannery, 2009, p. 21). The bank’s value is 
negatively affected by the uncertainty of possible bankruptcy proceedings, i.e. there is 
pessimism about whether the bank remains a going-concern surviving the distress or becomes 
a gone-concern facing bankruptcy. If an international bank has to be wound down across 
multiple national jurisdictions, creditors’ concerns weight even higher and so do their 
incentives to curtail their financial exposure to the bank. For non-bank firms in the United 
States bankruptcy proceedings take an average of over 17 months for reorganising the 
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struggling firm and almost four years if the aim is to liquidate the firm (Group of Thirty, 
1998). Administrators that dealt with the Lehman bankruptcy estimated that US$ 75 billion 
were wasted due to a lack of preparation for a case of bankruptcy (Cairns, 2009).  
Also, recall from chapter 2 that financial institutions are interconnected through short-term 
contracts such as overnight lending facilities. So in addition to the private costs to the bank’s 
investors comes a systemic risk component due to the disruption of daily business (Herring, 
2010). A sufficiently big bank that undergoes bankruptcy proceedings causes knock-on 
effects in these parts of the financial system and cause further social costs. The potential to 
save time and costs is the motivation for the next chapter to desing a CoCo bond that can 
recover or resolve a bank quickly and with moderate costs. 
To draw a preliminary conclusion, because of their role of financial intermediaries, deposit-
taking banks are naturally highly leveraged and according to the financial theory this leverage 
would exercise the best discipline on banks (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). McDonald (2011) 
finds a convincing end to this debate by saying that even if there are good reasons for a high 
leverage, CoCos as part of debt “permits banks to be highly levered while contributing less to 
systemic risk” (McDonald, 2011, p. 28). This view on CoCos, in general, would not interfere 
in discovering the banks’ optimal leverage ratio and would not impose excessive burdens of 
indiscriminate capital requirements by the regulators. Calomiris and Herring (2011) go a step 
further and argue that CoCos have an advantage over regulatory minimum capital 
requirement. They enable and encourage a bank’s management to quickly respond to changes 
in their exposure to risk with a pre-emptive equity issuance well before financial distress 
materialises. So, CoCos can make prudence an objective of banks’ risk management. 
 
6.5 Conclusion and implications for promoting financial stability 
CoCos can play an important role in financial regulation alongside increased minimum capital 
requirements. The choices of the trigger event and conversion ratio of CoCos into new equity 
are crucial to the success of CoCos. A few authors suggest leaving the decision to convert 
CoCos to the regulatory agencies. In this case CoCos would be a bail-in tool. Yet there are 
concerns about biased regulatory agencies that could intervene too late. The majority of 
authors are in favour of introducing automated, market-based mechanisms for conversion. 
If CoCos are converted at a premium to the CoCo investors, i.e. the value of the new equity is 
bigger than the nominal value of the CoCo bond, CoCo investors seek the trigger event. If it is 
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possible to manipulate the trigger event, CoCos can destabilise the bank. If conversion is at a 
discount to the CoCo investors, i.e. the value of the new equity is smaller than the nominal 
value of the CoCo, CoCo investors would take a loss of wealth upon the trigger event. But 
this can exacerbate the debt overhang problem, which is explained in more detail in section 
7.3.4. Incumbent shareholders might seek conversion to increase the relative value of their 
share in the bank. This concern abates the higher, i.e. the more prudent, the trigger level is set.  
However serious problems with CoCos remain. CoCos should qualify for regulatory capital 
on a going-concern basis. This consequently and intuitively suggests that CoCos are not 
subordinated to equity at all times since CoCo investors – who have a debt claim – experience 
a loss of wealth before equity investors are completely wiped out. So, the current CoCo 
proposals defeat the intention of policy makers to make shareholders the first line of defense 
against losses. 
In regards to a gone-concern basis, i.e. when a bank’s capital cushion is depleted or it is 
reasonably assumed to be in due course, CoCo investors are not offered a good investment. 
On a gone-concern basis new equity is issued when the bank is already bankrupt and CoCo 
investors would receive equity with uncertain value. This is likely to come with a complete 
loss of wealth. Hence, CoCos would not have any purpose. 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction each chapter is set to address the two research 
questions identified in chapter 2. Therefore, the following dissucion aims to anser: 
- Do the existing CoCo proposals encourage sustainable risk-taking? 
- Do the existing CoCo proposals curb systemic risk when it materialises? 
As for the first question, the majority of the related literature addresses practical issues such 
as finding an appropriate pricing model for CoCos. However, there is a lack of analysis of the 
bank’s incentives to change their business model as a direct consequence of the disciplining 
power stemming from CoCos. If it was clear beforehand that in case a bank falls short of 
capital to a level below the regulatory minimum and CoCos would dilute shareholders, they 
would monitor the bank’s management and their investment decisions more closely. 
However, this resembles the argument that because of the high liquidity of deposits banks are 
under constant threat of insolvency and therefore it would be in their interest to remain safe 
and sound. Considering the 2008 crisis the reality lacked behind the theory. The presence of 
the moral hazard because of government guarantees abated the disciplining power of deposits 
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and this can also apply to CoCos. The bank’s management could stoically wait for the crisis 
to be over and despite some damage to the bank continue their business. 
Fortunately, in anticipation of the next chapter, CoCos can be re-designed to discipline the 
individual manager. Rather than looking at the bank as a whole where individual managers 
are somewhat protected from repercussions, new regulations should allow for direct 
consequences for bank managers’ failures.  
As for the second question, the aim of CoCos is to bolster a bank’s capital to avoid a 
bankruptcy that could cause contagion to other banks and the financial system. CoCos that are 
triggered on a going-concern basis reinforce a bank’s capital cushion well before bankruptcy. 
This, in principle, helps curb systemic risk since leverage is decreased. Yet, the actual event 
of a bankruptcy does not occur. In the absence of proof of failure this demonstrates the 
precautionary nature of the “contingency” in CoCos. Because of the public service banks 
exercise, i.e. credit intermediation through deposit-taking and providing a payment system, a 
pre-emptive conversion is justified. 
However, there is a contradiction between preserving banks and introducing discipline. On 
the one hand, the services necessary to the wider economy that are exercised by banks, are 
ensured to continue. On the other hand a conversion of CoCos provides the bank with a 
rescue and it can continue its business despite its lack to manage its loss-absorbing capital. If 
banks are required to issue a further tranche of CoCos after conversion it is not difficult to tell 
which banks are poorly managed either. It is those banks whose CoCo base is frequently 
renewed and converted. The paradox is that there are indications for a poorly run bank, yet the 
ultimate penalty in the form of bankruptcy is missing.  
It is true though, that with CoCos the taxpayers’ money does not stand ready to solve 
financial disruptions of banks. Instead, CoCos shift the burden to private investors. So, this is 
an important step towards making bank failures a private cost. However, this is not 
completely achieved by the existing CoCo proposals in the literature. The remaining issues, 
for example the pricing paradox, actually introduce systemic risk concerns on their own. So 
far, in times of systemic distress banks and their investors were exposed to the moral hazard 
due to implicit government guarantees to protect the functioning of the payment system and 
hence maintain financial stability. Therefore, a wait and see strategy was not uncommon until 
bankruptcy occurred eventually. If it is clearly communicated that CoCos will impose a loss 
of wealth on CoCo investors and incumbent shareholders alike, both groups will liquidate 
their investments prematurely. This can introduce further tension in the financial sector and 
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destabilise banks. This is certainly not in the interest of regulatory agencies, banks, their 
investors, and the rest of the financial system.  
The next chapter takes up this criticism and the gaps in the literature and proposes a different 
CoCo design. First, this proposal incentivises a bank’s management towards moderation. 
Second, it curbs systemic risk not exclusively by making capital available upon a 
contingency, but paving the way for altering the ownership structure of the bank. Ideally this 
has a positive effect on the first research question. The bank managers have an incentive 
towards moderation since a significant change in the group of shareholders can come with a 
replacement in the hierarchy of the management. At the same time CoCos are made a “good 
deal” to increase marketability to investors. 
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7 Contingent capital part II: Empirical analysis and CoCo proposal 
This chapter makes two contributions: First, in section 7.2 an empirical analysis investigates 
what drives the Coco spreads of a sample of five of the biggest CoCo-issuing banks in 
Europe. The previous chapter identified that there could be the threat that debt-to-equity or 
write-down CoCos introduce instabilities to banks. In order to clarify this, a linear regression 
model is used to determine whether the CoCo spread is explained by the individual bank’s 
stock returns volatility or vice versa. In addition to the own stock returns volatility, the 
explanatory power of the following state variables on the CoCo spread change is investigated: 
the change in the equity market volatility, (the market being the Stoxx Europe 600), the 
change in the spread of long-term (the 10 year German government bond) against short-term 
(Euribor) risk-free refinancing conditions, and the change in the value of the Euribor, 
respectively. The empirical analysis finds that there is no causality between CoCos and stock 
returns. This suggests that the theoretical concerns identified in the previous chapter are not 
supported. This would also suggest that CoCos should be considered for the macro-prudential 
toolkit (chapter 4) available to support the regulatory agencies in maintaining financial 
stability (chapter 3). However, the results of the empirical analysis might be limited due to the 
relative small sample size.  
Second, section 7.3 proposes a design for CoCos to make them a macro-prudential tool that 
reconciles the task of incentivising banks to be more prudent and the need for a tool for the 
recovery and/or resolution of a distressed bank. The CoCo proposals in the current form do 
not offer a good deal to investors. Furthermore the lack of guidance for the time after 
conversion exacerbates this problem. This chapter proposes how to make CoCos a good deal 
to investors and, from a macro-prudential perspective, gives guidance on how to deal with a 
bank after CoCo conversion. The proposal thus is directly linked to the recovery and 
resolution authority of regulatory agencies like in the UK, USA, and EU in chapter 3. The 
crucial difference is that the regulatory agencies are not directly involved in the co-ordination 
of a recovery or resolution. This is because first, the proposed CoCos would automatically 
boost the capital cushion of a bank and, second, transfer ownership of a bank through a 
market mechanism instead of a costly, time consuming intervention by a public authority. 
This chapter finds that CoCos, if designed properly, can abate some of the issues identified in 
the existing body of literature. This chapter proposes a CoCo design that helps overcome the 
debt overhang problem identified in the established banking theory. This is a persistent 
problem when a bank is close to bankruptcy but its shareholders are reluctant to inject further 
equity that can rescue the bank. At the same time this proposal allows CoCos to play a role as 
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a private sector solution to orderly restructure or wind down a bank that fails. In this case the 
ownership of a bank can be quickly altered and therefore benefits a private sector solution. 
 
7.1 Overview of existing contingent capital bonds and market potential  
Banks around the world already issued contingent capital bonds
17
 with various terms for 
conversion and different triggers. Policy makers did not yet draft standards for CoCos for 
regulatory purposes, except the notion that CoCos a worth further research. However, the 
currently issued CoCos do not reflect any of the regulatory aims a macro-prudential policy 
maker would want to see put into action. Approximately US$ 70 billion worth CoCos are 
issued by banks since 2009. The UK and Switzerland are momentarily the main issuers of 
CoCos and contribute about half of the outstanding CoCos. In the same period banks have 
issued US$ 550 billion of other subordinated debt and US$ 4.1 billion senior unsecured debt, 
see Figure 7.1 according to Avdjiev et al. (2013). 
 
 
 
The issued CoCos are heterogeneous in their contractual terms. For example the Dutch 
Rabobank issued US$ 2 billion (Financial Times online, 2011) in 2011 with a trigger of 8 per 
                                                          
17
 Note that throughout this thesis the term CoCo is used for those contingent capital bonds that convert debt into 
equity. The already issued bonds discussed in this section and in the empirical work are write-down contingent 
capital bonds. For the sake of readability this empirical section uses the term “CoCo” to describe the bonds of 
the banks in the data sample. In section 7.3, where an alternative CoCo proposal is offered, the use of the term 
switches back and means a “debt-to-equity” convertible bond again. 
Rest of the world, 
US$ 17.1bn 
United Kindom, 
US$ 20.7bn 
Switzerland, 
US$ 15.2bn 
Australia, 
US$ 7.1bn 
Netherlands,  
US$ 5.7bn 
Ireland, US$ 4.1bn 
Figure 7.1: Contingent capital issuance by nationality of issuing banks. Source: 
Avdjiev et al. (2013) 
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cent consolidated equity capital ratio and the coupon is 8.375 per cent. If the trigger is 
breached, investors would not receive equity but write their claim down by an amount that 
would push the equity ratio just above 8 per cent again. However, orders were about US$ 6.5 
billion, indicating a high demand.  
In the USA in 2012 UBS AG has raised US$ 9 billion for its US$ 2 billion write-down 
convertible bond offer (Reuters, 2012). The coupon for this CoCo that triggers at 5 per cent 
Tier 1 common equity and writes down to zero is 7.625 per cent. 
In 2013 the Credit Suisse placement of EUR 1.25 billion worth of CoCos with a maturity of 
12 years attracted a demand in the financial markets worth EUR 3.15 billion (Reuters, 2013). 
Similar to the Rabobank issuance, this first Euro-denominated contract does not stipulate a 
conversion into equity. Notwithstanding the terms that upon conversion at 5 per cent of Tier 1 
equity ratio all claims would be written down immediately, 85 per cent of CoCos have been 
purchased by institutional investors. 
CoCos in the form of the above examples underscore that the unsecured investors are fully 
aware and agree on a write-down of their claim. However, this stays in stark contrast to the 
CoCo proposals in the literature. A struggling bank’s management has the incentive to 
actively seek the trigger event to release CoCo investors. From a regulatory agency’s point of 
view, this is a dangerous tightrope walk of the bank for it has every incentive to eliminate 
CoCo but are not disciplined enough to avoid the trigger event in the first place. The opposite 
is true because the “contingency” can be largely controlled by and therefore favours the bank. 
The regulatory objective of maintaining financial stability is not fulfilled by CoCos in the 
current forms. 
 
7.2 Empirical analysis of a selection of contingent convertibles 
This section contains an empirical analysis of a selection of already issued CoCos of 
European banks. The analysis investigates which factors affect the change in the spread of the 
CoCos. The various currently available CoCos can introduce imbalances a macro-prudential 
policy maker should be concerned of. Originally the “contingency” of CoCos should stabilise 
a bank when it is in distress. However, this can have the opposite effect, as analysed in the 
previous chapter. The possible destabilising effects of CoCos in their current form find 
anecdotal evidence in the case of Deutsche Bank (Steltzner, 2016). In the course of re-shaping 
its business model the bank is under constant scrutiny of the markets. Deutsche bank was one 
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of the first European banks in 2014 to issue CoCos worth EUR 5 billion and pay a coupon of 
7 per cent. The trigger is set to a capital ratio of 5.125 per cent and upon this contingency a 
temporary write down is imposed on the CoCos. The outspoken aim of CoCos is to boost the 
financial situation of a bank to mitigate distress that could lead to systemic risk concerns. 
However, because of its restructuring efforts Deutsche Bank announced a cut on dividend 
payments – which a regulatory agency welcomes for this should take some financial burden 
off a bank – and furthermore felt the need to repeatedly reasuure to meet its obligations on 
CoCos. In early February 2016 this resulted in a drop of the stock price due to markets’ 
concerns. 
The existing CoCos do not follow a standardised “terms and conditions” contract that 
specifically sets out the kind of the trigger, the trigger level, and what happens at the trigger 
event, i.e. a partially or full write down, conversion into new equity, and if so at what 
conversion rate. The financial markets are still making experiences in designing and trading 
CoCos. So, the CoCo market is heterogeneous. In order to make the CoCos comparable it is 
not the purpose of this section to empirically trace what determines the price of CoCos; 
instead, this section analyses how the CoCos yield spreads over a risk-free government yield 
change to common factors. 
For example, if the whole banking sector is under distress one would intuitively expect CoCo 
spreads to increase. The threat of touching the trigger moves closer so that a loss of wealth 
becomes a realistic prospect for the CoCo investors. Besides, not only does the volatility of a 
macro-level indicator could have an effect on CoCo spreads, but also the micro-level, like in 
above example of Deutsche Bank. Hence a bank’s equity volatility should have an effect on 
its CoCo spread. 
This chapter is one of the first empirical studies about CoCos. De Spiegeleer et al. (2015) find 
a moderately negative impact on prices of outstanding CoCos when a bank issues new CoCo, 
investors tend to prefer investing in new CoCos. De Spiegeleer et al. (2015a) empirically 
investigate how CoCos affect the core equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio. CET1 is the regulatory 
capital requirement banks have to produce, but banks regularly exceed the minimum threshold 
to make sure not to fall under the minimum. The authors find that CoCos issued by the same 
bank with similar, but not identical, terms of conversion have an identical impact on the 
volatility of the bank’s CET1 level. So, while on the one hand banks have more equity to 
absorb losses, its ratio above the regulatory minimum is exposed to volatility because of 
CoCos. This chapter takes a different angle and further investigates the relationship between 
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the observed returns on a bank’s stocks and its CoCo returns. Furthermore, this chapter is the 
first to investigate which market factors – e.g. a bank’s stock returns, market equity returns, 
short-term liquidity, and government benchmark spread – drive the change in the spread of 
CoCos.       
 
7.2.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
This sub-section discusses the observed time series of the CoCos. The CoCo bonds subject to 
this analysis are from Barclays, Lloyds, Credit Suisse, UBS, and Unicredit. Table 7.1 
provides the terms of these CoCos and their ISINs. 
 
Table 7.1: Overview of bank's CoCo terms 
Issuing bank Coupon Perpetual Callable Capital Trigger ISIN 
Barclays 7.63% No No Tier 2 7% US06740L8C27 
Lloyds  15% No No Tier 2 5% XS0459089685 
Credit Suisse 7.88% No Yes Tier 2 7% XS0595225318 
UBS 7.25% No Yes Tier 2 7% XS0747231362 
Unicredit 9.38% Yes Yes Tier 1 6% XS0527624059 
 
The CoCo issued by Unicredit is the only perpetual bond in the list. A perpetual bond has no 
maturity date at which the principal is paid back in full and any coupon payment comes to a 
halt. Once issued – in theory – a perpetual pays its coupon indefinitely. The other bonds have 
a given maturity. For example the Barclays CoCo issued in November 2012 matures in 
November 2022. The CoCos can either mature on the given date or the bank can call them 
back.  
Because it is perpetual, the CoCo of Unicredit qualifies to be treated as Tier 1 core capital. 
Because of the lack of a definite, contractually agreed maturity date, it can be treated similar 
to equity. For the other banks, their CoCos contribute to Tier 2 capital. So, a bank’s decision 
whether to call back the outstanding CoCos carefully depends on a trade-off: If the CoCo 
bonds are traded below their face value, for example 85 per cent, the bank can buy back its 
own outstanding debt cheaply. On the other side, by doing so the loss-absorbing regulatory 
capital cushion is diminished which is possibly punished by the markets in the form of 
decreasing stock value. 
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The trigger levels are set to below Basel III minimum capital requirements. Yet, the coupons 
on the CoCos differ considerably. With 15 per cent Lloyds pays almost twice as much as 
Barclays and the two Swiss banks. Unicredit pays over 9 per cent and is the only bank that 
pays annually, the others pay the coupon bi-annually.  
The explanatory variables used to analyse what explains the changes in the CoCo spread are: 
(i) The market volatility is estimated using data from the Stoxx Europe 600 index that 
covers approximately 90 per cent of European equity returns.  
 
(ii) The government spread is the difference between the 10 year German government 
bond, which is a benchmark for riskless investment, and the short-term refinancing 
conditions Euribor.  
 
(iii) The Euribor itself also serves as the short term yield.  
The banks’ stock returns volatility is expressed with the log returns in the form of 
 
𝜎𝑡 = |𝑟𝑡|        (7.1) 
where 
𝑟𝑡 = ln(𝑃𝑡) − ln (𝑃𝑡−1)      (7.2) 
with 𝑃𝑡 denoting the stock price for the bank in period t and 𝑃𝑡−1 denoting the stock price in 
the previous period. Using the log returns rather than simple returns find an argument in 
Hudson and Gregoriou (2010). The authors compare the two approaches and apply the two 
alternative ways of calculating returns on different numerical examples. They find that the 
mean returns are lower for the log return approach than for the simple returns method. As a 
consequence, the statistical significance of the results of any empirical study could be 
reported differently. So the results could be rejected under the one approach but not under the 
other approach. The relevance of this argument gains importance with the frequency of the 
collected observations. The higher the frequency, i.e. collecting intraday data versus weekly 
data, the more suitable is the log return approach. The empirical study at hand uses daily stock 
prices that are converted into daily returns. Hence the log return approach is used. 
Also the results for every CoCo are compared to the yield of different benchmarks. The 
spread of all banks are represented by the IBOXX Euro Corp bank index, the private sector 
229 
 
benchmark of prime credit rating is the IBOXX Euro AAA index, and the IBOXX Euro BBB 
index represents the lower medium grade ratings. 
Table 7.2 below reports the summary statistics of the volatility of stock returns of the CoCo 
issuing banks. These statistics are discussed when the respective CoCo bond spreads are 
presented. The same applies to the summary statistics of the change of the CoCo spreads, 
reported in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.2: Summary statistics for the volatility of bank stock returns. 
Bank Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
Barclays -0.343 0.508 0.000506 0.000525 0.0370 1.3131 30.7121 
Lloyds -0.415 0.408 -7.00E-05 5.08E-05 0.0365 -1.1843 38.0387 
Credit Suisse -0.152 0.15 6.34E-05 0 0.0236 -0.3354 5.860962 
UBS -0.116 0.13 -0.00015 0 0.0227 0.1391 3.8622 
Unicredit -0.19 0.19 -0.00042 0 0.0316 -0.1260 4.1108 
 
Table 7.3: Summary statistics for the change of bank CoCo spread. 
Bank Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
Barclays -0.925 1.250 -0.0026 -0.0125 0.2364 0.3590 5.439 
Lloyds -0.469 0.648 -0.0045 -0.002 0.0691 0.2348 20.3269 
Credit Suisse -0.401 0.308 0.0008 0.001 0.0913 -0.3094 4.7006 
UBS -0.616 0.615 0.0013 0.0005 0.1534 -0.0609 4.6405 
Unicredit -0.070 0.073 -0 0.0009 0.0202 -0.1017 3.9667 
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Figure 7.2 Barclays Coco Spread vs. Bond Index Spreads 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the Barclays CoCo spread over the various benchmark spreads. With a 
standard deviation of 0.2364 this CoCo has the highest volatility of change of the spread 
compared to the other banks’ CoCos, see results appendix. It also has the most extreme values 
for changes of the spread of -0.925 and 1.25 percentage points. Also, Barclay’s stock returns 
volatility and changes are among the highest of the five banks. However, from early 2015 on 
it has the lowest spread of all CoCos with around 4.5 percentage points. 
The bank spread is the change of the spread of the IBOXX Euro Corp. Bank index over the 10 
year German government bond. The AAA spread is the change of the spread of the IBOXX 
Euro Corp. AAA rated bonds index over the 10 year German government bond. The AAA 
rated bonds represent the highest tier of investment grade rated corporate bonds, so are of 
highest credit quality. The BBB spread is the change of the spread of the IBOXX Euro Corp. 
BBB rated bonds index over the 10 year German government bond. The BBB rated bonds 
represent the lowest tier of investment grade rated corporate bonds, indicating a medium 
credit quality. Bonds with a BBB rating are just above non-investment grade, which is 
speculative grade. 
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Figure 7.3: Lloyds Coco Spread vs. Bond Index Spreads 
 
Figure 7.3 hows the Lloyds CoCo. It experiences the second largest spreads, after Unicredit 
below. It peaks at 12 percentage points in early 2012.  
In comparison the other banks peak at just below 7 percentage points. Interestingly Lloyds’ 
stock returns volatility is 0.0365 and the highest of all banks, see Table 7.2 above, but the 
Coco spread volatility is the second lowest with 0.0691.  
 
Figure 7.4: UBS Coco Spread vs. Bond Index Spreads 
 
232 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the UBS CoCo. It has the second highest spread volatility with a standard 
deviation of 0.1534, see Table 7.3, but the stock returns volatility is the lowest of all banks 
with 0.0, see Table 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.5: Credit Suisse Coco Spread vs. Bond Index Spreads 
 
Figure 7.5 shows that the CoCo of Credit Suisse follows a similar pattern to the one of UBS. 
However, the mid-2012 peak spread is slightly lower. The stock returns volatility is slightly 
higher than the one of UBS, yet with 0.0913 the overall CoCo spread volatility is lower than 
the one of UBS, see Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, respectively. 
Figure 7.6: Unicredit Coco Spread vs. Bond Index Spreads 
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Figure 7.6 indicates that the CoCo of Unicredit has the highest spread of all CoCos of almost 
18. From approximately mid-2012 on the spread follows the other CoCo’s pattern within a 
band of 5 to 7. 
The stock returns volatility is in the mid-field of the five banks in the sample with 0.0316, see 
Table 7.2. But the volatility of the change in the CoCo spread is the lowest, see Table 7.3. 
 
7.2.2 Linear regression model 
This sub-section contains the presentation of the linear regression model to test which variable 
affects a bank’s change of the CoCo spread, i.e. the 1st difference rather than level. The spread 
of a bank’s CoCo is defined as the difference of the CoCo’s yield in period 𝑡 and the long-
term risk-free benchmark, here the 10 years German government bond. Expressed in algebraic 
terms: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑡 − 𝐿𝐺𝑌𝑡      (7.3) 
In order to investigate the relation between the change of CoCo spreads and the financial 
system factors, a linear regression analysis is performed. The time series of the change of 
CoCo spreads are regressed on the time series of the factors. This section presents the linear 
regression model that is used. Section 7.2.3 analyses whether the time series used in this 
empirical analysis are stationary. Section 7.2.4 presents the regression results and additional 
testing for Granger-causality of the results. 
For each CoCo a linear factor model is estimated to analyse what explains the changes in the 
respective bank’s CoCo spread. For the linear model the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression is applied. In general terms the aim of an OLS regression is to estimate by what 
amount a variable y, the dependent variable, changes if a factor, or explanatory variable, 
changes by one unit. More formally this is captured by the following model: 
𝒚 = 𝜷𝑿 + є.      (7.4) 
The 𝒚 is the dependent variable. The 𝜷 is the beta factor that captures the average contribution 
of the explanatory variable 𝑿 on the change in 𝒚. The є is the error term that captures the 
change that is not captured in the 𝜷. Note that the equation uses a matrix notation as indicated 
by bold font. This means that not only one explanatory factor is captured but a number of n 
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factors are in 𝑿. The same applies to 𝑦 that contains all dependant variables and their 
respective error terms, captured in є.  
The 𝒚 is a 𝑛 × 1 dimensional vector, where 𝑛 denotes the number of observations in the time 
series of the dependant variable. Applied to the empirical analysis of the time series of the 
CoCo bond spreads, here the vector 𝑦 contains the time series of the change in CoCo spread. 
The 𝑿 denotes a matrix containing the time series of independent, i.e. explanatory, variables 
and a constant in columns. So, the matrix 𝑿 consists of a number of 𝑘 explanatory variables. 
Each observation 𝑡 of the independent variables can be expressed with the vector 𝑥𝑡 =
(1,  𝑥𝑡,1, 𝑥𝑡,2 … , 𝑥𝑡,𝑘) , where 1 denotes the constant. Each of the other elements can be 
addressed with 𝑥𝑡,𝑗, which is the 𝑡
th
 observation of the explanatory variable 𝑗. All explanatory 
variables are summarised in 𝑗 =  (1, 2, … , 𝑘). The matrix 𝑿 has the dimension 𝑛 × (𝑘 + 1) 
because the length of the time series of the explanatory variables must necessarily match the 
number of observations for the dependant variable, here 𝑛, and the number of explanatory 
variables 𝑘 is extended with a constant. The vector of parameters, i.e. regression coefficients 
in the results section 7.2.4, for the explanatory variables is denoted by 𝜷 =  (𝛽1,  𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝑘), 
which has the dimension (𝑘 + 1) × 1 since there is one parameter for each explanatory 
variable’s time series and one parameter for the constant. Finally the 𝑛 × 1 dimensional 
vector є denotes the unobservable errors. The change in each bank’s CoCo spread is estimated 
with the linear regression model 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋4𝑡 + є𝑡    (7.5) 
with 𝛥𝑌𝑡 denoting the change in the spread in period 𝑡 (i.e. the 1
st
 difference), 𝛼 is the 
constant, the 𝛽 are the parameters that need to be estimated, the 𝑋s are the explanatory 
variables, and an error term є for period 𝑡. The explanatory variables that can explain the 
change in the CoCo spread of a particular bank are: 
𝑋1𝑡 = 𝛥𝜎𝑚𝑡 ,        (7.6) 
𝑋2𝑡 = 𝛥𝜎𝑡 ,        (7.7) 
𝑋3𝑡 = 𝛥(𝐿𝐺𝑌𝑡 − 𝑆𝐺𝑌𝑡) , and      (7.8) 
𝑋4𝑡 = 𝛥𝑆𝐺𝑌𝑡.        (7.9) 
The 𝛥𝜎𝑚𝑡 denotes the volatility of returns for the market (the market being the Stoxx Europe 
600) (7.6), 𝛥𝜎𝑡 denotes the volatility of returns for the bank (7.7), 𝛥(𝐿𝐺𝑌𝑡 − 𝑆𝐺𝑌𝑡) denotes 
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the change in the spread of long-term (10 year German government bond) against short term 
(Euribor) risk-free refinancing conditions (7.8), and 𝛥𝑆𝐺𝑌𝑡 denotes the change in the value of 
the Euribor (7.9), respectively, all in period 𝑡. Table 7.4 provides the summary statistics of 
their change, so the 1
st
 differences rather than their levels. 
 
Table 7.4: Summary statistics of the 1
st
 differences of the explanatory variables. 
Explanatory variable Min Max Mean Median Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
Market volatility -0.0643 0.0468 -0 -0.0001 0.0094 -0.1571 6.2131 
Gov. bond spread -0.225 0.251 0.0012 0.002 0.0488 -0.2503 5.3091 
Euribor -0.092 0.064 -0.0006 0 0.0064 -4.2561 78.6674 
 
7.2.3 Testing the regression data for stationarity 
In order to investigate whether the linear regression model that is used is appropriate, in this 
sub-section the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test analyses every time series for a unit root. 
If a unit root is present, then the particular time series is not stationary and vice versa. 
Stationarity means that the mean and variance of the collected data do not change or follow a 
trend over the whole observation period. For example, the stock price of a company can 
follow a trend because the company sells products that happen to be subject to seasonal 
demand (think of U.S demand for pumpkins at Halloween). The issue is that in the presence 
of non-stationarity of the time series the regression coefficients cannot be validly tested. 
The important aspect of such a shock (seasonal demand) on the stationarity of the times series 
is that the initial shock in period 𝑡 abates over the next periods 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, etc. Contrary for 
non-stationary data the initial shock persists and does not become smaller in periods 𝑡 + 1, 
𝑡 + 2, etc. A regression of two non-stationary time series leads to the problem of spurious 
regressions. Regardless whether the one time series can actually explain the other – causality 
is tested for in the results section 7.2.4 – two trending time series can produce a regression 
that looks convincing, i.e. the coefficient estimates are statistically significant and the 𝑅2 
indicates that a high percentage of the dependant variable can be explained by the 
independent variable.  
The ADF test is executed with one-lagged, two-lagged, three-lagged, four-lagged, and five-
lagged models. More formally, this is expressed as an autoregressive models of the orders 
AR(1), AR(2), AR(3), AR(4), and AR(5) An absence of a unit root means that the time series 
is stationary. More formally, the time series is identified as integrated of order zero, I(0). If 
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the time series has a unit root, the time series is integrated of order one, or I(1). The 
hypotheses that are tested on a 5 per cent confidence level are: 
H(0): There is a unit root, therefore the series is not stationary 
H(1): There is no unit root, therefore the series is stationary. 
The ADF test is performed to investigate stationarity of the time series of the banks’ CoCo 
spread (𝑌𝑡) and the banks’ stock returns volatility (7.7), the three other explanatory variables 
of the linear regression model (7.5), i.e. market volatility (7.6), the government bond spread 
(7.8), and the short term liquidity measure (7.9). Also the bond index for European 
corporations (IBOXX Euro Corps.) and the bond index specifically for banks (IBOXX Euro 
Corps. Banks) are tested for stationarity. These two indices are used to give a rounded view 
on the empirical analysis. As the example of Deutsche Bank from the introduction shoes, 
there might be bi-directional causality between CoCos and shares of a bank. The next section 
investigates whether bonds in general cause equity volatility or the other way round. Table 7.5 
provides the summary statistics of the change of the two indices, so the 1
st
 differences rather 
than their levels. 
 
Table 7.5: Summary statistics for the 1
st
 difference of corporate and bank bond indices. 
Name Min Max Mean Median Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
IBOXX Euro Corps. -0.1868 0.1842 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0312 0.155 8.2092 
IBOXX Euro Banks -0.3361 0.315 -0.0005 -0.002 0.0435 0.1625 13.9082 
 
For the following results, compare the results appendix: For all banks across all n
th
 lag models 
the H(0) is rejected on the 5 per cent level, suggesting that the time series are stationary 
(Table 7.6 to Table 7.10). Also, across all 𝑛th lag models the H(0) is rejected for the two bond 
indices, suggesting that these time series are stationary (Table 7.11). Across all 𝑛th lag models 
the H(0) is rejected for the explanatory variables, suggesting that these time series of the first 
differences are also stationary (Table 7.12). The same test is conducted and reported in table 
7.12 for the level of – not change in – the respective time series. The level equity market is 
stationary, the level of government spread and short-term refinancing conditions are not. All 
first differences tested using the ADF test with different lag lengths suggest that all of the 
time series are stationary. Thus, the simple regression model can be used to analyse what 
explains the changes in the banks’ CoCo spreads. 
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7.2.4 Linear regression results 
This sub-section reports the linear regression results to answer the direction of causality 
between the CoCo spread and stock returns of a single bank. The Granger causality test 
(Granger, 1969) identifies the direction of causality or whether one time series, i.e. 
explanatory variables (see data section), can actually be used to determine another time series. 
This goes beyond simple correlation and seeks to reveal a true causation. So, despite a 
statistical significance it is not necessarily plausible that the one time series can actually be 
used to forecast the other.  
Granger causality means that if an observation of variable 𝑥 causes 𝑦, then past observations 
for 𝑥 should contain predictive information about 𝑦 that are beyond past observations of 𝑦 
itself, i.e. auto-regression. In addition to the requirement that 𝑥 happens prior to 𝑦, if 𝑥, 
compared to any other variable, seem to contain unique information to predict future values of 
𝑦, then one can speak of causality. This is the advantage of introducing the Granger causality 
element over an orthodox linear regression. A linear regression alone produces estimates for 
the different variables chosen to be in the formula. Yet, the Granger causality hints to the 
direction of causation and not blunt correlation.  
In this empirical research the likelyhood ratio test version of the Granger causality is used, 
that produces equivalent F-test formula (note that Tables 7.13 to 7.19 in the results appendix 
abbreviate the the likelihood ratio to LR and the p-values indicate the critical value for 
rejecting the H(0)). This means that Granger causality from a time series 𝑥 to 𝑦 is inferred by 
calculating the relative reduction of the likelihood of 𝑦 by the exclusion of 𝑥 compared with 
the likelihood obtained using all the time series. So, a variable 𝑥 does not Granger-cause 𝑦 if 
for all ℎ > 0 if the following equation holds true: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝐴𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑌𝑡+ℎ|𝐴𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡)     (7.10) 
𝑃 refers to probability, 𝐴𝑡 is the set of all information available in the universe at time 𝑡, 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 is the set of all information available in the universe at time 𝑡 but without the unique 
information carried by the variable 𝑥. In simple words, if the above equation holds true, 𝑥 
carries no unique information about 𝑦 that is available somewhere else in 𝐴, hence 𝑥 does not 
help predict 𝑦.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑚𝑦𝑡−𝑚 + 𝑏𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑞𝑥𝑡−𝑞 + є𝑡  (7.11) 
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Let 𝑦 and 𝑥 be stationary time series. To test the null hypothesis, H(0), that 𝑥 does not 
Granger cause 𝑦, first the lagged values of 𝑦 are included in univariate auto-regression, as 
denoted. Second, the lagged values of 𝑥 are added and an error term. The H(0) is not rejected 
if and only if no lagged values of 𝑥 are retained in the regression.  
Caution must be exercised since a Granger causality could also be explained by a joint, third 
explanatory factor that has not been considered in setting up the model. However, the 
questions Q1 to Q7 below aim to answer the directionality between bond prices and share 
prices, micro-level individual bonds vs. shares and macro-level bond index vs. equity index. 
Nevertheless, comparing bonds to stocks are a popular field of financial research and 
represent the two sides of the same coin in corporate finance.  
In regards to the empirical analysis of this chapter, one direction could be that the volatility of 
a bank’s stock returns affects the change in the bank’s CoCo spread. The other direction is 
that the change in spread has an effect on the volatility as the example of Deutsche Bank in 
the introduction might suggest.  
For example the current period’s stock returns could be explained by the previous period’s 
stock returns and change of the CoCo spread. There might also be a feedback, so that the 
change of the CoCo spread could explain future stock returns. The hypotheses that are tested 
on a 5 per cent confidence level are, in general terms: 
H(0): The one times series does not Granger-cause the other time series. 
H(1): The one times series does Granger-cause the other time series. 
Applied to the data used in this chapter the Granger causality test helps answer the following 
questions about the time series of the five banks 𝑖 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the sample: 
Q1: Does the stock returns volatility of bank 𝑖 Granger-cause the change of the CoCo 
spread of bank 𝑖? 
Q2: Does the market volatility Granger-cause the change of the CoCo spread of bank  
𝑖? 
Q3: Does the change of the CoCo spread of bank 𝑖 Granger-cause the stock returns 
volatility of bank 𝑖? 
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Obviously Q3 is asking the reverse of what Q1 is asking, so the test undertaking also covers 
the possibility of a feedback effect between the stock returns and change of CoCo spreads. 
These three different regresions are each vector auto regressions (VAR) of different orders, 
here executed for up to five lagged periods. For example, this means that Q1 investigates 
whether the stock returns volatility of bank 𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 1 causes the change of the CoCo 
spread of bank 𝑖 in period 𝑡; whether the stock returns volatility of bank 𝑖 in periods 𝑡 − 1 and 
𝑡 − 2 cause the change of the CoCo spread of bank 𝑖 in period 𝑡 etc. all the way up to whether 
the stock returns volatility of bank 𝑖 from all periods together since 𝑡 − 5 cause the change of 
the CoCo spread of bank 𝑖 in period 𝑡.  
Recall from the previous chapter the pricing issues that are identified by the financial theory 
literature. Suppose that CoCos are intended to be automatically converted into equity at a low 
trigger where a bank can become a gone concern, i.e. facing bankruptcy. If CoCos are 
designed to be converted into shares of a struggling bank, the spread increases. A conversion 
of CoCos into new equity dilutes existing shareholders’ wealth, so the share price drops. A 
decrease in share prices is a sign for decline in health of a bank, so CoCo investors are 
concerned that the trigger will be pulled soon so that the CoCos convert, markets will price 
this risk with a higher spread etc. Similar concerns are spread when markets see permanent 
write-offs on CoCos. 
The Granger causality test is also applied to the bond index of the wider economy and the 
bond index of the banks to answer the questions: 
Q4: Does the market volatility Granger-cause the bond index spread? 
Q5: Does the index bond spread Granger-cause the market volatility? 
Q6: Does the market volatility Granger-cause the bank bond index spread? 
Q7: Does the bank bond index spread Granger-cause the market-volatility? 
Similar to Q1 and Q3, here Q5 is asking the reverse of Q4 and Q7 the reverse of Q6. Again, 
just like Q1 to Q3, each VAR is gradually expandend up to the fifth lag of the respective 
variable, i.e. VAR(1) to VAR(5). Theoretically, there can be intermarket relationship between 
bond markets and equity markets. Both markets can go in the same direction if the financial 
markets are generally confident in the future of an economy. A growing company can make 
its interest payments on its bonds and profits still grow. Therefore its stocks become also 
attractive to investors. If markets are confident in the whole economy the price for both bond 
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and stock markets move up. The economic environment also plays a role in determining the 
direction of the two markets. If the central bank increases the interest rates, stocks are less 
attractive since interest payments of newly issued bonds will eat into company profits. 
However, newly issued bonds are perceived relatively more attractive than stocks because of 
the higher interest rate. Consequently stock prices decrease, bond prices increase. However, 
during a prolonged period of low interest rates stock prices can go up because interest 
payments do not eat into profits. The bond market can also increase. This depends on how 
many old bonds with relative high interest are still in the markets. With fewer opportunities 
for higher returns, investors can still be invested in bonds because they are safer than stocks. 
This co-movement is particular plausible if investors are sceptical about how long the interest 
rates remain so low, they simply invest in both markets.  
However, if it turns out that in general the spreads in bond markets – for the purpose of 
CoCos especially the bank-related bonds – and volatility in equity markets are unrelated, one 
can better locate the results of the analysis of Q1 to Q3. For example, if the results are in 
support of Q1, this suggests that a bank’s stock returns volatility causes its CoCo spread. It is 
important to know wheter this also holds true in a general setting, e.g. the European stock 
volatility cause the spread of the bond markets. Also, the bank bond market is included, which 
is a sub-set of the European bond market index, to double check for differences. Different 
results can lead to suggesting that CoCo bonds, because of their unique design, are different 
to normal bonds and affect bank’s equity in a unique way that does not correspond with the 
other intermarket analyses as indicated by Q4 to Q5. 
Intuition would suggest that the more parameters are used in a linear regression model like 
(7.5) the better the fit. However, too many explanatory variables can lead to an overfitting 
model. The Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), developed by Schwarz (1978), is a criterion 
to select the most suitable model out of a selection of available models. In simple terms, the 
BIC assesses each model of its likelihood to be the appropriate model. The BIC introduces a 
penalty term that is the product of the number of parameters times the logarithm of the 
number of observations of the data. The idea is to consider parameter uncertainty and 
estimation uncertainty. Hence, a penalty is automatically attached to each additional 
parameter. To compensate for this, the explanatory power of the parameter must be 
sufficiently high so one can speak of strength of evidence. If one model has a lower BIC than 
another, this could be due to fewer explanatory parameters that are penalised, a better fit, or 
both. So, the model with the lowest BIC value is selected. In direct comparison one can speak 
of strong evidence against a model its BIC is reater than 10 compared to the lowest BIC 
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model. For smaller differences of 0 to 2 the difference is not worth metioning, see Kass and 
Raftery (1995) for details. 
In this empirical analysis the linear regression model applied to each bank only uses four 
explanatory variables of different kinds, e.g. a risk-free investment, a comparable risk 
benchmark, and a liquidity indicator. The Granger causality test is designed to compare five 
models with different lag, i.e. the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, and 5
th
 lag. The number of explanatory 
variables stays constant. The intended outcome of the BIC test aims at selecting the models 
with the appropriate lag to answer the questions Q1, Q2, and Q3, see above. Hence a lower 
BIC suggests a better fit. So, out of these models for each linear regression, only one is used 
to give a definite answer for the causality. Note that in the results tables the statistical p-value 
lower than 0.05 leads to the rejection of H(0) that there is no causality on the 5 per cent level. 
Also the estimates ?̂?𝑖 for each of the parameters of each independent (or explanatory) variable 
(7.6) to (7.9) are tested for statistical significance. So the H(0) is that the parameter is zero, 
hence is not significant and does not explain the CoCo spread. A rejection of the H(0) leads to 
accepting the H(1) which is indicated that the parameter is different from zero, hence 
explaining the CoCo spread. Furthermore, note that for the respective regression for each 
bank all four independent variables are used plus a constant, indicated by ?̂? in the respective 
table. The linear regressions on the corporate bond index and bank bond index does not use 
the individual bank’s returns as explanatory variable but only uses the Stoxx equity returns 
(?̂?1), government spread (?̂?2), and Euribor (?̂?3). 
 
7.2.4.1 Granger causality and linear regression results for Barclays 
 
[Insert Table 7.13 about here] 
 
For the sake of readability the tables in this and the following sub-sections are listed in the 
results appendix and are referred to in the text. So, for the Granger causality analysis for 
Barclays compare Table 7.13 in the results appendix. The likelihood ratio (LR) columns in 
table 7.13 are the test statistics for testing the H(0) versus the alternative H(1). The H(0) of 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 is not rejected for the 1
st
 lag VAR model, or VAR(1) since all p-values are 
larger than 0.05 and has the lowest BIC. This means that neither Barclays’ stock returns 
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volatility, nor the equity market volatility in general Granger-cause Barclays’ CoCo spreads. 
Also, Barclays’ CoCo spread does not Granger-cause Barclays’ stock returns volatility. Note 
that the H(0) is rejected for the VAR(5) of Q3, suggesting that including lags up to the 5
th
 
period of the change of the CoCo spread Granger-causes Barclays’ stock returns. However, 
the difference between the BIC of the VAR(5) model and VAR(1) model is significant, so 
that the VAR(5) model is probably over-fitted. 
 
[Insert Table 7.20 about here] 
 
Next the linear regression results for Barclays can be obtained from Table 7.20 in the results 
appendix. The CoCo spreads are regressed on the explanatory variables (7.6) to (7.9) 
according to section 7.2.2. The estimates for the true beta factor 𝛽 is ?̂?𝑖𝑡 for the explanatory 
variable 𝑖 in period 𝑡, for Barclays are shown in Table 7.20. Only the ?̂?3𝑡, i.e. government 
bond spread, is statistically different from zero, because of negative t-statistics smaller than -
1.96, and explains the Barclays CoCo spread. An increase of 1 in the Government spread 
results in a decrease of the CoCo spread of 1.19. However, the model that is suggested to 
explain the CoCo spread only explains approximately 0.04 per cent, according to the 𝑅2. 
 
7.2.4.2 Granger causality and linear regression results for Lloyds Bank  
 
[Insert Table 7.14 about here] 
 
For the Granger causality analyses for Lloyds compare Table 7.14 in the results appendix. 
The H(0) of Q1, Q2, and Q3 is not rejected for the VAR(1) model, which has the lowest BIC. 
This means that neither Barclays’ stock returns volatility, nor the equity market volatility in 
general Granger-cause Lloyds’ CoCo spreads. Also, Lloyds’ CoCo spread does not Granger-
causes Lloyds’ stock returns volatility. Note that the H(0) is rejected for the VAR(4) and 
VAR(5) model for Q3, suggesting that the vector auto regression up to the 4
th
 and 5
th
 lag of 
the change of CoCo spread Granger-causes Lloyds’ stock returns. However, the difference 
between the BIC of each model and 1
st
 lag model is significant, so that the VAR(4) and 
VAR(5) models are probably over-fitted.  
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[Insert Table 7.21 about here] 
 
Next, the linear regression results for the Lloyds CoCo are shown in Table 7.21 in the results 
appendix. Interestingly, Lloyds is the only bank for which two explanatory variables are 
statistically significant in terms of explanatory power. These are ?̂?3𝑡 and ?̂?4𝑡, or the 
government spread and the short-term refinancing conditions of the 3-months Euribor, 
respectively. Of all banks the explanatory power of the government spread is the lowest with -
0.88. An increase in the Euribor, however, comes with a decrease of the spread of 1.60. Only 
7 per cent of the CoCo spread can be explained with the regression model. 
 
7.2.4.3 Granger causality and linear regression results for Credit Suisse 
 
[Insert Table 7.15 about here] 
 
For the Granger causality analyses for Credit Suisse compare Table 7.15 in the results 
appendix. The H(0) of Q1, Q2, and Q3 is not rejected for the VAR(1), which has the lowest 
BIC. This means that neither Credit Suisse’s stock returns volatility, nor the equity market 
volatility in general Granger-cause Credit Suisse’s CoCo spreads. Also, Credit Suisse’s CoCo 
spread does not Granger-causes Credit Suisse’s stock returns volatility.  
Note that in contrast to the previous two banks the H(0) is rejected for the VAR(3), VAR(4), 
and VAR(5) model of Q2, suggesting that these lagged vectors of the equity market volatility 
Granger-causes Credit Suisse’s CoCo spread. However, the difference between the BIC of 
each model and 1
st
 lag model is significant, so that the regression models up to the 3
rd
, 4
th
, and 
5
th
 lag are probably over-fitted. 
 
[Insert Table 7.22 about here] 
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The linear regression results for Credit Suisse CoCo are shown in Table 7.22 in the results 
appendix. The government bond spread is the only statistically relevant explanatory variable 
in the regression model, but with a strong t-statistic. Of all banks in the sample the 
government bond spread has an impact on the CoCo of Credit Suisse of -1.06. Again, the 
government bond spread is the only explanatory variable that is significantly different from 
zero since the t-statistic is -16.5 this shows that the change in government spread tends to be 
high in magnitude. Also interestingly, in contrast to the other banks 26 per cent of the Credit 
Suisse’s CoCo spread can be explained with the regression model. The other Swiss bank in 
the sample is UBS, see below. The terms and conditions of the CoCos are identical, except 
that Credit Suisse offers a slightly higher yield. The patterns on the spreads – not the change 
of spreads – are almost identical. Also the summary statistics of both bank’s CoCos and stock 
returns are close.  
 
7.2.4.4 Granger causality and linear regression results for UBS 
 
[Insert Table 7.16 about here] 
 
For the Granger causality analyses for UBS compare Table 7.16 in the results appendix. The 
H(0) of Q1, Q2, and Q3 is not rejected for the VAR(1), which has the lowest BIC. This means 
that neither UBS’ stock returns volatility, nor the equity market volatility in general Granger-
cause UBS’ CoCo spreads. Also, UBS’ CoCo spread does not Granger-cause UBS’ stock 
returns volatility.  
Note that the H(0) is rejected for the VAR(4) of Q2, suggesting that the vector regression up 
to the 4
th
 lag of the CoCo spread Granger-causes UBS’ stock returns. However, the difference 
between the BIC of this model and the VAR(1) is significant, so that the model is probably 
over-fitted. Furtehrmore, the VAR(2) and VAR(5) reject the H(0) for Q3, suggesting that 
there is a Granger-causality of CoCo spread on stock returns. Again, the BIC results suggest 
strong evidence against these two models. 
 
[Insert Table 7.23 about here] 
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Next, the linear regression results for the UBS CoCo are shown in Table 7.23 in the results 
appendix. Again, the government spread is the only statistically significant explanatory 
variable. The effect is -1.13 on the CoCo spread. Only 12 per cent of the spread is explained 
with the regression model according to the 𝑅2. 
 
7.2.4.5 Granger causality and linear regression results for Unicredit 
 
[Insert Table 7.17 about here] 
 
For the Granger causality analysis for Unicredit, compare Table 7.17 in the results appendix. 
In contrast to the other banks in the sample the H(0) of Q1 is rejected for the VAR(1), 
therefore suggesting that stock returns in period t Granger-cause the CoCo spreads of 
Unicredit in period t+1. Also the BIC of this model is the smallest of all auto vector 
regressions. 
For Q2 and Q3 the H(0) is not rejected for the VAR(1), which has the lowest BIC. This means 
that the equity market volatility in general does not Granger-cause Unicredit’s CoCo spreads. 
Also, the bank’s CoCo spread does not Granger-causes Unicredit’s stock returns volatility. 
However, the VAR(3) of Q3 suggests that the CoCo spread Granger-causes the stock returns. 
Yet the BIC of this model is larger than the BIC of the VAR(1), so evidence speaks against 
using the VAR(3). So, in conclusion, the empirical analysis suggests a one-directional 
relationship of the first lag of Unicredit’s stock returns on the CoCo spreads.  
 
[Insert Table 7.24 about here] 
 
Next, the linear regression results for the Unicredit CoCo are shown in Table 7.24 in the 
results appendix. The Government bond spread, as for all other banks, is relevant in terms of 
explanatory power and accumulates to an effect of -1.81. However, the regression model 
explains only 16 per cent of the CoCo spreads. 
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7.2.4.6 Granger causality results of the bond indices and equity market 
All five banks in the sample are tested for Granger-causality on their individual stock returns 
and CoCo spreads. In addition to investigating these micro-level causalities, performing the 
Granger-causality test on a macro-level give a rounded image. So the causality between the 
equity market and bond market in general is analysed to derive a possible directionality. First, 
this is done for the Euro Stoxx Europe 600 and IBOXX Corp. Bond index to answer question 
Q4, and vice versa in Q5; second, this is done for the Euro Stoxx Europe 600 and IBOXX 
Corp. Bond for Banks only index in Q6, and vice versa in Q7. 
 
[Insert Table 7.18 about here] 
 
For the Granger causality analyses for the corporate bond index compare Table 7.18 in the 
results appendix. The H(0) is not rejected for any of the lagged models for Q4, suggesting that 
the market volatility does not Granger-cause the index of all corporation bonds. However, the 
H(0) is rejected for Q5 in the VAR(1) model. Since this model has the lowest BIC, this 
suggests that the corporate bond index spread Granger-causes the market volatility. 
 
[Insert Table 7.19 about here] 
 
For the Granger causality analysis for the bank bond index compare Table 7.19 in the results 
appendix. The H(0) is not rejected for any of the lagged models for Q6, suggesting that the 
market volatility does not Granger-cause the index of the bank bonds spread. However, the 
H(0) is rejected for Q7 in the VAR (1) and VAR(4), suggesting that the bank bond index 
spreads Granger-cause equity market volatility. Since the 1
st
 lag model has the lower BIC, 
there is strong evidence against the VAR(4) model and the suggested causality. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the economic crisis in Europe, the one-
directionality is not a surprise. The banks, as central element of financial markets, can cause 
equity markets to move as a direct result because of fears of resurgence of financial distress or 
even a crisis in Europe. Also, compare this with the systemic risk results in chapter 5. There, 
the ΔCoVaR for post-crisi banks is consistenly higher than before. 
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The application of the linear regression model on the bond index and the bank bond index 
show a similar picture. An increase in the spread of one unit has a negative effect on the two 
bond indices as expected. For both, the government bond spread is of statistical significance 
and explains 36 per cent and 26 per cent of the spreads, see Table 7.25 and Table 7.26, 
respectively. 
 
7.2.5 Conclusion and outlook 
In conclusion it appears that the alternative risk-free investment opportunity, i.e. the German 
10 year benchmark bond, is the main driver for the observable CoCo bond spreads. Only for 
Unicredit the own stock returns volatility directly affect the CoCo spread. This explains the 
large spike in the CoCo spread – not the change of the spread – in late 2011, see Figure 7.6. 
However, compared to bonds in general – and also bank bonds – the CoCos here behave in 
different ways. The existing CoCos differ substantially in their terms of conversion. The 
threat of touching the trigger event has not yet occurred in the data set. Nevertheless the fact 
that such a trigger exists is reason for concern to the investors. This is suggested by the theory 
presented in the previous chapter and could not be dismissed by the empirical findings in this 
chapter. 
Recall the example of Deutsche Bank from the introduction. This case is anecdotal evidence 
that information regarding a bank’s CoCos can have immediate impact on the bank’s stock 
price. However, this could not be confirmed with the empirical results. This is actually good 
news, because this suggests that there is no mutually reinforcing feedback loop of declining 
stock returns – carrying information about a decline in the bank’s health – causing volatility 
of CoCos because of fear of conversion, and then again causing stocks to further decline, or 
become more volatile for that matter, because share prices now receive information about the 
health of a bank from observing the volatility of the bank’s CoCos.  
Surprisingly, over the whole period from mid-2010 to 2015 the stock returns explain the 
CoCo spread of Unicredit. This effect cannot be identified for the other banks. In comparison 
to UBS the summary statistics for the stock returns and CoCo spreads do not differ greatly. 
Also, the terms of UBS’ and Unicredit’s CoCos are almost identical. Unicredit pays a slightly 
higher coupon.  
However, comparing the results from the empirical CoCo analysis with the systemic risk 
ranking according to the ΔCoVaR methodology used in chapter 5 give interesting 
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suggestions. Recall Table 5.1. The results suggest that Unicredit’s CoCo spread is caused by 
its stock returns volatility, at the same time it is the systemically most relevant bank in the 
same observation period. Here is a crucial difference between UBS and Unicredit. Unicredit 
was systemically relevant well before the observation period for the CoCos began, ranking 
10
th
 pre-crisis, 5
th
 during the crisis, and 2
nd
 post-crisis. The other banks in the sample rank 
much lower in the post crisis period. UBS was ranked just behind Unicredit, i.e. 11
th
, in 2002 
to 2006, but migrated to 15
th
 and 21
st
 during the crisis in 2007 to 2009 and 2010 to 2014, 
respectively. Taking the systemic risk results at face value, this suggests that the two banks 
deviated in terms of systemic risk contributions and that is captured in the relationship of 
systemic risk and CoCo spreads; Unicredit remains a concern over the full period, UBS less 
so.  
In general, the results suggest that no clear impact of a CoCo can be derived ex ante. This is 
important for CoCo-issuing banks and markets alike and requires caution when marketing 
such debt claims. Also this is important for policy makers. The intention behind CoCos in the 
first place was to make banks safer and introduce a contingency for distress, yet the existence 
of feedback effects cannot be eliminated with CoCos in their current form.  
However, from a macro-prudential point of view, how are CoCos useful for a regulatory 
agency to promote its regulatory objective of maintaining financial stability? The CoCos that 
are currently in the markets do not exercise macro-prudence as defined in this PhD thesis in 
the two research questions: First, does the topic at hand incentivise banks to abstain from 
unsustainable business practice, therefore to a degree not creating systemic risk? Second, does 
the topic at hand – here CoCos – contain systemic risk as systemic risk materialises? In the 
current form the existing CoCos can strengthen the capital base of banks since after the trigger 
event the leverage is decreased. Banks have no immediate access to this capital since it is 
contingent. However, the high coupon payments are substantial and impose a penalty on the 
liquidity situation of the issuing bank.  
The next section proposes debt-to-equity CoCos for the purpose of a recovery or resolution of 
banks. These are envisioned as a permanent penalty on bank managers instead of CoCo 
investors like the write-down CoCos of this chapter’s sample suggest.  
 
249 
 
7.3 Proposal for CoCo: a recovery and resolution tool with build-in market discipline 
The motivation behind this section’s CoCo proposal is to issue debt that is the first tranche to 
be converted into equity after incumbent equity capital is not quite exhausted, but too little to 
reassure a bank’s health. A credible CoCo design would make depositors, who are a quasi-
creditors, more reassured that their deposits are unaffected by the financial disruption the 
bank faces. Hence, CoCos need to be embedded in the discussion about macro-prudence. The 
aim of this section is to design CoCos to first, decrease the creation of systemic risk on the 
micro-level, i.e. the individual bank. In more general terms the building up of systemic risk 
must be reduced. Second, a non-orderly bankruptcy of a sufficiently big bank can cause 
systemic concerns. So, in addition to disciplining a bank CoCos can be featured in an orderly 
resolution or restructuring of a bank. This is another point not emphasised enough in the 
existing literature. 
The previous chapter 6 distinguishes bail-in capital from contingent convertibles (CoCos). 
Both are contingent capital. While the trigger event of the former is subject to a decision made 
by a regulatory agency, the latter is a private contract to either convert debt into equity or 
write-down upon a pre-defined trigger event. The first advantage of CoCos over bail-in 
capital is that the conversion is an automated mechanism that saves time in the process of de-
leveraging a struggling bank. The second advantage is that investors can estimate the 
probability of the trigger event. Unlike CoCos the discretion of a regulatory agency introduces 
an element of uncertainty to markets; exactly something that can exacerbate system wide 
distress. This section focuses on debt-to-equity CoCos. 
Two problems arise: First, it is arguable why an investor should swap his debt claim into new 
equity that is a residual claim of a seriously struggling bank. This would not be a good deal. 
Second, the automatic mechanism to convert debt into equity is de facto a second chance for 
the bank to avoid bankruptcy. 
As for the first problem of creating a good deal to investors, it is quite possible that the need 
for further write-downs due to declining asset prices exceeds incumbent equity and the newly 
converted equity. A gone-concern bank can cause a total loss of the CoCo investor’s wealth 
after conversion. The alternative is to hold straight debt of the bank. In case of a bankruptcy 
the investors can still negotiate the hair-cuts on their debt claim. They face a loss on some of 
their wealth and not a total loss as in the case of a gone-concern CoCo conversion. So in order 
to make CoCos marketable, investors must be offered a good deal. This can be done by 
designing CoCos on a going-concern basis, so the bank’s business can be continued. This 
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means that conversion is triggered well above a possible bankruptcy. The new equity has still 
an intrinsic value that makes conversion still a good deal.   
As for the second problem of granting a struggling bank a second chance, the conversion 
would immediately prop up a bank’s equity to avoid an imminent bankruptcy that could 
destabilise the financial system. Creditors would automatically become shareholders, as 
stipulated by the majority of CoCo-related literature. Now suppose that an otherwise gone-
concern bank is pushed back to a going-concern level because of the conversion of CoCos. 
New equity is available and raises the capital level. Shortly after, the equity could be reduced 
to pre-conversion levels and new CoCos are issued. If this becomes a frequent routine it, this 
keeps alive a bank that is not healthy on its own but is artificially propped up if its distressed 
state poses a threat to the financial stability objective. This routine would eliminate the threat 
of a bankruptcy; this is not highlighted enough in the related literature. The new owners can 
be still sceptical how to deal with their new investment of a bank that is not healthy (see 
Calello and Ervin, 2010).  
The related literature does not give specific recommendations about what should happen after 
CoCo conversion. The bank benefits from de-leveraging and produces more loss-absorbing 
equity capital. But should new CoCos be issued immediately after? Should they be issued 
with a delay? Should new CoCos be issued at all? The incentives of bank managers, 
shareholders, and CoCo investors are not only determined by the terms of conversion exactly 
in the moment the trigger is pulled; the wealth of the particular group is also affected post-
conversion and therefore shapes the pre-conversion incentives. This section gives a 
comprehensive analysis that also proposes how the time after CoCo conversion should be 
used to recover or resolve banks. 
The bank’s management have the ultimate decision about, and so responsibility for, the 
institution’s risk strategy. Hence, if sustainable risk taking is agreed upon on the top level, 
concerns of systemic risk can be reduced. To achieve this, the management must face the 
consequences of their decisions before they become a concern to depositors and other 
creditors. This reinforces the argument to design CoCos on a going-concern basis.  The moral 
hazard of managers must be circumvented so the bank can avoid serious self-made disasters 
in the first place. Again, concerns of destabilising the financial system are bigger if it is a 
systemically relevant bank because of its sheer size or interconnectedness.  
In this chapter the aim of CoCos is to disentangle the particular incentives of bank managers, 
shareholders, and creditors on a timely basis. This can be done with specific features that 
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differ from the existing proposals: Re-installing a clear order of loss-absorbency of different 
groups of investors. Shareholders must be fully responsible for absorbing losses, meaning 
experiencing a loss of wealth before any other group of creditors, including CoCo investors. 
Making CoCo investors “contingent” shareholders distorts the natural order of rewards for 
taken risks. This means that loss-absorbing equity by definition has a higher risk than straight 
debt and therefore is repaid with a higher reward in the form of a residual claim on the bank’s 
profits. The rewards on straight debt are limited to contractually agreed coupon payments. On 
the other hand the risk attached to straight debt is less sensitive to the profits of the bank. It 
only becomes sensitive if the bank becomes insolvent.  
7.3.1 Choosing a robust trigger event 
This sub-section discusses the choice of the trigger event for the proposed CoCo design. A 
preference for an accounting trigger based on book values (for example Glasserman and 
Nouri, 2010) in the earliest CoCo proposals may partly be due to the then fresh experiences 
with distorted markets during the financial crisis. For example, CoCos are converted when 
core equity Tier 1 falls to 7 per cent. Other authors see a trigger based on a ratio of two 
variables, for example market-priced equity to assets, better suited than a one-dimensional 
trigger (Flannery, 2002; Duffie, 2009). As soon as it falls to a pre-defined level that indicates 
that a bank has too little equity, CoCos are converted.  
One concern is that short-selling could cause temporary disruptions. If the trigger is linked to 
market values a conversion may be premature. CoCo investors could short the banks stocks, 
the intended decline in stock prices would hit the trigger and these investors’ strategy would 
be rewarded with undervalued shares that would rise to the initial fair value. In addition, a 
dilution of incumbent shareholders after conversion can cause a downward spiral since the 
low stock prices may lead shareholders to liquidate any pecuniary interests in banks and so 
the share price would decline further. De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2013) show this 
sensitivity of equity to CoCo conversion. The problem is that CoCo investors, who receive 
equity for their debt claim, have to hedge the bank’s shares. Because of this the share price is 
further decreased. The authors propose to reduce this problem by making CoCos subject to 
multiple triggers.  
However, defenders of a market-based trigger point out that accounting measures allow the 
banks to influence the trigger event and furthermore, per definition, book values are mere 
historic values and of no particular value for the financial markets (Goodhart, 2010; Calomiris 
and Herring, 2011). For these two reasons, the trigger event may occur only when the bank is 
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already in distress and therefore the purpose of CoCos to timely reinforce the bank’s financial 
stability is not met. Market values deliver more timely indicators for the health of a bank and 
in contrast to book values also comprise of information about off-balance items (Flannery, 
2009). This view is also reinforced by the new Basel III requirements that stipulate to 
reintroduce information on off-balance sheet operations like special purpose vehicles and 
consecutive derivative instruments, which played a major role in the recent crisis (Basel 
BCBS, 2010b), see also chapter 2. 
A market-based trigger is more likely to reflect the stability of a bank. However, this requires 
that the markets have a clear account about the overall state of the financial world. If there are 
widespread panics in the markets there is little reason to believe that the current market price 
reflects the bank’s true value. Recall the difficulties Northern Rock faced in refinancing 
through money markets during the decline of mortgage-backed securities. Despite good 
quality of the mortgages the bank wanted to borrow against, the financial markets refused to 
lend against anything mortgage-related. Such a discrepancy between the fundamental factors 
and market perception is the main problem of market-based CoCo triggers, especially during 
episodes of unrest (Perotti and Flannery, 2011). So, a negative verdict reflected in a low share 
price that is not justified by the fundamentals, can trigger an unnecessary conversion. 
On the other hand, an overoptimistic market perception about banks across the board could 
mean that a single bank’s mismanagement goes unnoticed. This difficulty in choosing the 
trigger resembles what in the field of statistics is known as type I error and type II error of 
hypothesis testing, see for example Sheskin (2004). The type I error means that a hypothesis 
turns out to be true but is rejected; the type II error means that a hypothesis turns out to be 
false but is not rejected. Suppose the hypothesis is that a bank is stable. The trigger is hit and 
causes the conversion of CoCos, even though the bank does not need them. This is a type I 
error. Alternatively, the hypothesis is invalid, the bank is not stable. The trigger is not hit and 
does not cause the conversion of CoCos, even though the bank is in need of conversion. This 
is a type II error. The costs of a type II error are higher than those of a type I error. It would 
defeat their own purpose if CoCos are not triggered when in fact their conversion can improve 
financial stability. There would be no point in introducing them as a macro-prudential tool.  
In conclusion, the kind of the trigger decides whether CoCos can deliver the regulatory 
purpose to mitigate losses to a bank and reduce the threat of contagion in the banking sector. 
It is doubtful whether a purely accounting-based trigger, for example book value of assets, has 
any valuable information that indicates the bank’s chances to survive financial distress. The 
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trigger must carry unambiguous information because these matter for market participants to 
create an opinion about the future. Market-orientated triggers are generally able to provide for 
this.  
A market-based trigger such as share price is supposed to carry relevant information about 
bankruptcy. Lower levels, i.e. low share price, suggest that the equity of a bank is not 
attractive to markets and suggest that the bank is performing poorly. Equity will have its 
lowest market price close to the bankruptcy threshold. However, bankruptcy or financial 
distress in general is foreshadowed by a decline in equity price in the weeks before 
bankruptcy procedures have officially been announced by regulatory agencies. Obviously, if 
the trigger level is too low, CoCos are obsolete because bankruptcy occurs anyway. With 
higher values of the trigger conversion occurs well before the bankruptcy threshold of the 
bank. This increases the capital cushion of the bank before serious financial distress could 
become contagious and a systemic crisis evolves. Some authors analyse the potential of 
CoCos assuming that the current share price level serves as the trigger event (McDonald, 
2011; Sundaresan and Wang, 2010). This point in time trigger is exposed to manipulation. In 
addition CoCos can be converted accidentally if the share price fluctuates. This leads to 
endogeneity of the trigger and the valuation of the bank’s equity. Sundaresan and Wang 
(2010) show how this leads to the problem of multiple equilibria. Similarly De Spiegeleer and 
Schoutens (2013) show how sensitive equity is to CoCo conversion and that by hedging this 
risk CoCo conversion can further drive down equity prices. 
In order to make the trigger robust, the quasi market value of equity ratio (QMVER) 
(Calomiris and Herring, 2011) delivers a good starting point. In addition, this variable is 
measured over a period of time, say 90 days. First, the costs of manipulation are prohibitively 
high. Second, type I errors are avoided. A likely volatility of the bank’s share price in times of 
systemic distress – not yet a systemic crisis – does not prematurely trigger conversion. In 
more general terms, the market value of the equity ratio at time t is defined as: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑀𝑉
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑀𝑉+ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑉       (7.12) 
The market value of equity in relation to debt delivers an assessment of the health of a bank 
(see also Glasserman and Nouri, 2010). The total value of the equity is the sum of all shares 
valued at the current share price, this is also called market capitalisation. The debt in the 
formula gives a point of reference to put the market capitalisation into context. However, 
Calomiris and Herring (2011) point out that calculating the market value of debt can be 
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costly. Not all debt positions are traded in the financial markets. The difference to the nominal 
or book value is not big anyway, hence the “quasi” in QMVER. They propose just to use the 
book value so that: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑀𝑉
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑀𝑉+𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝑉       (7.13) 
This measure alone allows for triggering conversion of CoCos due to either market 
manipulation or simply a sudden one-off shock in the stock markets. This can be avoided by 
taking the average of that ratio over a period of a 90 day rolling window.  
There is a trade-off between a “point in time” accuracy, or timeliness, of the trigger and the 
measurement of it over a specific period. The first indicates the trigger’s timeliness in the 
short-run. The current share price of a bank is such a short-run measure. The price is 
determined by market perception on an inter-day basis and can jump considerably. As 
indicated above, this might not be an appropriate measure during financial distress when 
prices are exposed to high volatility. Ultimately such a measure would be a trigger that 
converts CoCos prematurely.  
Second, a long-run perspective of the movement of the ratio is more reliable than a point in 
time observation. A conversion occurs if the average of this ratio over a certain period, say 90 
days, touches the predefined trigger. This means that the bank’s management failed to make 
clear that the overall strategy for the business is sound. Yet, the difficulty is to determine 
whether an immediate downward movement marks, in retrospective, the first signal of a 
decline in health. 
In conclusion there is a trade-off between timeliness and reliability. Recall that the purpose of 
CoCos is to be converted in order to increase the stability of a bank. A sudden drop of the 
market value of the trigger does not necessarily reflect that the bank is indeed in distress. Yet, 
a persistent downward movement over time can lead to this conclusion. Nevertheless, a 
moving average trigger is robust against volatility that is likely to be observed in times of 
systemic distress.  
 
7.3.2 Conversion into equity with an exclusive call option for incumbent shareholders 
This sub-section proposes an exclusive call option for the new equity as the terms of CoCo 
conversion. Generally speaking, a call option gives an investor the right, not the obligation, to 
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convert his debt claim into equity. This is option is expected to be exercised if the investor 
can increase his wealth, i.e. the equity has a higher value than the original debt claim. Doing 
so changes the incentive structure of CoCo investors, shareholders, and bank managers. These 
are subject of the following sub-sections. 
A trigger that cannot be manipulated is crucial to the credibility of CoCos as a macro-
prudential tool. Furthermore financial markets’ acceptance is increased. A conversion must 
not be confused with an actual or reasonably expected bankruptcy of the bank. In order to 
promote financial stability, this CoCo proposal disentangles the worst case scenarios upom a 
bankruptcy for all involved stakeholders, i.e. bank managers, shareholders, depositors, and 
other creditors.  
The individual worst case scenarios are the following: Bank managers must admit their 
mismanagement that potentially damages their reputation, shareholders see their investment 
wiped out, other debt holders are worried about whether they are bailed-in in the form of a 
haircut on their claims, and depositors start a run on their savings despite deposit protection 
being in place (Iyer and Puri, 2008). Especially the latter is mostly a product of the previous 
two events if they make it into the headline news. Again, compare this to the leaked 
information about possible government aid for Northern Rock. 
This threat to the bank’s survival can come with social costs in the form of a bank run on the 
deposits that can spread to other banks. In the worst case financial intermediation is disrupted 
and lending to the real economy is decreased. Alternatively social costs occur when this 
systemic risk is countered with financial support by the public in the form of taxpayers’ 
money.  
A call option on the new equity after CoCo conversion must first be made available to 
incumbent shareholders (Pennacchi et al., 2011). CoCo investors should not be made 
“contingent” shareholders that become permanent shareholders upon conversion as careful 
reading of the related literature suggests. Instead once the trigger event occurs, the new equity 
is offered exclusively to incumbent shareholders. They are offered the new equity at a 
discount, meaning that they can buy this new equity cheaper than the current share price. The 
consensus in the literature (chapter 6) is that a distribution of wealth between CoCo investors 
and shareholders is a source of concern for pricing such financial instruments. The proposed 
exclusive call option deliberately exploits this as a feature. According to the contractual terms, 
debt converts into equity not at par but at a premium for the CoCo investors, i.e. they would 
receive more equity than their CoCo is worth in nominal terms. This also means that 
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incumbent shareholders would be significantly diluted. However, at this point the pricing 
issue (Sundaresang Wang, 2010) is circumvented in the following way: Incumbent 
shareholders are exclusively offered the purchasing right for this new equity at a lower price 
than the current market price. The amount of new shares times this exercising price must 
equal the nominal value of the CoCo so that as a result CoCo investors are paid out with cash 
at par; they neither suffer a decrease in wealth nor do they increase their wealth with 
deliberately seeking conversion.  
When incumbent shareholders buy the new equity from CoCo investors, they increase their 
influence in the bank and can use their “countervailing voting constituency” (Coffee, 2010, p. 
10) to replace the management. Here a crucial differentiation must be made: Coffee assumes 
that CoCo investors are more risk averse than incumbent shareholders. After conversion the 
additional risk-averse shareholders counter risk-tolerant incumbent shareholders. This 
chapter’s proposal concurs with the idea to manipulate voting constituency to enforce a 
change of the bank’s strategy. However, this is done so not by making the group of 
shareholders larger, more heterogeneous and fragmented, but more homogeneous and 
concentrated.  
CoCos now are designed in a way so that the bank managers do not see a bankruptcy as the 
ultimate threat to their career, but the conversion of CoCos. From a macro-prudential policy 
point of view, the higher – or the more prudent – this conversion threshold is above the 
bankruptcy threshold, the earlier the bank management will take action to avoid hitting the 
trigger in the first place. Suppose that the trigger event is reached at the 8 per cent equity ratio 
Basel III stipulates. The bank’s management may decide to keep equity at, say 9 per cent all 
the time.  
Also, investors who are themselves subject to capital requirements like other banks, pension 
funds, etc., are not exempted from purchasing CoCos because they do not keep the new equity 
upon conversion. Nevertheless they should be part of the design process and broker these 
instruments (Kashyap et al., 2008). This avoids the market for CoCos becoming a mere niche. 
The following sub-sections analyse the different groups incentives under a CoCo proposal 
that stipulates that CoCo investors convert debt to equity and the incentives if incumbent 
shareholders have the exclusive option to buy the new equity from CoCo investors. 
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7.3.3 Incentives for CoCo investors 
This sub-section demonstrates how the call option manipulates the incentives of CoCo 
investors. Recall from the literature review in chapter 6 that originally CoCo investors are 
expected to sacrifice a fixed coupon-yielding debt claim for equity that is only entitled to the 
residual profits of a bank. This would seem a particularly bad a deal for two reasons.  
First, if a low-trigger CoCo approximates a bankruptcy threshold CoCo investors receive 
shares of an already struggling bank. This is not attractive to risk-averse investors such as 
pension funds that might not be allowed to hold equity of other financial institutions. From a 
macro-prudential perspective if the bank is systemically relevant conversion of CoCos can 
introduce financial distress to the other investing institution. This contagion must be avoided.  
Second, even a high-trigger level as proposed in this chapter does not change the fact that 
creditors become shareholders. The value of such a CoCo is not only the discounted coupon 
payments until maturity of this bond. In addition, CoCo investors must address the possibility 
of receiving shares. This requires an evaluation of the bank like other incumbent shareholders 
do. This increase in monitoring costs must be reflected in the pre-conversion coupon payment. 
Then again, it is arguable why an investor should go through the same effort as other 
shareholders but not benefit from the theoretically unlimited upward potential of equity 
returns. Of course, if the particular CoCo investor also happens to be a shareholder, then there 
is no duplication of these monitoring costs. If not, other potential CoCo investors would not 
invest in CoCos and the market for CoCos would mainly consist of investors that already are 
shareholders.  
Those investors, that hope to obtain equity that could be undervalued, would be willing to buy 
CoCos. However, this again suggests that investors already went through the process of 
evaluating the bank and know that the bank’s equity at conversion is undervalued. The easier 
alternative is to buy the existing shares in the markets and there is no need for obtaining it 
indirectly.  
One possible scenario why this might still be possible is a long-term motive for holding 
shares: it is not primarily for short-term financial gain in the form of dividends and increasing 
share price. Instead, investors aim to build up an ownership position in the bank and its asset 
portfolio. If the trigger is the share price, the CoCo investor has the incentive to manipulate 
the price through, for instance, short selling to trigger the conversion, just to see the share 
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price climbing back after they received the new shares. For reasons of avoiding manipulation 
a moving average trigger such as the QMVER is better suited.  
The introduction of a call option to incumbent shareholders makes the CoCo investors’ need 
to evaluate the bank’s equity unnecessary. The burden of monitoring costs is shifted to 
shareholders. Upon conversion incumbent shareholders buy the new equity – their incentives 
are discussed in the next section – for a value that equals the nominal value of the CoCo bond. 
So at all times it is clear to CoCo investors that their financial exposure to the bank ends with 
conversion. They collect the last coupon payment and sell the CoCo at the nominal value 
exclusively to incumbent shareholders. 
This clear, pre-defined exit route for CoCo investors decreases the costs of CoCos and opens 
this financial instrument to all market participants. Institutional investors and other 
systemically banks can hold CoCos. The call option abates the threat of contagion. In contrast 
to other proposals that make CoCo investors permanent shareholders, here the call option 
buys them out of the bank. 
 
7.3.4 Incentives for incumbent shareholders 
This sub-section analyses how the incentives of shareholders – excluding bank managers – are 
manipulated by the introduction of a call option on the post-conversion equity. Conversion 
happens upon a high trigger when a bank is financially destabilised, yet not facing bankruptcy 
and remains going-concern. Without CoCos shareholders have a moral hazard incentive to 
increase the riskiness of the firm, see Myers (1984). They decrease the value of the bank in 
the form of higher default risk. As long as the decline of the overall bank value is smaller than 
the decline of the value of the debt, relative wealth is channelled to shareholders. In analogy, 
when eventually a default is threatening the survival of the bank this incentive to shareholders 
remains. They refuse to inject more equity to stabilise the bank – and avoid a total loss of their 
own share – because the immediate effect is that other debt holders are paid first. This debt 
overhang problem can be overcome with CoCos. 
It is crucial that CoCos are designed to disentangle these interlaced incentives. An automated 
conversion decreases the debt burden and increases the equity cushion. Again, other debt 
claims are increasingly reassured because the coupon payments on CoCos disappear. The 
value of the bank is increased because mandatory conversion avoids the debt overhang 
problem. The higher, and therefore the more prudent, the trigger level the higher is this 
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reassurance. This in return would decrease non-CoCo creditors’ incentive to monitor the risk 
strategy of the bank.  
The following numerical example illustrates the different effects, see Figure 7.7. Suppose that 
Bank A has assets worth $100 and returns $10 after interest on all debt is paid, the equity 
capital of $25 consists of five shares, CoCos worth $20 and $55 other debt. Given the call 
option enhancement CoCo investors do not need to consider the credit risk of the bank. 
Suppose that the CoCo coupon is 5 per cent per annum. 
Each share is worth $5. Furthermore assume that all profits are distributed to shareholders so 
that each share claims 20 per cent of the profits, i.e. $2. As for voting rights each of the five 
shares has a 5 per cent share in the total assets of $100.  
 
Figure 7.7: CoCo conversion with a call option. Source: Own illustration. 
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Now suppose that a high-level trigger is touched, meaning that the bank faces some distress 
but is well above the bankruptcy threshold. Of course, in order to reach the trigger event, 
capital has decreased before. Value corrections on assets are reflected in the loss-absorbency 
of equity. So the assets might have been worth $105 and equity worth $30; so each share’s 
fair value would be $6. However, the purpose of this numerical example is to illustrate what 
happens in the exact moment of CoCo conversion.  
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In the moment of conversion, the book value of the shares is $5. Assuming that the shares are 
traded at that value
18
, all outstanding CoCo bonds are converted into 
$20
$5
= 4 new shares. 
Now 9 shares with $5 accumulate to a $45 equity cushion, immediately boosting the equity 
capital ratio from 25 per cent to 45 per cent.  
After conversion additional equity immediately decreases the return on existing equity. A 
counteracting effect is that the 5 per cent coupons on CoCos are saved and ceteris paribus are 
available to all shareholders. So the profits immediately increase to $10 + 0.05 × $20 = $11. 
On the other hand incumbent shareholders are diluted from their original return of $2 per 
share to 
$11
9
= $1.22 per share. The total return on equity sharply drops from 
$10
$25
=
40 per cent to 
$11
$45
= 24.44 per cent.  
Incumbent shareholders are hit twice: the debt overhang problem is abated, but debt 
repayment is served before the shareholders receive dividends, and the newly issued equity 
claims a portion of the residual profits of the bank, hence diluting incumbent shareholders. In 
the long-run, equity investors would be wary of banks in general. Hence, raising equity would 
be more costly for banks in the first place because those investors willing to offer equity 
would ask for a higher premium on such. A high trigger increases the likelihood of a 
conversion and hence the dilution of shareholders even though the overall stability of the bank 
is increased.  
Recall that among the incumbent shareholders there can be investors more prone to risk than 
the bank managers. The high risk profile of the bank is less due to the bank’s management but 
the shareholder base demanding higher returns. With the conversion into equity the former 
CoCo investors become a “countervailing voting constituency” (Coffee, 2010, p. 10), 
assuming that those who buy CoCos are less risk prone. This takes pressure off the 
management to deliver return, especially in the form of taking unsustainable risks. 
Consequently, if it is clear that CoCo conversion would always heavily dilute incumbent 
shareholders, they would look for alternative investment opportunities. Investors who are 
moderate in their demand for returns are less deterred than risk prone investors. Moderate 
shareholders do not pressure bank managers to generate high returns. This moderation allows 
                                                          
18
 Normally, shares of healthy firms are traded above the book value. The fair market value of equity depends on 
the future profits of the firm that are discounted at a rate that also includes the riskiness of that future cash 
stream. Considering these facts this numerical example is a conservative estimation for illustrator purpose only. 
Assume a perpetual profit of 10 per cent and 10 per cent as an adequate discount for the riskiness of the bank: 
$10/0.10 = $100. $100 for $25 equity gives a return of $4 to each $1 equity. The book value of each share is $5 
so the current fair market price per share is $20 per share. 
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for a more sustainable management of the bank well above the CoCo trigger. Again, because 
CoCo investors would have costs to assess the bank’s equity before conversion, this would 
not be a good deal to CoCo investors. 
However, back to the numerical example: Incumbent shareholders are now exclusively 
offered the purchasing right for the four new shares. Upon the equity-boosting conversion of 
CoCos, which steers the bank clear of more serious distress, shareholders are given the 
opportunity to avoid dilution. Suppose that a shareholder holds one share and now considers 
the next step: his share is still worth $5 but his claim on the residual profits of the bank 
decreased from $2 to $1.22 or 20 per cent to 11.11 per cent, respectively. This is equivalent to 
a decrease of a return on investment of $2 to his $5 share to $1.22 to his $5 share or 40 per 
cent to 24.44 per cent. However, now he can exercise a call option on the four new shares. 
Suppose that all four new shares are bought at the current fair value of $5 to pay the CoCo 
holders at par value. The shareholder only considers purchasing one of the shares at exactly 
$5. If he does so he now has invested a total of $10 and now receives $1.22 per share or $2.44 
in total. This is a return on investment of 24.44 per cent compared to his previous 40 per cent 
figure. However, keep in mind that the bank dramatically increases its loss-absorbency with 
the conversion of CoCos and is now safer than pre-conversion. The shareholder held 20 per 
cent of a 25 per cent equity-financed bank, he now holds 22 per cent of a 45 per cent equity-
financed bank. 
The original idea of Coffee’s countervailing voting constituency is not dismissed with the call 
option. Instead this chapter’s proposal takes up his idea of harnessing a change in ownership 
structure in order to incentivise bank mangers to exercise due care. The individual shareholder 
has not only countered the dilution of his relative position in the bank but strengthened it. 
Suppose that not every incumbent shareholder has purchased the new equity. Those who 
have, gained influence in the ownership structure of the bank. The conversion is an 
opportunity to increase a strategic investment in a going-concern bank. Now, the shareholders 
can possibly reach a voting threshold that allows them to replace the existing management. 
This concentration of ownership power stays in contrast to Coffee’s proposal. A more 
fragmented, heterogeneous shareholder base would hinder introducing change to a bank’s 
management. 
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7.3.5 Incentives for bank managers 
This sub-section demonstrates how the call option on the new post-conversion equity further 
curbs bank managers’ appetite for short-termism. They must be incentivised towards 
sustainable risk-taking. Usually performance-based bonuses are measured in the maximisation 
of shareholder value which is defined as the return on investment of shareholders, i.e. return 
on equity. Macro-prudence aims at promoting financial stability. Both aims turn out to be 
diverging tasks. Nevertheless this CoCo proposal aims at internalising possible negative 
externalities of unsustainable risk-taking. So, CoCos can reconcile both tasks by setting 
incentives on the level where risk-taking decisions are made: the senior bank management.  
The success of managers therefore should be re-defined as generating profits for shareholders 
given the macro-prudential aim of financial stability. Note that macro-prudence in this sense 
must not be seen as a constraint on the banking business but rather a feature that reassures 
other stakeholders’ claims. Admati et al. (2013) challenge the prevailing maxim that 
financing banks with equity is costly hence leverage is paramount to a bank’s profitability. 
For more details, see chapter 6. The authors conclude that more equity decreases the 
bankruptcy probability and the asked return on equity is decreased accordingly. Granted, 
profits may be lower, but systemic risk attached to these is decreased.  
The previous section demonstrates how the call option for post-conversion equity can be a 
good deal for incumbent shareholders. The bank managers’ performance can be measured by 
not converting CoCos. 
The key element of this chapter’s CoCo proposal is that conversion happens at a high-level 
trigger well above the bankruptcy threshold. This level resembles the new benchmark bank 
managers are judged by. The conversion of CoCos causes the return on equity to shareholders 
to decrease. Incumbent shareholders can avoid a dilution with exercising their call option and 
acquire the new shares. Not all shareholders avoid dilution and the ownership structure tends 
to result in a more concentrated shareholder base with increased voting rights. On the one 
hand shareholders have a decreased return on investment but on the other hand the return is 
safer and they gain more influence in the bank. This means that shareholders can remove bank 
managers and replace them with their choice of managers. Anticipating this scenario, bank 
managers have an incentive to moderate their investment decisions ex ante. In the end, it is in 
their personal interest to do so.  
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7.3.6 Post CoCo conversion is the first stage to an orderly resolution of a bank 
This sub-section demonstrates how the proposed CoCo design can fit into the recovery and 
resolution of a struggling bank. Banks can still fail and this chapter argues that in fact those 
banks should be allowed to fail. Despite the new structure of financial regulatory agencies 
(chapter 3), and their macro-prudential toolkit (chapter 4), crises can still break out. There can 
be instances in which a bank that has been hit the hardest by developments in the financial 
system must be supported with state aid. Otherwise, in an attempt to survive distress the bank 
could liquidate vast amounts of its balance sheet. If it is a systemically relevant institution this 
could be the beginning of yet another series of fire sales. Consequently, even under the new 
macro-prudential paradigm central banks still play the role of “market-maker of last resort” in 
a crisis (Buiter and Sibert, 2008) and assist certain financial institutions and bolster the 
markets of affected assets in the financial system. There is a threat of a race for such aid. 
When distress in the financial system can become systemic, financial institutions load on even 
more risks in order to become systemically relevant and qualify for last resort measures.  
Fortunately this CoCo proposal contributes to solving the conflict between the objectives of 
maintaining financial stability and allowing banks to fail. The link between these two is the 
moral hazard of banks that naturally arises when financial intermediation and thus the real 
economy must be protected. Putting down this protection in official writing in the form of the 
objective of financial stability makes this problem more severe. A macro-prudential policy 
maker must recognise and address the increased moral hazard. 
The CoCo proposal does not stop right after conversion. Designing the period after 
conversion is an integral part of a CoCo proposal that is neglected by the literature. The 
proposal of Pennacchi et al. (2011) does not analyse the crucial time after conversion. So, in 
addition to making CoCos a good deal, second, a clear guideline for the bank through the 
crucial time after conversion is necessary and given in this chapter. This chapter extends their 
proposal accordingly. For example, should the bank issue new CoCos again? If so, 
bankruptcy could be postponed again and again. If not, the bank suffers exactly from the same 
moral hazard and systemic risk concerns CoCos ought to solve in the first place and there 
would be no point in introducing CoCos.  
In addition two different effects determine the shareholders’ wealth: The price effect and the 
volume effect. Share prices constantly move. After the conversion the market price of the 
bank’s shares can go up if the increased loss-absorbency is received well by markets. On the 
other hand the market price can experience a negative correction. The bank is de-leveraged 
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and consequently the return on equity decreases. Shareholders who received new shares 
additionally enjoy a volume effect since they now simply hold more shares. Depending on the 
size of the two effects wealth is either increased or decreased. Especially for this reason 
Sundaresang and Wang (2011) identify the pricing paradox as an inherent flaw of previous 
CoCo proposals.  
Giving former CoCo holders new equity that is subject to re-evaluation, especially when the 
financial system as a whole is in a precarious state, unnecessarily introduces further distress. 
Instead, allowing incumbent shareholders to purchase the newly issued equity is a neat 
solution not only to avoid technical problems such as finding a pricing model.  
More practically, the post-conversion ownership structure is a precursor to a possible 
resolution of the bank. The need for an intervention by public authorities is decreased for a 
private sector solution is already initiated. As the previous sections make clear upon the 
trigger event fewer individual shareholders hold more equity of the bank. The ownership 
structure is more concentrated after the conversion of CoCos. 
What must be avoided is that in the long run a bank survives distress with the conversion of 
CoCos and issues new CoCos to survive the next disturbance. A constant repetition of 
conversion and issuance suggest that the bank is in fact not a healthy bank. This is a bank that 
continues operations but there is evidence that this is only due to benefiting external factors 
that keep a flawed business model running. For example, the monetary policy stance of 
central banks in the aftermath of the global financial crisis was to decrease interest rates to 
nearly zero to foster growth. Consequently those banks that are not competitive benefit from 
generous refinancing conditions close to zero per cent. This makes it more difficult to 
distinguish healthy from less healthy banks. 
Now, further adjustments must be made to the CoCo design framework. It must cater for an 
orderly resolution of a bank. Rather than allowing the issuance of further CoCos immediately 
after conversion, there should be a period of probation that is also linked to certain 
requirements. This probation should be subject to the new ownership structure of the bank 
and, if applicable, the replacement of the bank’s management. If there is no substantial change 
to either, a probation of, for example, one year would prohibit the issuance of new CoCos. 
During that period the bank must regain reputation among the markets and regulatory 
agencies.  
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Note that during such a probation the bank’s management and shareholders are immediately 
exposed to the moral hazard and debt overhang problem again. This resembles a world in 
which CoCos does not exist in the first place. Hence a way has to be found to bridge this gap 
between two states of market discipline reinforced by outstanding CoCos.  
Consequently the bank’s management must be incentivised to work towards being allowed to 
issue CoCos again. It seems counterintuitive that the management issues a financial 
instrument that effectively puts them under shareholders’ monitoring. It is true that after 
conversion the bank has a higher equity ratio compared to its competitors. However, the price 
bank managers paid was that shareholders now have more influence, hence constraining them 
in their plans for the bank and careers. In the long run, if CoCos are accepted by markets the 
conversion of such is perceived as proof of the managements’ inability to enhance shareholder 
value. Thus, a conversion would translate to a loss of reputation which is the worst case for a 
manager. 
One of these possible requirements during probation is to put the bank under close scrutiny by 
the regulatory agencies. This can include more frequent on-site visits to the bank and a closer 
engagement with senior management. Other constraints may be to link the CoCo probation to 
other regulatory tools such as limiting dividends to shareholders and retaining bonuses to 
senior staff (chapter 4). If the bank management satisfies the requirements they are rewarded 
with a regulatory dividend in the form of lifting these constraints. But they have to issue 
CoCos again. Of course, this only happens if the regulatory agency sees the bank fit. 
However, note that the regulator’s pro-active scrutiny is replaced by shareholders’ monitoring 
once again through CoCos. 
In case the management fails to deliver at the end of probation, the regulatory agency can 
decide to engage with the shareholders and discuss replacing the management. If the decline 
in the bank’s health is more severe the option of winding down the whole bank should be on 
the table. If so, a private sector solution to find other investors for the assets and liabilities 
should be initiated. 
 
7.4 Conclusion and implications for promoting financial stability 
CoCos according to this proposal are a “commitment device” to a bank’s creditors. However, 
in contrast to existing proposals the commitment of incumbent shareholders is reinforced 
rather than asking CoCo investors to become shareholders of a bank. This indirect 
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commitment is derived by incentivising incumbent shareholders to buy the newly issued 
equity into which CoCos are converted. The debt overhang problem stems from shareholders’ 
reluctance to inject new equity when it is needed to increase firm value and avoiding 
bankruptcy. The more prudent the level of conversion is, the better a deal this is to 
shareholders. At the time of conversion they might lose some of their financial wealth. 
However, by exercising their right to buy the new equity they can abate the dilution of their 
relative position in the bank.  
In the bigger picture from a macro-prudential regulation point of view it also introduces 
perverse incentives that can destabilise a bank. For example, if they were to keep the new 
equity CoCo investors might actively seek conversion. If they expect the market price of the 
bank’s equity to go up, they have the incentive to temporarily manipulate the trigger event so 
that CoCos are converted. The trigger for conversion must capture distress on a timely basis, 
yet must not prematurely allow CoCos to convert. The quasi market value of equity ratio 
“QMVER” is such a trigger. It is not exposed to market manipulation or accounting 
manipulation, also known as window dressing, because it captures the equity value over a 90 
days window. A manipulation of this trigger comes with costs that exceed the possible gains 
from obtaining undervalued equity.  
Fortunately, these problems are circumvented with the introduction of a call option. 
Incumbent shareholders buy the new equity. CoCo investors are offered a clear exit option. 
The advantage is that they are bought out of the bank at par value of their CoCo bond with 
cash and no commitment to face a hair-cut on their debt claim. This makes CoCos available to 
risk-averse and institutional investors too. 
After the exit of CoCo investors, the ownership structure of the bank is altered. The result of 
CoCo conversion is that the group of shareholders is not composed of a variety of different 
shareholders but is now more concentrated. Thus, individual shareholders tend to hold more 
power in terms of voting rights after conversion and so the management becomes easier to be 
removed. The introduction of a third group of investors – among shareholders and other debt 
holders – that exercises pressure on the management is not a necessity. In fact, more 
individual shareholders would compete for influence in the bank and hinder progress. 
Especially a bank in financial distress does not need such a competition among its 
shareholders. 
CoCos are a micro-prudential tool for they immediately bolster the equity situation of a 
particular bank in distress. Recall the definition of the micro- and macro-prudential approach 
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according to Borio (2003) in section 2.5. The link to the macro-prudential approach is that a 
bank is still allowed to fail but its non-viability is less a threat to the stability of the system as 
a whole. The conversion of CoCos, according to the proposal in this chapter, already 
introduces a path for the resolution of the bank and its assets that has not been in place during 
the last financial crisis. 
Without CoCos managers should steer the bank clear of the bankruptcy threshold and the 
systemic risk problems around that threshold. Now, with CoCos managers have all the 
incentive to steer the bank clear of the CoCo conversion threshold. The bigger the difference 
between these thresholds, the more macro-prudent CoCos are. There is no severe violation of 
shareholder value maxim. The omnipresence of this “sword of Damocles” (Calomiris and 
Herring, 2011, p. 17) over the head of managers and shareholders is a constant reminder to 
refrain from taking unsound investments.  
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that it requires the introduction of a financial instrument 
by macro-prudential policy makers to overcome the problems inherent to banking. Banks are 
not likely to voluntarily issue CoCos as a financial instrument that takes away their moral 
hazard. This chapter and the proposal outlined may serve as such a policy draft. Insofar, the 
introduction of CoCos to the banking sector does not impose yet another regulatory 
inconvenience banks have to abide by. Instead, it fosters market discipline that can “bring 
capitalism back into the heart of capitalism” (Tucker, 2011, p. 6), i.e. banks.  
Bank managers in turn are under more scrutiny of shareholders. However, this pressure is not 
directed towards generating the highest possible profits but safeguarding the sustainability of 
profits. In contrast to the original proposals, CoCo investors see a clear exit route upon 
conversion. They are bought out of the bank by incumbent shareholders. Therefore CoCos are 
a relatively secure fixed income financial instrument.  
As mentioned earlier in the introduction each chapter is set to address the two research 
questions identified in chapter 2. Therefore, the following dissucion aims to anser: 
- Does this CoCo proposal encourage sustainable risk-taking? 
- Does this CoCo proposal curb systemic risk when it materialises? 
As for the first question, bank managers with foresight avoid the concentration of power of 
certain shareholders in order to protect their own gains. A specific shareholder could 
accumulate a considerable voting right majority after conversion and thus it is likely that 
changes to the management of the bank are introduced. Managers therefore steer the bank 
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clear of the trigger event. In addition, a conversion threshold that is set well above the 
bankruptcy threshold reconciles the objectives of financial stability and the incentives of bank 
managers. They have an incentive to promote a sustainable investment strategy for the bank. 
However, this is not a mere lip service to promoting financial soundness for the sake of 
saving social costs. Instead, their personal wealth and career now depends on it. So, this CoCo 
proposal introduces the regulatory objective of maintaining financial stability to the 
shareholder value maxim in banks.  
The proposal at hand also emphasises that shareholders face the constant threat of a “death by 
dilution” (Herring, 2010, p. 21) after conversion. Consequently increasing monitoring costs 
benefits their investment. From a social costs perspective this is a means of internalising 
negative externalities on the micro-level, i.e. the individual bank. 
As for the second question, with this CoCo proposal the natural order of loss-absorbency is 
re-established: First, shareholders see the equity written down until the trigger event occurs. 
Then CoCo investors as subordinated debt holders exit the bank but do not suffer a financial 
loss. Shareholders exercise their call option for the new equity. The debt overhang problem is 
abated because they have the opportunity to acquire undervalued equity. Other creditors and 
depositors are unaffected. If the trigger is set to a prudent level, shareholders are incentivised 
to opt for a “good deal”. Despite a forced de-leveraging of the bank other creditors and 
depositors have no reason to panic and start a bank run.  
In contrast to other CoCo proposals here the period after CoCo conversion follows a clear 
route. This helps deduce uncertainty to shareholders and CoCo investors. Furthermore the 
bank is put under public scrutiny. In a time of probation the bank is prohibited from 
prematurely issuing new CoCos. Shareholders who exercised the call option now benefit from 
a higher share in a de-leveraged, hence more stable bank. They can decide whether to replace 
those managers who did not avoid the conversion. New CoCos can be issued after the new 
shareholders agreed on a change in the bank’s business plan. During this process a 
comprehensive due diligence assessment of the bank’s business reveals whether it is worth to 
be continued (going-concern) or is resolved (gone-concern). This means that prior to a 
bankruptcy the private sector can compete for sound assets. If the result of this assessment is a 
going-concern bank, new CoCos must be issued. If the bank turns out to be a gone-concern, it 
is easier to negotiate a resolution with fewer shareholders who each have a relatively high 
share than with several, relatively small shareholders.  
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A further advantage of this CoCo proposal with an exclusive call option for post-conversion 
equity is that it does not put too high a financial burden on the bank in form of high coupon 
payments. One concern of CoCos is that post-conversion CoCo investors become permanent 
shareholders of a bank. If these investors happen to be systemically relevant financial 
institutions themselves, CoCos defeat their original purpose because they re-introduce 
systemic risk. A consequence would be to introduce holding restrictions to exclude certain 
institutions from investing in CoCos of other banks in order to avoid contagion.  
Fortunately, because this chapter’s CoCo proposal incorporates a call option for the newly 
issued equity to incumbent shareholders, no such restrictions are necessary. Regardless of 
what kind of investors they are, CoCo investors are bought out of the bank immediately after 
conversion. They do not become permanent shareholders. Even though there is an equity 
component in such a debt claim, fixed income investors and risk-averse institutional investors 
can invest in them (Herring, 2010). There is no discrimination of investors. Because of this 
simplicity, there can be a highly liquid market for CoCos in the future. So, CoCos can be 
made a macro-prudent tool and are not exposed to being a mere “accounting gimmick” 
(Goodhart, 2010a). 
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Results appendix B 
 
Table 7.6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for Barclays 
Lag Change in CoCo spread Critical value Change in stock volatility Critical value 
AR(1) -29.7614 -2.86 -33.5647 -2.86 
AR(2) -21.9949 -2.86 -27.2877 -2.86 
AR(3) -18.5953 -2.86 -23.3957 -2.86 
AR(4) -17.956 -2.86 -20.0729 -2.86 
AR(5) -14.6688 -2.86 -18.752 -2.86 
 
Table 7.7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for Lloyds 
Lag Change in CoCo spread Critical value Change in stock volatility Critical value 
AR(1) -31.9941 -2.86 -44.5334 -2.86 
AR(2) -27.1554 -2.86 -38.1995 -2.86 
AR(3) -22.0774 -2.86 -32.6127 -2.86 
AR(4) -16.9913 -2.86 -28.3739 -2.86 
AR(5) -14.6008 -2.86 -27.3062 -2.86 
 
Table 7.8: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for Credit Suisse 
Lag Change in CoCo spread Critical value Change in stock volatility Critical value 
AR(1) -26.7348 -2.86 -33.6951 -2.86 
AR(2) -20.2252 -2.86 -27.6558 -2.86 
AR(3) -17.2905 -2.86 -23.0178 -2.86 
AR(4) -15.1492 -2.86 -20.2048 -2.86 
AR(5) -14.3697 -2.86 -19.1316 -2.86 
 
Table 7.9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for UBS 
Lag Change in CoCo spread Critical value Change in stock volatility Critical value 
AR(1) -28.5373 -2.86 -32.1275 -2.86 
AR(2) -21.7149 -2.86 -27.1354 -2.86 
AR(3) -18.5767 -2.86 -21.6567 -2.86 
AR(4) -16.2892 -2.86 -20.1207 -2.86 
AR(5) -14.821 -2.86 -17.9639 -2.86 
 
Table 7.10: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for Unicredit 
Lag Change in CoCo spread Critical value Change in stock volatility Critical value 
AR(1) -26.5944 -2.86 -43.9334 -2.86 
AR(2) -24.172 -2.86 -34.9541 -2.86 
AR(3) -19.8325 -2.86 -31.1097 -2.86 
AR(4) -19.023 -2.86 -26.6365 -2.86 
AR(5) -16.4902 -2.86 -23.0957 -2.86 
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Table 7.11: Augmented Dicker-Fuller test for bond indices 
Lag IBOXX Euro Corp. Critical value IBOXX Euro Corp. Banks Critical value 
AR(1) -21.522 -2.86 -21.2526 -2.86 
AR(2) -18.3515 -2.86 -18.4771 -2.86 
AR(3) -15.9011 -2.86 -15.6483 -2.86 
AR(4) -14.7365 -2.86 -14.5813 -2.86 
AR(5) -13.1241 -2.86 -12.9801 -2.86 
 
Table 7.12: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for explanatory variables 
For the level of the explanatory variable, i.e. observation in period t. 
Lag Equity market 
price 
Critical 
value 
Government 
bond spread 
Critical 
value 
Short-term 
refinancing 
Critical 
value 
AR(1) -20.1671 -2.86 -2.2084 -2.86 0.7806 -2.86 
AR(2) -16.4431 -2.86 -2.0472 -2.86 0.4901 -2.86 
AR(3) -13.1394 -2.86 -2.0185 -2.86 0.2907 -2.86 
AR(4) -11.1207 -2.86 -2.0290 -2.86 0.1387 -2.86 
AR(5) -9.4470 -2.86 -2.0235 -2.86 0.0461 -2.86 
 
For the 1
st
 difference of the explanatory variable, i.e. for ln(xt) – ln(xt–1). 
Lag Equity market 
returns  
Critical 
value 
Government 
bond spread 
Critical 
value 
Short-term 
refinancing 
Critical 
value 
AR(1) -44.3814 -2.86 -28.225 -2.86 -16.5469 -2.86 
AR(2) -37.9953 -2.86 -23.6512 -2.86 -13.1817 -2.86 
AR(3) -32.9589 -2.86 -19.3933 -2.86 -11.1569 -2.86 
AR(4) -30.5266 -2.86 -17.118 -2.86 -10.0005 -2.86 
AR(5) -27.9127 -2.86 -15.2065 -2.86 -9.0513 -2.86 
 
Table 7.13: Granger causality test results Barclays 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 LR 3 p-value 3 BIC 
VAR(1) 1.1236 0.2891 0.0706 0.7905 0.2416 0.623 -28744.42 
VAR(2) 0.0053 0.942 0.3855 0.5347 0.2664 0.6058 -28111.15 
VAR(3) 0.0788 0.7789 0.8275 0.363 0.0212 0.8841 -28074.34 
VAR(4) 0.2025 0.6527 1.2001 0.2733 2.7005 0.1003 -28079.74 
VAR(5) 0.0776 0.7806 0.2352 0.6277 8.8213 0.003 -28068.04 
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Table 7.14: Granger causality test results Lloyds 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 LR 3 p-value 3 BIC 
VAR(1) 1.9394 0.1637 0.4743 0.491 0.1949 0.6589 -54541.44 
VAR(2) 0.5211 0.4704 0.4429 0.5057 0.5421 0.4616 -53411.20 
VAR(3) 0.1677 0.6822 1.6283 0.2019 1.0102 0.3148 -53380.33 
VAR(4) 0.2572 0.6121 0.0423 0.8371 5.1489 0.0233 -53349.07 
VAR(5) 0.0208 0.8853 1.9712 0.1603 6.6175 0.0101 -53342.48 
 
Table 7.15: Granger causality test results Credit Suisse 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 LR 3 p-value 3 BIC 
VAR(1) 0.6719 0.4124 0.0218 0.8826 0.5839 0.4448 -31580.4312 
VAR(2) 1.0645 0.3022 2.6292 0.1049 1.5395 0.2147 -30903.396 
VAR(3) 4.9734 0.0257 7.7819 0.0053 0.6142 0.4332 -30866.4861 
VAR(4) 2.6548 0.1032 5.8994 0.0151 1.6996 0.1923 -30877.7485 
VAR(5) 0.7653 0.3817 4.1868 0.0407 1.1956 0.2742 -30846.9387 
 
Table 7.16: Granger causality test results UBS 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 LR 3 p-value 3 BIC 
VAR(1) 0.1719 0.6784 0.2109 0.646 3.0544 0.0805 -30530.2481 
VAR(2) 0.0558 0.8133 0.1356 0.7127 4.4134 0.0357 -29860.1071 
VAR(3) 0.5995 0.4388 1.5961 0.2065 0.1163 0.7331 -29840.25 
VAR(4) 0.082 0.7745 5.8245 0.0158 0.6884 0.4067 -29855.9193 
VAR(5) 0.5627 0.4532 1.1903 0.2753 5.273 0.0217 -29823.6471 
 
Table 7.17: Granger causality test results Unicredit 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 LR 3 p-value 3 BIC 
VAR(1) 10.8538 0.001 0.0279 0.8674 2.3035 0.1291 -50844.4705 
VAR(2) 2.3251 0.1273 0.0296 0.8633 0.4617 0.4968 -49662.4621 
VAR(3) 0.0516 0.8203 0.1216 0.7273 3.9888 0.0458 -49694.6357 
VAR(4) 1.0729 0.3003 0.092 0.7617 0.2243 0.6358 -49651.2331 
VAR(5) 0.5189 0.4713 0.2238 0.6362 0.511 0.4747 -49600.3415 
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Table 7.18: Granger causality test results all bond index 
 
Q4 Q5 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 BIC 
VAR(1) 1.0578 0.3037 7.09 0.0078 -47860.1573 
VAR(2) 0.3053 0.5806 0.3454 0.5567 -47173.6173 
VAR(3) 0.186 0.6663 0.2309 0.6309 -47054.8558 
VAR(4) 1.0348 0.309 3.775 0.052 -47046.5731 
VAR(5) 1.0162 0.3134 0.8654 0.3522 -47019.6931 
 
Table 7.19: Granger causality test results bank bond index 
 
Q6 Q7 all system 
VAR(n) LR 1 p-value 1 LR 2 p-value 2 BIC 
VAR(1) 1.3573 0.244 12.8484 0.0003 -46762.1182 
VAR(2) 0.0024 0.9612 0.663 0.4155 -46027.5248 
VAR(3) 1.2318 0.2671 0.0859 0.7694 -45916.1854 
VAR(4) 0.0354 0.8508 5.9026 0.0151 -45923.3114 
VAR(n) 0.3948 0.5298 1.4062 0.2357 -45876.6666 
 
Table 7.20: Results for the linear regression model of Barclays 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.00472402908736815 -1.13313539760431 
?̂?1 -0.0319529062705964 -0.0234663691612001 
?̂?2 0.314171120442186 0.599654192608351 
?̂?3 -1.19375793761926 -5.77650321945787 
?̂?4 -3.31256746278327 -1.89736716083824 
𝑅2 = 0.0394562999670610   
 
Table 7.21: Results for the linear regression model of Lloyds 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.00392391210215231 -1.35705810300533 
?̂?1 -0.810899461954198 -1.15336131857568 
?̂?2 0.131196943969489 0.442249710204191 
?̂?3 -0.877609576166878 -4.89479229621805 
?̂?4 -1.59640625695908 -2.74029604898819 
𝑅2 = 0.0769072028128279   
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Table 7.22: Results for the linear regression model of Credit Suisse 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.000113693205694542 -0.0681506636004940 
?̂?1 0.631529561550289 1.23094223576368 
?̂?2 0.384516381776108 1.31280311367218 
?̂?3 -1.05679957841556 -16.5032748069398 
?̂?4 -0.330259610835206 -0.595626455725809 
𝑅2 = 0.262870040953006   
 
Table 7.23: Results for the linear regression model of UBS 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.000365134843196180 -0.114707533014476 
?̂?1 0.982590814689094 1.23264021829020 
?̂?2 0.244193297730229 0.495178122559593 
?̂?3 -1.12959929576056 -12.5459233333497 
?̂?4 -0.383295244347346 -0.373124125199343 
𝑅2 = 0.117705976091852   
 
Table 7.24: Results for the linear regression model of Unicredit 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.00208111369211980 -0.362151299910510 
?̂?1 0.437303875287855 0.527565767855205 
?̂?2 -0.194505503432246 -0.543515664292793 
?̂?3 -1.81307436992135 -7.17409974550795 
?̂?4 -1.31947499949141 -1.37693780832525 
𝑅2 = 0.160400142708117   
 
Table 7.25: Results for the linear regression model of all bonds index 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.000440592621386152 -0.492692215607995 
?̂?1 0.0121491146833501 0.131640437916109 
?̂?2 -0.383024969001009 -16.1403861867866 
?̂?3 -0.0739136065063325 -0.402299687696603 
𝑅2 = 0.356549817199584   
 
Table 7.26: Results for the linear regression model of bank bonds index 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
?̂? -0.00109443587004533 -0.817214251737434 
?̂?1 -0.0909803373013629 -0.683840780093922 
?̂?2 -0.459280032029211 -11.8678310682510 
?̂?3 0.0127196930391443 0.0428055538180904 
𝑅2= 0.264238183340916   
 
  
275 
 
8 Conclusion 
This PhD thesis addresses the regulation of banks that perform financial intermediation. The 
financial stability objective applies to banks in particular that perform credit intermediation 
and deposit-taking. The stability of this intermediation is essential to an economy and thus is 
treated as a public good. Its promotion is the subject of a macro-prudential financial 
regulation framework; this includes regulatory agencies, such as central banks, and the 
corresponding macro-prudential tools. This PhD thesis contribution to knowledge is to stress 
that financial instability can also arise from non-bank financial institutions and corners of the 
global financial markets that are out of the reach of the regulatory agencies. Therefore, 
focussing exclusively on certain financial institutions may not mitigate financial instabilities 
sufficiently.  
Chapter 2 analyses the causes of the global financial crisis of 2008. A bank can become a 
systemic threat even if its business is only indirectly exposed to a shock, as the case of 
Northern Rock demonstrates. It is merely because of the exposure to the rest of the financial 
system that a sudden drying up of refinancing conditions indiscriminately hits all banks alike. 
Regardless of the credit quality on its books, a bank can face serious distress with adverse 
refinancing conditions. So, even a well-managed bank is not exempted from fatal crises. Its 
collapse can be yet another link in the chain of contagion among banks leading towards a 
systemic crisis. Based on the results the two research questions throughout the thesis address 
first, how banks can be incentivised towards prudent business conduct, i.e. abstain from 
taking unsustainable risks in large quantities. Second, ways must be found to insulate banks 
against shocks from within the financial system. 
Macro-prudential financial regulation must take this important insight into account. The 
comparative methodology in chapter 3 analyses the different interpretations of macro-
prudence and the different initiatives to put macro-prudence into practice in the UK, the USA, 
and EU. First, for each of the three jurisdictions the new regulations that the regulated 
institutions have to abide by are analysed. Second, the regulatory architecture – i.e. who are 
the regulatory agencies – of each is analysed in regards to their ability to promote the 
common regulatory objective of maintaining financial stability. The chapter finds that the 
regulatory frameworks in the UK and EU are appropriate to put macro-prudence into practice. 
However, the approach in the USA is over-complex and competition among regulatory 
agencies bears the threat of prioritising turf wars over pursuing the objective of maintaining 
financial stability.  
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There are several new tools that a regulatory agency can employ. Chapter 4 gives an 
overview. With the new macro-prudential tools in the form of, for example, loan-to-value 
ratio the regulatory agencies can manipulate lending to sectors in the economy that have a 
history of creating asset bubbles like residential mortgage lending. Instead of cleaning up the 
damages after a bubble – with taxpayers money –, now the regulatory agencies can lean 
against the creation of bubbles in the first place. This is a direct intervention in the daily 
business of banks. The threat of unsustainable lending can be curbed. 
Chapter 5 introduces the conditional Value-at-Risk, or CoVaR, as a measure to capture the 
co-movement of a single bank’s losses and the losses of the banking system of which the bank 
is part of. The losses are defined as losses on their stock returns. More precisely the ΔCoVaR 
measures the difference of co-movement by comparing a state of tranquillity to a state of 
distress. For example the former is defined as the median, i.e. 50 per cent quantile, of a loss 
distribution and the latter are extreme losses, defined as the worst 5 per cent. 
There are some surprising results. There is an overall tendency that the pre-crisis banks with 
low ranks stay there in the other periods. At the top, some banks remain systemic risk 
concerns, for instance BNP Paribas, others experience a sharp decrease in their respective 
ranking. For instance Deutsche Bank dropped from the top 10 to 25 after the crisis. In the pre-
crisis mid-field there are banks that dramatically alter their ranking but no clear rule can be 
derived. For example, RBS decreased its systemic risk contribution from 21 to 33 during the 
crisis, but becomes the top risk in 2010. Crédit Agricole follows an opposite path from rank 
25, to rank 2, to rank 17.  
The ΔCoVaR shows how systemic risk moves but has no explanatory power as to what 
factors explain the movement. Thus, it is an observation tool complementary to the rest of the 
regulatory toolkit at the regulator’s disposal to screen for financial institutions that can 
potentially pose a threat to financial stability. The empirical analysis suggests that individual 
banks can quickly become a systemic threat.  
The contribution to knowledge is that the introduction of conditioning events into empirical 
research on systemic risk is an improvement to more simple measures such as the VaR. 
Furthermore, for the practitioner in the form of a regulatory agency the ΔCoVaR measure can 
become a tool to flag up those banks that appear to be a systemic concern. For example, the 
ECB could maintain a ΔCoVaR-based systemic risk map. If a particular bank is being flagged 
up, the ECB can commission the national regulatory agency to integrate the systemic risk 
calculations in their supervisory review of that bank. However, a further contribution to 
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knowledge and practitioners is that due care must be exercised with the choice of length of the 
time series used to calculate a bank’s systemic risk contribution. Depending on the time 
window of analysis, the systemic risk ranking of banks changes dramatically. This only 
reveals the fickle nature of systemic risk. Nevertheless, further improvement in terms of 
methodology and data input is a promising undertaking for future research.  
In chapters 6 and 7, this thesis puts an emphasis on CoCos and how they can be designed to 
be a macro-prudential tool. In case the systemic risk measures presented in chapter 5 do not 
flag up a struggling bank, CoCos can abate distress without the direct intervention of a 
regulatory agency. CoCos are a new form of debt that, once triggered, de-leverages a bank 
immediately. Therefore it could be a strong asset within the macro-prudential toolkit of any 
macro-prudential regulatory framework.  
Chapter 6 identifies the gaps in the literature and design flaws of existing CoCos. Macro-
prudence is not exercised with these proposals. Banks are not incentivised towards prudence 
because a conversion of CoCos increases their loss-absorbency but there is no penality.  
However, chapter 7 proposes a design that does manipulate bank managers’ incentive to be 
prudent and contains systemic risk stemming from a bankruptcy of a bank. 
The empirical analysis in chapter 7 finds that there is no causality of the stock returns on 
CoCo spreads and vice versa. This is good news since the threat of feedback effects is abated. 
Otherwise CoCos that are embraced by policy makers would be counterproductive. If so they 
would be anything but macro-prudential; on the contrary, they would introduce instability. 
However, the analysis may be limited by the data. Complete CoCo data sets could only be 
obtained for five banks. For example it might well be the case that other banks’ CoCos 
respond differently to the explanatory variables. For example, compare the results from the 
empirical CoCo analysis and the systemic risk ranking according to the ΔCoVaR 
methodology used in chapter 5, especially table 5.1. The results suggest that Unicredit’s CoCo 
spread is caused by its stock returns volatility, at the same time it is the systemically most 
relevant bank in the same observation period. Unicredit was systemically relevant well before 
the observation period for the CoCos began, ranking 10
th
 pre-crisis, 5
th
 during the crisis, and 
2
nd
 post-crisis. The other banks in the sample rank much lower in the post crisis period. So, 
this suggests that when a bank becomes a systemic concern, outstanding CoCos could become 
counterproductive for stability. When the bank is not too severe a concern, markets’ 
perception of its CoCos is more positive. Unfortunately, at this time the empirical results 
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cannot be merged without technical difficulties. A promising idea for future research is to 
investigate whether the CoCo spread responds to the individual ΔCoVaR directly. 
The second part of chapter 7 proposes an alternative design for CoCos: A debt-to-equity 
conversion with an exclusive call option for incumbent shareholders. First, the CoCo proposal 
introduces a swift penalty on a bank’s management upon the trigger event. Second, the 
proposal is macro-prudent for it can easily play a role in a recovery and resolution 
programme. The CoCo is designed to convert debt into equity. However, the new equity does 
not remain with the original CoCo investors. Instead, incumbent shareholders are offered the 
new equity. In order to avoid a dilution of their claim in the bank’s equity, they buy off the 
new equity at par from the CoCo investors. As the numerical example in section 7.3.4 shows, 
incumbent shareholders do experience a decrease in the return on equity, yet the bank is safer 
due to an increased loss-absorbency and the shareholders can increase their ownership in the 
bank. The former CoCo investors are bought out of the bank and face no loss, hence in terms 
of pricing, this CoCo proposal is a low-risk investment. From a strategical investment point of 
view, shareholders can increase their influence in a bank, alter the bank’s strategy, and even 
replace managers. Exactly this is the swift penalty imposed on the bank’s management that 
other CoCo proposals lack. The bank’s management has good reason to steer the bank clear of 
the trigger event. 
This chapter’s contribution to theory is that CoCos can be designed to become a market-based 
instrument that addresses the debt overhang problem. This problem occurs when banks and 
incumbent shareholders are reluctant to inject further equity into a struggling bank, but doing 
so would save the bank and the shareholders’ wealth. The underlying issue is that an injection 
would first benefit the value of outstanding debt and only then equity. CoCos with in the 
proposed form with an exclusive call option for incumbent shareholders provide a solution. At 
the same time this proposal is addressed at practitioners like macro-prudential regulatory 
agencies. In a recovery (going-concern basis) or resolution (gone-concern basis) process these 
CoCos are easier to provide a private sector solution than an intervention by a regulatory 
agency, possibly with taxpayers’ money. Also, the regulatory agency only takes a passive role 
in the supervision of an orderly process of the reshaping of ownership.  
In conclusion, with all the different measures that make the new regulatory frameworks, i.e. 
new regulations and new regulatory architectures, banks are made safer but not safe. 
However, they are just one part of the global financial system. The success of the regulatory 
agencies should be measured by maintaining the stability of such crucial services to the 
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economy. Systemic risk can arise in other parts of the financial system to which the regulatory 
agencies do not have access to. Therefore the contribution of this PhD thesis is limited as 
well. Theoretically the proposed CoCos could be introduced to other non-bank financial 
institutions. However, this would require an active role of the legislation to impose such a 
tool. Yet, non-bank institutions that are not fully subject to a rigid regulatory framework do 
not have the incentive to introduce these CoCos. 
Macro-prudence is a step forward to make banks safer. Yet, to policy makers and their 
regulatory agencies, the regulated banks, other market participants, and the public with their 
tax money, there is little relief in knowing that a definite answer to whether a macro-
prudential framework can deliver, is just a financeal crisis away.  
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